Violent urban disturbance in England 1980-81 by Ball, Roger
Ball, R. (2012) Violent urban disturbance in England 1980-81. PhD,
University of the West of England. Available from: http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/17958
We recommend you cite the published version.
The publisher’s URL is:
http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/17958/
Refereed: No
(no note)
Disclaimer
UWE has obtained warranties from all depositors as to their title in the material
deposited and as to their right to deposit such material.
UWE makes no representation or warranties of commercial utility, title, or fit-
ness for a particular purpose or any other warranty, express or implied in respect
of any material deposited.
UWE makes no representation that the use of the materials will not infringe
any patent, copyright, trademark or other property or proprietary rights.
UWE accepts no liability for any infringement of intellectual property rights
in any material deposited but will remove such material from public view pend-
ing investigation in the event of an allegation of any such infringement.
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR TEXT.
 0 
Violent Urban 
Disturbance in England 
1980-81 
 
 
 
R. Ball 
 
PhD  
2012 
 
 1 
 
Violent Urban Disturbance in England 1980-81 
 
Roger Ball 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements of the University of the West of 
England, Bristol for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy 
 
 
Faculty of Arts, Creative Industries and Education, 
University of West of England, Bristol 
 
September 2012 
 
 
 
This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that 
no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 2 
Abstract 
This study addresses violent urban disturbances which occurred in England in the 
early 1980s with particular reference to the Bristol ‘riots’ of April 1980 and the 
numerous disorders which followed in July 1981. Revisiting two concepts 
traditionally utilised to explain the spread of collective violence, namely ‘diffusion’ 
and ‘contagion,’ it argues that the latter offers a more useful model for understanding 
the above-mentioned events. Diffusion used in this context implies that such 
disturbances are independent of each other and occur randomly. It is associated with 
the concept of ‘copycat riots’, which were commonly invoked by the national media 
as a way of explaining the spread of urban disturbances in July 1981. Contagion by 
contrast holds that urban disturbances are related to one another and involve a variety 
of communication processes and rational collective decision-making. This implies 
that such events can only be fully understood if they are studied in terms of their local 
dynamics. 
 
Providing the first comprehensive macro-historical analysis of the disturbances of 
July 1981, this thesis utilises a range of quantitative techniques to argue that the 
temporal and spatial spread of the unrest exhibited patterns of contagion. These mini-
waves of disorder located in several conurbations were precipitated by major 
disturbances in inner-city multi-ethnic areas. This contradicts more conventional 
explanations which credit the national media as the sole driver of riotous behaviour. 
 
The thesis then proceeds to offer a micro analysis of disturbances in Bristol in April 
1980, incorporating both qualitative and quantitative techniques. Exploiting 
previously unexplored primary sources and recently collected oral histories from 
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participants, it establishes detailed narratives of three related disturbances in the city. 
The anatomy of the individual incidents and local contagious effects are examined 
using spatial mapping, social network and ethnographic analyses. The results suggest 
that previously ignored educational, sub-cultural and ethnographic intra- and inter-
community linkages were important factors in the spread of the disorders in Bristol. 
 
The case studies of the Bristol disorders are then used to illuminate our understanding 
of the processes at work during the July 1981 disturbances. It is argued that the latter 
events were essentially characterised by anti-police and anti-racist collective violence, 
which marked a momentary recomposition of working-class youth across ethnic 
divides. 
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1.0 Introduction 
1.1  Summary 
 
The 1980-81 period in England studied in this thesis was marked by numerous violent 
urban disturbances labelled as ‘riots’ in the media. Ostensibly beginning with a major 
disorder in St. Paul’s in Bristol in April 1980, the following year saw a serious 
outbreak of collective violence in Brixton in April, several other incidents in London 
in the spring and culminated in the most widespread and numerous series of ‘riots’ in 
the 20
th
 Century in July.  
 
The media, government and other commentators presented a number of different 
explanations for these events. These ranged from what we might categorise as 
mainstream approaches which utilized such categorical frameworks as ‘Race and 
Disorder’, ‘Law and Order’ ‘Social Deprivation’ and ‘Alienation and Powerlessness’ 
to the less widely known critical theories which emphasised ‘class’ and ‘race’ (or a 
fusion of both) as analytical tools (these are all discussed in more detail in Section 
1.5).  
 
Amongst the mainstream theories, existing concepts such as ‘race riot’ and the ‘Black 
mob’ along with new terms such as ‘copycat riots’ entered popular usage in the 
period. The employment in the media of the first two terms effectively racialised the 
incidents whilst the latter was used particularly in the aftermath of the ‘July riots’ to 
‘explain’ their widespread nature and crucially the significant involvement of White1 
people. Many of the theorists that used the critical concepts of ‘class’ and ‘race’ to 
                                                 
1
 In this thesis the designation of ‘White’ and ‘Black’ people is marked by capitalisation. Definition of 
these problematic terms is discussed in Section 1.3.2. 
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analyse the events attempted to fit the ‘riots’ into these existing frameworks (or in 
some cases exclude them) regardless of their complexity. Despite the opposing 
viewpoints contained within these various mainstream and critical paradigms they 
were all characterised by a lack of substantive empirical research. Equally crucial was 
their common exclusion of the voices of those involved in the violence.  
 
The approach of this thesis is quite different. Rather than speculating on the content of 
the events, and the motivations of the participants or attempting to fit the 'riots' into an 
existing critical paradigm, this work attempts to provide on both a macro and micro 
level, a detailed examination of the anatomy of these disturbances based on 
structured, in-depth and analytically-informed empirical research. This approach 
made it possible to dismiss some of the explanatory frameworks and provide 
supporting evidence for others.  
 
The key research questions in this thesis were concerned with documenting the extent 
and number of the disturbances that occurred in the principal period of unrest in July 
1981, the spatial and temporal patterns of the wave of disorders, and the ethnic 
composition of the ‘crowds’ involved. Questions related to the composition of the 
‘riotous’ crowds, their motivations and the rationality of their actions are addressed by 
three micro-histories of disorders in Bristol in April 1980. Evidence concerning the 
connections between these ‘riotous’ locales, mechanisms for communication and 
responses that were generated, combined with the country-wide macro analysis was 
used to challenge the concept of independent and random ‘copycat riots’ spurred 
purely by the homogenous spread of information by the mass media. 
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1.2 Research outline 
 
This thesis examines violent urban disturbances that occurred in England in 1980-81. 
A number of commentators in the 1960s and 70s had predicted outbreaks of ‘racial’ 
unrest in Britain based on the model of the 1960s U.S. ‘riots’ that predominantly 
involved ‘Black’ populations in urban ‘ghettos’. However, the disturbances of 1980-
81 in England were a surprise for many as they involved both multi-ethnic crowds in 
the inner cities and, significantly, widespread unrest in mainly White outlying areas. 
The majority of those arrested in July and August 1981 were White
2
 which 
confounded explanations solely based on the effects of institutional and societal 
racism. Instead most of the ‘White riots’ were written off as merely the criminal 
activities of ‘hooligans’ or denigrated as ‘copycat riots’. 
 
The voices of ‘rioters’ were sadly lacking in most secondary sources studied, 
consequently central to the research project was the use of oral histories from 
participants in Bristol, which aided in understanding the precipitating factors for the 
unrest in the city, the nature of the disturbances and the connections between the 
subject areas. Similarly, although numerous secondary sources purported to explain 
‘why the riots had happened’, there were few examples of detailed analysis of the 
anatomy of disturbances
3
 and only two that seriously considered the point of view of 
                                                 
2
 Home Office, The Outcome of Arrests during the Serious Incidents of Public Disorder in July and 
August 1981 (London: Home Office, 1982). 
3
 The only detailed examinations are of St. Paul’s in April 1980, Harris Joshua, Tina Wallace and 
Heather Booth, To Ride the Storm: The 1980 Bristol 'Riot' and the State (London: Heinemann, 1983), 
Brixton in April 1981, L. G. Scarman, The Scarman Report. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), 
Toxteth, J. P. Bowrey, ‘The 1981 Urban Riots in England,’ (PhD level qualification, University 
College London, 2005), and Moss Side, B. A. Hytner, Report of the Moss Side Enquiry Panel to the 
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the participants
4
. Typically, the principal sources of evidence in the exceptions were 
provided from court or police records. Although a few authors and police spokesmen 
drew reference to the organisational forms and communication channels of the 
‘rioters’5 there were no detailed analyses of the social networks that were in operation 
during the unrest. 
 
The research strategy adopted here involves a detailed study of a cluster of urban 
                                                                                                                                            
Leader of the Greater Manchester Council (Manchester: Greater Manchester Council, 1981) in July 
1981. 
4
 These were Reicher’s study of St. Paul’s in April 1980 S. Reicher, ‘The St. Paul’s Riot: An 
Explanation of the Limits of Crowd Action in Terms of a Social Identity Model,’ in Dialogues and 
Debates in Social Psychology, ed. J. Murphy, Vol. 14 (Hove: Erbaum, 1984) and Field and 
Southgates’s analysis of Handsworth in July 1981, Simon Field and Peter Southgate, Public Disorder: 
A Review of Research and a Study in One Inner City Area (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 
1982). 
5
 For example Tumber noted the communication channels for ‘riot’ in 1981 were the ‘youth grapevine’ 
or the ‘bush telegraph’ H. Tumber, Television and the Riots: A Report for the Broadcasting Research 
Unit of the British Film Institute (London: British Film Institute, 1982), p.46; Ashton referred to 
‘spontaneous intelligence networks’ quoted from E. E. Cashmore, No Future: Youth and Society 
(London: Heinemann, 1984), p.84; another source stated ‘the Police thought the youth grapevine was 
by far the most effective media for communicating a message, which burst out simultaneously in all 
parts of the country. It was throughout the entire week their only promising insight’, Wolfie Smith and 
others, ‘Like a Summer with a Thousand Julys…and Other Seasons...,’ (1982), 
 http://www.revoltagainstplenty.com/index.php/recent/34-archivelocal/37-like-a-summer-with-a-
thousand-julys, p.5 and Murdock stated ‘Youth in the inner city are not disorganised, they are simply 
organised in a different way, built around informal networks and unofficial leisure milieux’ G. 
Murdock, ‘Reporting the Riots: Images and Impact,’ in Scarman and After: Essays Reflecting on Lord 
Scarman's Report, the Riots and their Aftermath, ed. J. Benyon (Oxford: Pergamon, 1984), p.85. 
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‘riots’ in Bristol in April 1980 to aid in the analysis of the origin and spread of a much 
larger and unprecedented countrywide rash of disturbances in July 1981. Of particular 
interest are the characteristics and patterns that emerged in the outbreaks and diffusion 
of the Bristol ‘riots’ and the similarities to the more widespread and serious events of 
the following year.  The research is divided into two phases, the first considering the 
July ‘riots’ in 1981 (a macro history) and the second a cluster of disorders in Bristol in 
April 1980 (micro histories).  The results of the research are presented in reverse order 
as it was judged that the macro history of the July 1981 disturbances would be 
informed by the micro histories of the Bristol disturbances of 1980. 
 
The first phase of research aimed at a comprehensive investigation of the urban 
disturbances that spanned England in July 1981. A thorough collection of data from 
the existing primary sources demonstrated that the number and extent of the July 
disturbances had been significantly underestimated by previous studies. Various 
quantitative methods were employed to analyse this intense period of unrest with the 
objective of determining the characteristics of the spatial and temporal diffusion of 
disorders and the ethnic composition of the ‘crowds’ involved. The results 
demonstrated that city-based mini-waves of disturbances were generated by serious 
precipitating incidents in multi-ethnic inner city areas. These heterogeneous clusters 
of disorders were followed by a more homogenous nationwide contagion that spread 
the disturbances countrywide.  
 
The second phase of research was focussed on establishing micro histories of three 
disorders that occurred in Bristol in April 1980.  The aim was to uncover the 
precipitating factors that led to the unrest, the social relationships that connected the 
 17 
events and the processes by which the disturbances spread. The emphasis in this 
investigation was on the previously under-researched perceptions of participants in 
the disorders and relied principally (though not exclusively) upon new primary 
sources and oral history testimony. The results demonstrated that a serious 
precipitating incident (the St. Paul’s ‘riot’) involving multi-ethnic crowds led to 
further, though less serious, disturbances in two outlying mainly White areas. The 
primary target of the collective violence in all three areas was the police. This was 
predicated by the oral history respondents on a history of discriminatory policing 
behaviours both at street level and by area. It was demonstrated that the spread of the 
disturbances in Bristol was at least partially connected to sub-culturally and ethically 
derived social networks that were operating in the period. 
 
Using the Bristol micro-histories as a case study helped explain the form of the mini-
waves of unrest that occurred in several major cities in July 1981. The evidence 
pointed towards the operation of a fusion of sub-cultural and ethnic social networks in 
disseminating news of ‘riots’ to outlying areas and formulating responses. To a 
certain extent, these social networks overcame ethnic and spatial divisions and led to a 
momentary recomposition of a section of working-class urban youth who engaged in 
collective violence aimed at the police.  
 
1.3 Definitions 
1.3.1  Collective violence  
 
Denoting collective violence is problematic as the very form of the signifiers 
represents historically derived bias and what is signified is of course dependent on the 
position of the observer. By way of example, in this thesis the following words have 
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been used to denote collective violence: riot, disorder, disturbance, unrest, incident 
and event.  In general only the first of these terms has been enclosed by apostrophes 
(despite similar issues with the second and third terms in the group) as the author felt 
it was the most contentious of the collection. However, all of the terms have been 
used interchangeably in this work and should be considered as such by the reader.  
 
In general, other descriptive but politically loaded terms such as violent protest, 
uprising, rebellion, revolt, insurgency and insurrection have been avoided in order to 
avert unnecessary confusion, to ease the worries of more conservative readers and to 
avoid shallow dismissals of the findings. The use of the more traditional terms such as 
‘riot’, disorder or disturbance to delineate collective violence does not, however, 
imply that the events of 1980-81 should be characterised as chaos, irrational, 
apolitical and ahistorical or merely the actions of criminals, purely through usage of 
the terms. Neither does it exclude the period from characterisation by the more 
contentious terms listed above
6
. 
 
1.3.2  ‘Race’ and ethnicity  
 
The period under study (the early 1980s) arguably marked the transition in academia 
from the use of term ‘race’ to delineate groups (as in ‘race relations’) to ethnicity (as 
in ‘ethnic minorities’)7. Fundamental to this change was the growing realisation of the 
                                                 
6
 As was pointed out to the author by a mischievous local historian, a ‘mob’ of less than a thousand 
people stormed the Bastille in Paris in 1789. If they had failed in their actions, would they have been 
labelled as unsuccessful ‘revolutionaries’ or merely ‘rioters’? 
7
 The term ‘ethnicity’ first appeared in dictionaries in 1972. T. H. Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: 
Anthropological Perspectives (London: Pluto, 1993), p.4. 
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absence of scientific validity for the former term and thus its problematic associations. 
One author summarised the content of the UNESCO statements of the 1950s that laid 
claims of ‘races’ having a scientific basis to rest: 
 ‘There are no ‘races’ in the biological sense of their being distinct and 
discrete biological groups, distinguished by phenotypical (physical) or 
genotypical (genetic) characteristics and organised in some hierarchical 
fashion. This is not to deny the fact that there are phenotypical and genetic 
variations between human beings. Rather, the claim is that there is no 
scientific basis for both systematically categorising the human population 
by such phenotypical and genetic factors and for attributing these 
supposedly biological groups with fixed cultural attitudes’8 
However, as was noted by many writers, removing scientific validity did not 
necessarily eradicate the concept of ‘race’ as a cultural construct. This was famously 
summed up by Colette Guillaumin who stated ‘race does not exist but it does kill 
people’9. Despite this problematic, the new concept of ethnicity was embraced on the 
basis that it rejected the formal link with the pseudo-scientific paradigm of  ‘race’10 
                                                 
8
 R. Miles, ‘Racism and Nationalism in Britain,’ in 'Race' in Britain: Continuity and Change, ed. C. 
Husband (London: Hutchinson, 1982), p.280. In this thesis references to ‘race’ have been enclosed by 
apostrophes. This does not of course deny ‘race’ as a social construct, but this author’s scientific 
background precludes any confusion surrounding its scientific validity, hence the apostrophes. 
9
 C. Guillaumin, ‘The Changing Face of 'Race',’ in Racism, eds. M. Bulmer and J. Solomos (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), p.362. 
10
 Miles and Brown argued that even retaining labels such as ‘race relations’ as analytic categories 
effectively reproduced the dubious concept of ‘race’. R. Miles and M. Brown, Racism, 2nd ed. 
(London: Routledge, 2003), p.91. 
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and turned instead towards more flexible and workable cultural definitions of 
‘difference’11. The idea of difference is important, for rather than defining essentialist 
(and hierarchical) properties of groups as the concept ‘race’ had claimed, ethnicity 
was considered to be an aspect of the relationship between human groups. Thus: 
‘for ethnicity to come about…groups must have a  minimum of contact 
between them, and they must entertain ideas of each other as being 
culturally different from themselves. If these conditions are not fulfilled, 
there is no ethnicity’12 
The accent on relationship rather than essentialism led to a nuanced understanding of 
ethnicity that stressed dynamic social processes, which were subject to historical, 
religious, economic and political contexts
13
. It was also recognised that changes in 
these relationships could be gradual or accelerate rapidly from apparently static 
situations into historical discontinuities dependent on these contexts
14
. As such, 
ethnicity became an all-encompassing term that could operate at various levels of 
social magnification (macro, meso or micro)
15
 and could aid in understanding groups 
as varied as ‘urban ethnic minorities’, ‘indigenous peoples’, ‘proto-nations’, ‘ethnic 
                                                 
11
 The flexibility inherent within the term allowed some to argue that ‘race’ was a particular subset of 
‘ethnicity’ concerned with ‘ethnic ideologies’. S. Fenton, Ethnicity: Racism, Class and Culture 
(London: Macmillan Press, 1999), p.68. 
12
 Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives, p.12. 
13
 Fenton, Ethnicity: Racism, Class and Culture, pp.10-11 and pp.21-27. 
14
 Ibid. p.59. 
15
 Ibid. pp.13-17. 
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groups in plural societies’ and ‘post-slavery minorities’16.   
 
In the context of this thesis, the former group is of most relevance, though it is 
important to note that despite the (invalid) common interchangeability and sometimes 
coded use of ‘ethnic-minority’ as  ‘racial grouping’, there is still has to be relationship 
with something for the term to have meaning. This ‘something’ cannot be simply 
defined as ‘Britishness’ or ‘British ethnicity’ (as some might suppose). Instead it has 
to be recognised that nation-states are actually riven with ethnicities, which questions 
the concept of the unified ethnic-majority. Even under the sway of the essentialist 
racial theories of the nineteenth century in Britain, membership of the ‘Caucasoid 
race’ did not infer either equality at the supposed pinnacle of the racial hierarchy or 
unification under the banner of ‘White British’. Instead, a whole series of eugenic 
sub-levels related to ethnicity and social class were in play predicated on the existing 
economic and political relations
17
.  
 
Modern assumptions of a ‘shared culture’ of ‘Britishness or Englishness’ are arguably 
a social construct but it is questionable how operational or successful this concept was 
or is in practice. Consciousness of divisions by social class, which were clearly 
present in the oral histories in Bristol, undermine this assumption and were 
                                                 
16
 Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives, pp.14-15. This does not, 
however, imply that ‘ethnicity’ or ‘ethnic groups’ are easily defined or bounded. Criticisms of 
‘groupism’, that is ‘the tendency to take discrete, bounded groups as basic constituents of social life, 
chief protagonists of social conflicts, and fundamental units of social analysis’ undermines fixed 
boundaries to ethnic collectivities in any case. C. Gilligan, ‘Race and Ethnicity,’ in Routledge 
Handbook of Ethnic Conflict, eds. K. Cordell and S. Woolf (London: Routledge, 2011), p.85. 
17
 Fenton, Ethnicity: Racism, Class and Culture, p.83. 
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particularly relevant to the research in this thesis. What was certainly prevalent in the 
sub-cultural groupings that were investigated was a rejection of such strict 
unifications suggesting a majority ethnic-identity, which to a certain extent was why 
such groupings could be open to both ‘White’ and ‘Black’ youth. Of far more 
importance is the recognition that the relationship between ethnicities is a process of 
cross-fertilisation whereby both groups end up somewhere else. As demonstrated by 
the following chapters, the idea of one-way assimilation of second-generation ‘Black 
youth’ into ‘British culture’ may have been the fanciful plan of the post-war social 
engineers, but the outcomes were somewhat different for some ‘Black’ and ‘White’ 
youth. 
 
In general, simplistic and limited signifiers of ethnicity such as ‘Black’, ‘Non-White’, 
‘White’, ‘Mixed-race’ ‘Asian’ and ‘Afro-Caribbean’ have been employed in various 
places in this thesis. These problematic terms are hard to define; however, the 
following delineations have been assumed in this work and follow to some extent the 
categorisations in play in the early 1980s: 
 
‘Black’: refers to ‘people of colour’ or ‘non-Whites’ regardless of their ethnic origins. 
‘Asian’: refers to people of ‘South Asian’ ethnic origins (principally from the nations 
of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka). 
‘Afro-Caribbean’18: refers to people of ethnic origins in that part of the African 
Diaspora that was originally situated in the islands of the Caribbean. 
‘Mixed-race’: refers in this case to people with one parent defined as ‘White’ and the 
other as ‘Black’. 
                                                 
18
 This term, common in the 1980s has since been replaced by ‘African-Caribbean’. 
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‘White’: refers extremely loosely (and contentiously) to people of ‘European origins’. 
 
1.3.3  ‘Race riot’? 
 
Politicians and journalists deployed the term ‘race riot’ in 1980-81 either to affirm or 
deny its validity as a description of the disturbances of the period
19
. It is a particularly 
contentious phrase, which in 1980-81 summoned up images of rampaging mobs of 
‘Blacks’ out to kill or injure ‘Whites’. However, to understand its realities in Britain it 
has to be placed in historical context.  
 
Several secondary sources delineate two versions of collective racial violence in the 
twentieth century in the U.K. and U.S.
20
 located before and after the Second World 
War. The first, designated as inter-racial communal violence, is commonly associated 
with the concept of ‘race riot’. Panayi defined this unrest as: 
‘an attack by a large number, hundreds or even thousands, of members of 
a dominant group upon members of a minority who have been singled out 
for attack specifically because they belong to that particular minority in a 
                                                 
19
 See for example the Daily Star (03-04-1980), Western Daily Press (03-04-1980) and Sunday Express 
(06-04-1980). 
20
 See Joshua, Wallace and Booth, To Ride the Storm: The 1980 Bristol 'Riot' and the State, pp.35-55, 
James N. Upton, Urban Riots in the 20th Century: A Social History (Lima: Wyndham Hall Press, 
1984), Chapter 1 and Field and Southgate, Public Disorder: A Review of Research and a Study in One 
Inner City Area, p.34. 
 24 
time when that ‘racial’ group usually faces more widespread animosity’21 
Under this definition ‘race riots’ are marked by offensive violence by the dominant 
group and in some cases defensive reactions by the subordinate minority. In general, 
the police have taken a backseat role in such events, either tacitly allowing the 
violence to proceed or intervening to ‘keep the peace’. This was certainly the 
experience in the ‘race riots’ in the U.K in the first half of the twentieth century22.   
 
The second historical category was described as ‘Black revolt’ or ‘commodity riots’23, 
the latter term being a reference to a change in emphasis from attacks on civilians to 
attacks on property. This form of racial disorder was marked by violence unleashed 
by ethnic minority communities on agents of the state and property, but not directed at 
civilians from the majority ethnic community. Despite popular confusion around the 
term ‘race riot’24, the second form of unrest, the ‘commodity riot’ was considered by 
                                                 
21
 P. Panayi, ‘Anti-Immigrant Violence in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Britain,’ in Racial 
Violence in Britain in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, ed. P. Panayi, Revised ed. (London: 
Leicester University Press, 1996), p.4. 
22
 Examples include (in the U.K.) Cardiff (1911), Glasgow, Hull, Liverpool, Newport, Cardiff, Barry 
(1919), Hull (1920-21), Newport, Salford (1922) Liverpool (1948), Nottingham, Notting Hill (1958) 
and Dudley (1962). References from Ibid. pp.12-13 and Joshua, Wallace and Booth, To Ride the Storm: 
The 1980 Bristol 'Riot' and the State, pp.20-35. 
23
 The former designation is from Ibid. p.35 and the latter from Upton, Urban Riots in the 20th 
Century: A Social History, Chapter 1. 
24
 For example, the entry for ‘race riot’ in Wikipedia states ‘a race riot or racial riot is an outbreak of 
violent civil disorder (i.e. a riot) in which race is a key factor’ and goes on to note ‘In the late 1960s the 
term Race Riots came to describe riots involving large numbers of members of racial minority groups’ 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Race_riot. 
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the secondary sources (and by this writer) to not be adequately defined by this 
particular label.  
 
Drawing such distinctions is important as utilisation of the term ‘race riot’ without 
qualification in 1980-81 created significant confusion that led to the racialisation of 
events or conversely suppressed ‘racism’ as a causal factor. This lack of clarity not 
only misrepresented the content of the unrest of the period
25
 but also provided a 
closed and ahistorical explanation through the popular signification of the term. This 
of course does not rule out racism as being a major or even dominant factor in the 
precipitation of unrest, but the confusing term ‘race riot’ is not considered to be a 
useful description of the events in the period of 1980-81. 
 
1.4  Violent Urban disturbance in England 1980-81 
1.4.1 The ‘Bristol Riots’ of April 1980 
 
The violent disturbance in the St. Paul’s area of Bristol on April 2nd 1980 is 
commonly regarded as iconic, in that it heralded the beginning of a decade or more of 
unrest in English cities. It is also central to the modern history of Bristol, marking a 
moment where issues of institutional and popular racism were forced into the media 
spotlight by the immediacy of the event, obliging national and local government 
bodies to search for explanations. Consequently, the ‘St. Paul’s Riot’ as it was defined 
                                                 
25
 Field in a Home Office sponsored report stated ‘there are two senses in which the British riots were 
not ‘race riots’: they did not involve collective violence between whites and blacks as such (the 
uniforms worn by the whites being more important than the colour of their skin), and both blacks and 
whites were involved in the disorder’. Field and Southgate, Public Disorder: A Review of Research and 
a Study in One Inner City Area, p.34. 
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by the local media
26
 or ‘The Bristol Riot’ as the national newspapers labelled it27, now 
occupies a racialised place in the popular memory signifying ‘race riot’ or ‘Black 
uprising’. 
 
The day before the 25
th
 anniversary of the St. Paul’s ‘riot’ in 2005 the main local 
newspaper in Bristol ran a double page spread entitled ‘The night a riot rocked a 
nation’. The article included eyewitness statements and comments by a ‘community 
leader’, a councillor, a press photographer, ‘a resident’ and ‘the policeman’. The last, 
Superintendent Tim Lee, was a ‘beat’ constable during the 1980 St. Paul’s disorders, 
and later became Deputy District Commander of the Avon and Somerset 
Constabulary. Lee provided an interesting insight into events that occurred in the 
succeeding days after the St. Paul’s ‘riot’, when he stated in the article: 
‘Before the riots, St. Pauls had never been regarded as a particular trouble 
spot and there was a genuine disbelief among officers that it was 
happening. What few people know is that for the following nights we had 
more problems in Southmead than we did in St. Paul’s because of 
copycat attacks’28 
The recognition by the Avon and Somerset Constabulary of the grave character of the 
subsequent events in the mainly White outlying north Bristol estate of Southmead 
echoes that made in their Annual Report for 1980. In this document the St. Paul’s and 
Southmead disturbances are the only events of that nature which are recorded for the 
                                                 
26
 Western Daily Press 05-04-1980. 
27
 Times 03-04-1980 p.1. 
28
 Bristol Evening Post 01-04-2005. 
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year, the latter incident being described thus: 
‘On the 3rd and 4th April 1980 there were serious incidents of public 
disorder in the Southmead area of Bristol when gangs of youths 
numbering some two hundred smashed several large shop windows and 
stoned police officers who attended at the scene’29 
Yet, in contrast to the massive local and national media coverage of the St. Paul’s 
‘riot’, the subsequent disorders in Southmead were barely reported in the local press 
and largely ignored by wider media outlets. Despite being considered serious 
incidents by the police authorities the events in Southmead were denigrated to the 
status of ‘copycat attacks’. Subsequent research undertaken for this thesis has 
uncovered an even more neglected incident in the south Bristol estate of Knowle West 
that occurred in the immediate aftermath of St. Paul’s. Bristol’s ‘other riots’ thus 
passed unnoticed and, more significantly, unheeded into obscurity for nearly thirty 
years. 
1.4.2  England 1981 
 
For many contemporary commentators in the media and politics the St. Paul’s ‘riot’ of 
1980 was variously characterised as either an ‘un-British’ aberration or merely a one-
day oddity of purely local significance. After the initial media furore, there were no 
major public inquiries launched and little policy response from central government
30
. 
However, this complacency was shattered in April 1981 when the south London 
district of Brixton erupted into four days of collective violence that left 415 policemen 
                                                 
29
 Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Annual Report of the Chief Constable  (Bristol, 1980), p.40. 
30
 Joshua, Wallace and Booth, To Ride the Storm: The 1980 Bristol 'Riot' and the State, p.208. 
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injured, 122 police vehicles damaged or destroyed and 145 buildings damaged, 28 by 
fire
31. The longevity and intensity of this event eclipsed the ‘Bristol Riot’ of the 
previous year, shocked the government and led to a public inquiry headed by the High 
Court Judge Lord Scarman. The weeks following the Brixton ‘riots' were marked by 
sporadic outbreaks of disorder in varying locations
32
, which culminated in two 
ostensibly unrelated incidents, at opposite ends of the country at the beginning of 
July. These particular events marked the key precipitating factors in many of the 
numerous disorders to follow, namely policing and racist attacks. 
 
On Friday 3
rd
 July in Toxteth
33
, Liverpool the arrest of a Black man for a minor 
offence led to a street confrontation with police that developed into another major 
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 The disorders in Brixton lasted between Friday 10
th
 and Monday 13
th
 April 1981. At the time the 
damage to property was estimated at £10 million, 282 people were arrested during the disturbances and 
several thousand police were deployed to suppress the incidents. L.G. Scarman, The Scarman Report, 
pp.37-72. 
32
 For example the serious disturbances in Ealing Common and Finsbury Park in London (April 1981), 
Coventry (May 1981) and Thornton Heath, London (June 1981). Ron Ramdin, The Making of the Black 
Working Class in Britain (Aldershot: Gower, 1987), p.506 and Joshua, Wallace and Booth, To Ride the 
Storm: The 1980 Bristol 'Riot' and the State, pp.192-5.  
33
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Princes Avenue, opposite a drive-in bank and what was the Rialto furniture store, both famously 
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disorder
34
. The same evening in Southall, London, skinheads who had travelled to the 
area to see some ‘Oi’ bands35 engaged in vandalism and attacks on Asian residents 
and their shops prior to the gig. This led to a violent confrontation between local 
Asian youth, the skinhead protagonists and police, which left sixty-one police officers 
injured and the venue in flames
36
. The Toxteth incident erupted over the weekend into 
arguably one of the most serious urban disorders Britain had seen in the twentieth 
century. Over the four days of rioting (3
rd
-6
th
 July), 355 policemen were injured, 244 
arrests were made (90% of which were Whites), 150 buildings were burnt down and 
CS gas canisters were fired as projectile weapons to disperse crowds for the first time 
on mainland Britain
37
.  
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 Ian Hernon, Riot!: Civil Insurrection from Peterloo to the Present Day (London: Pluto, 2006), p.201. 
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some associations with far-right and racist groups. 
36
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 Twenty-five canisters were fired as projectile weapons into crowds and several people were seriously 
injured. Notes and Documents, p.226 and Hernon, Riot!: Civil Insurrection from Peterloo to the 
Present Day, pp.201-6. 
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The following week (6
th
-13
th
 July) was to see the unrest spread across England, 
beginning in Moss Side Manchester with three days of violence which commenced on 
the 6
th
 and included a massed attack by more than a thousand rioters on the local 
police station the following night
38
. Over the following days and particularly over the 
weekend of 10
th
-13
th
 July Cities such as London, Wolverhampton, Birmingham, 
Nottingham, Derby, Leicester, Halifax and Leeds were struck by numerous 
disturbances in various locations. In addition, many towns experienced unrest 
including those in the Home Counties such as Luton, High Wycombe, Bedford and 
Maidstone. In all, over the months of July and August 1981 in twenty-five of forty or 
so police force areas in England and Wales, nearly four thousand people were arrested 
in relation to the disorders, with approximately two-thirds being described as 
‘White’39. 
 
1.5  The search for explanations 
 
The following section is a review of the explanations for the unrest of 1980-81 that 
were on offer from the media, government, extra-parliamentary political groupings 
and academia. Although this thesis is not specifically concerned with analysing the 
accounts provided by these bodies, it is useful to understand how they were framed. 
This influenced the representation of the unrest in many of the primary sources 
employed in the research. Restrictions of space limit this section to a categorised 
précis of the explanatory frameworks that were on offer in the period. 
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The aftermath of serious ‘riots’ and particularly waves of violent disturbances 
typically generate problematic responses related to the search and selection of causes 
in order to ‘explain’ events40. This activity is often predicated on the outcome of 
explanations, and usually involves apportioning ‘blame’ or finding the ‘guilty’ party. 
Thus causal logic effectively goes into reverse; the outcome (blame) determines the 
chosen explanation, which is related back to the event. This process was prevalent in 
the period of the 1980-81 disturbances from public statements of politicians and the 
media, through to sociologists and historians who appropriated histories into wider 
grand narratives. The lack of comprehensive data concerning the unrest at the time 
suggests that many commentators weren’t really sure ‘what had happened’ in 1980-
81. However, this crucial fact did not hold back the search for explanations for ‘why it 
had happened’, the apportioning of blame and the generation of institutional policy. 
 
Essentially, the explanatory frameworks that were in play in 1980-81 could be divided 
into those in the ‘mainstream’ with considerable public exposure through the mass 
media and those confined to academia and relatively small circulation media (such as 
left wing and radical Black newspapers, pamphlets and journals). In general the 
former group dominated a ‘terrain of debate’ that enclosed ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’ 
explanations
41
 predicated on idea that modern liberal democracies are structurally 
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non-conflictual, stable or self-stabilising, with urban disorder being understood as the 
result of deviancy, irrationality or bad management.  In contrast the latter group of 
conflictual theories, which were excluded from the ‘mainstream terrain of debate’, 
argued that modern democracies were inherently unstable due to ‘race’ and/or class 
divisions predicated on historically defined economic exploitation and unequal power 
relations.  
 
In the mainstream, there were essentially four non-conflictual frameworks in 
operation in 1980-81
42
. These were not entirely specific to the period and had 
appeared in various forms in relation to unrest in the past, particularly in the U.S. in 
the 1960s. The ‘conservative’ explanatory frameworks comprised the ‘Race and 
Disorder’ and ‘Law and Order’ discourses. The former proposed that Britain was an 
essentially stable country, which had experienced urban disorder as a result of the 
presence of immigrant groups. The unrest was thus solely a product of the attributes 
of these groups acting as an ‘other’. The latter framework denied the disorders were 
‘protests’ with social or political contexts, instead characterising them ahistorically as 
purely criminal and irrational behaviours. The ‘Social Deprivation’ and ‘Alienation 
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and Powerlessness’ frameworks generally fell into the ‘liberal’ categorisation, as they 
were concerned with distribution of resources and political management. The former 
predicated the ‘riots’ on the long-term economic decline of the inner cities and 
focused on causal factors such as unemployment, inadequate housing and education. 
The latter highlighted the social disorganisation of sub-ordinate groups as a key factor 
in alienating them from the political process and thus creating the conditions for more 
desperate forms of action such as collective violence. 
 
The conflictual explanatory frameworks can be divided into those that characterised 
unrest as a limited form of ‘struggle’ by economically marginalized sections of the 
proletariat (classical Marxist), those that emphasised autonomous sectoral struggle of 
the ‘racially’ subordinate (autonomous Marxist) and those that emphasised resistance 
to the generalised alienation of capitalist society (Situationists and Anarchists). 
Divisions between these explanations were not always distinct and there were several 
attempts to synthesise the various approaches. Table 1 displays the relevant 
explanatory frameworks categorised by ideological paradigm, exposure and political 
perspective. 
 
 Category 
Ideological 
Paradigm 
Non-conflictual Conflictual 
Exposure Mainstream Non-mainstream 
Political 
Perspective 
‘Conservative’ ‘Liberal’ ‘Radical’ 
Explanatory 
Framework 
Race and Disorder 
Law and Order 
Social Deprivation 
Alienation and 
Powerlessness 
Classical Marxist 
Autonomous Marxist 
Situationist and 
Anarchist 
Table 1: Matrix showing explanatory frameworks for disorder in England in 1980-81 categorised 
by exposure, ruling paradigm and political perspective  
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Each of these different explanatory frameworks from dissimilar political persuasions 
emphasised and downplayed different aspects of the disorders to support their 
positions. For example, those explanations based on the primacy of ‘race’, such as the 
mainstream ‘Race and Disorder’ framework highlighted that many of the disorders 
originated in inner city multi-ethnic areas and were thus the inevitable product of the 
‘alien’ presence of New Commonwealth immigrants and their offspring43. The 
‘Alienation and Powerless’ explanations were often coded in terms of ‘race’ by 
assuming that the ‘social disorganisation’ of inner city communities was a product of 
historical, cultural and generational weaknesses in the ‘West Indian’ family and an 
associated collapse in community and local political leadership. From the opposite 
end of the political spectrum, autonomist Marxists argued that Black youth were a 
vanguard in the disturbances, which were predicated on societal and institutional 
racism operating in tandem with class oppression
44
.  
 
Other mainstream explanatory frameworks such as ‘Law and Order’ and ‘Social 
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Deprivation’ ignored ‘race’ (and racism) altogether and emphasised the multi-ethnic 
nature of the unrest. The former framework denied institutional racism as a cause and 
instead focused on the supposed irrational, imitative
45
 and criminal behaviours of the 
young led by ‘outside agitators’46. Political opponents to the ruling Conservative 
Party drove the latter explanations in order emphasise the social effects of government 
policies in the inner cities which were regarded as generalised and not ‘race’ specific. 
From the ‘conflictual’ group of explanatory frameworks much of the Marxist left 
concentrated on the multi-ethnic nature of the revolts in order to subsume ‘racial’ 
aspects into the concept of ‘generalised class struggle’47. 
 
Other more controversial approaches from the Situationists and Anarchists focused on 
‘proletarian alienation’48 and emphasised the creation in the 1970s of a deviant 
‘impossible class’ in the inner cities. This sub-proletarian stratum refused capitalist 
work, subverted the Keynesian economic strategy of welfarism and survived through 
an illegal ‘unofficial subterranean economy’49. For these commentators the repressive 
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activities of the police in the inner cities during this period was a result of the need for 
the state to suppress these damaging behaviours. The resulting explosion of rioting, 
looting and arson in 1981 represented both an assertion of ‘human superiority over 
commodities’ and the search for a ‘life worth living’50. 
 
Post-modernist approaches in rejecting the Marxist meta-narrative concerning ‘class’ 
emphasised the diversity of motives of participants, the fragmentary nature of the 
events and argued for the importance of meaning rather than objective fact. Others 
argued that the ideological ‘position of the observer’ determined what the various 
commentators saw and emphasised when studying the unrest
51
. One theorist even 
denied that ‘unified’ wave of disturbances had actually occurred, suggesting that 
many of the ‘riots’ were figments of a media self-signification spirals and ideological 
bias
52
. Other researchers influenced by post-modernist axioms in rejecting the grand 
narratives of ‘race’ and ‘class’ turned to new discourses such as gender53 and 
racialisation
54
 to explain the disorders. 
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The mainstream explanations, trapped as they were within a ‘terrain of debate’ 
dominated by the hegemonic contingencies concerning the role of the state, the nation 
and the political process, were also hamstrung by political contingencies of 
government and opposition. The lesser known conflictual theories of the left and the 
Black radicals had little public exposure and were consumed with arguments about 
the historical contexts of the revolts and the issue of subsuming of ‘race’ into the 
mater category of ‘class’. The post-modernists merely appeared to want to 
disaggregate the July wave of disorders and leave a pile of localised fragments 
behind, whilst the taboo theories of the ultra-left championed ‘riot’ as a tool for 
undermining capitalism utilised by a new sub-proletarian grouping.  
 
Significantly these ideological struggles to ‘own’ the disturbances of 1980-81 were 
often based upon little empirical evidence or knowledge of the temporal and spatial 
nature of the unrest and rarely involved the views of participants. Whilst many wanted 
to explain the unrest, what had actually happened was far from clear and few 
commentators had much evidence or testimony to back up their theories. In fact, the 
only disorders that were comprehensively documented in 1981 were those that 
occurred in Brixton (April) and Moss Side (July) amongst literally hundreds of 
disorders that summer
55
. 
 
1.6  The research: questions, strategy and structure 
1.6.1  ‘Macro’ analysis 
 
Having briefly reviewed the principal disorders of 1980-81 and contemporary 
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explanations for these events, in the following section the central research questions 
derived from this study, are outlined. Preliminary examination of the principal 
secondary sources concerning the unrest of the summer of 1981 showed that the 
majority of the then known disturbances were merely quoted in lists of ‘riots’ and 
were significantly under-researched. Little information was available on these 
disturbances outside of specific major incidents and it was certainly clear that very 
little detailed research had been carried out beyond reports in national media sources.  
 
As a result of these deficiencies and the preliminary investigations into the ‘Bristol 
Riots’ of 1980, which showed that certain disorders were highlighted (St. Paul’s) 
whilst others (Southmead and Knowle West) were almost completely ignored, it was 
suspected that the 1981 ‘riot’ lists were far from comprehensive. Thus, the first 
research task involved evaluating in detail the content of the July wave of unrest in 
1981.  In addition, none of the secondary sources made a thorough study of the 
severity or spatial and temporal characteristics of the July wave as a whole. Similarly, 
local clusters of ‘riots’ that appeared in many major cities were only studied in any 
detail in two locations, London and Liverpool
56
.  Consequently, the second major area 
of investigation was focused on determining these characteristics for individual daily 
incidents. These could then be grouped as a series of contiguous disorders in a 
particular neighbourhood, as a tranche of incidents in different locations in a city or 
combined for analysis of the countrywide ‘wave’ of disturbances. 
 
It was recognised from the outset of the research that the very scale of the wave of 
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disturbances in July 1981 and the time-scale of the project precluded comprehensive 
detailed analysis of significant numbers of incidents beyond that of the evidence in the 
principal primary sources (local newspapers). Consequently, the research into the July 
wave was not focused on detailing individual serious incidents of unrest but targeted 
at gathering as much information on as many daily events as possible within the 
designated period. This quantitative emphasis was informed by significantly under-
researched questions in the secondary sources. Its brief was to examine the apparent 
simultaneous nature of the uprisings in different districts of cities, the rate at which 
events unfolded and replicated themselves and the ethnic composition of the ‘rioting 
crowds’.  
1.6.2   ‘Micro’ history 
 
The limitations in detail inherent in the macro analysis of the numerous disorders in 
the July wave of 1981 meant that certain important questions could not be 
successfully investigated by such a study. These included: 
 
 The simultaneous nature of the uprisings in different districts of cities with 
apparently different ethnic compositions, histories and demographics. 
 The organisational forms shown by the participants both prior and during 
disorders. 
 The social and sub-cultural networks that were in operation both prior to and 
within disturbances, which helped to create the ‘disorderly crowds’. 
 The form and content of communication processes that allowed knowledge of 
‘riots’ to spread and be responded to. 
 Why the participants were there and what their perceptions of the historical 
factors and precipitating incidents that led to the disorders were. 
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In order to investigate these aspects of the anatomy of individual disorders and the 
relationship between contiguous disturbances in 1980-81 a different research strategy 
was required. 
 
Preliminary investigations into the nature and configuration of the disturbances spread 
over four to five days in April 1980 in Bristol suggested that they shared several 
salient features with the patterns of disorders in cities in July 1981. In Bristol, a well-
publicised major disturbance in an inner city area of mixed ethnicity (St. Paul’s) led to 
a series of further incidents of lesser magnitude in outlying mainly White estates over 
the succeeding days (Southmead, Knowle West).  This pattern accorded with the 
findings in the existing secondary sources concerning the temporal and spatial 
arrangement of disturbances in London and Liverpool in July 1981
57
.  Consequently, 
the Bristol events were considered to provide three useful case studies that allowed 
investigation into the questions that could not be effectively approached in the 
overview of the July wave.   
 
It was recognised from the outset of the research effort that regional and local 
variations in the pre-history of disturbances and demographics could compromise this 
strategy. However, certain features of the 1981 disturbances suggested that these 
effects were moderated to some extent. First, the temporal and spatial homogeneity of 
mass electronic communication meant that the whole country was simultaneously 
exposed to information about the outbreak of major ‘riots’. Second, the large number 
of disturbances that occurred in July 1981 implied that the unrest was not an 
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aberration.  Third, the wide geographic spread of locales affected by ‘riots’ in England 
suggested that despite regional and local variations a significant number of counties 
and cities saw similar patterns of disorder. Lastly, the majority of July incidents were 
concentrated over six days a similar time period to the temporal pattern of the Bristol 
disorders.  These features as a whole were felt to be sufficient to allay problems of 
‘causality-correlation’ and over-generalisation. 
 
1.7  Objectives: approaches and content 
 
In the following section the approaches and content of this thesis are discussed with 
an eye to what was and what was not objectively intended. As explained previously, 
the macro-study of the wave of disturbances in July 1981 was not planned to be a 
definitive history of specific disorders but to function as a comprehensive overview of 
the countrywide unrest. The data gathering exercise was thus essential both to remedy 
the significant gaps in the historical record and to allow future macro and micro 
histories to be constructed. The principal aim of the quantitative analysis of this data 
was to study temporal and spatial patterns in the diffusion of the disturbances. 
 
The micro-histories of the ‘Bristol Riots’ of April 1980 performed several functions. 
As historical writings they provided a comprehensive and up to date account of the 
St. Paul’s disturbance of April 2nd 1980 based on hitherto un-researched primary 
sources. They also rescued the disturbances of Southmead and Knowle West from 
obscurity by placing these events into the historical record. As individual analytical 
studies they offered detailed examinations of the anatomy of disorders including 
previously under-researched aspects of urban disturbance such as the importance of 
social and sub-cultural networks, looting, negotiation with the authorities, travellers to 
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riots and the motives and feelings of participants. From the perspective of the spread 
of disturbances, they provided studies of communication channels, social links 
between areas and demographic features of locales, which helped explain both 
characteristics of the Bristol incidents and provided evidence for the patterns found in 
the analysis of the wave of disorders in July 1981. 
 
Neither of these two phases of research and analysis was primarily aimed at validating 
or refuting a preconceived ideological position or the various explanatory frameworks 
for disorder briefly reviewed in Section 1.5. Instead the two methodological 
approaches were informed by theory and quantitative methods concerned with the 
anatomy of riots and the diffusion of disturbances. Thus the principal review of theory 
in this thesis is concerned with these particular considerations rather than an extended 
debate about which theoretical explanations were ‘correct’. This of course does not 
mean that such inferences cannot be made or that certain explanations for the 
‘English’ disorders of 1980-81 cannot be wholly or partially dismissed as a result of 
the evidence and analytical conclusions in this thesis. 
 
1.8  Outline of thesis structure  
 
In the following section the structure of this thesis is outlined by a brief description of 
the content and direction of each chapter. 
 
 Chapter 2 entitled ‘The disorderly ‘crowd’ and the diffusion of disturbances’ is 
essentially a review of the historical, sociological and psychological approaches to 
collective violence and the spread of unrest. The first section, concerning the 
‘disorderly crowd’, provides various theoretical tools for the micro-histories studying 
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the anatomy of the ‘Bristol Riots’ in 1980. The second section, relating to the 
diffusion of disturbances, contributes quantitative methods for analysing the spatial 
and temporal spread of unrest, some of which are employed in the macro analysis of 
the July 1981 unrest. Chapter 3, ‘Sources and Methodology’ outlines the primary and 
secondary sources and methodological approaches employed in the research activities. 
 
Chapters 4-7 present the findings of the research into the urban disorders in England 
in 1980-81. Chapter 4, ‘Violent Urban Disturbance in England July 1981’ provides a 
macro historical analysis of the July 1981 countrywide wave of unrest. This 
incorporates a quantitative and cartographical study of the spatial and temporal 
characteristics of this wave and the ethnic composition of the ‘crowds’ involved. 
Chapter 5, ‘Bristol 1980: St. Paul’s, Southmead and Knowle West’ is dedicated to a 
quantitative and qualitative examination of the demography and features of the three 
disparate areas of Bristol which experienced unrest in April 1980. This chapter 
provides contextual information for the micro histories of the disturbances that follow. 
Chapter 6, ‘What Happened in the ‘Bristol Riots’?’ comprises comprehensive 
accounts of the disturbances in St. Paul’s, Southmead and Knowle West areas of 
Bristol in the first week of April 1980. Chapter 7, ‘The ‘Bristol Riots’: An Analysis’ 
compares and contrasts the various incidents in Bristol and provides quantitative and 
qualitative analyses of under-researched features of the disturbances such as the 
importance of sub-cultural and social networks, negotiation, looting, travellers and the 
meanings of the events for the participants. Finally, Chapter 8, ‘Conclusions’ draws 
together the findings of the two phases of research, presents some conclusions and 
suggests further research activity and analysis. 
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2.0 The disorderly ‘crowd’ and the diffusion of 
disturbances 
2.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter is dedicated to a review of psychological, sociological and historical 
theories concerned with crowd composition, behaviour and the spread of collective 
violence. The principal aim of this chapter is to outline the theoretical approaches of 
the various disciplines and to chart their development in the context of the prevailing 
historical conditions and discourses. This historical approach was undertaken, as it 
was clear from an examination of the theoretical advances in this area that the 
associated bursts of research activity were often linked with governmental responses 
to cycles of serious disorders in various nations. As such they were influenced by the 
need to understand how these ‘riots’ came to happen, the anatomies and behaviours of 
the ‘crowds’ involved and how they diffused into ‘waves’ of disorders. These 
requirements were indirectly linked with state-level efforts to improve the methods for 
the control and suppression of collective violence of this form.  
 
The objective of this chapter is to consider the theoretical tools (both qualitative and 
quantitative) that were employed in the analysis of the anatomy of disorders in Bristol 
in 1980 and the spread of disturbances in 1980-81. As such, the emphasis is on the 
explanation and historical development of these particular approaches rather than a 
comprehensive review of all the theoretical paradigms concerning collective violence. 
 
The chapter is split into two parts, the first considering theories of ‘disorderly crowd’ 
behaviour and the second contemporary work on the spread of violent disturbances. 
Over the last decade the apparent division between the two approaches has reduced as 
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contemporary social scientists have attempted to integrate them. Despite this 
commendable research, the overall history of the theoretical developments suggests a 
general separation in activity and focus between the two fields of study and this 
frames the structure of the chapter.  
 
2.2  The disorderly ‘crowd’  
2.2.1  Introduction 
 
The following section is concerned with charting the development of theories 
concerning crowd composition and behaviour in the context of urban disorder. The 
trend of this development can be loosely characterised as moving through a series of 
discrete phases that were influenced both by theoretical advances in the various 
concerned disciplines (psychology, history, sociology) and the impact of 
contemporary historical events (such as the urban disorders in the United States in the 
1960s, the urban disturbances in the United Kingdom and France of the late twentieth 
and early twenty-first century and the apparent reappearance of ‘food riots’ in the 
1990s in the developing world). Each series of disorders in the U.S., U.K. and France 
created both academic interest in crowd behaviour, governmental requirements for 
research and crucially funds for these activities. Consequently the study of ‘crowds’ 
and their relationship to disorder has in the main been a succession of immediate 
academic responses to contemporary events with all the restrictions of limited time 
and resources. These studies have of course been moulded by the ideological 
positions of the theorists and the dominant discourses in play in each particular era. 
More specifically they were also affected to a greater or lesser extent by the 
immediate political exigencies of the periods of disturbance in which they were 
written. 
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The first phase of the theoretical developments can be charted from the ahistorical and 
non-contextual psychological theories of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries through to the post-war British Marxist historians who emphasised the 
concept of agency in their analysis of the composition of the ‘crowd’, its motives and 
targets. The second phase, which was primarily instigated by the extensive urban 
uprisings in major U.S. cities during the 1960s, produced a plethora of research 
evidence and theoretical advances. This phase was marked by both a realisation of the 
complexity involved in crowd behaviour and the tentative introduction of situational 
and contextual factors to the analysis. The third phase, stimulated by the urban ‘riots’ 
of the 1980s in the U.K., produced a smaller volume of material but marked a decisive 
theoretical turn towards combining structural, contextual and situational influences on 
crowds and disorder. This tendency was also affected by post-modernist theoretical 
developments, which criticised teleological meta-narratives and quantitative analyses 
as well as leading to the introduction of new discourses such as (sub) culture, gender, 
ethnicity and locale to the expanding ‘models of disorder’. These particularly became 
apparent in the recent analyses of the 1991-2 and 2001 disorders in the U.K. and the 
banlieue ‘riots’ in France of 2005-2007. 
2.2.2  Early theories of the ‘crowd’ 
 
The work of Gustave Le Bon is the common starting point for ‘modern’ theories of 
crowd behaviour and his influential work ‘The Crowd: a study of the popular mind’ 
published in 1895 begins with a revelatory statement exposing some of the ideological 
bases in his approach to crowd theory: 
‘The following work is devoted to an account of the characteristics of 
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crowds. The whole of the common characteristics with which heredity 
endows the individuals of a race constitute the genius of the race. When, 
however, a certain number of these individuals are gathered together in a 
crowd for purposes of action, observation proves that, from the mere fact 
of their being assembled, there result certain new psychological 
characteristics, which are added to the racial characteristics and differ 
from them at times to a very considerable degree.’ 58 
This opening statement was informed by notions of biological determinism inherent 
within ‘race’ theory and also by pre-Freudian theories of the unconscious59. Le Bon’s 
approach to the disorderly ‘crowd’ was premised upon the supposed base and 
irrational behaviours of the lower classes that he understood to be ‘easily led’60. The 
theory proposed that a set of processes were underway within ‘crowds’, without the 
awareness of the participants, where ‘their conscious personalities automatically 
disappear to be replaced by a sinister, uncivilised and potentially barbaric ‘collective 
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mind’’61. Fundamental to this conjecture was the idea that placing the individual in 
the scenario of the ‘crowd’ allowed de-individuation to occur; effectively the loss of 
personal responsibility through the anonymity of the collective experience. Once this 
process was in effect, Le Bon believed that the subjects were less able to resist the 
‘power of suggestion’ and were consequently capable of unsavoury actions that they 
would not normally have undertaken. Finally and perhaps most contentiously, he 
argued that these effects were ‘contagious’ in that they could be passed via the 
emotive atmosphere of the ‘crowd’ to ‘uninfected’ individuals.  
 
Le Bon’s theoretical legacy was to be grasped by the founder of social psychology as 
a scientific discipline, the American academic Floyd Allport. Allport’s 1924 work 
‘Social Psychology’62 followed Le Bon’s theoretical trajectory by employing idea of 
‘social facilitation’. This stressed the importance of the emotive atmosphere of the 
‘crowd’ in creating a progressive spiral, which had: 
‘the gradual effect of overriding customary processes of self-restraint on 
anti-social behaviour and paving the way for a biologically universal 
‘reflex of struggle’ to emerge, marked by the destruction of anything 
preventing the attainment of basic human needs’63.  
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The connections between the two theories are explicit in their view of the collectively 
induced collapse of ‘civilised’ values and their reduction of human behaviour to a 
core of savagery. However, as we shall later see in more detail, this was challenged by 
the crowd psychologist Steven Reicher who argued in the 1980s: 
‘While these two approaches are diametrically opposed to each other, the 
one proposing that individuality is extinguished in the crowd [Le Bon] 
and the other that it is accentuated [Allport], they are nonetheless united in 
one crucial premise. Both suggest that the only mechanism capable of 
directly planned or rational behaviour is a sovereign individual 
identity’64  
Reicher followed the argument of each theory through to their essentialist conclusions 
with Le Bon’s ‘group mind’ approach leading to the ‘primitive racial unconscious’ 
and Allport’s ‘social facilitation’ and consequent ‘extreme individualism’ effectively 
limiting participation in disorder to certain personality types. 
 
The thread of the Le Bonian legacy continued into the pre-war period albeit mutated 
into the ‘frustration-aggression’ hypothesis of Dollard et al.65. These theoreticians 
postulated that crowd disorder was a ‘collective emotional outburst of psychic 
energy’, which occurred when a group were denied access to a defined objective or 
were subject to relative deprivation compared to other groups. These theories of the 
disorderly crowd were all rooted in the discipline of psychology; the next significant 
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developments were to be found amongst historians and specifically the British 
Marxist School of the post-war period. 
 
2.2.3 The ‘Marxists’ and the ‘crowd’ 
 
Up until World War II, Marxist historiography had, in general, been dominated with 
deterministic structural analyses of modes of production and their effect on super-
structural political forms and ideology
66
. There had been less concern with the actions 
of Marx’s historical agents the bourgeoisie and more significantly the proletariat. The 
British Marxist historians in the post-war period took a more radical turn which 
emphasised the actions of the proletariat in making history. George Rudé, who was 
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state’, ‘the world market’ and ‘crises’ as noted in Ernest Mandel’s introduction to K. Marx, Capital: A 
Critique of Political Economy (London: Penguin Classics, 1990), pp.27-28. It has been postulated that 
the fact that these sections were unwritten or unfinished has left the structure-agency tension within 
Marx’s theory significantly tipped towards the former. Writers such A. Negri, Marx Beyond Marx: 
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Economy (London: Penguin Classics, 1993). 
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influenced by the Annales School
67
 and was a student of the eminent French historian 
Georges Lefebvre (who originally coined the term ‘history from below’), led the 
charge with his ground-breaking work ‘The Crowd in History’68 (published in 1964), 
Rudé critiqued Le Bon’s theories as well as crude ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ 
historical descriptions of the ‘crowd’ as the ‘people’ or the ‘mob’ respectively, which 
he argued ‘reduce the crowd to a disembodied abstraction’. Instead Rudé posed a 
series of challenging questions for the researcher in determining the size, class 
composition and leadership of the historical ‘crowd’, its motives, aims and underlying 
ideas and its actions, targets and the historical significance of the event. Unlike the 
crowd psychologists of the pre-war era, Rudé did not ignore the relationship between 
the ‘crowd’ and the ‘authorities’, particularly in relation to ‘trigger’ events, the role of 
mediators and the context of previous encounters between the protagonists. Crucially, 
Rudé also noted the existence of dynamic divergences between the political context 
and ‘trigger’ of a disturbance and the agendas of the disorderly ‘crowd’69.  
                                                 
67
 The Annales School of History originated in France in the 1920s. Its writers moved from 
contemporary historical studies of politics, diplomacy and war towards long view (longue durée), inter-
disciplinary analyses of society, economy and culture. This ‘turn’, although still firmly rooted in the 
French Marxist tradition of structuralism, opened up new vistas and techniques of historical study 
including ‘micro-history’ and ‘cultural history’ that were directly connected to the ‘histoire des 
mentalités’ ('history of attitudes' or 'history of world-views') championed by the Annales School. 
68
 G. Rudé, The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England, 1730-
1848 (London: Serif, 1995). 
69
 This phenomenon was recognised by the historian Peter Linebaugh (a protégé of the British Marxist 
School) in his analysis of the ostensibly ‘anti-Catholic Gordon Riots’ of 1780. Linebaugh argued that 
the precipitating events for the disorders may have been politically inspired anti-Catholic protests but 
once the disturbances were underway new agendas within the ‘crowds’ appeared which had a different 
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Rudé’s methodological advance that emphasised the anatomy, motive and action of a 
crowd within a disturbance scenario that included other contending forces, rather than 
its abstraction into an amorphous or irrational ‘beast’ was still fettered by the 
structuralist leanings of classical Marxism
70
. These constraints were mirrored in 
subsequent works by Marxists from the ‘British School’, including Eric Hobsbawm, 
whose work on ‘social banditry’ and his later collaborative work with Rudé, a social 
history of the Captain Swing ‘riots’71 made similar connections between the possible 
repertoires of crowd action and the class composition and specific mode of production 
in place in the period of the disturbance.  
 
A related problem, which particularly came to the fore in Marxist analysis of the 
urban disorders of 1980-81 in England, concerned Marx and Engel’s definition of the 
‘underclass’ or ‘lumpen proletariat’.  Hobsbawm argued in his studies of the ‘criminal 
poor’ that they could not play a key role in social movements because they were 
                                                                                                                                            
political, economic and social targets; P. Linebaugh, The London Hanged: Crime and Civil Society in 
the Eighteenth Century, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 2003), pp.333-370. 
70
 By way of example, Rudé maintained a clear (but questionable) distinction between two types of 
‘crowd’; the ‘pre-industrial’ (engaged in food riots, machine breaking, effigies and incendiarism) and 
the ‘industrial’ (involved in strikes, mass meetings and demonstrations). He argued that the former 
consisted of peasants or lower orders led by ‘captains’ with backward looking beliefs in customary 
right, natural justice and a nostalgia for ‘past utopias’. In contrast, the latter crowds were made up of 
industrial workers with well-defined, rational and forward-looking objectives. Rudé, The Crowd in 
History: A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England, 1730-1848. 
71
 E. J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 
20th Centuries (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959) and E. J. Hobsbawm and G. Rudé, Captain 
Swing (Harmondsworth: Penguin University Books, 1973). 
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marginal to production and the proletariat and consequently they could not achieve 
the consciousness of the proletariat. As the Marxist theorist Stuart Hall noted, the 
orthodox reading of the ‘lumpen proletariat’ suggested that ‘though the life and values 
of the ‘dangerous classes’ represent an inversion of the bourgeois world, they remain 
ultimately enclosed by it – confined by it and in the end parasitic upon it’72. This 
sweeping classical interpretation effectively ruled out the ‘disorderly crowd’ 
principally composed of the marginalized underclass, from meaningful progressive 
action
73
. 
 
A more fundamental critique of classical Marxist thought was to spring from the 
British School through the works of Edward Thompson, particularly his influential 
work ‘The Making of the English Working Class’74 originally published in 1963. In 
the context of this thesis the importance of this book is not in its historical content as 
such, which was ground-breaking, but instead in marking Thompson’s shift of the 
Marxian master category from the mode of production (structure) to class struggle 
(agency). In the process he also posed a new definition of class that was not bound as 
tightly to the base-superstructure paradigm. Thompson’s model of class was a 
dynamic social relation between groups of people
75
 rather than a ‘double relation 
                                                 
72
 Hall added this is why there ‘cannot by definition be a ‘Marxist theory of crime’’ in S. Hall and 
others, Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order (Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Education, 1978), pp.363-4. 
73
 This constraint on the composition of ‘legitimate’ crowds is reminiscent of the ‘riff-raff’ theory of 
disorder discussed later in this chapter in Section 2.2.4. 
74
  E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1988). 
75
 Thompson stated ‘By class I understand a historical phenomenon, unifying a number of disparate and 
seemingly unconnected events, both in the raw material of experience and in consciousness. I 
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between groups of people and things, the means of production’76 as had been 
suggested by classical interpretations of Marx.  As a consequence of liberating ‘class’ 
from the fetters of strict economic determinism, Thompson was able to propose that 
the working class had an active role in its own ‘making’ and that this process was 
directly linked to class-consciousness.  
 
The importance of this realignment of the understanding of class as a social relation 
rather than a relation to the mode of production provides a connection to social 
protest. For Thompson such activities were potentially a pole of class re-composition 
and through the praxis of their agents, class-consciousness could be engendered. An 
extension of this argument to the ‘disorderly crowd’ reopens this particular arena, 
under particular conditions, as a site of meaningful social protest within the Marxist 
schema. Thompson exhibited an aspect of this argument in his important contribution 
to ‘crowd theory’ in his 1971 work ‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the 
Eighteenth Century
’77
. This paper, which was principally concerned with the analysis 
of food ‘riots’ in the period, proposed the existence of a customary ‘moral economy’, 
which legitimised, informed and guided the actions of  ‘riotous mobs’. Within this 
framework of legitimate action, ‘crowds’ moved up the supply chain from market to 
                                                                                                                                            
emphasize that this is an historical phenomenon. I do not see class as a ‘structure’, nor even as a 
category, but as something which in fact happens (and can be shown to have happened) in human 
relationships’ from R. Harrison, ‘Marxism as Nineteenth-Century Critique and Twentieth-Century 
Ideology,’ History 66, no. 217 (1981), p.211. 
76
 R. Johnson, ‘Edward Thompson, Eugene Genovese, and Socialist-Humanist History,’ History 
Workshop Journal 6, no. 1 (1978), p.91. 
77
 E. P. Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,’ Past & 
Present 50, no. 1 (1971). 
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mill to landowner using threat and violence if necessary to enforce price control and 
fair distribution of food. Thompson argued the fact that these, sometimes complex, 
processes were present in such ‘riots’, was not always explicit in the sources 
particularly if the historian disregarded the action as merely ‘criminal’.  
 
The impact of the British Marxist School’s re-orientations in the approaches to 
historical research and analysis were extremely influential in generating new lines of 
and sites of enquiry. Quantitative and qualitative analyses of historical waves of 
contentious ‘disorders’ began to appear in the 1970s, effectively opening up a new 
sub-field within studies concerned with social movements and protest, championed by 
sociologists and historians such as Tilly, Charlesworth, and Bohstedt
78
. The British 
Marxist historians and their protégés work on the ‘disorderly crowd’ began to be 
referenced in relation to contemporaneous disorders
79
, the most influential of which in 
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developments in ‘crowd’ theory were the urban uprisings of the mid to late 1960s in 
the United States.  
 
2.2.4  The impact of the U.S. disorders of the 1960s 
 
The six days of ‘rioting’ in Harlem, New York in 1964 arguably marked the 
beginning of the most serious period of unrest in U.S. cities in the twentieth century. 
August of 1965 saw even more intense rioting in the Watts area of Los Angeles on the 
West Coast, which drew attention to urban disorder as a national problem. As the 
decade wore on the frequency and intensity of unrest in mainly Black urban areas 
increased, with National Guard and military intervention becoming common. After 
the Newark (New York) ‘riots’ of mid-July 1967, and whilst areas of Detroit were 
still burning from further serious disorders, President Lyndon B. Johnson, appointed 
the ‘National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders’ (led by the Governor of 
Illinois, Otto Kerner, Jr.)
80
, to investigate the causes and prevention of violent urban 
disturbances. Johnson essentially asked for answers to three basic questions about the 
‘riots’, ‘what happened, why did it happen and what could be done to prevent it from 
happening again?’ The intervention of the Federal Government and the scale of the 
investigation stimulated and greatly expanded the existing research and theoretical 
effort in American Universities concerned with the anatomy and dynamics of the 
‘disorderly ‘crowd’81.  
                                                 
80
 Hence the more commonly known name ‘The Kerner Commission’. 
81
 The ‘Kerner Commission’ probably ranks as the largest and most comprehensive qualitative and 
quantitative investigation into urban disorder in world history, involving at its peak hundreds of 
researchers, advisors and witnesses as well as interviews with over a 1,200 residents of selected 
‘riotous’ districts. 
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The vast amount of new data on urban disorder that became available through the 
research provided a basis for testing and critiquing existing approaches to crowd 
behaviour. The most coherent and current theory available for the 60s researchers was 
that of Neil Smelser, a structural-functionalist
82
 sociologist whose work on collective 
violence and crowd behaviour had expanded the somewhat limited approaches of 
earlier theorists
83
. Smelser created a series of six determining categories for collective 
disorder to occur; structural conduciveness, structural strain, the growth and spread of 
generalised hostile belief, precipitating factors, mobilisation of participants for action 
and social control. The first two categories related to the structural context at the time 
of the disorder, that is a group or institution that could be blamed for a grievance, no 
mechanism for the redress of that grievance and an awareness of this fact which 
created ‘strain’ amongst the potential participants. The third category related to the 
mechanism for transfer of this knowledge between the participants. The final three 
categories are situational in that they relate to the actual disorder itself, the ‘trigger’ 
event, the assembly of the ‘disorderly’ and the form of action taken by the authorities 
for suppression of the disorder. By systematising his theory of ‘collective disorder’, 
Smelser rejected the closed approaches of Le Bon and Allport that negated historical, 
structural, contextual and to a certain extent situational analyses in favour of 
naturalistic psychological explanations. 
 
                                                 
82
 The structural-functionalist current of sociological thought, which was particularly prominent in the 
1940s-50s in the U.S., viewed society as a coherent whole (a ‘body’ essentially) where norms, customs, 
traditions and institutions (the ‘organs’ of the ‘body’) functioned to provide cohesion and stability. 
83
 N. J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1962). 
 58 
However, it was argued that Smelser’s approach: 
‘was predicated on the belief that public disorder is an anomalous and 
irrational activity, involving ‘deviant groups’ – that is, criminals, the 
poorly socialised and those sections of society experiencing some form of 
unsettling transition (for example, adolescents, the unemployed or recent 
migrants)’ 84 
This allusion to collective violence being the province of the societal ‘deviant’ is 
commonly known as ‘riff-raff’ theory and has a long historic precedent85. In fact, 
Rudé’s ground-breaking emphasis on studying the composition of crowds in the 
French Revolution was initially a direct investigative response to similar 
contemporary explanations for ‘riot’.   
‘thus he sought to show that those who took to the streets were ordinary, 
sober citizens, not half-crazed animals, not criminals. They were 
individuals who took part in protest for very sensible reasons - an increase 
in the price of bread, a decrease in their wages - not bought by some 
political demagogue, not creating disorder to carry out theft, plunder and 
                                                 
84
 Waddington and King, The Disorderly Crowd: From Classical Psychological Reductionism to 
Socio‐Contextual Theory – The Impact on Public Order Policing Strategies, pp.493-5. 
85
 The explanation of disorder as being the product of  ‘deviant’ or ‘criminal’ elements was a common 
explanation for ‘riot’ in the nineteenth century and appears to have an ahistorical attraction for most 
authorities dealing with violent dissent, hence its unsurprising reappearance within the ‘explanatory 
frameworks’ of the media, politicians and police during the 1980s urban disorders in the U.K. 
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revenge killings’86 
It was this reading of Smelser’s theory, that an essentially stable, self-regulated and 
integrated society was under threat from disorderly ‘deviant groups’ that was to first 
come under examination in the light of the evidence generated by the researchers into 
the 1960s U.S. disturbances. A commendable and interesting facet of the 
investigations carried out by the Kerner Commission appointees were the attempts to 
collect data on the opinions and backgrounds of both participants and non-participants 
in the disorders in their localities.  This information was to have significant impact on 
the understanding of crowd behaviour, the pre-conceptions about the make-up of the 
‘crowds’ and the explanations for the waves of disorders. A crucial section of the 
Kerner Report
87
 concerned the profile of the ‘average rioter’, which showed that ‘he’ 
‘was economically on a par with the average non-rioter, was comparatively better 
educated, politically more active, and invariably a lifelong resident of the city’88. This 
was a stunning riposte to the ‘riff-raff’ theory and also to those who had suggested 
that the recent pattern of migration of Black workers to Northern U.S. cities had 
created a transient group unable to ‘adjust to the stress and complexity of urban 
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living’89.  
 
The revelatory findings of the Kerner Commission led to further studies, which 
explicitly investigated the politicisation of ‘rioters’, the effects of ‘racial isolation’ and 
the views of the ‘rioters’90. The latter investigations opened up a new vista, which had 
been seriously lacking in much of the existing ‘crowd’ theory; that of the role of the 
state in the form of the police and institutional racism as primary historical and 
immediate precipitating factors of disorder
91. This revelation was to strike Smelser’s 
theory from a different angle in that the only category he directly attributed to the 
police was that of ‘social control’, effectively the response to a gathering or active 
disorder. The fact that the forces of the state might act historically in a ‘structurally 
conducive’ manner, might as a result generate ‘structural strain’ and as the Kerner 
Report and subsequent studies showed were often a ‘precipitating factor’ in 
disturbances, attacked the structural-functionalist assumptions of a stable state serving 
an integrated society
92
. The question that came to the fore concerned the identity of 
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the ‘deviant group’ that were threatening social stability; was it the ‘rioters’ or the 
police? 
 
Another aspect of Smelser’s approach that came under scrutiny concerned the link 
with Le Bon’s implicit assumption of irrationality in crowd behaviour, despite the 
historic, contextual or situational circumstances. From the structural-functionalist 
perspective, which it must be stated, appears to be derived from the viewpoint of a 
supposed rational and benign authority, the activities of ‘disorderly mobs’ are 
inherently irrational. Within this paradigm, the forces of the state are considered to be 
at best victims of and at worst merely unintended instigators of this irrationality. 
Many academic researchers into crowd behaviour had themselves participated or been 
eyewitnesses to collective violence in the student protests of the 1960s
93
. Their own 
experiences and consequent analyses led many to attack Smelser’s assumptions, with 
critics turning this theory upside down and asking if this inherent irrationality 
extended to the state
94
. Others argued that the disorderly crowd of the 1960s urban 
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‘riots’ had rational motives, demands and cognitive skills95. It is no surprise that 
structural-functionalist theory which was principally developed and championed in 
the 1940s-50s, a perceived period of consensus politics (this is of course contentious), 
would come under severe scrutiny in a period (1960s-70s) of actual dissensus marked 
by political and social conflict
96
. 
 
As Smelser’s systemised theory of ‘riot’ behaviour began to crumble under multiple 
assaults a deeper problem emerged concerning the concept of the ‘crowd’ and 
offshoots such as the ‘average riot participant’. The first signs of this appeared as 
researchers began to delve into the detailed anatomy of specific disorders in the 
1960s. The inherent complexity of disturbances exposed by the research initially led 
to further critiques of Le Bonian approaches, which ascribed pathological totalities to 
crowd behaviour. Instead the crowd, it was argued, should be considered as a ‘social 
system’, which was not inherently different to other forms of human collectivity97. 
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Almost simultaneously other researchers argued for the primacy of the ideological 
effect, effectively the politicisation of ‘crowds’ as a common motivation for action, in 
response to the rejection of structural drivers for the disorders
98
. A contradiction 
between these approaches began to emerge as the researchers in the former group 
began to question the concept of the ‘crowd’ as single homogenous entity and by 
implication as acting with common ideological goals. It was argued that this problem 
had been present in the opposing approaches of Le Bon with his psychological 
homogenisation and his critics such as Rudé with their homogenisation of ideological 
belief in the disorderly crowd
99
.  Essentially the question turned on whether 
ideological belief was the primary or even sole driver for crowd behaviour or that 
other complex processes were underway once a group had been mobilised. This 
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effectively left the path open for the rejuvenation of somewhat discredited 
behaviourist approaches to the ‘crowd’.  
 
Several variants of frustration-aggression theories
100
 reappeared at this point, some of 
which verged on the fanciful in citing primary causal factors such as ‘hot weather’ for 
the mobilisation of the ‘disorderly crowd’101. Others who were sceptical of the 
‘common motivation’ approach to crowd behaviour focussed on combinations of 
economic and psychological motivations, most notably with the ‘rioting for fun and 
profit’ slant that modelled the individual ‘rioter’ as Adam Smith’s rational ‘homo-
economicus’102. Other academic writers attempted to tip the balance back from the 
emphasis on ideology and political belief in crowd disorders by arguing that these 
ideas should not be generally applied to disturbances because of the existence of 
‘issueless riots’103. Out of this theoretical confusion generated by the unrest in the late 
60s in the U.S. an innovative new approach arose which attempted to escape the 
problems of homogeneity in the ‘common motive’ discourse. 
 
2.2.5  ‘Emergent Norm’ theory and the English ‘riots’ of 1980-81 
 
The turn towards ideological belief as a driver of ‘riot’ had a direct connection with 
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‘convergence’ theory of disorder, which suggested that rather than the ‘crowd’ 
causing people to act in an unusual way (as in Le Bon’s ‘mass hysteria’), people who 
wanted to act in a certain way came together to form crowds. ‘Emergent-norm’ 
theory in contrast to this unresolved dichotomy recognised that although at the outset 
‘crowds’ contained people with various motives and interests, in the process of group 
action certain novel but collectively accepted modes of behaviour could emerge based 
on the actions of prominent individuals. Turner and Killian, the original proponents of 
this approach
104
, stressed the dynamic nature of this process, which overcame the 
thorny problem of homogeneity of ‘belief’ but did not wholly dispense with the 
potential effects of ideology on the participants. 
 
The next significant advances in emergent-norm theory were to occur in the U.K, 
ironically in the very location of the disturbance that was to mark the beginning of the 
‘riotous’ decade of the 1980s. Steven Reicher, then an academic ‘crowd’ theorist at 
Bristol University, collected much of his research evidence in the immediate 
aftermath of the St. Paul’s disturbance of April 2nd 1980. Crucially this consisted of 
formal and informal interviews with participants and onlookers recorded within three 
days of the disturbance. Reicher used this evidence to expose some of the 
inadequacies of the deluge of theory that had appeared from the U.S. in the 1960s and 
70s and to propose a development to the emergent-norm theory of Turner and 
Killian
105. Reicher argued that the evidence he had gathered supported a ‘social 
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identity’ approach106, proposing that the St. Paul’s ‘crowd’ was a social group that 
adopted a common social identification. In the novel experience of the crowd 
disturbance Reicher suggested that such a group would ‘construct an appropriate 
situational identity’ limited by its overall social identification. Thus the limits to the 
behaviour of the crowd were important in that they gave clues as to that social 
identification. Reicher was thus arguing that it is what the crowd doesn’t do that 
becomes important in understanding its nature as a collective entity. These limiting 
behaviours were part of a dynamic process of defining the ‘norms’ of the crowd in an 
extraordinary situation.  
 
Reicher also noted that actions by individuals would only be widely adopted by the 
‘crowd’ (i.e. become norms) if the individuals who undertook them were regarded as 
‘in-group’ (that is identified as part of the collectivity) and the actions were consistent 
with the ‘in-group’s’ social identification. These constraints on behaviour were 
introduced by Reicher to counter a potential weakness he located in the ‘emergent-
norm’ theory relating to ‘outside agitators’. Reicher argued that within Turner and 
Killian’s paradigm, the undefined ‘prominent individuals’ could: 
‘because crowd members are mindless…persuade them to do anything. 
They are especially vulnerable to unscrupulous individuals who want to 
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use crowds to foment disorder…The bad leading the mad’107.  
Having dealt with this potential theoretical pitfall, Reicher then turned towards the 
problem of ‘common motivation’ by arguing that his oral evidence from the St. Paul’s 
‘riot’ supported the view that the shared social identity encapsulated a series of shared 
assumptions including: 
i) they unanimously considered themselves exploited and impoverished by 
the government and financial institutions and perceived themselves the 
victims of regular Police discrimination; (ii) they suffered constant 
humiliation due to their dependency on the welfare system; (iii) they were 
resentful of local retailers who were taking advantage of low local rental 
costs but whose goods were not affordable to the community; and (iv) 
they felt that they had lost the capacity to exert any control over 
community matters.
108
 
These assumptions guided the ‘Crowd’s’ selection of acceptable targets and directed 
the violence but, it must be added, as part of a crowd learning process with ‘deviant’ 
in-group actions being condemned and the protestations of ‘out-group’ interlopers 
being ignored or rejected. Finally, Reicher (at a later date) took issue with the 
ahistorical nature of much of ‘crowd theory’ by introducing the concept of collective 
memory, which he argued: 
‘can sometimes go back well beyond the experience or even the lifetime 
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of any individual member. Crowds will ‘remember’ their supposed 
mistreatment at the hands of another group many years ago and they will 
retain a suspicion and hostility to all members of the other group, 
irrespective of whether they individually have done anything to offend’109 
Reicher’s ‘social identification’ theory of crowd behaviour married together dynamic 
and interactive crowd processes with historical and experientially derived beliefs. 
Effectively this overcame the problem of situational and contextual absences in many 
of the contradictory and bifurcated theoretical approaches that emerged from the U.S. 
in the 1960s. 
 
Reicher's innovations were further systematised in the mid-1980s by a group of 
academics at Sheffield City Polytechnic who developed a general theoretical approach 
to the study of disturbances, named the ‘flashpoint model of public disorder’110. 
Inspired by the American researchers in the 1960s, who dealt with the connection 
between micro and macro effects by prioritising the ‘relationship between a 
precipitating incident and a ‘reservoir’ of grievances’111, the Sheffield team hoped to 
overcome the fragmentation of contemporary approaches. These included the 
sociologists with their structural factors, politicians with cultural explanations and the 
socio-psychologists (such as Reicher) with their examinations of the anatomy of 
‘riot’. The method involved an integrated examination of a particular disturbance 
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from six perspectives: structural, political/ideological, cultural, contextual, situational 
and interactional. The trend of these categories moves from the macro to the micro, 
with the situational and interactional related directly to the ‘trigger’ and escalation of 
a disturbance. The ‘flashpoint model’ was generated out of the analysis of case studies 
of disorder in the early 1980s including demonstrations, industrial picketing and 
community disorders. 
 
2.2.6  Post-modernism and the ‘disorderly crowd’ 
 
The first signs of the post-modernist impact upon concepts of the ‘disorderly crowd’ 
were to be found in the work of the academic Michael Keith who studied disorders in 
London in 1981
112. Keith’s major insight, revolved around the notion of ‘symbolic 
locations’ that were both central to some of the communities that ‘rioted’ as well as 
being the sites of precipitating or ‘trigger’ incidents. Essentially Keith offered 
historical and cultural descriptions of these locations in an attempt to contextualise 
disorders and understand the divergent meanings they had for both the resident 
populace and the police. This was an explicit move away from generalised structural 
considerations such as social class or deprivation as drivers of disturbances and 
towards the protagonists understanding of spaces of contention (‘turf’, ‘no go areas’ 
etc.).  
 
The spatial thread initiated by Keith was developed by a subsequent analyst of urban 
disorder, Max Farrar, who studied disorders in the Chapeltown (1975, 1981) and 
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Harehills (1981, 2001) areas of Leeds in England
113
. Farrar marked the post-modernist 
‘turn’ by stating: 
‘The sociology I am trying to apply here is one which is concerned with 
the emotional dimensions of everyday life as with the material 
dimensions, and seeks to focus simultaneously on the meanings held by 
participants in these events and on their underlying structures’114 
Farrar succinctly marks the division of the subjective (emotional) and objective 
(material) perspectives and the move toward internal meanings (the participants in the 
communities) as against the external (officialdom, academic researchers etc.).  The 
emphasis on ‘everyday life’ was popularised by the French neo-Marxist philosopher 
Henri Lefebvre who the author cited as a major influence on his approach. Using 
Lefebvres’s conceptual framework of the ‘production of social space’115, Farrar 
immediately drew a distinction between the officially designated boundaries of the 
Harehills district of Leeds, those understood by the residents of the area (local 
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knowledge) and the ethnic representation of the space in the wider city
116. Farrar’s 
division between the signifiers and the signified in the form of ‘territory’ and ‘space 
of representation’ is important in understanding the meaning of locales from the 
various contending perspectives.  
 
The general rejection of the essentialisms of class and race inherent in post-modernist 
analysis led to a reassessment of these master categories in the study of the ‘crowd’ 
and urban disorder. This approach effectively reinvigorated the term ‘racialisation’ 
which referred to the processes by which minority ethnic groups were defined and 
represented to the wider populace
117. By way of example, in his study of ‘Harehills’ in 
Leeds, Farrar recognised both the external spatial racialisation of the area and the 
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rejection of this process by the ‘racialised’118. Farrar’s evidence suggested this 
rejection exhibited itself in several forms during and after the disturbances of 2001. 
Initially it was present in the perceptions of local people, who protested at the site of 
the precipitating incident and later in the statements of ‘rioters’ who resisted attempts 
by the police to turn the disorder into a ‘race’ issue119. However, the effect of 
racialisation from the ‘outside’ was to draw the ‘racialised’ into this very framework 
of representation. So despite the fact that many were (violently) rejecting this 
categorisation, other Asians travelled to support the ‘rioters’ because ‘Harehills’ 
represented ‘Asian-ness’ in Leeds and this had to be defended120. This apparent 
contradiction is important, as it explains why participants in the disorders of 1980-81 
often rejected the term ‘race riot’ or denied the primacy of ethnicity as an explanation 
whilst simultaneously accepting that racialisation was operating within the 
disturbances. Racialisation is thus not just a one-way process of representation from 
the outside, but is a dynamic relationship between the labellers and the labelled. 
Participants in disorders may want to be treated equally and may reject their 
categorisation but often remain trapped within its paradigms in how they understand 
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themselves and mobilise.  
 
The move from the rejected master category of ‘race’ to the representation inherent in 
the concept of racialisation marks the transition from objective fact to subjective 
meaning engendered in post-modernist interventions. A similar post-modern tack 
could have been taken with the meaning and representation of social ‘class’, 
effectively unhooking it from its Marxian materialist basis. However, such approaches 
seem to have been few and far between; instead the master category of ‘class’ appears 
to have entered the silence of a post-modernist limbo. There was, however, a critique 
unleashed on the concept of the ‘crowd’ by several writers. In his attack on collective 
behaviour theory, Keith rejected quantitatively derived concepts such as the ‘average 
rioter’ and suggested that ‘the crowd, although a recurrent analytical theme of history, 
is not necessarily a valid object of analysis’. Keith stressed that the homogeneity of 
the concept of the ‘crowd’ both denied the ‘complexity of individual intentions and 
purposes’ in disorders and allowed ‘the rationality of the collective’ to be ‘kidnapped 
by social science and the personal project reclassified as natural response’121.  
 
Hussain and Bagguley launched a similar critique in their study of the Bradford ‘riot’ 
of 2001
122, where they contested the exaggerated emphasis in ‘emergent norm’ theory 
on the ability of a ‘crowd’ to transform its collective identity123 and the concept of a 
cohesive ‘common purpose’. Instead they argued that despite the relative ethnic 
                                                 
121
 Keith’s original emphasis is shown in bold. Keith, Race, Riots and Policing: Lore and Disorder in a 
Multi-Racist Society, pp.79-81. 
122
 Y. Hussain and P. Bagguley, ‘Bradford Riot of 2001: The Diversity of Action,’ in Rioting in the UK 
and France: A Comparative Analysis, eds. D. Waddington and M. King (Devon: Willan, 2009). 
123
 See Section 2.2.5 of this chapter. 
 74 
homogeneity of the participants in Bradford
124
, there was a diversity of actions within 
the ‘crowd’. These included spectating, jeering, attacking the police and looting as 
well as those who were trying to act as intermediaries negotiating between the 
‘rioters’ and the police (the ‘restrainers’) and those who were intervening to prevent 
violence, helping residents who had been caught up in the arson attacks and escorting 
journalists out of the area (the ‘helpers’). The authors argued that the spectacle of 
violent acts, apparently of intense interest to the public, police and media, obscured a 
repertoire of deeds, which represented a ‘variety of behaviours with quite different 
meanings and motivations’. Of particular interest was their recognition that 
participants could take on multiple and apparently contradictory roles at different 
times within in a single disorder
125
. 
 
2.2.7  Sub-culture and social networks 
 
The post-modernist rejection of theories of collective behaviour in favour of 
individual-level ‘diversity of action’ and the associated disaggregation of the ‘crowd’ 
left some uncomfortable silences. Some researchers in response turned to sub-culture, 
ethnography and network theory in an effort to understand the composition of 
disorderly crowds.  
 
Several writers influenced by the works of the theorists of youth sub-culture and 
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deviance of the previous decade
126
 studied the relationships between Black and White 
youth who participated in the disturbances in England in 1980-81. Cashmore’s 1984 
study of youth subcultures
127
 (particularly Skinheads, Rastafarians and Punks) was 
derived from oral histories and focussed on the riots of the early 80s as a defining 
moment. Cashmore claimed that 'young people stopped fighting each other because of 
their colour and fought for themselves. The process had a unifying effect on them and 
brought them together in a common effort'. Cashmore went onto argue that these 
groups were able to overcome sub-cultural divisions in these extraordinary moments 
and to an extent the meshing of these groups that occurred in the disorders was carried 
over into the aftermath. The recognition that many of the ‘crowds’ of young people in 
the ‘riots’ of 1980-81 were composed of Black and White youths united either by 
cross-ethnic sub-cultures or by associations between sub-cultures
128
 spurred further 
research efforts examining these links.  
 
Simon Jones, a researcher in the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies
129
 in 
Birmingham produced an interesting participant-observation ethnographic study of 
the relationships between Black and White youth through the medium of reggae 
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music
130
. Jones critiqued Hebdige's earlier view of 'the phantom history of race 
relations played out on the stylistic surfaces of post-war youth subcultures' by arguing 
that these relations had a ‘substantive and not just 'phantom' history, one that is rooted 
in concrete experience and interaction’131. Jones insistence on the concrete relations 
between youth sub-cultures was, he argued, exhibited by the White appropriation of 
Black culture in the inner cities. This took various forms including speech (patois), 
music (reggae) and sub-culture (Rastafarianism). The meshing of ethnic groups 
through cultural media also led to intra-ethnic sexual and eventually family 
relationships further cementing the bonds between youths and wider sections of their 
respective communities.  
 
Jones also claimed that 'Black forms of counter-school cultures played a hegemonic 
role and acted as paradigms of resistance for young whites’, which were often 
subsequently transmitted to borstals, custodial units, residential homes and detention 
centres.  Jones argued that the experience of mass unemployment amongst the young 
in the early 1980s had a symbiotic relationship with low paid work and the rejection 
of work discipline and wage labour in general. The growing post-school dole queues 
unified inner city Black and White youth and generated survival strategies including 
active participation in communities through cultural and leisure institutions as well as 
'hustling', DIY culture, drug dealing, self-help, mutual aid, cooperation and 
reciprocity. This Jones argued was affecting a counter-narrative to the mythologized 
'good old days' of White working class community. Jones concluded his study by 
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stating that the 'riots' of 1980-85 were as a result of 'a long history of mis-policing of 
inner city and working-class areas’. He noted the celebratory nature of the 'uprisings', 
their 'signifying power...amongst the young’ and that the 'combativity of Black youth 
in inner cities provided an impetus to White youth living in areas of negligible Black 
settlement’ 132.  
 
Although ethnographic studies in urban areas became more common in the late 1980s 
and after
133
, few were fortunate enough to be placed in communities prior to 
subsequent disorders. One of the exceptions was the work of Marwan Mohammed
134
 
in the banlieue
135
 Hautes-Noues of Villiers-sur-Marne, a town on the outskirts of 
Paris. Mohammed carried out an ethnographic study of the role of families in the 
formation of youth gangs between 2001 and 2007 and was present during the 
outbreaks of ‘riots’ in the district during the ‘hot’ autumn of France in 2005136. 
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Mohammed’s close connection to the youth gangs of the area (he personally 
interviewed over eighty members or former members of seven different gangs) 
allowed him to analyse their role within the ‘community’ both during and prior to the 
disorders. Mohammed noted during the disorders the ability of gangs to communicate 
between towns and organise combined operations as well as the effect of their 
superior experience and local knowledge
137
 in their battles with the police.  
 
Central to Mohammed’s paper was the recognition that the gangs operated in two 
arenas: 
‘conventional political activity, such as public demonstrations, calls for 
national press release, work for the weakening of a local public opinion… 
[and] a more unconventional resort to violence and/or intimidation’138 
The relations of force between the gangs and the authorities were predicated on the 
respective threat and fear of violent disorder in the district. As a result negotiations 
between the representatives of the gangs and the civic authorities and the granting of 
significant concessions to the community were a feature of this relationship. 
Mohammed remarked:  
‘Violence and disruption, or the common belief by local politicians that 
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social breakdown is always a possibility, can induce politicisation of 
rioters, or possible rioters, however young they may be. Such 
politicisation must be understood here as part of a process of being 
incorporated as a political actor by local elites – even if that process 
appears to be confined to acts of patronage stimulated by the fear and 
pressure brought to bear by the local youths’139 
These relations of force and apparent patronage
140
 are important in understanding the 
conditions for mobilisation of ‘rioters’ and the range of behaviours both conventional 
and violent that made up their repertoire of actions. Mohammed’s work concretely 
exposes the crucial dichotomy between the apparent spontaneity of ‘disorders’ and 
formal political ‘protest’, which had vexed many sociologists and historians. 
Depending on the political situation, the ‘riotous’ gangs could exercise either type of 
apparently contradictory activity in order to gain concessions from local elites and this 
was recognised and accepted by many in their own communities. 
 
The importance of these sub-cultural and ethnographic studies was that rather than 
approaching the disturbances of 1980-81 in England and 2005 in France from a post-
riot retrospective and distant analyses of arrest figures or the like in order to gauge 
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crowd composition and behaviours
141
 the researchers engaged with some of the 
eventual participants for significant periods prior to the outbreaks. They were able to 
organically describe and contextualise the sub-cultural social networks that were in 
play during the disorders from their own perspective as participant-observers and 
from the oral histories they had obtained. This gave their work a greater depth than 
either the efforts of crowd theorists or their post-modern critics who were generally 
separated from social realities prior to urban unrest.  
2.3  The diffusion of disturbances 
2.3.1  Introduction 
 
The following section reviews theories concerning the spatial and temporal spread of 
disorders. The theoretical developments are charted chronologically, with an eye to 
prevailing political and historical conditions that influenced the studies. Essentially 
two threads of research can be traced in the twentieth century, the first was generated 
by developments in the sciences and mathematics and became rooted in the academic 
discipline of sociology, the second was a later but overlapping development in the 
historical analysis of waves of disorder. In the late twentieth century these threads 
began to intertwine as the techniques of mathematical modelling derived by social 
scientists began to be applied to historical episodes of protest and disorder. The 
constraints that simplistic mathematical modelling had on later usage of the concept 
within the realm of sociology are discussed. Of particular importance was the 
development of definitions of the concepts of diffusion and contagion, which become 
more complex as both historians and sociologists delved into the historical data. 
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2.3.2  Origins of ‘diffusion’ theory 
 
Diffusion, as a scientific phenomenon, first emerged in the early nineteenth century in 
the studies of thermo-dynamic and chemical processes. Crucial within the 
mathematical modelling of these phenomena
142
 was the recognition of diffusion being 
a random but time-dependent process. The use of the concept in other academic 
disciplines followed soon after the scientific discoveries
143
 and first made its 
appearance in the theory of ‘crowds’ in the works of the French social psychologist 
Tardé.  Tardé argued that social systems were effectively psychological relations 
between individuals rather than encompassed by wider and more popular concepts 
such as ‘society’. The key elements of Tardé’s analysis, which were influenced by 
contemporary developments in Chemistry, were the ideas of imitation and innovation. 
These micro relationships were the essential mechanisms of Tardé’s concept of the 
‘group mind’ and acted as explanations of ‘herd-like’ behaviours observed and 
popularised by earlier writers such as Charles Mackay
144
.  
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In parallel to the work of these early geographers, anthropologists and sociologists; 
mathematicians began to expand their use of quantitative models of diffusion from the 
sciences into other disciplines. The first of these innovators was the French 
mathematician Louis Bachelier, who in 1900 applied the mathematics of diffusion to 
model the changes in stock market prices and in so doing founded the sub-discipline 
of financial mathematics. This development opened the way for the application of 
diffusion mathematics into other research arenas. 
 
The first sociologist to use the mathematics of diffusion in an applied manner was 
Earl Pemberton in 1936 in his analysis of the spread of ‘cultural’ innovations145. 
Pemberton’s study and that of Louis Bachelier was to influence the seminal work of 
Everett Rogers whose book ‘The Diffusion of Innovation’ was first published in 
1962
146
. Rogers used extensive case studies to validate a systematic model of the 
spread within social systems of innovations, which he defined as ‘an idea, practice, or 
object that is perceived as new by an individual or other unit of adoption’. Rogers 
emphasised the temporal aspects of this process (for example the changing rate of 
adoption of innovations) and isolated the form and extent of the communication 
channels within a defined social system as being an essential factor in the outcome.  
 
Central to the quantitative theory of Rogers is the ‘S’ curve, which describes the 
cumulative adoption of innovation over time, the derivative of which, is a measure of 
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the rate of change of adoption over time. The latter function generates the distinctive 
‘bell curve’ shown in Figure 1147. The importance of this simple mathematical model 
is that essentially it is the basis for most studies of diffusion that were undertaken in 
the wake of Rogers’s work, albeit in more complex and sophisticated forms. 
 
 
Figure 1: The logistic function and its derivative 
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2.3.3  ‘Diffusion’ and the Historians 
 
As Rogers was publishing his influential work on the diffusion of innovations a 
significant new line of enquiry was being opened up in the discipline of history. 
George Rudé’s studies of disorderly crowds in Britain and France in the 18th and 19th 
centuries involved tracking clusters of disturbances such as food riots, rural disorders 
and episodes of machine breaking
148. The novel aspect of Rudé’s approach was his 
use of maps displaying the temporal and spatial spread of disturbances. These 
unsophisticated visual aids suggested that some kind of contagious effect was in play, 
which was spreading the virus of ‘riot’ along communication routes such as roads and 
canals whilst being magnified by collective gatherings
149. Rudé’s temporal and spatial 
cartographic approach to disorders and protests encouraged other historians to track 
waves of disturbances in a similar fashion. The historical geographer Andrew 
Charlesworth carried out studies of the temporal and spatial dynamics of the spread of 
Swing ‘riots’ in 1830-31 in Southern England using more comprehensive research 
and map detail than Rudé and Hobsbawm
150
. The maps displayed day-by-day paths of 
disorder and delineated towns, major and minor roads as well as geographic features 
such as high ground that might inhibit movement. Charlesworth recognised the 
                                                 
148
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importance of modes and channels of communication in the spread of the ‘Swing’ 
disorders. He demonstrated that ‘word of mouth’, regular collective gatherings such as 
market days in rural areas and the rate of diffusion of news of disturbances along 
major highways by carriage were important mechanisms in the contagious effect.  
 
Charlesworth also argued in agreement with another contemporary champion of 
cartographical approaches, John Bohstedt, that ‘often all we can know about the mode 
of communication of rioting must be inferred from maps charting the spread of 
disturbances’151. Charlesworth’s latter paper was authored during the urban 
disturbances in England of 1981 and he made specific reference to these events in 
stating: 
‘the copycat model is invoked too glibly in societies such as ours where 
media coverage of the first occurrences of riot is extensive, almost 
simultaneous, and predominantly visual’152 
Charlesworth challenged the concept of ‘copycat riots’ by arguing that impact of 
modern rates of communication and forms of media on the diffusion of disorders was 
not a justification for simplification into ahistorical and crude psychological theories 
of ‘imitation’. Instead Charlesworth proposed that cartographical studies of historical 
events when the modes and rates of communication were significantly different were 
key to understanding the effects of the modern media on the diffusion of disturbances. 
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The American historian John Bohstedt employed similar cartographic techniques to 
analyse other episodes of disorder in Britain though with significant expansions and 
emphases. For example, the cartographical aspects of Bohstedt’s joint study with Dale 
Williams of the diffusion of food riots in Devon in the eighteenth century
153
 were 
enhanced by the addition of features such as the relative size of towns, whether they 
had markets and mills and included socio-economic sub-regional boundaries. Of 
particular interest were the authors’ inclusions of previous episodes of ‘riot’ on the 
same chart rather than creating a series of discrete maps covering each episode. This 
allowed them to consider whether the diffusion of disorder in one particular episode 
was influenced by previous waves of disorder sometimes separated by decades. 
Effectively this crudely tested whether collective memories of the successes (and 
failures) of previous disorderly protest that may have given rise to traditions or 
‘cultures of riot’ were playing a part in the propensity for towns to mobilise. Another 
important innovation in their approach was to consider ‘silences’ in the data by 
examining the geography and attributes of the towns that failed to ‘riot’.  
 
Integral to Bohstedt and Williams’ description of ‘riotous’ towns were some 
interesting observations that the food 'rioters' created their own ad hoc means of 
organisation and communication, that formal occupational groups (militia volunteers, 
sailors, weavers etc.) were involved as collectivities and maintained informal 
                                                 
153
 Bohstedt studied waves of food riots in 1766, 1795 and 1801. Although published in journal form in 
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networks often through their institutional linkages. The authors argued that 'hardship, 
outrage and riot ‘news' did not create crowds out of floating individuals, rather these 
factors were most likely to bring about riots by galvanising networks of people 
already used to cooperating’154. Bohstedt and Williams concluded with a revealing 
quote about the possibility of success or failure of contagious processes: 
‘Some seeds of riot fell on rock - where there was no medium of 
supportive networks - and so withered away. And some of the seeds fell 
among thorns - where they were choked by prudent charity from the 
gentry. And some of the seeds fell on fertile soil, and grew-supported by 
the community networks - and yielded a great harvest of protest in times 
of dearth’ 155 
This important statement recognised that the existence of appropriate social networks, 
traditions of protest and inhibiting actions by local elites provided the contextual basis 
for the outbreak and spread of disturbances. Conditions could vary between locales 
and the conjunction of these contextual factors could increase (or inhibit) the 
propensity for collective violence. 
 
2.3.4  Modelling the U.S. disorders of the 1960s  
 
Charlesworth’s and Rudé’s ground breaking move towards spatial and temporal 
cartographical analyses and Bohstedt’s emphasis on the combination of this with 
‘thick’ description, were useful tools in attempts to understand diffusion and 
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contagion of rural disorder. However a problem remained as to whether it was 
possible to quantitatively assess the relative importance of these various factors. In 
order to understand the subsequent developments in theory and methodology of 
diffusion of disturbances within historical studies we have to step back to the urban 
disorders of the 1960s in the United States. 
 
As has been stated previously in this chapter, the most comprehensive and detailed 
study of the U.S. disorders of the 1960s was the report of the Kerner Commission 
published in 1968. Despite its limitations there was recognition in this document of 
diffusion effects. In a section aptly named ‘Patterns of Disorder’, the authors noted: 
‘In 1967, disorders occurred with increasing frequency as summer 
approached and tapered off as it waned. More than 60 per cent of the 164 
disorders occurred in July alone’156 
The recognition of a generalised wave of ‘riots’ that grew, peaked and declined across 
the nation in 1967 was further deconstructed in the report to reveal temporal and 
spatial clustering effects of disturbances around major riots in Newark and Detroit.  
 
Seymour Spilerman was the first academic to attempt systematic mathematical 
modelling of the diffusion of disorders of the 1960s
157
. Using a generalised Poisson 
distribution, Spilerman attempted to match selected variations of this model with 
actual distributions of disturbances in the U.S. between 1961 and 1968. The standard 
Poisson distribution assumes that the probability of an event occurring is unchanging 
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over time, is identical for each potential event and crucially that events themselves are 
independent
158.  Spilerman’s model is compared to the observed data in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Comparison of observed number of cities experiencing disorders for the U.S. (1961-68) 
compared to a basic Poisson distribution 
 
Spilerman found that the calculated distributions failed to fit the historical data in the 
basic model and hypothesised that this was due to the assumptions in the Poisson 
relationship. These included the supposition of equal disorder-proneness of cities as a 
constant over time and the independence of each disorder, effectively the assumption 
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that the occurrence of a disorder in a city does not affect the likelihood of another 
within that city or in any other city. 
 
Spilerman investigated the effect of these constraints by modifying his model and 
came to the conclusion that: 
‘an assumption of heterogeneity in community disorder-proneness, which 
derives from underlying differences among cities, is necessary to explain 
the distribution of disturbances’159  
Spilerman rejected ideas of temporal and spatial contagion
160
 (which affect the 
dependency of events) and followed up his focus on the underlying differences 
between cities by testing a series of structural variables including ‘weak social 
integration’, ‘alienation from the political system’ and ‘relative deprivation’. None of 
these appeared to correlate with the data and so in rejecting the relevance of structural 
factors he concluded; 
‘I would argue that although different communities are not equally prone 
to racial disturbance, the susceptibility of an individual Negro to 
participating in a disorder does not depend upon the structural 
characteristics of the community in which he resides. As for the 
community propensity, it is an aggregate of the individual values-the 
larger the Negro population, the greater the likelihood of a disorder. Little 
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else appears to matter.’161 
Despite Spilerman’s rather glib conclusion his mathematical efforts opened the way 
for a series of more sophisticated attempts to model the distribution of U.S. 
disturbances in the 1960s. 
 
Researchers began to focus on how ‘riot’ participants gained and transferred 
knowledge about disturbances. Singer’s interviews with nearly five hundred persons 
arrested during the Detroit riot of 1967
162
 was aimed at isolating the form and extent 
of media from which information was gathered about disorders, the content of those 
‘messages’ and their impact on the receiver. Singer found, unsurprisingly, plenty of 
evidence that rapid ‘word of mouth’ communication networks were in action within 
the ‘riotous’ communities in U.S. cities (the intra-urban) but also that television and 
radio played an important role in the transfer of disorder knowledge between cities 
(the inter-urban).  
 
In addition Singer made two other salient observations, firstly, that knowledge of 
previous ‘riots’ in other cities did have a reinforcing affect upon the participants and 
secondly that communities that were already ‘primed’ for or engaged in disorder only 
required specific information (such as time and location) rather than emotive 
messages to begin the final stage of engagement. The importance of Singer’s research 
is that it debunked the idea that television images allied with passive consumers alone 
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spread disturbances, typically the central pillar of ‘copycat’ theories. Mass electronic 
media did serve a function on an inter-urban level in spreading information but that 
once that message was exposed to primed communities it passed from the passive 
relationship between broadcast and viewer to the active realm of the social network. 
 
Developments in the mathematical modelling of diffusion of disturbances were 
restricted in the mid-70s, mainly due to the decline of U.S. governmental funding in 
response to the urban disorders of the mid to late 60s. Of the remaining quantitative 
studies, the changing political situation of the mid 70s refocused government-
academic funding, directing it towards the analysis of aeroplane hijackings, coup 
d’états, revolutions and other forms of formal political violence163. Although ‘riots’ 
had been subsumed into the frameworks of protest and political violence by some 
researchers
164
, specific studies were few and far between. This situation began to 
change with the advent of easy access to both mainframe and personal computers in 
Universities for mathematical modelling
165
.  
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Two key papers from the American mid-west (both originally presented in 1976) 
marked the resurgence of interest in the temporal and spatial spread of U.S. urban 
riots in the 1960s. The first, authored by Midlarsky
166
, examined the period of 
numerous and intense riots of 1966-67, using the numbers of arrests as the key 
variable and a lognormal distribution as the mathematical model
167. Midlarsky’s 
choice of this function was an explicit attempt to deal with the problems of severe 
positive skew and over-dispersion demonstrated in previous analyses of the 
distribution of disorders
168
. Figure 3 shows the relationship between the observed data 
and the lognormally distributed prediction for the disorders in the U.S. for the period 
1966-67
169
. The positive skew and over-dispersion effects in the real data are palpable 
despite the extreme flexibility of the lognormal distribution
170
.  
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Figure 3: Comparison of observed data and lognormally predicted distribution for the number of 
arrests in U.S. disorders 1966-67 
 
Midlarsky’s response to these quantitative deviations was to suggest that more than 
one process was underway which in combination distorted the real data away from the 
lognormal model. His solution was to study the patterns of disorder in 1966-67 over 
time, which demonstrated a similar positive skew effect particularly in the period of 
the massive ‘riots’ in Newark and Detroit in July 1967. This is schematically 
represented using Rogers’s logistic function for diffusion in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 demonstrates that the rate of adoption in the observed data is increased in the 
early part of the ‘S’ curve and lessened in the latter part. 
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Figure 4: Schematic representation of positive skew (contagious) effects using the logistic 
function to model adoption by diffusion 
 
Midlarsky explained this phenomenon by stating that the precipitating incidents for 
disorders:  
‘were assumed independent from each other. That is, each precipitating 
incident leading to a disorder, such as an encounter between Black 
residents and the Police or shopkeepers on the street in the local 
community, is independent of all of the others. This is a diffusion process 
in which each incident results in a consequence similar to other disorders, 
but each of them began independently of the other. However, the lesser 
applicability of this model to the intervening period in 1967 (in particular, 
the clustering effect [around the massive disorders in Newark and 
Detroit]…), indicates that this assumption was violated, and that a 
different process operated here. This latter period may be termed 
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contagious, in which separate incidents are not required to spark a 
disturbance, but a common process may have operated to generate the 
disorders.’171 
Midlarsky attributed this violation of the independence of events within classical 
diffusion theory to ‘hierarchical contagion’; effectively a second process which he 
tested and stated was as a result of ‘the dependence of small cities upon the behaviour 
of large ones, and the accelerated occurrence of disorders in small cities when larger 
ones are experiencing disturbances.’ These observations led Midlarsky to redefine the 
concepts of diffusion; 
‘the cumulative impact of a set of statistically independent events. The 
modal response to the independent precipitating events may be the same 
(a disorder), but the individual initiations are mutually independent.’  
And contagion; 
‘the spread of a particular type of behaviour through time and space as the 
result of a prototype or model performing the behaviour and either 
facilitating that behaviour in the observer or reducing the observer's 
inhibitions against performing that same behaviour’ 172 
Midlarsky’s statistical separation and definition of these two processes, was an 
important advance and led to his observation that the latter process was ‘more 
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susceptible to social-psychological investigation’ than the former. 
 
The second influential paper of the mid 70s, authored by Pitcher et al.
173
 noted the 
limitations of Rogers’s mathematics of diffusion in earlier studies of political 
violence
174
. The authors argued in the classical model of diffusion of innovation the 
communicators (admen and salesmen) had already adopted and were aware of the 
cost-benefit relationship of that adoption whereas in the diffusion of disorder this 
process was less clear. They also rejected the assumption in the earlier theory that 
adopters and potential adopters were in direct communication. Studies of disorders 
also showed that, unlike the classical theory, which assumed adoption could only 
occur once for each population unit, multiple adoptions (disorders) succeeding each 
other could occur. Finally in line with Midlarsky’s findings they noted the asymmetry 
of distributions of disorder and located this in the failure of the classical assumption 
that the rate of adoption is constant. Instead they argued that the rate of adoption 
changed over time creating the asymmetric features.  
 
The authors used a mathematical model employing differential equations
175
 to study 
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the temporal diffusion of violence but with some interesting changes in emphasis 
from the classical model of diffusion of innovation. Rather than assuming an 
independent process of adoption, they proposed a model that took into account: 
‘social contagion wherein the units are instigated and inhibited by the 
information they receive through time about one another's behaviour and 
its consequences. Hence, the modifier collective here implies a population 
of units separated in time and space and influencing one another as they 
act together on the basis of second-hand information and without 
hierarchical leadership’176 
Pitcher et al, thus rejected the purely random processes of the classical diffusion 
theory. They explicitly recognised in their mathematical model contagious 
communication processes between actors and crucially that these actions could both 
increase and decrease the likelihood of adoption of collective violence. Using a series 
of varied data sets
177
, including civil disorders, the authors were able to test their 
mathematical model against real incidents
178
.  
 
The results of the analysis showed that of all the various types of incidents, the civil 
disorders in the U.S. in 1966, and as Midlarsky had demonstrated, particularly in 1967 
were the least easy to model. The authors put this failure of the model down to the 
massive and severe Newark disorder of July 1967, which they claimed received 
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intensive media coverage. They went on to state: 
‘This greater than usual media coverage evidently produced a 
discontinuity, a jump in the instigation process. Over one-half of the 83 
disorders in 1967 occurred in the two-week period immediately following 
the Newark coverage.’179 
The problem of fitting the U.S. civil disorders to the model extended to the case 
studies of riots in general, whether in 1960s or the 1830s. The results suggested that a 
significant reinforcement of contagion was occurring which was not solely 
attributable to the effect of mass electronic media.  
 
The importance of the work of Midlarsky and Pitcher et al was their joint rejection of 
Spilerman’s claims that contagious effects were not present in the disorders in the 
1960s, their general critique of the base assumptions of the classical models of 
diffusion and their efforts to include such effects in their new mathematical models. 
The reversal of Spilerman’s closure led to further more sophisticated attempts to 
analyse cycles of ‘riots’, which appeared to be the most difficult forms of collective 
violence to mathematically model.  
 
In Govea and West’s study of ‘riot contagion’ in Latin America between 1949 and 
1963
180
, the authors argued that the lack of previous research into dynamic processual 
effects in the diffusion of disorders was a product of simplistic approaches that 
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attempted to directly link attribute variables (such as the size of the Black population 
or relative deprivation) with the magnitude of the collective violence that was 
unleashed. For Govea and West this approach effectively ignored temporal 
relationships and reinforcement effects that may have occurred during the process of 
diffusion. Instead they postulated a more complex alternative model based upon a 
series of stages that included the preconditions for violence as well as the processes 
within the actual cycle of violence itself. Each stage of the progression was influenced 
by intervening variables, which altered according to the phase of the process that had 
been reached. The two models, the traditional and an alternative proposed by the 
authors are reproduced in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
Traditional conception of political violence 
 
 
 
 
 
Alternative model of political violence 
Figure 5: Govea and West’s traditional and alternative models of political violence 
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which affected the preconditions for disorder, precipitating events and influences 
which affected the possibility of the onset of violence and the dynamic process of 
disorder itself which was affected by other variables (such as state responses, 
communication channels etc.). The authors argued that the separation of stages 
resolved the empirically problematic linkage of structural and other such attributes 
with the magnitude of disorder, effectively rendering them indirectly related. 
 
In order to test their hypothesis, the authors employed a standard Poisson distribution 
(as a control) representing independence of events and a positively skewed 
‘contagious Poisson distribution’ in an attempt to take account of dependent 
variables
181
 where reinforcement (or inhibition) effects altered the probability of 
adoption during the process. Using a quantitative measure of deviation of the 
observed data from the two models
182
 allowed the researchers to gauge the degree of 
contagious effects that were in play in any cycle of disorders.  
 
The authors studied both long cycles (over several years) and individual cycles of 
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disorder (over weeks and months) for individual Latin American countries
183
 using 
the various models and came to the conclusion that several nations experienced 
contagious effects but there were significant differences in the form of these 
reinforcement phenomena. The authors defined the category of ‘chronic contagion’, 
which was observed over the longer cycles of disorder and which deviated from the 
standard Poisson distribution but matched the contagious version. In contrast, ‘acute 
contagion’ was related to intense periods of unrest over short cycles of disorder and 
deviated from even the ‘contagious Poisson distribution’. This led the authors to a 
new definition of contagion that included ‘spontaneity’, and which was ‘the 
unplanned spread of a particular type of behaviour as the result of one actor’s 
performing the behaviour and facilitating that behaviour in the observer’184 rather than 
a planned instrumental response, which they regarded as a separate category.  
 
The work of Midlarsky and Pitcher et al in the 1970s and Govea and West in the early 
80s exposed contagious processes in the spread of disorders and developed 
measurements of these effects. In so doing the researchers noted a deeper complexity 
in the differentiation of independent (diffusion) and dependent (contagious) events. 
Further advances were to follow in the late 1980s and 1990s that sought to model 
these effects in detail within the temporal process of the spread of disturbances rather 
than as external comparisons.  
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2.3.5  ‘Event history’ analysis 
 
‘Event history’ analysis of disorders first appeared in the late 1980s as a result of the 
emphasis on the rate of occurrence of collective events by researchers of collective 
protest such as Tilly and as a by-product of the mathematics developed within bio-
statistics and industrial engineering
185
. The advantages of event history analyses of 
cycles of protest or disorder were in the temporal modelling of a process rather than 
treating the cycle as a series or distribution of discrete events. As had been noted by 
several researchers
186
, one of the problems with standard diffusion models was the 
assumption of spatial and temporal homogeneity. Strang and Tuma who pioneered the 
integration of temporal and spatial heterogeneity into event-history diffusion models 
defined these terms: 
‘Spatial homogeneity means that all members of the population have the 
same chance of affecting and being affected by each other. Temporal 
homogeneity means that the potential influence of prior adoption events 
does not vary with the length of time since their occurrence. These 
assumptions make the mathematics of diffusion relatively tractable. But 
they also render diffusion analyses uninformed by, and uninformative 
about, the social structure of the population under study’187 
                                                 
185
 For Tilly’s ground breaking work on collective protest see note 78. A useful summary of event 
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 D. Strang and N. B. Tuma, ‘Spatial and Temporal Heterogeneity in Diffusion,’ American Journal of 
Sociology 99, no. 3 (1993), p.615. 
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In contrast to the top-down (macro) fitting of statistical distributions to ‘real’ data sets 
and the classic assumption of homogeneity, Strang and Tuma returned to the micro-
level in proposing ‘individual-level models of diffusion that allow heterogeneity both 
within the population and over time’. Effectively the micro level spatial and temporal 
relationships between initiating events and potential events (based upon ‘real’ event 
history data) are set up and the model is allowed to run its course. The simplest 
models represented classical diffusion functions with assumptions of independence 
and homogeneity. In stages, more complexity (such as temporal and spatial 
heterogeneous variables) was then added. Statistical measures of the fit of the model 
to the ‘real’ data are taken after the addition of each assumption or variable in order to 
gauge the ‘success’ of the additions and to guide the researcher in deciding on the 
next modification of the variables. 
 
One of the first researchers to directly apply event-history models containing spatial 
and temporal heterogeneity to cycles of disorder was Daniel Myers who returned to 
the analysis of the disturbances of the U.S. in the 1960s. Myers recognised that the 
problems that Spilerman, Midlarsky and Pitcher et al. faced in modelling diffusion 
and contagion of disorders were down to the inflexibility and inadequacy of the top-
down classical mathematical models they employed
188
. Myers re-examined 
Spilerman’s data on the U.S. riots in the 1960s utilising event-history micro-
relationships and introduced three new variables to the model.  
 
The first, a spatial contagion variable, tested the hypothesis that ‘riots in one city 
                                                 
188
 D. Myers, ‘Racial Rioting in the 1960s: An Event History Analysis of Local Conditions,’ American 
Sociological Review 62, no. 1 (1997), p.95. 
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increase the likelihood of rioting in other cities and that other riots are more likely in 
cities closest to where the original rioting occurred’189. Myers also recognised that the 
impact of the mass electronic media of the 1960s may have had a national effect on 
diffusion of disorder. The second variable thus reflected the influence of the number 
of riots that occurred nationally in the previous week regardless of their location. 
Lastly, he included the square of this variable to model the decreasing (and possibly 
inhibiting) effect of numerous riots.  
 
These progressively complex models showed significantly better fits to the observed 
data than the relatively crude efforts of the previous researchers. In contrast to 
Spilerman’s original conclusions that there were no contagious effects, Myers stated: 
‘local conditions did indeed contribute to the occurrence of racial rioting in the 1960s’ 
and he went on to add;  
‘once a riot broke out, that event increased the likelihood that other riots 
would break out elsewhere in the near future-particularly in cities 
geographically close to the original riot. These results are robust across a 
variety of models’190 
The use of event history modelling thus provided strong evidence for both national 
and regional contagion effects that had been hinted at by the earlier findings of 
Midlarsky and Pitcher et al.  
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In a succeeding paper
191
 Myers enhanced his models to both overcome limitations in 
the classical mathematics of diffusion and to take account of additional relevant 
variables. The constraint of single adoptions inherent in Rogers’s original model of 
diffusion of innovation was remedied by allowing actors to adopt repeatedly. Myers 
also added the decay of contagious influence over time, the seasonal effects of the 
weather
192
 and a measure of the intensity of riots on the basis that this would be a 
marker of the quantity of media coverage and thus infectiousness.  
 
These enhancements further improved the fit of the model to the observed data set and 
exposed additional underlying complexities in the pattern of disturbance. Myers stated 
that the analysis ‘demonstrates that diffusion occurred both through spatially 
homogenous and spatially heterogeneous processes and was characterised by a series 
of waves within waves’193. This interesting observation recognised that the overall 
temporal distribution of disorders was actually partly composed of brief mini-cycles 
of diffusion. So whilst the national picture of diffusion might appear to be spatially 
homogenous due to the effects and extent of the mass media, it actually also contained 
simultaneous heterogeneity in the form of mini-cycles of diffusion which were 
regional or even city-based and thus subject to local conditions of instigation and 
inhibition. This important observation led Myers to follow several new avenues of 
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research.  
 
The first path that Myers followed was concerned with the ‘local’ as a result of the 
detection of mini-cycles of disturbance centred on major cities in the U.S. in the 
1960s. Using similar spatially and temporally heterogeneous event-history models 
Myers investigated a series of questions related to the contagious effect of riot extent 
and intensity, the relationship of larger cities to nearby smaller neighbours and the 
asymmetry of media communications between them
194
. Myers demonstrated that 
severe riots certainly had a greater contagious effect than the less intense incidents 
although this influence decayed rapidly, such that after one week or so the impact was 
negligible. He also argued that: 
‘...there are always substantially more riots in big cities than in small ones, 
but this difference wanes over time because riots in the big cities are 
propelling additional riots in small cities, but the riots in small cities are 
being ignored by the big cities’195 
Myers attributed this phenomenon to the unequal infrastructure of media 
communications and resources where large cities with TV stations defined their 
‘local’ events as having greater newsworthiness than that at the geographical 
periphery and broadcast this information outwards to smaller population centres. This 
asymmetry in the communication of information about disturbances, he argued, 
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created a ‘further exaggeration of the influence of riots in large, media rich cities’196.  
 
The second avenue Myers investigated was related to his findings of simultaneous 
spatial homogeneity and heterogeneity in the diffusion of disturbance. In an earlier 
paper, Myers made a revealing statement: 
‘Because spatially homogenous diffusion is dependent upon the 
technology of mass media, the relative importance of spatially 
homogenous and heterogeneous diffusion should be expected to vary 
based on the historical epoch of the collective violence wave in 
question.  Specifically, as one studies collective violence waves in times 
prior to radio and television, national-level diffusion should be a much 
weaker force relative to distance-dependent diffusion’197 
Myers thus argued that the relative influence of the homogenous and heterogeneous 
aspects of spatial diffusion of disorders would vary according to the prevalent 
mechanisms for communication of information in that particular historical era. For 
Myers, modern mass electronic communication (television and radio) encouraged 
national-level homogeneity in the spread of disturbances as it had little time delay (a 
few hours, at most) and was spatially generalised in that the consumers received 
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similar information throughout the country. In contrast, spatial heterogeneity of 
diffusion was more prevalent when news of disorders travelled by word of mouth 
along physical communication routes creating delays in action and differences in 
exposure to the information. 
 
The impact of ‘event-history’ methodology reveals the extent to which the 
development of the mathematics of diffusion and contagion had progressed over a 
century. In its early stages human beings were effectively treated as ‘molecules’ 
lacking any agency and driven purely by unchanging and independent probabilities. 
By the end of the century the unconscious ‘adopters’ were being more realistically 
considered as ‘actors’, that is, communicating participants whose agency created 
dependent events and heterogeneous effects in the diffusion of disorders. Myers’s 
summarised this succinctly in his definition of contagion as: 
‘a rational form of inter-actor influence in which potential actors observe 
and evaluate the outcomes of others' behaviours and then make a decision 
for themselves about whether or not to adopt the behaviour. Our study, 
then, is oriented simply to viewing outbreaks of collective behaviour as 
flowing from the decisions of rational actors situated within social 
networks of influence, rather than as series of spontaneous, disconnected 
and independent events.’198 
Event-history mathematics not only took account of the effects of diffusion and 
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contagion but in its latter developments allowed testing of structural factors within a 
more realistic framework than had been available to the researchers of the 1960s and 
70s. In this sense it offered a holistic solution to the problem of integrating the various 
factors that generated the preconditions for collective violence as well as opening the 
way for the incorporation of the ‘disorderly crowds’ into the repertoires of action in 
social movements
199
. 
  
2.4  Discussion 
 
This review of the history of developments in the parallel sub-disciplines of theories 
of the ‘disorderly crowd’ and the diffusion of disturbances outlines a series of 
qualitative observations and quantitative tools that are employed in subsequent 
chapters.  
 
From the perspective of the ‘crowd’ the insights of the British Marxist school of 
history concerning the role of the authorities, the composition of the crowds, the 
existence of diverse and dynamic agendas and the understanding of ‘riot’ as protest 
were significant observations. The U.S. sociologists recognised the importance of 
both structural and situational contexts in understanding disorders. Reicher’s use of 
emergent-norm theory to identify dynamic collective identities generating common 
motivations but limited by in-group and out-group status represented a more 
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sophisticated situational analysis of crowd behaviour. The Post-Modernists 
contributed notions of symbolic locations, public space and diversities of motive and 
action within disorders. Neo-Marxist anti-essentialists offered the concepts of 
ethnicity and racialisation (rather than ‘race’) to the mix. Finally the participant-
observation driven ethnographic studies added richer descriptions of the sub-cultural 
and ethnic social networks in play in the early 1980s. All of these approaches are 
utilised in the analysis of ‘crowds’ in the unrest in England in 1980-81. 
 
The subsequent analysis of the spread of disorders utilises elements of the 
cartographical techniques and observations pioneered by the historians of unrest 
Rudé, Charlesworth and Bohstedt. The quantitative study of diffusion generated by 
Rogers and developed by the sociologists investigating the U.S. disturbances of the 
1960s is used to analyse the wave of unrest in England in July 1981. In particular, the 
concepts of independence (diffusion) and dependence (contagion) of events described 
by the earlier studies are examined both quantitatively and qualitatively. Although 
event-history mathematics is not utilised in this thesis, the insights of Myers and 
others concerning heterogeneous and homogenous, spatial and temporal 
characteristics of disturbance waves and mini-waves are employed in the subsequent 
analyses. 
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3.0 Sources and Methodology 
3.1  Introduction 
 
The principal objective of this chapter is to outline the historical sources and 
methodological approaches that were employed to generate and analyse the research 
evidence in this thesis. The chapter is divided into two sections; the first is a review of 
the primary and secondary sources relevant to the micro history of the Bristol 
disorders in April 1980 and the macro-study of the country-wide July wave in 1981. 
The second section outlines the various methodological approaches including 
quantitative analysis, cartography, oral history, social network analysis and 
ethnography. 
 
Given the nature of urban ‘riot’, the principal challenge in this thesis was to find 
robust evidence for both the micro and macro analyses of disturbances. The explosive, 
rapidly transient and ‘criminal’ nature of collective violence creates significant 
problems in obtaining useful evidence for the writing of history. ‘Riots’ are 
unpredictable events even within the midst of a general wave of unrest or when a 
media driven moral panic is in operation that is forecasting outbreaks of disorder. 
When they do happen they are generally spasmodic, hurried events that can last a few 
hours or appear staccato-like over a few days. Even if a researcher is located near a 
particular incident, it is rare that they will be present in the early phases of an 
outbreak, particularly during the precipitating event or the initial mobilisations. This 
is also the case for the majority of participants (and journalists) who usually arrive 
sometime after this has occurred. Consequently, determining how the disorder was 
‘triggered’ is a particular problem for researchers as rumour and post-riot justification 
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often overwhelm the original eyewitness accounts (if they are available). Similarly, 
the agenda of the ‘riotous crowd’ is dynamic, may be unrelated to the original 
precipitating incident and as the disturbance develops in terms of numbers of 
participants and intensity, can become, depending on the context, by degree unified, 
fragmentary or incoherent
200. Other researchers have argued that ‘riots’ contain a 
repertoire of definable activities (such as ‘rioters’ and ‘looters’) as well as 
unconnected participants who travel to disturbances
201
. This problem is compounded 
by the observation that a single participant can undertake different and sometimes 
contradictory roles within a particular disturbance ranging from counter-rioter 
activities, peace-making, negotiating as well as carrying out violent actions and 
damage to property
202
.  
 
‘Riots’ have both spatial and social ‘insides’ and ‘outsides’, which also hinder the 
gathering and objectivity of eyewitness accounts
203
. Physically, a disorder may 
delineate a ‘no go’ area for some eyewitnesses as well as researchers, journalists or 
photographers. This inevitably places them on the outside, typically behind police 
lines or in the presence of spectators and counter-rioters. As has been noted by several 
analysts this spatial positioning of the camera alters perceptions and modifies the 
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understanding of a disorder
204
. Similarly, being spatially on the inside of a ‘riot’ does 
not entail being part of that event or save the observer, particularly photographers, 
camera people or reporters from being (violently) excluded. Being part of a ‘riot’ is 
not just a matter of location it involves being socially included, an active insider.  
 
These difficulties are enhanced by the inherent criminality of disorder that makes 
anonymity, loyalty and denial necessary attributes of the ‘rioter’ who wants to escape 
incarceration. Typically those that are arrested are seldom a representative sample of 
the participants
205
 and despite the claims of the authorities are rarely ‘ringleaders’ (if 
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such a category exists). In addition the complexity, legal severity of ‘riot’ and its 
popular (and historical) association with unfortunate ‘scapegoats’ makes the 
courtroom a place where facts and motives are harder to ascertain than for many other 
forms of offence. Outside of the courtroom, the need for ‘riot’ participants to retain 
anonymity in order to escape arrest and prosecution necessarily limits publicly 
available testimony particularly in the immediate aftermath. All of these facets of 
‘riot’ make finding quality primary sources of evidence from the ‘inside’ difficult. 
Whilst the novelty and shock value of the disturbances of 1980-81 did generate a 
large number of primary sources, these were mostly from ‘outsider’ perspectives, 
partisan and of limited value. The more robust information was much harder to 
obtain. 
 
The approach adopted was first, to study the events of July 1981 from a quantitative 
macro perspective and second, to carry out a comparative case study using a micro 
history of the ‘riots’ in Bristol in April 1980. These two different lines of enquiry 
required different methodological strategies. Data for the macro study was generated 
by a countrywide survey of local newspapers, specific arrest statistics and utilised 
relevant secondary sources. It also entailed mass quantitative analysis for the 
categorisation of disturbance severity and the analysis of local and national trends 
within the data. In addition cartographic software was deployed for the production of 
maps.  
 
The micro study employed various primary sources including hitherto restricted 
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police documents, publicly available police, local government and public inquiry 
reports, local and national newspapers, television footage, photographs, minutes from 
Crown Court cases, community newspapers and crucially oral history testimonies 
from participants in disturbances in three different locales in Bristol. Available 
secondary sources were limited to one book and the few academic papers of 
relevance. Tabular formats were employed to display the quantitative data that 
provided demographic background analysis of the various locales that experienced 
disturbances. Maps were constructed to delineate the neighbourhoods under study and 
oral history testimonies from residents and participants in the disturbances were then 
added to develop the analysis of the different areas.  
 
The narratives of three disturbances in Bristol were generated from primary and 
secondary sources with an emphasis on those facets of the events that had been under-
researched or ignored in previous accounts. In two of the three disturbances studied 
wholly new historical narratives were created from the oral history evidence and the 
few existing primary sources (local and community newspapers). Cartographical 
techniques were used to both locate the extent of the disturbances in each locale and 
in one case to map out in detail the various movements of the police and crowds 
during the unrest. The subsequent examination of the under-researched aspects of the 
three disorders used quantitative analysis, social network theory and ethnography to 
illuminate the evidence. 
 
In the following sections, the primary and secondary sources and the various 
methodological approaches are examined in more detail. Where relevant the origins of 
the source data, the choice of the methodological approaches and the limitations of 
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these sources and methods are outlined and explained.  
 
3.2  Sources 
3.2.1  Secondary Sources 
 
It is pertinent to begin the analysis of the evidential bases that underpin this thesis by 
considering the secondary sources concerning violent urban disturbance in England in 
1980-81 that were available during the research activity. This section is divided into 
those secondary sources that related to the disorders in Bristol in April 1980 and those 
that were concerned with the larger numbers of disturbances that transpired 
countrywide in 1981. Attention is drawn to the form, content and limitations of the 
data that was used to construct these secondary sources. In addition, omissions in the 
evidential base and phases or locations of ‘riots’ that were under researched or 
ignored are highlighted.  
 
3.2.1.1 Bristol 1980 
 
The April 1980 disturbances in Bristol produced only one dedicated book ‘To Ride 
the Storm: The 1980 Bristol ‘Riot’ and the State’206 published in 1983 and authored 
by academic researchers Harris Joshua, Tina Wallace and Heather Booth. The 
strength of the account of the events in St. Paul’s on April 2nd 1980 delivered by the 
authors’ lies in its detailed and logical analysis of the available official reports, court 
statements and police testimony and the contradictions therein. However, there are 
obvious omissions in the evidence they gathered and selected for analysis. The irony 
of this is lost on the authors’ when they state in their critique of local government 
investigations of the ‘Bristol Riot’: 
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‘It must be stressed that at no stage in these local negotiations were either 
the community in St. Paul’s or participants in the violent confrontation 
involved. Thus the perspectives that were ‘squeezed out’ were not, as it 
were, the ‘demands of the rioters’ but the very perspectives evolved 
within the state’ 207 
Yet the authors followed the same policy by failing to put the actual perspectives of 
the participants forward rather than their own assessment based on at best the 
testimony of defendants or community representatives from St Paul’s.  
 
Tellingly, the most extensively researched section of ‘To Ride the Storm’ is that 
dealing with the 1981 Crown Court trial in Bristol for the serious charge of ‘riotous 
assembly’208 in which sixteen persons were retrospectively selected from more than a 
hundred defendants who were originally indicted for less serious offences connected 
to the April 2
nd
 disturbances. Part of the remit of the prosecution in this trial and a 
fundamental foundation for the case was to prove that the disturbance in St. Paul’s 
constituted a ‘riot’ in law209. As a result there were significant pressures to 
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substantiate this assertion by moulding the circumstantial and specific evidence 
provided by the police witnesses both temporally and spatially
210
. The consequent 
contradictions in this evidence relating to the timing of particular incidents during the 
disturbances was compounded by claims by one of the defence barristers that key 
documents such as the log of radio and telephone calls to the police had not been 
made available to them
211
. The evidence provided in these cases, with all the problems 
inherent in the environment of the court in which defendants are potentially facing 
long terms in gaol, is about the closest the authors’ got to actual testimony from the 
participants.  
 
The only other available secondary source of note, Steven Reicher’s paper ‘The St. 
Paul’s riot: An explanation of the limits of crowd action in terms of a social identity 
model’212 (published in 1984) approached the disturbance of 2nd April from a different 
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sub-disciplinary angle, that of crowd theory. Reicher, then an academic at Bristol 
University, collected much of his research evidence in the immediate aftermath of the 
St. Paul’s disturbance. Crucially this consisted of formal and informal interviews with 
participants and onlookers recorded within three days of the disturbance.  
 
As far as providing evidence for the research activity in this thesis, Reicher’s paper 
contains a key section that provides a detailed chronological list of the main events of 
the April 2
nd
 disturbance in St. Paul’s. Incidents were only included in this narrative if 
two or more sources recorded the event independently. Reicher’s account 
consequently differs from those presented in ‘To Ride the Storm’ as it contains 
evidence from both the perspective of the police, bystanders and crucially the crowd. 
The comparison of these versions provides a useful perspective on the relative 
viewpoints and helps expose the ideological sub-texts of the differing narratives. 
 
Further limitations are, however, apparent in the phases of the St. Paul’s disturbance 
that were analysed by both secondary sources. The authors focused almost entirely on 
the early phases of the ‘riot’, which involved the police raid that apparently 
precipitated the incident, the subsequent periods of collective violence that were 
interspersed with ‘lulls’ in the action and finally the withdrawal of the Avon and 
Somerset Constabulary from the neighbourhood. The later period of ‘looting’ that 
occurred once the police force had left the area is almost completely ignored, as was 
the police operation to retake the area. In contrast to this detailed though limited 
account of the disturbance in St. Paul’s there were no secondary sources which even 
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mentioned the subsequent disorders in the districts of Southmead and Knowle West, 
which are analysed in detail in this thesis. 
 
3.2.1.2 England 1981 
 
The numerous disorders that occurred the following year in England produced a 
plethora of secondary sources ranging from academic papers to whole books. 
However, the majority of secondary sources either concentrate on specific major 
disturbances such as those in Brixton, London (April 1981), Southall, London (July 
1981), Toxteth, Liverpool (July 1981) and Moss Side, Manchester (July 1981) or 
merely quote lists of the numerous other incidents without adding significant local 
detail to them. In general the content of these ‘riot’ lists was originally derived from 
national newspapers with all the restrictions inherent in the reporting of countrywide 
events from a ‘top down’ perspective. These limitations included a lack of eyewitness 
reports by journalists, a paucity of detail in the narratives they produced and the 
physical distance from the incidents themselves.  
 
It was argued in particular secondary sources that significant numbers of the July 
disturbances went unreported in the national media and others have been exaggerated 
or misrepresented
213
. As far as this author is aware, no systematic countrywide search 
of local media sources was undertaken to substantiate the various ‘lists’ of riots that 
were generated in these secondary sources or to provide more detail about the 
                                                 
213
 For example Keith demonstrates that the July 1981 London ‘riot lists’ published in State reports 
(Home Office, The Metropolitan police and Greater London Council) and other secondary sources all 
disagree to a greater or lesser extent in Keith, Race, Riots and Policing: Lore and Disorder in a Multi-
Racist Society, pp.52-68 and p.257. 
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incidents that appeared on those lists. Despite these significant limitations a number 
of secondary sources, which contained roll calls of ‘riots’ that occurred in 1981 were 
selected as the starting point for the quantitative analysis of the July disorders 
undertaken in Chapter 4.0
214
. 
 
Some of the more accomplished research undertaken in the secondary sources used 
arrest statistics in an attempt to determine the demography of selected ‘crowds’ in the 
1981 disturbances
215
. The main source for this data was the Home Office Statistical 
Bulletin for the ‘serious incidents of public disorder in July and August 1981’ 
published more than a year after the unrest
216
. This summary document was compiled 
from special returns provided by twenty five police forces with clusters of data 
included on the basis that ‘in the opinion of the Police forces concerned’ they were 
‘more serious incidents of public disorder than would normally be expected in the 
area’217. Although useful from national or regional perspectives this data was 
restricted at the local level due to its summary form. The detail required for 
microanalyses of individual and local clusters of disturbances was contained in the 
original reports from each constabulary from which it was compiled. However, it 
                                                 
214
 These secondary sources are listed in full in Chapter 4.0 note 275.    
215
 Examples include Cooper, Competing Explanations of the Merseyside Riots of 1981, Peach, A 
Geographical Perspective on the 1981 Urban Riots and Keith, Race, Riots and Policing: Lore and 
Disorder in a Multi-Racist Society. 
216
 Home Office, The Outcome of Arrests during the Serious Incidents of Public Disorder in July and 
August 1981. 
217
 Ibid. Notes 1 and 2. 
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appears, apart from three exceptions
218
, that no attempt was made by researchers to 
obtain the breakdown of these statistics by police force region, which according to the 
summary document were available in 1982
219
.  
 
Oral history is a useful source for compiling richer descriptions of events, particularly 
incidents of collective violence. However, amongst the plethora of competing 
explanations in the coincident worlds of the media, the state and academia in 1981, 
the voices that were silent were those of the ‘rioters’. There were a few exceptions 
and attention was focused on these insider testimonies to compare and contrast them 
with the new oral sources derived during the research in this thesis
220
.  
                                                 
218
 Research based on the original arrest data from regional Constabularies was only undertaken in two 
of the 25 force areas; for Merseyside in Bowrey, The 1981 Urban Riots in England and Cooper, 
Competing Explanations of the Merseyside Riots of 1981 and for the Metropolitan police force area 
(London) in Keith, Race, Riots and Policing: Lore and Disorder in a Multi-Racist Society. 
219
 Home Office, The Outcome of Arrests during the Serious Incidents of Public Disorder in July and 
August 1981, Note 5 explains that the twenty five local Constabulary reports that made up the summary 
report were available on request from the Home Office Statistical Unit in 1982. However, despite 
extensive archival searches by this author (over a considerable period) this data does not now seem to 
be available. 
220
 The exceptions that contained insider testimony include Tumber, Television and the Riots: A Report 
for the Broadcasting Research Unit of the British Film Institute, Paul Gilroy, There Ain't no Black in 
the Union Jack: The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation (London: Hutchinson, 1987), D. 
Waddington, ‘'The Summer of '81 Revisited: An Analysis of Sheffield's Haymarket Fracas',’ in Studies 
in Communication, eds. A. Cashdan and M. Jordin (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), J. Clare, ‘Eyewitness in 
Brixton,’ in Scarman and After: Essays Reflecting on Lord Scarman's Report, the Riots and their 
Aftermath, ed. J. Benyon (Oxford: Pergamon, 1984), M. Nally, ‘Eyewitness in Moss Side,’ in Scarman 
and After: Essays Reflecting on Lord Scarman's Report, the Riots and their Aftermath, ed. J. Benyon 
(Oxford: Pergamon, 1984) and G. Greaves, ‘Eyewitness in Brixton,’ in Scarman and After: Essays 
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3.2.2  Primary Sources 
 
This review of the primary sources used to generate the research evidence in this 
thesis is once again divided into the micro study of the disturbances in Bristol in 1980 
and the macro study of the unrest in England in1981. The emphasis of this section is 
on two important aspects of the use of these primary sources. The first is an outline of 
the collation and development of the sources for the various methodological 
approaches undertaken during the research activity. The second identifies which of 
these primary sources were hitherto unavailable, were ignored or were completely 
new in comparison with the evidential base in the available secondary sources. 
 
3.2.2.1 Bristol 1980 
 
The original project for the collation of primary sources for the disturbances in Bristol 
in 1980 was based upon the preliminary cataloguing by the author of a new collection 
of material that was deposited in the Bristol Record Office in 2007
221
. This collection 
came from the Bristol office of the Commission for Racial Equality (BCRE), later 
reorganised as the Bristol Race Equality Council (BREC)
222
. The BCRE/BREC 
                                                                                                                                            
Reflecting on Lord Scarman's Report, the Riots and their Aftermath, ed. J. Benyon (Oxford: Pergamon, 
1984). 
221
 This collection is now fully catalogued and available at the Bristol Record Office under the general 
reference number BRO 43129. 
222
 The national CRE body was formed in 1976 as consequence of the Race Relations Act of that year, 
replacing the Race Relations Board and the Community Relations Commission. The Bristol office of 
the CRE opened in 1976. In 1990 the national body of the CRE began funding a more dispersed 
network of Race Equality Councils (REC) to carry out local racial equality work, eventually supporting 
more than eighty of these bodies in England, Scotland and Wales. In Bristol the CRE office was 
renamed as the Bristol Race Equality Council (BREC), though maintaining the same premises and 
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collection comprised a large amount of material assembled over thirty years
223
; of 
general relevance were an extensive collection of local and national newspaper 
cuttings and considerable amounts of statistical information concerning inner city 
areas of Bristol such as St. Paul’s. Crucially the collection also contained a series of 
files specifically concerned with the disturbance in St. Paul’s in April 1980224. These 
latter files held some important primary sources including numerous collected local 
and national newspaper cuttings concerning the disturbance and its aftermath, a 
BCRE report of court proceedings in 1981 concerning those charged with riotous 
assembly, minutes and a press release from the St. Paul’s United Defence 
Committee
225
, various local unofficial inquiry reports and community newsletters and 
several photographic contact sheets of images taken in the aftermath of the 
disturbance. 
                                                                                                                                            
office structure. On October 1st 2007 the new Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) was 
created after the introduction of the Equality Act 2006. This new body took over the responsibilities of 
the Commission for Racial Equality, Disability Rights Commission and Equal Opportunities 
Commission. As a consequence the existing BREC office was closed and its papers deposited in the 
Bristol Record Office (BRO). 
223
 The collection prior to cataloguing consisted of 93 boxes and 50 freestanding files of material.  The 
preliminary cataloguing created 338 entries. Full details of the cataloguing exercise are contained 
within an (unpublished) MA project dissertation by the author R. Ball, ‘Bristol Records Office: Bristol 
Commission for Racial Equality (BCRE) and Bristol Race Equality Council (BREC) Collection’ (MA 
History, University of West of England, 2008). 
224
 These particular files are referenced in the Bristol Record Office as ‘St. Paul’s and other uprisings’ 
BRO 43219 Boxes 105-107. 
225
  This organisation was set up in the aftermath of the April 1980 disturbance in St. Paul’s in order to 
organise the defence of those arrested during and after the incident and to represent the views of the 
community with regard to calls for local and national inquiries. 
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This material was used to facilitate the methodological approaches chosen for analysis 
of the St. Paul’s disturbance of 1980. These included oral history, social network and 
quantitative analyses, which are discussed in more detail in later sections of this 
chapter. To assist these approaches, a prosopographical exercise was undertaken 
which involved gathering simple biographical information on selected individuals 
who were (alleged) participants or eyewitnesses in the disturbance from the primary 
sources in the BREC/BCRE collection. This information was collected in a separate 
database and processed for later use in the specific analytical methods. Figure 1 
illustrates the structure of this approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Flow chart showing the approach for the extraction of data from the BREC/BCRE 
collection in the Bristol Record Office 
 
Biographical information was collected from the specified sources under a series of 
fields in the database, which are explained in Table 2. 
Preliminary 
cataloguing 
Bristol Record Office  
BCRE/BREC 
collection 
Selection of relevant 
primary sources 
Database of  
biographical information 
 
Oral history 
respondents 
 
Social 
network 
analysis 
 
Quantitative 
methods 
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Prosopographical Category Explanation 
Name Ref. No. In order to ensure the anonymity of the person this field 
contained a reference number only
226
 
Sex Male (M) or Female (F) 
Age In years (at the time of the disturbance) 
Ethnicity White (W), Afro-Caribbean (AC), Asian (A), Other (O) 
Address: Street Street name (at the time of the disturbance) 
Address: District District of Bristol or town (at the time of the disturbance) 
Occupation At the time of the disturbance, either stated in court 
record or from other sources 
Status Either defendant (in court case) or stated eyewitness to 
specific events 
Charge Defined by court case 
Court outcome Result of court case or hearing 
Notes Specific details from sources 
Network link 1: Familial
227
 Denotes a familial linkage to another person in the sample 
Network link 2: Sub-
cultural 
Denotes membership of a youth subculture (stated in the 
field) 
Network link 3: Spatial Denotes a spatial linkage within specific events to another 
person in the sample.  
Ref. Specific reference to primary source 
BRO Ref. No Bristol Record Office formal reference number for 
primary source 
Table 2: Categories for the collection of prosopographical data for participants in the 
disturbances in Bristol in 1980. 
                                                 
226
 The Data Protection Act 2000 states the term ‘research purposes’, which is defined as statistical or 
historical research activity. This category allows exemption from some of the requirements of the act. 
Of particular relevance is where ‘the results of any research or any resulting statistics become 
anonymised and the relevant conditions apply, the data become exempt from data subject access rights, 
provided the data are processed only for research purposes’, Public Record Office, Data Protection Act 
1998 - A Guide for Records Managers and Archivists, (2000). As far as the potential use of 
biographical data for the selection of oral history respondents, the author had already considered issues 
concerning the anonymity of interviewees as the subject matter of violent urban disturbances 
necessarily concerns criminal actions, which may or may not have been brought to justice. 
Consequently, all oral history respondents would be offered the choice of anonymity in the final 
published documents. For this reason the selection of potential oral history respondents from 
bibliographical data gathered in this assignment necessitated anonymity at this stage in order to provide 
the choice of anonymity in oral history interviews at a later date. 
227
 This and the subsequent two categories are explained in more detail in Section 3.3.4 of this chapter. 
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In all, data was collected on forty-eight alleged participants and eyewitnesses to the 
St. Paul’s disturbance (2nd April 1980) using primary sources in the BREC/BCRE 
collection. A similar approach was employed using a smaller number of other primary 
sources to collect data on eleven alleged participants in the Southmead disturbances in 
Bristol (3rd-4th April 1980). No such data was available for the Knowle West 
incident in the city (4th-5th April 1980). 
 
A number of Avon and Somerset Constabulary reports and press releases were 
employed to analyse the Bristol disturbances, all of which were in the public domain. 
However a file entitled ‘Papers relating to the disturbances in St Paul's’ containing 
hitherto unseen primary sources was held under restriction in the Bristol Record 
Office until 2056 on the basis that it contained sensitive personal data which 
contravened the Data Protection Act 1998
228
. Permission to view this item or receive 
information from it had to be obtained from Avon and Somerset Constabulary. The 
author received this permission in 2010 on the grounds that personal information 
therein would not be published. 
 
The file contained several vital sources of previously unseen information, including 
the operational briefing for the police raid that precipitated the disorders in St. Paul’s 
on April 2
nd
 1980 and a comprehensive log of police radio traffic and emergency calls 
during the events. These significantly aided both the construction of the narrative of 
events and crucially the timing of numerous incidents, which had bedevilled the 
                                                 
228
 This file remains restricted until this date. Bristol Record Office 42794 POL/LG/1/9. 
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narrative in the secondary sources
229
. 
 
Essential visual primary sources included television footage and photographs of the 
disturbance in St. Paul’s on April 2nd 1980. Although one secondary source employed 
recordings of television and radio programmes concerning the disorder
230
, the author 
of this thesis was able to obtain the full footage recorded by BBC and HTV 
cameramen during the event
231
. The majority of this material comprised rushes taken 
from the moment the cameramen arrived at the scene in the late afternoon. These 
contained hitherto unseen footage of several phases of the St. Paul’s ‘riot’ and 
included thirteen interviews with residents of the area both during and after the 
events. Using the existing primary and secondary sources, the author was able to 
construct a full temporal and spatial listing of the incidents shown in the television 
footage both for use in the construction of a narrative of the events in this thesis as 
well as for future use in the relevant archives. A copy of this document is included in 
Appendix 10.1. Finally, two important sets of photographs were obtained by the 
author, which documented incidents after the withdrawal of the Avon and Somerset 
                                                 
229
 Joshua, Wallace and Booth, who were not party to this information, laid great emphasis on the 
temporal discrepancies between the account of the events given by the Chief Constable of Avon and 
Somerset Constabulary and the statements and evidence given by police officers during the ‘riotous 
assembly’ trial in Bristol in 1981; Joshua, Wallace and Booth, To Ride the Storm: The 1980 Bristol 
'Riot' and the State, Chapter 2. 
230
 Reicher, The St. Paul’s Riot: An Explanation of the Limits of Crowd Action in Terms of a Social 
Identity Model, p.190. 
231
 Approximately 80 minutes of this material in DVD format was retrieved from the archives of the 
BBC News West Library in Bristol as part of a project launched by the M-shed Museum of Bristol in 
2010; BBC & HTV: St. Paul’s riot. 1980. Television, (Bristol: BBC News West Library). The author 
wishes to thank local historian John Penny for his assistance in this task. 
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Constabulary from St. Paul’s on April 2nd 1980 and the aftermath of the looting and 
arson on the following day
232
. 
 
3.2.2.2 England 1981 
 
The quantitative analysis of the disorders in England in 1981 that is undertaken in 
Chapter 4.0 was based upon data from a combination of secondary and primary 
sources. As explained in Section 3.2.1.2, a selection of ‘riot lists’ derived from 
relevant secondary sources was used to compile a preliminary roll call of disorders to 
be investigated by use of the primary sources, principally local newspapers. The first 
phase of investigation of the local newspapers was used to expand the ‘riot lists’ by 
adding new locations of disorder that had been discovered during the process. This 
‘snowballing’ approach led to several expansions of the lists until all the new primary 
sources had been investigated and no new locations were found. The data was then 
processed for use in the quantitative and cartographical phases of the research. Figure 
7 describes the full data gathering process.  
 
The dependence of this data collection process upon information obtained from local 
newspapers in contrast (as was noted in Section 3.2.1.2) to the existing secondary 
sources that relied almost entirely on reports in national newspapers generates a 
question concerning research validity. Fundamentally, this turns on whether national 
media outlets (in this case major newspapers) are more likely to carry an accurate 
                                                 
232
 The first set of (hitherto unseen) photographs was digitised from the original negatives supplied by 
the photographer himself, the authors thanks go to Mike Leggett; M. Leggett, Photographic Negatives, 
(1980). The second set taken by John Penny the day after the ‘riot’ is available in the Bristol Record 
Office. J. Penny, Presentation Slides about the St Paul's Riots 1980. (Bristol: Bristol Record Office 
43565/2/1, 1980). 
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story about a civil disorder than a local news source. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Flow chart showing the process for gathering data on disorders in England in July 1981 
from the primary and secondary sources 
 
 
Comprehensive studies in the U.S. that considered the discrepancy between the 
reporting of civil disorders in national news outlets and local press sources have 
demonstrated that the former rarely achieved sixty per cent coverage of events in the 
latter group
233
. This was due to a combination of effects, including a propensity for 
the national media outlets to report disorders that were large, intense, of significant 
                                                 
233
 See the quantitative analysis of reporting of disorders in the 1960s in Myers and Caniglia, All the 
Rioting that's Fit to Print: Selection Effects in National Newspaper Coverage of Civil Disorders, 1968-
1969. 
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duration and relatively close to the outlet
234
. Some effects of political bias and 
discrimination through discounting collective disorders (particularly with respect to 
the activities of high school students and the ‘young’) were also shown to be in 
operation.  
 
In contrast (and unsurprisingly) local press sources were less likely to report disorders 
some distance away from the outlet. Typically, information about severe, distant 
disorders in local newspapers was derived from national news sources. This 
hierarchical relationship of distribution of information and the underreporting of less 
severe, distant events by major news outlets suggested that the correct research 
approach was to begin the data collection process with the national newspapers, using 
this information to delineate which of the (numerous) local newspapers should be 
subsequently studied. The considerable number of additional disorders that were 
discovered during the research activity as a result of the ‘snowballing feedback loop’ 
in the primary sources (shown in Figure 7) demonstrated both the validity of this 
approach and explained the deficiency of information concerning less severe and 
relatively distant disorders in the existing secondary sources. 
 
Another factor of importance in the data collection process concerned the effect of 
media self-signification spirals. Keith claimed in his analysis of the July 1981 
                                                 
234
 Myers and Caniglia demonstrated that if the civil disorder was in the home city of a national news 
outlet in the U.S. then the likelihood of it being reported was almost unaffected by its severity. 
However, when reporting incidents 500 miles away, the probability of coverage of a disorder of 
moderate severity had fallen to approximately 70% and a mild event to 45% of that for a severe 
occurrence. This downward trend in probability of coverage of disorders of lesser severity against 
distance from the national outlet was maintained at greater distances. Ibid. Figure 3. 
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disorders in London that a media-driven ‘moral panic’ was in operation in early July 
1981, which created ‘streets that were like stage sets for disorder’, anticipation within 
the Metropolitan police and self-fulfilling local rumours that ‘trouble was coming’235. 
The supposition of the existence of this self-signification spiral led Keith to belittle 
the actual content of some of the disorders that were trumpeted by the press as ‘riots’ 
in London
236
. In contrast, the U.S. researchers argued that such ‘attention cycles’ in 
the national media actually led to ‘overreporting at the beginning and end of a protest 
cycle and underreporting in the middle’. This ‘event density effect’ the authors 
claimed ‘may partially offset the attention cycles phenomenon’237. 
 
At the level of local newspaper sources, Keith’s argument may still hold, in that such 
sources would have been in the sway of a national newspaper-led attention cycle due 
to the hierarchical nature of information distribution between the national and local 
media. This may have led to spurious and exaggerated reports concerning local 
disorders or the highlighting of incidents that were normally ‘routine’238. Three 
                                                 
235
  Keith, Race, Riots and Policing: Lore and Disorder in a Multi-Racist Society, p.70-71. 
236
 Keith’s ‘shaggy dog riots’ which all appear on the Home Office list include those in West Ham (10-
11
th
 July 1981), Croydon (10
th
 July 1981), Walthamstow (11
th
 July 1981) and Penge (11
th
 July 1981). 
Ibid. p.61-68 and App.1. 
237
 Myers and Caniglia, All the Rioting that's Fit to Print: Selection Effects in National Newspaper 
Coverage of Civil Disorders, 1968-1969, pp.538-9. 
238
 Unsworth like Keith argued that a form of ‘moral panic’ was in operation in the media in July 1981 
where ‘as many Police Chiefs agreed, what the press described as ‘riots’ were, for them, routine 
disturbances’. Interestingly, Unsworth inverted this statement by arguing that ‘routine’ was not as a 
sign of stability but in fact a permanent state of ‘low-intensity war’. Unsworth claimed that the 
disturbances, which punctuated this ‘routine’, were caused by ‘provocative policing, insecurity and 
increasing resistance in the black communities, and traditions of resistance in white working class 
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methods were used in the data collection process using local newspaper sources to 
allay this problem. The first involved a clinical collection of categories of 
information
239
 concerning a disorder leading to a quantitative measure of disturbance 
intensity relative to the wave of unrest as a whole. This completely ignored the 
subjective aspects of reporting in the local newspapers (such as explicit headlines or 
prominent photographs). The second entailed, where possible, the cross referencing of 
local press outlets in a particular area, rather than relying on a single source. This was 
particularly useful in towns and smaller cities where both daily and weekly local 
newspapers were available. In these locations the temporal effects of media attention 
cycles could be gauged. The third research method necessitated searching the local 
press for similar though less explicit stories a few weeks before and after the riotous 
period of early July 1981 to gauge the severity and rarity of disorders in that particular 
area. This gave a subjective measure of the impact on the local press of the national 
media attention cycle. Finally, this author’s observation should be noted, that mono-
ethnic (White) disorders outside of mixed-ethnicity areas in the inner cities were often 
ignored or underreported by the media whether local or national in 1980-81. 
  
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Quantitative analysis 
 
Various quantitative analyses were undertaken during the research activity and are 
presented in the following chapters of this thesis. In the following section these 
techniques are categorised and reviewed. 
                                                                                                                                            
youth exacerbated by steeply and disproportionately rising unemployment, together with the 
concentration of these conditions in the inner cities’, C. Unsworth, ‘The Riots of 1981: Popular 
Violence and the Politics of Law and Order,’ Journal of Law and Society (1982), p.71. 
239
 These categories are detailed in Chapter 4.0 Section 4.3.2. 
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3.3.1.1 Bristol 1980 
 
Essentially two phases of quantitative analysis were undertaken in the examination of 
the disorders in Bristol in April 1980. The first was concerned with the demographic 
background of the principal neighbourhoods experiencing unrest in the wards of St. 
Paul and Southmead
240
. This analysis relied upon statistical information distilled from 
local government reports that provided data on population, ethnicity, socio-economic 
grouping, residential property tenure, transience, overcrowding, unemployment, car 
ownership and ‘social stress indicators’241. This information was rationalised in the 
local government reports into ‘workplace zones’, which lay between the Small Area 
Statistics (SAS) units provided by the 1981 census (from which the data was derived) 
and the larger electoral ward. This effectively broke the relevant electoral wards down 
into four neighbourhoods with populations of several thousand.  
 
This level of detail was deemed sufficient to overcome some of the issues encountered 
by other researchers who had studied the conditions in inner cities prior to the 1981 
unrest. Typically these academics had significant problems in using statistical data as 
it was of too large a sample size (such as ward, shire and metropolitan counties) to be 
                                                 
240
 Although the minor disturbance in Knowle West is studied in this thesis, the emphasis is on the 
demographics of the areas that experienced more serious confrontations. 
241
 These were collections of factors (such as measures of unemployment, one parent families, social 
service referrals, electricity disconnections, lack of car ownership, overcrowding of households, 
statutory supervision orders and households with a new Commonwealth or Pakistan born head) that 
showed correlation. Avon County Council, Social Stress in Avon, 1981: A Preliminary Analysis. 
(Bristol: Avon County Council, 1983). 
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able to delineate specific social conditions in the ‘riotous’ urban neighbourhoods242. 
For the research in this thesis, where possible, multiple local government sources 
were compared in the analysis in order to isolate local variations in the statistical data. 
Care was also taken in the delineation of neighbourhoods, districts and wards within 
the survey data as it was recognised that the geographic definition of communities 
engaged in disorder was subject to both dubious popular perception and post-riot 
political contingencies. Statistical information at the neighbourhood level was 
compared to inner city, city and countywide results for comparative purposes. 
 
The second phase of quantitative analysis concerned the actual disorders in St. Paul’s 
and Southmead in April 1980. Samples of participants in the disorders in the two 
locales were selected from the prosopographical data (see Section 3.2.1.1) in order to 
construct histograms to investigate their place of residence, gender, age and offence 
type (where applicable). Unfortunately, details of the ethnicity of defendants were 
unavailable for large enough samples of participants to facilitate such an analysis.  
 
Finally, a comprehensive quantitative analysis of the properties that were damaged, 
looted or burned in St. Paul’s during the period of four hours in which the police were 
absent from the community was also undertaken. This was achieved by cross-
referencing primary sources
243
 in order to construct a list of those properties that were 
affected or unaffected by the ‘riot’. 
                                                 
242
 See for example the work of C. Hamnett, ‘The Conditions in England's Inner Cities on the Eve of 
the 1981 Riots,’ Area 15, no. 1 (1983) and Peach, A Geographical Perspective on the 1981 Urban 
Riots. 
243
 These sources included business street directories, telephone books, street maps, police documents, 
photographic and video sources, local newspapers and oral history testimony. 
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3.3.1.2 England 1981 
 
The quantitative analyses of urban disorders in England in 1981 were solely aimed at 
investigating the numerous countrywide disturbances in July of that year. As was 
explained previously (see Section 3.2.2.2) a database of these incidents was 
constructed from the secondary and primary sources. This collection of information 
included details of the location, date, observed crowd ethnicity and severity of each 
daily disturbance. From this information it was possible to construct tables of data and 
graphs that examined the temporal characteristics of the wave of unrest from the 
perspective of the whole country, individual conurbations as well as single locales. 
These temporal distributions were analysed, for comparative purposes, using some of 
the probability models (such as Lognormal, Poisson and Logistic functions) employed 
in previous research concerned with the diffusion of disturbances
244
. In addition, a 
comprehensive survey of those disorders where the primary sources had delineated 
the ethnicity of the ‘rioting crowds’ was also undertaken. 
 
As a result of this approach, which was significantly skewed toward a quantitative 
study, there were significant inherent limitations concerning the qualitative content of 
the disturbances. Quantitative analysis of waves of disorder has the effect of 
delineating incidents purely by numerical measures of severity or by temporal and 
spatial attributes. Essentially this obscures the complex anatomy of ‘riots’, including 
precipitating events, diverse ‘crowd’ motives and actions as well as outcomes. These 
important limitations were understood at the outset of the research activity and were 
considered to be acceptable within the context of the time and resource constraints.  
                                                 
244
 These analytical methods are explained in more detail in Chapter 2.0 Section 2.3.4. 
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3.3.2  Cartography 
 
Extensive studies of primary and secondary sources demonstrated a significant lack of 
cartographical analyses of disorders whether at the level of individual incidents or for 
waves of disturbances. Although some secondary sources used local maps to delineate 
neighbourhoods where disorders had occurred in 1980-81 they were merely passive 
visual aids for positioning symbolic locations described in the text
245
.  The wave of 
disorders that struck England in July 1981 were, as far as the author is aware, only 
mapped in two obscure publications, neither of which were comprehensive or 
detailed
246
.  These limited maps suffered from a lack of temporal considerations as 
well as failing to demarcate the severity of the disorders they displayed. The 
following section briefly outlines the extensive use of cartography in this thesis to 
both illuminate the anatomy of the ‘riots’ in Bristol in 1980 and to study the spatial 
and temporal features of the wave of disorders in England in July 1981. 
 
3.3.2.1 Bristol 1980 
 
Maps were employed in several ways to delineate both the neighbourhoods that 
experienced ‘riots’ in Bristol in 1980 and the spatial anatomy of the disturbances. In 
                                                 
245
 For example, Joshua, Wallace and Booth used street scale maps to delineate the ‘St. Paul’s 
neighbourhood’ in Bristol and a three dimensional schematic (with errors) to mark two symbolic 
locations in that area in 1980; Joshua, Wallace and Booth, To Ride the Storm: The 1980 Bristol 'Riot' 
and the State, pp.66-67. Keith in his studies of the ‘riots’ in London in 1981 employed three street scale 
schematic maps of Notting Hill, Stoke Newington and Brixton to mark symbolic locations in Keith, 
Race, Riots and Policing: Lore and Disorder in a Multi-Racist Society, Chapter 7. 
246
 These two publications were a small circulation pamphlet, Smith and others, Like a Summer with a 
Thousand Julys…and Other Seasons.. and the PhD thesis Bowrey, The 1981 Urban Riots in England. 
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the analysis of the demography of the districts of Southmead and St. Paul’s, ward 
level maps were utilized to mark specific areas that the research showed to be 
commonly and statistically understood as significant neighbourhoods. This was an 
important definition, as determining where the ‘Southmead estate’ or the ‘St. Paul’s 
neighbourhood’ actually were, was problematic247. A combination of local knowledge 
derived from the author’s experience248 and oral history testimony combined with 
existing maps and statistical delineations were used to achieve these spatial 
definitions. 
 
In the creation of the three historical narratives for the disorders in St. Paul’s, 
Southmead and Knowle West in 1980, street level maps showing the extent of the 
disorders were variously employed to mark symbolic sites (such as ‘front lines’, cafés, 
public houses and green spaces), the ‘hangouts’ of youth gangs, premises that were 
damaged by looting and arson, as well as the temporally defined movements of police 
formations and their vehicles. The complexity of these micro histories of disorder 
required visual aids that were active, in the sense that they showed more than just 
streets or boundaries, in order to more fully understand the dynamics of these events. 
 
3.3.2.2 England 1981 
 
The database of information concerning the numerous disorders in England in July 
1981 that was compiled as part of the research activity was used in combination with 
                                                 
247
 These issues are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.0 Section 5.2. 
248
 The author was a resident of St. Paul’s in Bristol in the 1980s. 
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proprietary cartographic software
249
 to create nineteen countrywide maps, each 
covering a specific day in July 1981 that experienced at least one disorder. These 
maps display the severity of a disorder (as determined in the research database) by the 
relative size of the map marker. Using this approach it was possible to construct a 
comprehensive spatial and temporal visual account of the July disorders that both 
presented the diffusion of multiple disturbances on a daily basis and demonstrated the 
growth, peak and decline characteristics of individual incidents.  
 
3.3.3  Oral History  
 
As has been discussed previously, the voices of the participants in the urban disorders 
in England in 1980-81 were generally ignored in most of the existing primary and 
secondary sources. In contrast, oral history testimony became central to the micro-
history of the disorders in Bristol in 1980 presented in this thesis. This evidence 
allowed the generation of richer background descriptions of the various locales under 
study and aided the construction of the comprehensive narrative of the St. Paul’s 
disturbance. Oral history was crucial in the creation of wholly new narratives for the 
hitherto hidden histories of disorders in the Southmead and Knowle West districts of 
Bristol. In the following section, the methodology for locating oral history 
respondents, ethical considerations, the approach to the interviews and the resulting 
testimonies are reviewed. 
                                                 
249
 As the July 1981 disorder database was created using Microsoft Excel spreadsheets, the Excel 2000 
accessory Microsoft Map was employed to process the data into a cartographical format. This was 
achieved by positioning more than 130 locations of disorder on the U.K. map contained within the 
software database using the relevant postal district designations. These location markers were then 
more accurately aligned using the public domain software Google Earth. 
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As noted in Section 3.1 of this chapter, the serious criminal nature of collective 
violence such as urban ‘riots’ presents particular problems for locating oral history 
respondents. The remit of the research plan for this project was to concentrate on 
locating those who had directly participated in disturbances as ‘rioters’, ‘looters’ or as 
‘travellers’ to disturbances rather than those who had been non-participating eye-
witnesses or who had acted as community spokespeople at the time of the disorders. 
This approach was undertaken on the basis that being a non-participant affects the 
subject’s perspective of events as well as making it easier for them to speak.  Taking 
the view that ‘crowds’ within disturbances have a diversity of motives and actions, 
suggested that finding those who were acting rather than being merely spectators or 
self-appointed spokespeople within these groups was vital to investigating the 
anatomy of a disorder. It was precisely these respondents that were the most difficult 
to locate.  
 
Many oral history studies, which have at their heart physical and ideological 
separations
250
 between the researchers and the researched, typically have to be 
initiated by adverts in relevant locations, local newspapers or appeals through local 
radio
251. However, the author’s own experience of the outcome of institutionally-led 
searches related to finding participants in ‘riots’ was not positive252. Typically the oral 
                                                 
250
 These separations are often related to existing ethnic and class divisions. 
251
 See for example the advice provided in R. Perks, Oral History: Talking about the Past, 2nd ed., Vol. 
94 (London: The Historical Association, 1995). 
252
 The author was briefly involved in two such oral history projects in London in 2008 and Bristol in 
2009 whilst undertaking research for this thesis. The former was launched by the Museum of London 
to commemorate the 30
th
 anniversary of the 1981 Brixton ‘riot’ (see 
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respondents that contacted the projects through these public channels were non-
participant eyewitnesses, self-appointed spokespeople or policemen, firemen and local 
government officials
253. ‘Rioters’ appeared to be non-existent in most of these studies, 
which begged the question as to the veracity and completeness of the narratives that 
were created during these exercises. The reasons for the absence of such participants 
from such projects became explicit during this author’s research activity. These 
included issues concerning criminality (and anonymity) that could affect the current 
social status of a potential respondent, suspicion concerning the motives of 
researchers and a general distrust and dislike of academic and similar institutions. 
 
In order to overcome these problems, a different approach for locating oral history 
respondents who participated in the disorders in Bristol in 1980 was employed. This 
involved combining the prosopograhical data derived from archival research (see 
Section 3.2.2.1) and the author’s contacts amongst veterans of the sub-cultural milieus 
of the late 1970s and early 80s
254
. Initial interviews were used to locate other 
respondents through the existing social networks and to expand the list of potential 
respondents. This ‘snowballing’ activity essentially involved retracing the social links 
between sub-cultural groupings of the early 1980s, some of which still existed over 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.museumoflondon.org.uk/Get-involved/Collaborative-projects/Brixton-Riots/) the latter by 
the Bristol City Museum and Art Gallery for a similar anniversary concerning the 1980 St. Paul’s 
disorder. 
253
 See for example the Museum of London project at http://www.museumoflondon.org.uk/Get-
involved/Collaborative-projects/Brixton-Riots/. 
254
 These were principally from the late 70s Bristol Punk scene (which the author joined in the early 
1980s), though subsequently ‘survivors’ of the Skinhead, Rastafarian and Ska milieus also participated 
in the interviews. 
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thirty years later. Several props were particularly useful in facilitating this process. 
Some of the initial respondents were completely unaware that they featured in the 
principal secondary source dealing with the St. Paul’s disorder; ‘To Ride the Storm: 
the Bristol Riot and the State’255. Copies of this work were obtained by the author and 
distributed to the initial interviewees who passed the book onto others who appeared 
in the text. This stimulated discussion
256
 and eventually led to further interviews with 
new respondents. The previously unseen TV footage of the St. Paul’s disturbance that 
was obtained by the author from the BBC archive (see Section 3.2.2.1) was used in a 
similar manner to encourage participants to provide testimony. 
 
As noted previously, most participants in the Bristol disorders of April 1980 were 
reluctant to engage in oral interviews because of fears about personal security and 
significant distrust and disdain for academic institutions. The worries about 
anonymity were overcome by reassurance that all interviews would be recorded, 
transcribed and then passed to the respondent for checking, editing and withdrawal if 
necessary. All interviewees were given the option of complete anonymity (crucially 
this also extended to the academy) whereby the author was the only person with 
knowledge of their real identities
257
. This and other aspects of the interview and the 
testimony were provided prior to the meeting in an information sheet and the 
respondents were asked to sign a consent form (see Appendix 10.2). 
                                                 
255
 Joshua, Wallace and Booth, To Ride the Storm: The 1980 Bristol 'Riot' and the State. 
256
 The initial responses of the respondents were excitement that they featured in a book followed by 
anger that they had been written about without their permission and without a ‘say’ in the matter.  
257
 This was agreed with the University of West of England Ethics Committee. The committee decided 
that assumed names were deemed acceptable means of locating the oral history testimony and that the 
author would retain the sole access to the real identities of the respondents. 
 144 
 
The respondents’ distrust of academic institutions was overcome in two ways. Firstly, 
the author pointed out that without their testimony the historical record would contain 
only the views of outsiders, such as policemen, journalists and academics and that this 
was an opportunity to capture the views of ‘rioters’. Secondly, the social network 
approach to obtaining respondents enabled an insider’s level of trust to be developed 
between the researcher and the researched, based upon the personal contacts of the 
author. This eventually led to a reunion of some of the ‘riot’ veterans. A small number 
of respondents turned down the offer of interviews on the basis that they were 
unhappy about recalling the events, distrusted the protection of their identity that was 
offered or were unwilling to engage with University researchers. 
 
Other groups of respondents such as ex-police officers from the Avon and Somerset 
Constabulary were located from a close study of the participants in the raid that 
precipitated the St. Paul’s disturbance and the use of personal contacts258. During the 
research into looting during the St. Paul’s disturbance several recorded and 
unrecorded interviews were obtained from shopkeepers still resident in the area. In 
some cases impromptu street level interviews were undertaken after chance meetings 
                                                 
258
 These were derived from the restricted documents in the Bristol Record Office, particularly Avon 
and Somerset Constabulary, Log of Events: Riots St Pauls Area Bristol (Bristol Record Office 
POL/LG/1/9, 1980) and Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Avon and Somerset Constabulary: 
Operational Order: Black and White Cafe, 27 Grosvenor Rd., St. Paul's: 26th March 1980 (Bristol 
Record Office POL/LG/1/9, 1980). One ex-police officer attended a seminar on the riots given by the 
author at the University of West of England Regional History Centre (24-03-2010) and offered his 
testimony; another gave an unrecorded interview during discussion over access to the restricted 
documents in the Bristol Record Office. 
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with respondents on the agreement that they wouldn’t be recorded, although the 
author was allowed to take notes. Finally, two eyewitnesses to the disorders in St. 
Paul’s and Southmead spoke about their experiences at a public history event and later 
gave interviews to the author
259
. 
 
The problems of locating relevant respondents were seemingly compounded by the 
length of time (approximately thirty years) since the events under study. This 
potentially presented significant difficulties for the respondents in merely recalling the 
‘correct’ incidents let alone providing useful accounts. However, it soon became 
apparent that for most respondents the three disturbances in Bristol in April 1980 (St. 
Paul’s, Southmead and Knowle West) were very significant events in their memories 
and they had little difficulty in recounting narratives. Despite this advantage various 
devices were used to aid their recall. These included providing maps, photographs and 
TV footage to the respondents and asking them to provide details of locales and 
depicted incidents. This process not only helped the respondents construct more 
accurate accounts but also provided useful geographic and situational information for 
the historical analysis of the Bristol ‘riots’. 
 
As has been pointed out by several analysts of oral history, a strict separation and 
assumptions of objective equality between interviewer and interviewee are somewhat 
of an illusion
260
.  These observations helped placate a perceived problem concerning 
the approach of the interviewer in the meetings with the respondents during this 
                                                 
259
 This oral history event was entitled ‘Insurrectionary Bristol: 1980’, part of the Bristol Radical 
History Week of 2006. See http://www.brh.org.uk/brhw2006/insurbris1980.html (03-11-2006). 
260
 See for example (Portelli 1981) and (Figlio 1988). 
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research activity. From the perspective of undertaking objective research using oral 
history as a primary source, the interview is envisaged as a formal process, with the 
interviewer taking an unemotional and ‘neutral’ position. However, it was understood 
from the outset that this supposed objective stance could have unintended 
consequences, particularly in alienating the respondent. As a result there was a 
requirement for the interviewer to balance a professional stance with informal engagé. 
Consequently, in some cases, questions and responses were couched in informal 
language understood by both the interviewer and the respondent. This approach 
helped overcome the implicit divisions present in supposedly ‘neutral’ formal 
interviews. 
 
The primary aim of the analysis of the oral history material was to supplement the 
narrative of the better documented incidents, such as the St. Paul’s disorder of 1980 as 
well as uncovering the hidden histories of the subsequent unrest in Southmead and 
Knowle West. The secondary objective of the interviews was to obtain testimony that 
provided ‘thick description’ of the areas under study, the nature of policing and to 
study the sub-cultural and ethnographic linkages between locales and groups in the 
city. Subjects were encouraged to verbally and physically map their home locales and 
the wider city with details such as sites of youth gangs, sub-cultural gathering points 
and symbolic locations with reference to their past feelings of threat or sanctuary.   
 
For the historical narratives, the data obtained from the respondents was cross-
referenced with the available primary sources as well as with other oral history 
material. However, more subjective parts of the accounts, which related to personal 
feelings about the incidents and other aspects of the areas in which the respondents 
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had been brought up, were not ignored. Where relevant these were included to provide 
an understanding of the desires, fears and impact of the ‘riots’ on the respondents over 
thirty years later.  
 
Excerpts of oral history testimony in this thesis have been reproduced from the 
original transcripts of interviews with respondents. In general although they may have 
been edited for reasons of space, they have not been corrected or altered to remove 
grammatical errors, obscenities or in an attempt to standardise dialects. The former 
category is regarded by the author as irrelevant and the latter two are considered to be 
valid ways of speaking and emphasising meanings. Where gaps in the dialogue or 
edits in the testimonies are present they are marked by three dots (e.g. …). Sections of 
text marked in parentheses in the excerpts represent non-linguistic audible sounds 
(e.g. [laughs]) or descriptions of linguistic style (e.g. [fakes a posh accent]). 
 
3.3.4  Social Network Analysis 
 
Social network analysis is essentially a study of the relationships between individuals, 
groups or organisations rather than a quantitative study of shared attributes. For 
example, a sample of prosopograhical data concerning the disturbances of 2
nd
 April 
1980 in St. Paul’s could be analysed from the perspective of attributes such as age, 
ethnicity, gender or occupation. However, this would not necessarily capture the more 
complex social relationships between those involved in the actual incidents 
themselves or facilitate an understanding of the structures inherent in these social 
networks. Social network analysis is a method for trying to both map these networks 
and analyse them to understand their form and content.  
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Although there are potentially numerous forms of social networks, the following 
categories of network relationship were the most relevant to this study of urban 
disturbance
261
: 
 
 Communication relations: this is where linkages between agents are effectively 
conduits for information. 
 Instrumental relations: agents are related to one another in an effort to obtain 
goods, services or information. 
 Sentiment relations: agents are linked together by emotional relations such as 
affection, admiration or even hostility. 
 Kinship or descent relations: these can be simply considered as familial 
networks. 
 
Typically social network analysis is carried out by observation, interviewing the 
participants or having them complete standard questionnaires
262
, though it is possible 
to carry out network analysis from archival data
263
. Examples of such archival 
approaches include deriving social networks from studies of journals, newspapers or 
court records
264
 or of archival studies of political organisations
265
.  The limited sample 
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  David Knoke, Network Analysis. (London: Sage, 1982), pp.15-16. 
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  Ronald S. Burt, Applied Network Analysis: A Methodological Introduction (Beverly Hills: Sage, 
1983), pp.79-81. 
263
  Stanley Wasserman, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), pp.50-51. 
264
 Ronald S. Burt and Nan Lin, ‘Network Time Series from Archival Records,’ Sociological 
Methodology 8 (1977). 
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of data studied here lent itself to a basic analysis of the social networks operating 
between individuals who participated in the disturbance in St. Paul’s on 2nd April 
1980.  
 
During the process of collecting biographical information on participants (see Table 
2), three relational links were studied: 
 
 Familial: Kinship relations between actors were noted. 
 Sub-cultural: Where sources verified that the actors were members of a sub-
cultural grouping and knew each other. 
 Spatial: A link between actors was recorded if it was stated in court proceedings, 
oral history testimony or eyewitness accounts that two or more participants were 
acting together in the disturbance. 
 
These three categories were chosen on the basis that they were important in 
understanding the composition of the ‘crowd’ in St. Paul’s and could be substantiated 
by the primary sources. The first two categories pertained to existing social networks 
prior to the disturbance whilst the third was a dynamic relationship generated during 
the event itself. The collected data was then entered into input files for the social 
network analysis software PAJEK
266
. This platform was used to construct a visual 
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 Naomi Rosenthal and others, ‘Social Movements and Network Analysis: A Case Study of 
Nineteenth-Century Women's Reform in New York State,’ American Journal of Sociology 90, no. 5 
(Mar., 1985). 
266
 The public domain social network analysis software PAJEK (v.1.01) is available from the 
University of Ljubljana at http://vlado.fmf.uni-lj.si/pub/networks/book/. Its use is explained in V. 
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representation of the interlocking social networks and to carry out quantitative 
analysis of the roles of key actors. Although this method employed only a small 
sample of the ‘crowd’ this was considered significant enough to demonstrate the 
connections between actors and groups. 
 
3.3.5  Ethnography 
 
The ethnography in this thesis was not pre-planned but came about as a result of the 
prosopographical sampling and the analysis of the initial oral history testimony from 
respondents from the three areas of Bristol that experienced disturbances in April 
1980. It became clear from the examination of this data that symbiotic social 
networks, relevant to the composition of the ‘crowds’, were operating in the disorders 
in Bristol. These networks came in several forms, those linked to youth subcultures 
and locales as well as another relating to ethnic connections between second-
generation mixed-race youth who were dispersed in various locations (including the 
areas under study) around the city. These arrangements of social linkages were 
sometimes coincident where mixed-race youth were members of both groups. Of 
particular interest was the pan-Bristol nature of these associations, which appeared to 
socially connect distant areas of the city with each other as well as linking their 
members with symbolic locations in inner city St. Paul’s.  
 
As a result of these observations, additional oral history interviews were sought out to 
provide further evidence for the existence of these networks and questions for the 
interviewees were directed towards their ethnographic investigation. These questions 
                                                                                                                                            
Batagelj, W. de Nooy and A. Mrvar, Exploratory Social Network Analysis with Pajek. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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were designed to encourage the respondents to provide verbal psycho-geographic
267
 
maps of their social movements and to outline the social connections that facilitated 
these travels. Responses to these questions provided confirmation of the symbolic 
gathering points of these social networks and the groups that interacted with them. 
This in turn provided evidence for the conduits for information exchange concerning 
disorders that had already occurred as well as mechanisms for planning future 
disturbances. It also aided the analysis of ‘crowd’ composition within disorders and 
the motives of ‘travellers’ to these incidents. 
 
This approach was distinctive in that it worked through existing relationships derived 
from the social networks generated from youth sub-cultures and ethnic links in the 
late 1970s and early 80s. Essentially the research activity involved tracing the 
remnants of the social connections between members of these groups to obtain their 
perceptions of the origins and composition of the ‘disorderly crowds’ that shook 
Bristol over thirty years ago. 
                                                 
267
 Psycho-geography was a term popularised by the Situationist International in the 1950s and was 
described by their leading theoretician Guy Debord as ‘the study of the precise laws and specific effects 
of the geographical environment, consciously organized or not, on the emotions and behaviour of 
individuals’ G. Debord, ‘Introduction to a Critique of Urban Geography,’ in Situationist International 
Anthology, ed. K. Knabb (Berkeley, CA: Bureau of Public Secrets, 1981), p.5. This definition is not 
strictly related to the usage of this method in this thesis. Psycho-geography in this case relates to what 
members of a network (such as a youth subculture) regard as the important social locations to be 
present at (such as ‘hangouts’, public houses, cafés etc.) and which areas of the city they would choose 
to socialise in. Thus, psycho-geography relates less to the formal geography of the urban environment 
and more to the desires and customs of social groups who are moving within it. 
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4.0 Violent Urban Disturbance in England: July 1981 
 
‘‘Copycat riots’? Some cats – and some claws!’268 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
The month of July 1981 saw one of the most widespread and intense periods of urban 
disturbance in England in the twentieth century.  A series of portentous disturbances 
in St. Paul’s Bristol (April 1980), Brixton (April 1981) and other disparate 
disturbances (April–June 1981)269 preceded the July events. However the number and 
ferocity of the wave of ‘riots’ unleashed over that month was unprecedented in post-
war mainland Britain.  
 
Studies of the secondary sources pertaining to the July events demonstrated that there 
was a significant lack of narrative detail, statistical analysis and pictorial 
representations
270
. A large body of work exists which attempted to both explain the 
causes of the wave of ‘riots’ and provide responses through policy initiatives, some of 
it based upon analyses of the better-documented major incidents or a single summary 
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 Fryer, Staying Power: The History of Black People in Britain, p.399. 
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 For example the serious disturbances in Ealing Common and Finsbury Park in London (April 1981), 
Coventry (May 1981) and Thornton Heath (June 1981). 
270
 The significant exceptions to this are Bowrey, The 1981 Urban Riots in England, who provides a 
simplistic map of urban disturbances in 1981 and a basic statistical analysis of the Toxteth event; Keith, 
Race, Riots and Policing: Lore and Disorder in a Multi-Racist Society, who provides maps and 
quantitative analysis of the July 1981 incidents in London; and Cooper, Competing Explanations of the 
Merseyside Riots of 1981, who undertakes a quantitative analysis of the Toxteth ‘riot’ using similar 
data for arrests as Bowrey. 
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of nationwide arrests in July/August 1981
271
. However an extensive survey of this 
literature demonstrated that the vital questions concerning the extent, content and 
nature of a large number of the July 1981 disturbances had not been effectively 
answered in the local detail required to facilitate the successful development of causal 
explanations. 
 
As a result of these shortcomings, there was a need to go beyond ‘riot’ lists both to 
expand their limited scope, allow quantitative analysis of the numerous July events 
and thus to understand the characteristics of the spread of disorders. The key 
questions to be addressed in the quantitative analysis of the July disturbances concern 
randomness, dependency and patterns in the distribution of disturbances. All of these 
categories relate to the concept of ‘copycat riots’ where the homogenous 
dissemination of information about disorders via the mass media assumes that all 
locales are subjected equally to the same influences. Consequently, if locales with a 
propensity to ‘riot’ were truly independent of each other, a fairly random spread both 
temporally and spatially of outbreaks of disorder would be expected. However, if 
these locales were not independent of each other either through communication, 
physical contact and/or one event increasing (or decreasing) the likelihood of another 
occurring; temporally and spatially quantifiable patterns local to cities or even 
country-wide would be expected. 
 
These two paradigms mark the independent, random and homogenous diffusion 
processes connected to the ‘copycat’ effect and dependent, dynamic and 
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 Home Office, The Outcome of Arrests during the Serious Incidents of Public Disorder in July and 
August 1981. 
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heterogeneous contagion linked to conscious communication and action. In order to 
determine the veracity of these two paradigms some of the quantitative techniques 
outlined in Chapter 2.0 Section 2.3 are employed to analyse the July 1981 data. This 
allowed an assessment of whether part or all of the July 1981 events fell into either 
category. 
 
4.2  Objectives 
 
The principal objectives of this phase of research into primary sources were to gather 
from local newspapers selected information concerning the July 1981 disturbances, to 
collate this data into a manageable form and finally to undertake some quantitative 
analysis in order to provide pictorial information in the form of maps and numerical 
data for further statistical investigation. Local newspapers were selected as the 
primary sources for analysis, as it appeared from examination of the secondary 
sources that no systematic countrywide survey of this particular media had been 
previously undertaken. 
 
The purpose of the subsequent quantitative analysis of the results of the investigation 
of the primary sources was to address several pressing questions. From a global 
perspective, some of the secondary sources reviewed in this thesis laid claim to the 
concept of a countrywide ‘wave’ of disturbances in July 1981 without actually 
quantifying the temporal form of this supposed wave or attempting any further 
analysis or explanation. In addition, from a more local view, only two of these sources 
provided evidence concerning the distribution of disturbances within the environs of a 
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city
272
 and neither author attempted a quantitative analysis of the temporal distribution 
of these incidents.  
 
In contrast the quantitative investigation presented here provides hitherto unseen 
numerical, graphical and cartographical information from the perspective of the whole 
of England as well as from key cities affected by the disturbances. The aim of the 
collection of this data was to document and examine the form and frequency of 
disturbances in relation to their severity from both a countrywide and urban 
perspective. The relationship between local and global phenomena was important in 
investigating the presence of diffusion and contagion within the nationwide ‘wave’ of 
disturbances.  
 
A second area of quantitative enquiry concerned the relationship of the ethnic make-
up of the ‘crowd’ with respect to the severity of a particular disturbance. This study 
was undertaken in the light of quantitative research carried out by Keith into the July 
1981 disorders in London
273. Keith’s conclusions emphasised different motives and 
behaviours between ethnic groups in the incidents he studied. Information gathered 
from the primary sources in this research activity and the subsequent quantitative 
analysis was aimed at reassessing this proposition but from the perspective of all the 
                                                 
272
 Bowrey supplies data from the Merseyside Constabulary on ‘minor’ incidents of public disorder 
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countrywide disturbances rather than the limited locality of the capital city. 
 
4.3  Methodology 
4.3.1 Data Collection Process 
 
In order to isolate the local newspapers in the archives
274
 relevant to the research a 
series of thirteen secondary sources containing ‘riot’ lists or textual references were 
studied
275
. From these sources a preliminary list of sixty-nine ‘riot’ locations and 
approximate start and end dates was created for the month of July 1981. This list 
informed the initial choices of local newspapers selected for investigation. These 
sources were studied primarily for the information they provided concerning the 
disturbances in their particular region, but data was also gathered on a general basis 
for the countrywide events.  This process produced multiple items of data for 
individual incidents allowing cross-referencing later in the investigation. 
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Colindale facility (London), the Central Reference Library (Bristol) and The Times Archive (online) via 
University of West of England St. Matthias Library. 
275
  The thirteen secondary sources studied were Fryer, Staying Power: The History of Black People in 
Britain, Ramdin, The Making of the Black Working Class in Britain, Smith and others, Like a Summer 
with a Thousand Julys…and Other Seasons.., Benyon and Solomos, The Roots of Urban Unrest, Rowe, 
The Racialisation of Disorder in Twentieth Century Britain, Joshua, Wallace and Booth, To Ride the 
Storm: The 1980 Bristol 'Riot' and the State, Martin Kettle and Lucy Hodges, Uprising!: The Police, 
the People and the Riots in Britain's Cities (London: Pan Books, 1982), Farrar, Northern ‘Race Riots’ 
of the Summer of 2001 – were they Riots, were they Racial? A Case-Study of the Events in Harehills, 
Leeds, ‘Www.channel4.com/history/U/untold/programs/riot/timeline,’ (2009), Keith, Race, Riots and 
Policing: Lore and Disorder in a Multi-Racist Society, Hernon, Riot!: Civil Insurrection from Peterloo 
to the Present Day, Hytner, Report of the Moss Side Enquiry Panel to the Leader of the Greater 
Manchester Council and Bowrey, The 1981 Urban Riots in England. 
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The preliminary exploration of the selected primary sources both removed spurious 
disturbances and through a process of ‘snowballing’276 significantly expanded the 
original list of July ‘riots’. As a result of following this approach several further 
phases of data collection were undertaken with the aim of investigating new locations 
of disturbances. The completion of these iterative collection phases was followed by a 
rationalisation of the data set into discrete daily events. This allowed a disturbance 
associated with a particular locale to be analysed as a continuum of connected daily 
incidents rather than a bland location reference associated with a single day or 
undefined period of days as was the case in the majority of the original secondary 
sources.  This process of deconstruction was aimed at gaining some understanding of 
the temporal dynamic of a particular disturbance (typically its trigger, growth and 
decline phases), its relationship to other incidents in a locale and to the national 
picture.  
 
4.3.2 Basis for the Selection of Data 
 
For the initial phase of information gathering from the primary sources a series of 
categories were defined. These were based on similar exercises undertaken by other 
researchers concerned with violent disturbances
277
 but were modified to suit the 
conditions and content of the July 1981 disorders. The categories are described and 
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explained in Table 3 below.  
 
Category Description 
District/Town 
A disturbance locale whether city centre, city district, or 
satellite town. This was an attempt to escape the crude 
definitions in national newspapers of disturbances being 
situated in cities or towns, without reference to the actual 
locations. 
Date (Begin/End) 
The beginning and end dates of a contiguous set of disturbances 
in a particular location. The data under this category was later 
sub-divided into daily events 
Time (Begin/End) 
The beginning and end time of a daily disturbance. This 
category was aimed at providing data concerning the duration of 
a particular disturbance as well as information useful to the 
correlation of different forms of incident (e.g. the separation of 
day time and night time violence). 
Rioters (Number) 
An estimate of the number of active participants in a 
disturbance. This was assumed to be useful in gauging riot 
severity. 
Rioters (Ethnicity) 
An analysis of the ethnic make-up of the crowd. The primary 
source definitions were adhered to, e.g. White or Black. Where 
the crowd was specified as ‘Asian’ or ‘Afro-Caribbean’ this was 
noted. 
Arrests (Number) 
The number of (daily) arrests noted by the primary source. A 
potential marker of riot intensity. 
Arrests (Ethnicity) 
In the few cases where this was stated the ethnic breakdown 
was recorded using the crude definitions of the primary source. 
Injuries (Police) 
The number of police injuries as a result of the disturbance (and 
where stated, ‘minor’ or ‘serious’). This category was 
considered to be another potential gauge of riot severity. 
Injuries (Other) 
Numbers of injured civilians and/or rioters. Counting of the 
injuries to participants in disturbances is notoriously difficult 
however, as most go unreported or are logged under different 
causes in hospitals in order for the participant to avoid 
apprehension by the police. 
Primary Source/Date Acronym denoting newspaper title and reference date. 
Notes 
Other information from the primary source thought useful to the 
research (e.g. use of petrol bombs, damage to police vehicles 
etc.). 
Table 3: Categories for the collection of information about disturbances from the primary 
sources 
 
During the process of collecting the data, several further categories of information 
were defined, particularly those relating to the measurement of riot severity. These are 
described below in Table 4. After the sub-division of the data into daily periods, 
various categories of information associated with each incident and described above 
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were cross-referenced to provide a level of empirical solidity.  Where data was 
considered to be lacking, further efforts were made to isolate relevant primary 
sources. 
 
Category Description Explanation 
PD  
Properties 
damaged or 
destroyed 
This denoted the presence of property damage and where 
known the number of properties damaged. 
PB  
Use of petrol 
bombs 
Forms of use or discovery of petrol bombs in the locale of 
the disturbance 
A  Arson 
Evidence of arson in a disturbance and/or number of 
vehicles or buildings damaged or destroyed. 
L  Looting Evidence of looting. 
PC  
Police 
commitment 
The numbers of police officers committed to a particular 
disturbance 
PV  
Police vehicles 
damaged or 
destroyed 
The presence and/or number of police vehicles damaged 
or destroyed 
PS  
Police station 
attacked 
Significant attack during a disturbance on a police station 
or other property (in addition note was made of attacks on 
fire stations or ambulance stations). 
DUR  Duration 
Where the information was available the duration of a 
particular disturbance was either calculated or stated from 
the primary source (in hours). 
Table 4: Additional categories for the collection of information concerning disturbances from the 
primary sources 
 
4.3.3 Disturbance Severity Analysis 
 
Using the collated daily data defined by the categories described in Section 3.2 it was 
possible to generate a measure of disturbance severity. This was achieved by 
expanding and modifying a quantitative system employed by Keith
278
. The numerical 
ranges of the data collected for all of the incidents of daily disturbance derived from 
the primary and secondary sources for each particular category were studied.  The 
                                                 
278
 Keith, Race, Riots and Policing: Lore and Disorder in a Multi-Racist Society, pp.109-114, which 
was in turn derived from J. T. Wanderer, ‘An Index of Riot Severity and some Correlates,’ American 
Journal of Sociology 74, no. 5 (1969). 
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arithmetic mean, median and mode of all the disturbance data were calculated and 
used to define a series of five intervals within a series of six final categories. These 
categories, their intervals and respective disturbance severity scores are described in 
Table 5. 
 
Category 
Disturbance Severity Score (DSS) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Duration 
(Hours) 
<1 1 to <2 2 to <4 4 to <8 8 
Rioters 
(Number) 
< 50 50 to <100 100 to <300 300 to <700 700 
Police injuries 
(Number) 
< 5 5 to <10 10 to <20 20 to <50 50 
Properties 
damaged 
(Number/arson) 
< 10 10 to <30 >30 
Buildings 
burned 
(minor) 
Buildings 
burned 
(major) 
Attacks on 
police property 
Police 
vehicles 
damaged 
(minor) 
Police 
vehicles 
damaged 
(major) 
Police 
vehicles 
burned 
(minor) 
Police 
vehicles 
burned 
(major) 
Police 
station 
attacked 
Use of petrol 
bombs 
Found at 
scene of 
disturbance 
Used 
against 
property 
Used against 
police 
(minor) 
Used against 
police 
(major) 
Used against 
police 
(massive) 
Table 5: Categories and intervals for calculation of disturbance severity scores 
 
A closer examination of Table 5 reveals that the category intervals are not in a linear 
relationship
279
. Instead they were weighted so that the capability of a disturbance to 
achieve a high severity rating was increasingly difficult. This was considered 
necessary in order to clearly and conservatively delineate the more common minor or 
major disturbance from the major or exceptional ‘riot’. It was hoped that this 
approach would also counteract tendencies in the local and national media to 
erroneously exaggerate the importance of some disturbances over others. 
 
                                                 
279
 For example the ‘Rioters (Number)’ categories have variables which double in each of the 
ascending intervals (e.g. 50, 100, 200, 400). 
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It should be noted that several of the initial categories defined in Section 3.2 were 
either combined for simplicity or not employed in this particular disturbance severity 
analysis.  Particularly ferocious ‘riots’ often produce lower numbers of arrests than 
incidences of large scale looting. For these reasons this category ‘Arrests’ was ignored 
in this particular analysis. Similarly the numbers of police committed (‘PC’) to a 
disturbance may, of course, impede its ferocity, so basing a riot intensity study on this 
category was deemed questionable. Finally the presence of looting (‘L’) is also 
problematic, as again Keith points out
280
. Taking goods from damaged shops may be 
considered an almost benign activity compared to actually smashing the windows, 
arson or a pitched battle with police, which are more commonly associated with ‘riot’. 
For this reason, ‘looting’ as an activity was excluded from the disturbance severity 
analysis. 
 
The final phase of the process of defining disturbance severity was to score each of 
the daily incidents for the various categories shown in Table 5. Where information 
was not available, no score was entered. This approach was undertaken because a lack 
of useful data did not necessarily indicate a low disturbance severity rating for a 
particular category. The Disturbance Severity Scores (DSS) were then averaged to 
derive the Disturbance Severity Quotient (DSQ) an overall measure of event severity. 
Averaging of severity scores was only undertaken where at least three values were 
available. The averaging process was thus aimed at a conservative smoothing of the 
disturbance severity scores over a series of categories where data was available in the 
primary sources. In the case where a disturbance had less than three severity scores 
available, a subjective but conservative judgement was made. As a general rule such 
                                                 
280
  Keith, Race, Riots and Policing: Lore and Disorder in a Multi-Racist Society, p.110. 
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incidents only achieved a ranking of 1 (minor disturbance) or  2 (major disturbance) 
marking the absence of a diversity of information. In this manner, daily events that 
lacked source data but had one or two high scores would not be weighted upwards. 
Conversely, incidents that lacked data and had low scores would not be entirely lost 
either. 
 
The DSQ data was then used to subjectively rank the severity of a particular 
disturbance within the context of the primary source data of July 1981. This is shown 
in Table 6: 
 
 DSQ Range 
1 >1 to 2 >2 to 3 >3 to 4 >4 to 5 
Disturbance 
Severity 
Minor 
Disturbance 
Major 
Disturbance 
Riot 
Major 
Riot 
Exceptional 
Riot 
Table 6: Subjective definition of disturbance severity based upon DSQ ranges 
 
Examination of Table 6 shows that the DSQ range of ‘greater than 2 to 3’ defines the 
boundary between less serious incidents of public disorder (minor and major 
disturbances) and the more serious conditions of ‘riot’. On this basis and referring to 
Table 5, for a particular daily incident to be defined as a ‘riot’ within the DSQ range it 
would be expected at a minimum to have at least three available disturbance severity 
scores and to exhibit some or all of the following characteristics: 
 
 A longevity of two or more hours 
 One hundred or more active participants 
 Ten or more police injuries 
 Widespread property damage 
 163 
 Numerous police vehicles damaged (including by fire) 
 The use of petrol bombs against the police 
 
4.4 Review and Discussion of Results 
4.4.1 Daily Incident Data Set 
 
The primary source data consisted of 90 media publications the vast majority of 
which were local newspapers. A full listing of these sources, including those that 
yielded no relevant information
281
, is provided in Appendix 10.3. Following the 
process described in Section 3.0 these primary sources were combined with the 
original secondary sources to yield 200 cross-referenced daily incidents distributed 
throughout the month of July 1981 and spread over 128 locations in England
282
. The 
criteria for inclusion in this data set was that a particular disorder should at least attain 
the level of ‘minor disturbance’ as defined in Table 6. The daily incidents are listed in 
chronological order, with their respective disturbance severity scores (DSS) and 
quotients (DSQ), in Appendix 10.4.  Incidents that failed to achieve this rating or 
where no evidence could be found despite their appearance in the secondary sources 
are listed in Appendix 10.5. 
 
Table 7 gives the percentage breakdown of the daily incident data set according to 
                                                 
281
 The primary sources that yielded ‘negative’ results are included as they tend to discount locations of 
disturbances cited by the secondary sources. This is possibly evidence of the phenomenon of ‘shaggy 
dog riots’ discussed by Keith as moral panics in the media. Ibid. pp.61-68. Other possibilities include a 
lack of data or suppression of news of disturbances by police authorities in tandem with the local 
media. 
282
 Only one location fell outside the geographic boundaries of England. The disturbances in Dundee on 
11
th
 and 12
th
 July were included despite failing the strict remit of this thesis. 
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disturbance severity.  Examination of this data shows that the vast majority of the 
disturbances in July 1981 fell into the category of minor or major disturbances, with 
less than 20% being classed at the ‘riot’ severity levels. This suggests that either the 
conservatism inherent in the non-linear severity analysis provided a damping effect 
(as intended) and/or that the July 1981 disturbances were actually characterised by a 
minority of serious incidents of public disorder within a sea of less severe events. 
Although this form of analysis escapes limitations inherent in the ‘riot lists’ cited in 
many secondary sources by providing an index of severity, greater detail inherent in 
spatial and temporal examinations of the data is required to gain a better 
understanding of the anatomy of the July 1981 events. 
 
Disturbance 
Severity 
DSQ 
No. of Daily 
Disturbances 
Percentage 
of Total 
Minor Disturbance 1 96 48.0 
Major Disturbance >1 to 2 68 34.0 
Riot >2 to 3 25 12.5 
Major Riot >3 to 4 9 4.5 
Exceptional Riot >4 to 5 2 1.0 
Total - 200 100 
Table 7: Breakdown of disturbances by severity in England July 1981 
 
4.4.2 Cartographical Analysis  
 
An important phase of the quantitative analysis involved geographic and temporal 
mapping of daily disturbance data derived from the primary sources. Extensive 
searches of both primary and secondary sources provided only scant examples of 
cartography being undertaken for the July 1981 events and none were found that 
illustrated countrywide disturbances on a daily basis. 
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In this study a series of U.K. maps were created charting both the geographical and 
temporal location of the 200 daily disturbances, as well as their severity. Each daily 
incident had a map marker assigned to it whose size was relative to the Disturbance 
Severity Quotient for that event. The full set of maps produced by this cartographical 
study covering 19 days between July 3
rd
 and 28
th
 1981 are presented in Appendix 
10.6. 
 
Examination of these maps suggested that temporal sub-divisions could be discerned. 
The opening phase of the disturbances was considered to lie between Friday 3
rd
 and 
Monday 6
th
 July (Maps 1 to 4). Only two disturbance locations, Toxteth (Liverpool) 
and Southall (London) were present and there were no subsidiary incidents. Both of 
these sets of disturbances were severe, falling into the higher categories of ‘riot’ (2 < 
DSQ  3), ‘major riot’ (3 < DSQ  4) or ‘exceptional riot’ (4 < DSQ  5). 
Significantly both locations experienced an incident on the first day of the July wave 
of disturbances. Whilst the Southall ‘riot’ only lasted one evening, the Toxteth 
disturbances displayed considerable longevity, developing in severity over the 
weekend. 
 
The Toxteth ‘riots’ of 3rd to 7th July displayed a pattern that was a reoccurring feature 
of many examples in this study. After the initial ‘trigger’ incident involving a small 
crowd on Friday 3
rd
 July
283
 and consequent sporadic attacks on police lasting 
                                                 
283
 Hernon (along with many other sources) states that the ‘trigger’ incident was the attempted (and 
eventually unsuccessful) arrest by the police of a motorcyclist in the heart of Toxteth. Significantly the 
disturbance was escalated by members of the public intervening to stop the rider being seized by the 
police who claimed that he had stolen the motorbike he was riding in Hernon, Riot!: Civil Insurrection 
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approximately two hours
284
, the disturbances grew rapidly in severity over the 
succeeding days as shown in Table 8. A pattern of ‘trigger’ (July 3rd), growth to a 
peak (July 4
th
 – 5th) and decline (July 6th – 7th) is clearly shown in the life cycle of this 
disturbance. 
 
 July 1981: Day/Date 
Friday 3
rd
 Saturday 4
th
 Sunday 5
th
 Monday 6
th
 Tuesday 7
th
 
DSQ Rating 1.8 4.0 4.3 2.8 2.0 
Disturbance 
Descriptor 
Major 
Disturbance 
Major Riot Exceptional 
Riot 
Riot Major 
Disturbance 
Table 8: The Toxteth disturbances of 3
rd
 – 7th July 1981 by severity 
 
The second phase of the July events lasted from Tuesday 7
th
 to Thursday 9
th
. The 
maps (5 to 7) for this particular period show several interesting new developments 
and can be considered as representing a local ‘growth’ phase, characterised by clumps 
of minor disturbances in cities generated by preceding major events. At the very 
moment where the Toxteth incident was in decline, severe disturbances broke out in 
the district of Moss Side in the neighbouring city of Manchester over the mid-week 
period. In tandem with this serious event are the first appearances of minor incidents 
in the environs of Liverpool. On Tuesday 7
th
 July there were minor disturbances in the 
city centre and in Kirkby a suburb to the North East of the city, followed on 
Wednesday 8
th
 by further more serious violence in Kirkby and in Netherly in the 
South East. By this stage the inner city area of Toxteth itself was relatively quiet. On 
the succeeding night (Thursday 9
th
 July), nine disparate areas of Merseyside, 
                                                                                                                                            
from Peterloo to the Present Day, p.201. The Times (06-07-1981) states that the initial crowd involved 
‘40 black youths’. 
284
 Times (06-07-1981). 
 167 
including the city centre, experienced minor or major disturbances (Kirkby, Bootle, 
Halewood, Leasowe, Speke, Thornton, Tuebrook and Wallasey). Similar phenomena 
appeared at the peak of the Moss Side event in Manchester, with incidents in Clayton, 
Gorton, Rusholme and Salford on Wednesday 8
th
.  In the capital a serious disturbance 
in Wood Green (North London) on Tuesday 7
th
 July was followed on Thursday 9
th
 by 
more minor incidents in Balham, Battersea, Dalston, Deptford, Fulham, Lewisham, 
Notting Hill, Stoke Newington, Tooting and Woolwich
285
. 
 
The ‘clusters’ of less serious disturbances in the environs of the cities of Liverpool, 
Manchester and London demonstrate the contagious effect of the more serious ‘riots’ 
in Toxteth, Moss Side and Wood Green respectively. It is interesting to note that no 
‘national effect’ was in play at this stage. Disturbances are confined to the major 
conurbations already mentioned and there is little evidence of the contagion affecting 
England as a whole. 
 
However, from this point on, as shown in maps 8 and 9 covering 10
th
 - 11
th
 July, the 
wave of incidents multiplies at an escalating rate, rising to a peak on the Saturday 
night, when 73 locales, spread over much of England, experienced disturbances of 
varying severity. Although new concentrations of disturbance appear during this 
phase in major cities and conurbations, for example the West Midlands (Birmingham 
and Wolverhampton), East Midlands (Nottingham, Leicester, Derby) and the 
                                                 
285
 Keith noted that ‘In the days following Southall, there was a gradual build-up of tension within the 
Stoke Newington area and an expectation of ‘trouble’, particularly in the wake of the mid-week 
disturbances in Wood Green less than two miles from Dalston Junction station along Green Lane’ in 
Keith, Race, Riots and Policing: Lore and Disorder in a Multi-Racist Society, p.150. 
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Yorkshire cities (Leeds, Bradford, Hull, Halifax, Huddersfield), there is also a 
dissemination of incidents to more isolated large towns. Significant incidents, 
sometimes with a longevity of several days, occur in numerous and diverse places 
such as High Wycombe (Buckinghamshire), Luton and Bedford (Bedfordshire), 
Portsmouth, Slough (Berkshire), Gloucester, Chester (Cheshire) and Darwen, 
Fleetwood, Blackpool, Blackburn and Preston in Lancashire. This pattern implies that 
although the local contagion effect confined to the major conurbations was operating, 
a newer diffusion phenomenon was functioning and significantly expanding the 
number and spread of incidents as a result. 
 
The fourth stage of the wave of July events, lasting from Sunday 12
th
 to Monday 13
th
 
(Maps 10 to 11) can be characterised as the ‘decline phase’. Although serious 
incidents occurred over this period (notably in Leicester, Leeds and Derby), the 
number of disturbances as a whole fell rapidly. One obvious characteristic that 
connected both the peak and decline phases of the July disturbances was the weekend 
period (Friday 10
th
 – Sunday 12th). Although there were 12 incidents on the night of 
Monday 13
th
 July, all but one (Derby) was of minor or major disturbance severity and 
there were no recorded events on Tuesday 14
th
.  This suggests that the expanded 
leisure time afforded by the weekend and its consequences in effecting social 
groupings in public spaces may have had an impact on both the growth and eventual 
decline of the overall wave of incidents.  
 
Growth and the subsequent decline of waves of disturbances have been noted in 
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several other historical studies of disorder
286
. Quantitative studies of racial rioting in 
the United States in the 1960s cited various factors as being potentially important in 
understanding the decline in cycles of incidents
287. ‘Exhaustion or ceiling effects’ are 
generated by intense periods of serious disorder and are usually the result of a 
combination of the literal physical cost involved, as well as due to negative reactions 
in the communities local to the disturbances. This quasi-cost-benefit analysis leads to 
‘saturation effects’ that cause cessation of open hostility to the authorities, sometimes 
temporarily, in locales that have sustained prolonged periods of unrest. Also of 
importance is the repression unleashed by the state as a result of the disorder. 
Although this activity can have a dual nature, that is exacerbating conflicts as well as 
suppressing them, the latter effect including the physical danger to the participants 
combined with large numbers of arrests can act as a significant inhibitor of both the 
continuation of specific disturbances and the wider diffusion of disorder.  
 
In July 1981 there were significant differences in the tactics and levels of violence 
applied by the police to disturbances in different regions. These ranged from static, 
defensive responses to disorders early in the month, through to pre-emptive 
concentrations of police in areas believed to be susceptible to the disturbance 
contagion over the weekend of 10
th
 – 12th July288. Escalation and modification of 
                                                 
286
 For example the Swing Riots of the 1830s in Hobsbawm and Rudé, Captain Swing or the rioting in 
major cities in the United States in the 1960s in Myers, Racial Rioting in the 1960S: An Event History 
Analysis of Local Conditions. 
287
 Myers, Collective Violence and Heterogeneous Diffusion Processes: U.S. Racial Rioting from 1964-
1971, pp.23-24. 
288
 Several primary sources celebrate the ‘swamping’ of town centres with police over that weekend as 
being successful in fending off potential disorders or reducing their severity. Examples include Reading 
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tactics, particularly in Manchester over 7
th
 – 9th July, were a direct result of the 
injuries sustained by police and their perception of ‘defeat’ during their deployment to 
the neighbouring city of Liverpool in the preceding Toxteth disorders
289
. There is 
evidence to support the view that these aggressive policing tactics
290
, previously 
unseen in mainland Britain (though long-used in Northern Ireland), were a significant 
factor in the suppression of further disorders in Moss Side and Greater Manchester. 
This temporal and regional variation in the adoption of repressive tactics adds 
potential explanations as well as significant heterogeneity to the decline in the July 
wave of disturbances. 
 
The final segment of the July disturbances, which will be denoted as the ‘death 
phase’, covers 14th July to 28th July (Maps 12 to 19).  This period is marked by very 
few, disparate and sporadic incidents often interspersed with several days where no 
disturbances were recorded. The only major disorders of any note occur in Brixton 
(Wednesday 15
th
), Southall (Wednesday 15
th
 and Thursday 16
th
), Keswick (Saturday 
25
th
) and Toxteth (Sunday 26
th
 – Tuesday 28th). All of these incidents have significant 
differences both in initiation, participants and content. They are interesting in their 
persistence and apparent disconnection from the overall form of the July wave. They 
                                                                                                                                            
(Reading Chronicle 17-07-1981), Bristol (Western Daily Press 13-07-1981), Harlow (Harlow Gazette 
17-07-1981), Bedford (Bedford Record 14-07-1981), Romford (Romford Recorder 13-07-1981) and 
Hereford (Worcester Evening News 20-07-1981). 
289
 Hytner, Report of the Moss Side Enquiry Panel to the Leader of the Greater Manchester Council, 
App. 4B p.4. 
290
 These tactics included the use of mobile police units, ‘snatch squads’ to target ‘ring leaders’ and 
most controversially the use of semi-armoured police vehicles as high speed battering rams to break up 
crowds. Ibid. Section 39.1 and Appendix 4B Sections 9-16. 
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also demonstrate some of the complex characteristics of disturbances within it.  
 
The Brixton event was a violent but short-lived, localised response to an aggressive 
police operation
291
. It demonstrated the continuing conflicts between the authorities 
and Black communities situated in contentious locales in the wake of the events in the 
first two weeks of July 1981. The earlier and profound Southall disturbance of 3
rd
 July 
was initiated by the aggressive invasion of the area by skinheads, some with fascist 
affiliations, leading to a violent collective response by the community both to the 
invaders and the police who appeared to be protecting them. As a result ‘the Asian 
youth had made clear that Southall was a ‘no-go’ area for fascists’292 and it is no 
surprise that the disturbances in that area later in the month are associated by Keith 
with racial violence
293
. In contrast the incident in Keswick on Saturday 25
th
 was 
connected to a scooter rally where several hundred ‘mods’ attacked police using 
                                                 
291
 This serious incident (DSQ=3.0) was triggered by a coordinated series of raids by the Metropolitan 
police on 11 houses in Railton Road on the pretext of hunting for petrol bomb stores. This particular 
locale was the so-called ‘frontline’ or as designated by Keith a ‘centre of resistance’, a place where 
‘resentment of power relations was transformed into resistance of power relations’. The raids involved 
over 100 police officers, found no petrol bombs and resulted in the residences being severely damaged. 
They were regarded by both residents and most interestingly some police officers as an attempt to 
‘avenge the defeats of the riots earlier in the year’. As such this particular disturbance is unusual as it is 
the result of a premeditated, offensive operation by the police rather than the more common case of a 
crowd response to ‘routine’ (though questionable) policing, which appears to be behind many other 
‘trigger’ incidents in July 1981. Keith, Race, Riots and Policing: Lore and Disorder in a Multi-Racist 
Society, pp.131-32 & 159-62. 
292
 Notes and Documents, p.226. 
293
 Keith, Race, Riots and Policing: Lore and Disorder in a Multi-Racist Society, p.112. 
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petrol bombs and weapons, burned a mobile theatre and looted the ‘Tea Gardens’294. 
This incident falls into the supposed category of ‘juvenile delinquency’ more 
associated with youth violence on Bank Holidays in seaside towns. However, the 
Keswick disturbance clearly had a more vicious edge, possibly stimulated by the 
disorders earlier in the month.  
 
Finally and perhaps aptly, Toxteth exploded into three days of serious rioting at the 
end of the month, in some ways confounding the concept of the ‘death phase’ of the 
July wave of riots. If this phase is supposed to a represent a reduction in number, 
longevity and severity of disturbances, then Toxteth in late July clearly contradicts the 
latter two categories. This particular tranche of disturbances in Liverpool 8 were 
considered by many commentators to be the most ferocious of the summer in 
Merseyside
295. The intensity of the violence of the ‘rioters’ was matched and 
exceeded by the application of new aggressive policing tactics. This led to serious 
injuries amongst the ‘rioters’, including the first death of the July 1981 events when a 
disabled man David Moore was run down by a police van.   
 
These four examples, which mark the ‘death phase’ of the July disturbances, 
exemplify a deeper complexity within the events as a whole, something which basic 
quantitative analysis is not necessarily well suited to explore. The difference in their 
content is important; Brixton as a defensive reaction to police incursions into a site of 
                                                 
294
 Keswick Reminder (31-07-1981). 
295
 Several sources note the vicious nature of the combat including Bowrey, The 1981 Urban Riots in 
England, p.45, and Hernon, Riot!: Civil Insurrection from Peterloo to the Present Day, pp.207-209. 
The Times (30-07-1981) quoted the Chief Constable of Merseyside, Kenneth Oxford as saying ‘there 
had been more petrol bombs than on any previous night’. 
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contention, marking the historical collapse in relations between the inner city Afro-
Caribbean communities and the police; Southall as a violent collective response to 
racist attacks and formal intervention by organised racist groups; Keswick as  
‘delinquent’ action by a White crowd centred around a youth sub-culture and Toxteth 
as a durable and ferocious anti-police riot fusing a Black and White crowd into a 
formidable force requiring severe measures by the state to suppress it. These 
complexities, although arguably linked, imply that merely ranking disturbances 
according to severity and quantifying them spatially and temporally as an overall 
wave of incidents will illuminate only certain facets of the July 1981 unrest. 
 
Another question that relates to the concept of the ‘death’ of the July disturbances and 
to the cartographical and tabular arrangement of the primary source data concerns the 
end point of the wave. There is a certainly a level of superficiality in claiming an end 
to the cycle with the Toxteth incidents of July 26
th
 – 28th. Several references quote 
further outbreaks of disorder in the days following the events in Liverpool 8 that fall 
outside the remit of this particular analysis
296
.  This issue relates to a problematic 
understanding of the July disturbances, that is, envisaging them as a clearly defined 
                                                 
296
 For example Hernon states ‘Further ‘copycat’ riots broke out the day after David Moore’s death 
marked an end to the Toxteth disorder. The Moss Side district of Manchester was shattered by a mob 
which attacked police, smashed windows and looted shops. Hundreds of mainly black youths went on 
the rampage in Brixton, Southall, Reading, Hull and Preston’. Ibid. p.209. In addition, the Chief 
Constable of Merseyside was quoted in The Times (30-07-1981) as using a disturbance in Maghull (16 
km north of Liverpool) that occurred during the late July Toxteth disorders as evidence that ‘copycat’ 
events would continue regardless of the suppression of the major incidents. 
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wave of disorder in an otherwise sea of calm
297
. Tarrow in his seminal analysis of 
collective protest proposed a different view, stating: 
‘when we reconstruct cycles of protest from both public records and 
private memories, the peaks that leave indelible impressions in public 
consciousness are really only the high ground of broader swells of 
mobilization that rise and fall from the doldrums of compliance to waves 
of mobilization more gradually than popular memory recognizes’298  
This insight was noted and applied by some of the more astute writers when 
commenting on the July 1981 disturbances. For example Unsworth states: 
‘[the ‘riots’] were not sudden explosions of violence within normally 
peaceful and harmonious communities, but a temporary cluster of 
upsurges punctuating a chronic reality of tension and aggression in the 
inner city. They may be seen as a sudden dramatic escalation of the 
routine conflict with the Police, vandalism, property theft and racial 
violence which characterised these areas before the riots and has 
                                                 
297
 Problems of finding ‘start and end points’ have bedevilled other historical analyses of waves of 
disorder. A discussion of this issue with respect to another disturbance wave is found in Griffin’s paper 
on the Swing Riots of the early 1830s; C. J. Griffin, ‘Swing, Swing Redivivus, Or Something After 
Swing? on the Death Throes of a Protest Movement, December 1830–December 1833,’ International 
Review of Social History 54 (2009). 
298
 Mark Traugott, Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action. (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1995), p.96. 
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returned to routine but heightened levels since’ 299 
This perspective places the July wave of disorder in a ‘choppy sea’ of routine low-
level disturbance, consequently making the task of finding the end (or the start) of 
such a cycle a difficult if not impossible project.  Effectively there may be no defined 
point of termination (or initiation). Instead the disturbance wave should be seen as a 
fluctuation of much higher frequency and severity level within a continuum of unrest. 
An examination of the overall picture of violent urban disorder in 1981 supports this 
view in revealing that there were several serious disturbances in the months preceding 
July and a number after.  
 
Two additional factors may have had an impact on the reporting of disturbances and 
thus skewed the results of this survey with respect to locating the chimerical ‘end 
point’. The shock value of the disturbances of the first two weeks of July 1981 
initially led to intensive reporting in the media. In the weeks that followed there was 
the inevitable loss of newsworthiness particularly for the more numerous but less 
serious disturbances, as their very number led to media indifference. These saturation 
effects, may have both exaggerated the significance of incidents early in the wave but 
also dampened reporting of events after the peak on Saturday 11
th
 July
300
. Allied with 
this phenomenon was pressure from the police and local authorities to suppress 
information both internally in their organisations and externally in the media. This 
was essentially driven by concerns about the supposed media driven ‘copycat’ effect 
                                                 
299
 This author’s emphasis in italics. Unsworth, The Riots of 1981: Popular Violence and the Politics of 
Law and Order, p.71. 
300
 In addition to this effect, a huge news item dominated the media several weeks after the peak of 11
th
 
July. This was the Royal Wedding of Charles and Diana on Wednesday 29
th
 July 1981. 
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in generating more disturbances. As a result of these two trends and due to the 
reliance of this study on primary sources derived from the media, the form of the July 
cycle of disturbances, especially the decline and ‘end’ phases, may be significantly 
distorted. 
 
In concluding this cartographical study of the July 1981 disturbances, some general 
observations can be made regarding their overall severity and spatial location. Certain 
regions of mainland Britain appear to be completely free of disorder; these include the 
South West (comprising Cornwall, Devon, Dorset and Somerset), Wales, East Anglia 
(including Essex, Norfolk, Suffolk, Cambridgeshire and Lincolnshire), Scotland 
(apart from Dundee) and barring some minor disturbances in Newcastle and 
Sunderland, the North East (including Northumberland, Tyne and Wear, Cleveland, 
Durham and Cumbria). The apparent lack of significant unrest in these regions could 
be partly due to a paucity of reports in the secondary sources that were studied. 
However, it is fairly certain that if serious disturbances had occurred in these regions 
they would have been covered in the national media. It can therefore be argued that if 
there were unreported incidents in these areas of the country they would not have 
been of major significance.  
 
The question thus arises as to why there were few or no disturbances in these 
particular regions. Interestingly, some politicians and commentators used this point, in 
combination with historical comparisons of previous periods of economic depression, 
to scotch arguments proposing structural factors such as unemployment and/or 
deprivation as being the drivers of unrest. They essentially posed a dual question that 
if poverty, driven by rapid economic decline inevitably leads to disorder why was 
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there little urban violence of the 1980s form in the 1930s?
301
 Also, why in 1981 did 
areas of the country severely affected by unemployment such as Scotland, Wales and 
the North East fail to ‘riot’?  Several explanations have been offered for this 
conundrum. Unsworth proposed that a particular combination of local structural and 
social factors had to be in place for such unusual events to occur: 
‘it would be necessary to look to the unevenness not only of 
unemployment rates, but of racial mix, Police practices and local social 
environmental conditions to account for the geographical distribution and 
differential character of the disturbances’302  
This perspective may explain the differentiation in the evidence provided by the 
cartographical analysis. Examination of the full set of maps shows that major 
conurbations lying roughly on a line from the south east to the north west (London, 
Leicester, Nottingham, Derby, Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool and Leeds) 
experienced serious disorders and those in the South West, Wales, East Anglia, North 
East and Scotland did not. The cities lying on or close to the London – Liverpool line 
all experienced rapid and severe unemployment between 1979 and 1981, they all 
contained significant inner city communities with mixed ethnicity and many had long 
standing issues concerning the policing of those locales. In contrast the cities lying 
                                                 
301
 This historical argument was criticised by several commentators including Unsworth who pointed 
out that although perhaps the context and form of unrest of the 1930s was different to the 1980s, it was 
incorrect to suggest that there had been no disorder in that period. He cited the counter-examples of 
violent clashes with police associated with the unemployment marches and anti-fascist demonstrations 
of the 1930s to refute this position. Ibid. Note 34, p.83. 
302
 Ibid. p.72. 
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outside of this axis may have had high unemployment but significantly had smaller 
and in some cases no ethnically mixed communities
303
. This scenario points towards 
ethnically mixed inner city areas as vanguards in the July wave, providing the 
incentive for other areas in the environs of the city with mainly White populations to 
engage in the disorder
304
. 
  
The cartographical analysis provides useful information in understanding the spatial 
                                                 
303
 Statistics from the 2001 census showed ‘Minority ethnic groups were more likely to live in England 
than in Scotland or Wales. In England, they made up 9 per cent of the total population compared with 
only 2 per cent in both Scotland and Wales...The minority ethnic populations were concentrated in the 
large urban centres. Nearly half (48 per cent) of the total minority ethnic population lived in the 
London region, where they comprised 29 per cent of all residents. After London, the region with the 
next biggest share of the minority ethnic population was the West Midlands (with 13 per cent of the 
minority ethnic population), followed by the North West (8 per cent), the South East (7 per cent), and 
Yorkshire and the Humber (7 per cent). The English region with the smallest proportion of the minority 
ethnic population was the North East where minority ethnic groups made up less than 2 per cent of the 
region's population’. A. White, Social Focus in Brief: Ethnicity 2002 (London: Office for National 
Statistics, 2002), p.7. 
304
 From a somewhat different perspective, Ennis argued that the specific cultural history and identity 
of the north east of England was a factor in that region’s apparent lack of response to the 1981 
disturbances. Ennis postulated that the region’s peripheral relationship to the ‘rest of the country’ in 
both geographic and socio-economic terms creates a ‘simultaneous membership in two communities – 
one regional, the other national’. This dichotomy, he argued, generated an ideological adherence to the 
nineteenth-century values of the ‘English imperial system’, which in turn explains the stability of the 
region in 1981 so championed in the local press. Regionally specific cultural arguments such as this 
may also help to explain the relative calm in Scotland and Wales in 1981, though the detailed local 
research required to fully substantiate this proposition lies beyond the remit of this thesis. F. Ennis, 
‘Time, Person and Place in the North-East of England,’ (Ph.D thesis, Durham, 1987). 
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and temporal nature of the overall wave of disturbances. It has exposed the various 
phases of trigger, growth and decline of both individual events and more crudely in 
the overall wave of incidents. The problems of defining the start and end points of this 
wave have been addressed and the mapping of the July incidents generated questions 
concerning the uneven geographic spread of disturbances. However, one facet that 
certainly requires more qualitative and quantitative treatment concerns the 
relationship between local ‘clusters’ of disturbances situated in major cities and the 
overall wave of disorder in July 1981. This aspect, highlighted by the cartographical 
analysis, will be addressed in greater detail in the next section. 
 
4.4.3 Quantitative Analysis of Local and National Characteristics 
 
4.4.3.1 The National Perspective 
 
To initiate the study of the relationship between disturbances located in and around 
major cities and the nationwide wave it is worthwhile to begin with a consideration of 
the macro perspective in more detail. Figure 8 displays the complete daily disturbance 
data set for England (presented in Appendix 10.4) as a histogram stratified according 
to incident severity for the month of July 1981.  
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Figure 8: Histogram of frequency and severity of disturbances for England July 1981 
 
This figure clearly exposes the temporal form of the wave of disturbances, showing a 
distribution of incidents clustered around a peak on 11
th
 July 1981. 
 
Other more subtle features are also apparent which are displayed in Table 9. This 
summarises the frequency of riot or greater severity level events as a percentage of all 
the incidents for the phases outlined in Section 4.2.  
 
Phase within wave Opening Growth Peak Decline Death Overall 
July date range 3
rd
-6
th
 7
th
-9
th
 10
th
-11
th
 12
th
-13
th
 14
th
-28
th
 3
rd
-28
th
  
Number of events 
of severity  ‘riot’ 
4 5 18 4 5 36 
Total number of 
events in phase 
5 35 123 28 9 200 
% of events of 
severity  ‘riot’ 
80.0 14.3 14.6 14.3 55.6 18.0 
Table 9: Breakdown of overall disturbance wave into phases to analyse frequency of disturbances 
at the incident severity level of ‘riot’ or greater 
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Examination of this data demonstrates that the opening phase (3
rd
-6
th
 July) is 
dominated by serious incidents (in Southall, London and Toxteth, Liverpool) of the 
level of ‘riot’ or greater (DSQ>2). Although the serious incidents remain stable as a 
percentage of the whole during the growth, peak and decline phases it is clear that 
rapid growth and decline occurs in the frequency of the less serious disturbances over 
this period. This evidence points towards the severity of the initial events as being a 
factor in the trigger of the overall wave. In the ‘death’ phase (14th-28th July), the 
serious incidents again dominate showing their reoccurring persistence (particularly in 
Toxteth). 
 
In order to analyse this national wave of disturbances more systematically, the 
cumulative count of disturbances was compared to the predictions of the logistic 
function (or more commonly known as the ‘S’ curve)305. This mathematical 
relationship effectively models the diffusion of disturbances assuming that each event 
is independent and that the spread of incidents is a random process. The closeness of 
fit gives an indication of the influence of contagious processes within the overall 
diffusion wave.  Midlarsky argued that a good ‘fit’ of the real data to the logistic 
function suggests that precipitating incidents for disturbances were not directly 
influenced by other events although the responses might be similar
306
.  
 
For example, if  ‘riots’ were planned as a result of imitative behaviours or if the 
                                                 
305
 For a fuller description of this diffusion equation see Chapter 2.0 Section 2.3.2 note 147. 
306
 See for example the work of Midlarsky in comparing ‘real’ data from the disturbances in the U.S. in 
1966-67 with the logistic function in order to isolate contagious processes within the diffusion wave. 
This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.0 Section 2.3.4. 
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chances of them happening were lessened by the impact of other events then they 
would not necessarily be independent and the ‘fit’ would suffer as a result. Thus less 
correlation between the curves would suggest that contagious processes involving 
inter-dependence of events might be in operation.  
 
Figure 9 shows the relationships between the cumulative numbers of disturbances by 
day in July 1981 in England (blue curve) and the prediction of the logistic function 
(black curve). The derivative of the logistic function (green curve) predicts the 
number of disturbances per day through the period and is compared to the actual daily 
disturbance data (red curve)
307
. 
Figure 9: Comparison of ‘real’ disturbance data from 3rd –18th July 1981 in England with the 
logistic curve and its derivative. 
 
                                                 
307
 The predictive logistic function curves were centred on the day of the peak number of disturbances 
(11
th
 July). This represents the point of maximum gradient (rate of change) of the logistic function and 
consequently the peak of the derivative of this curve. 
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The results of this comparison show that the peak of the actual daily event data had 
almost 50% more disturbances (73) than predicted by the derivative of the logistic 
function (49). Although the two daily disturbance curves are similar between the 3
rd
 
and 9
th
 July, the real number of disorders increases rapidly over the weekend of 
Friday (10
th
 July) and Saturday (11
th
 July) in comparison to the prediction. This 
observation is borne out by the deviations between the curve for the cumulative 
distribution of real events and the logistic function. The skew of the real data to the 
left suggests that a significant contagious effect was in play between 3
rd
-11
th
 July, 
which created dependency between events and thus encouraged further disorders to 
occur. Closer examination of the difference between the two cumulative curves 
suggests that the deviation increases non-linearly over the first part of the weekend of 
9
th
-10
th
 July. In order to examine these discontinuities in more detail the first 
differential (d/dt) of real daily disturbance data set was compared with the equivalent 
second differential (d/dt
2
) of the logistic function. This is effectively a comparison 
between the two rates of change of daily disturbances and is shown in Figure 10. 
 
A flat line in Figure 10 represents a situation where the number of daily disturbances 
is constant, an inclined straight line depicts a linear increase in the number of daily 
disturbances and an inclined curve shows a non-linear increasing rate of change in 
these incidents. Descending lines represent the same characteristics but with declining 
rates of change.  Several features are apparent in Figure 10, notably the instigation of 
the diffusion process after 6
th
 July initially matching the mathematical model. 
However, the real dataset shows significant non-linear increases in daily disturbances 
after 9
th
 July and a comparatively rapid reduction in the number of daily events after 
11
th
 July (unlike the logistic function). 
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Figure 10: Comparison of the rates of change of daily disturbances for the real data for England 
July 3
rd
-18
th
 and that predicted by the second differential of the logistic function 
 
The characteristics of the real dataset in Figure 9 and Figure 10 indicate the presence 
of contagious processes, which were particularly prevalent over the weekend of 10
th
-
11
th
 July, acting in parallel with the pure diffusion effects. The noticeable skew in the 
actual data over this period may be partly as a result of the effect of the ‘weekend’ in 
enhancing the likelihood of the occurrence of disorders though it is difficult to 
quantify this effect without a larger data set spread over a longer time period
308
. In 
order to augment this overall perspective of the July 1981 disturbances it is worth 
turning towards the local characteristics of the spread of disturbances within cities and 
conurbations that were most affected by unrest. 
                                                 
308
 Several researchers alluded to the possible relationship between extended leisure time and the 
propensity for disorders to breakout. See for example C. McPhail, ‘Civil Disorder Participation: A 
Critical Examination of Recent Research,’ American Sociological Review 36, no. 6 (1971), p.1070. 
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4.4.3.2 The City-Conurbation Perspective 
 
In order to study the effect of disturbance frequency and severity from the local 
perspective of cities and conurbations, four areas that experienced significant unrest in 
July 1981 (Merseyside, Manchester, London and the West Midlands) were targeted 
for analysis. Figures 11-14 illustrate the temporal patterns of disturbances for these 
four locations. The similarities between them are striking. Despite the difference in 
the quantity of events in each case, all show a similar temporal distribution, namely a 
growth, peak and decline phase. All of these ‘mini-waves’ of incidents are preceded 
by serious disorders (Toxteth in Merseyside, Moss Side in Manchester, Southall and 
Wood Green in London and Handsworth in the West Midlands). 
Figure 11: Histogram of frequency and severity of disorders for Merseyside July 1981 
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Figure 12: Histogram of frequency and severity of disorders for Manchester July 1981 
 
Figure 13: Histogram of frequency and severity of disorders for London July 1981 
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Figure 14: Histogram of frequency and severity of disorders for West Midlands (Birmingham, 
Wolverhampton, Coventry) July 1981 
 
In each case the major disorders are followed by a rapid growth in more minor 
disturbances. The main temporal differences lie in the location of the peaks of 
disturbance frequency, Manchester on Wednesday 8
th
 July, Merseyside and London 
on Friday 10
th
 July and the West Midlands on Saturday 11
th
 July. These features 
imply that, although each location had a similarity in the rate of diffusion of 
disturbances in its environs, a local relationship was also operating, possibly driven by 
the timing and scale of the initiating disturbances. The similarity in the temporal form 
of each city-based mini-wave of disturbances in Figures 11-14 is also mirrored when 
they are compared to the profile of the overall countrywide wave of disturbances 
presented in Figure 8. This relationship is explored in Figure 15, which compares the 
Merseyside, Manchester, London and West Midlands mini-waves with the overall 
distribution of July incidents. 
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Figure 15: Comparison of frequency of disturbances in England, Merseyside, Manchester, 
London and the West Midlands in July 1981 
 
Each city-based mini-wave of disturbances has a distinct similarity to the form of the 
overall wave of disorder in England, with only slight differences in phase. The fact 
that the overall wave is partly composed of these smaller city based waves is shown in 
Figure 15 by the ‘combined’ curve (shown dotted), which is the sum of the frequency 
curves for the four locales. This curve, which closely models the overall frequency 
distribution for England in general and more specifically for the period 3
rd
 – 9th July, 
suggests that disturbances were confined to these city locales over the ‘opening’ and 
‘growth’ phases as postulated in Section 4.4.2. After this point, the curves diverge to 
some extent suggesting a greater geographical spread of disturbance over the ‘peak’ 
and ‘decline’ phases (10th –13th July). This is borne out by the more spatially 
fragmented nature of incidents over this period, in particular the diffusion of disorder 
to more isolated towns. 
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The relationship between the city based mini-waves of disturbance and the complete 
data for England brings to mind two mathematical phenomena that may illuminate 
aspects of this conjunction. The decomposition of periodic functions (in this case the 
wave of disturbances for England) into the sum of more simple oscillating functions 
(the city based mini-waves) is a method undertaken in Fourier analysis. In this process 
the particular forms of the constituent functions (their magnitude, phase and 
frequency) are superposed to generate a wave of differing form, scale and wavelength. 
Applying the analogy of Fourier analysis suggests that an investigation of the 
characteristics of the overall function and its constituent wavelets is relevant. These 
features are estimated and compared in Table 10
309
:
 
 
 
Location of 
disturbance 
wave 
Magnitude 
(peak number of 
disturbances) 
[incidents] 
Wavelength
310
 
(distribution of 
disturbance wave) 
[days] 
Phase Shift 
(from peak of 
overall curve) 
[ days] 
Merseyside 11 8 -1 
Manchester 5 3 -3 
London 20 6 -1 
West Midlands 15 3 0 
Combined 36 8 -1 
England 73 8 0 
Table 10: Features of mini and macro waves of disturbances 
 
These negative phase shifts confirm the previous observations that the peaks of the 
                                                 
309
 Disturbance waves were considered to start and end with at least one incident in evidence. In 
addition an unchanging number of disturbances was considered to be a ‘background’ effect 
representing stasis and was thus ignored. 
310
 This is not strictly a ‘wavelength’ as such. For a periodic function it would represent a half wave. 
However, it remains a useful measure of the longevity of a particular cycle of disturbance. 
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Liverpool, London and Manchester disturbance waves fell before the overall zenith on 
Saturday 11
th
 July. The data also demonstrates the longevity of the Merseyside and 
London series. An analysis such as this, whilst producing useful quantitative 
descriptions of sub-sets of disturbance in relation to the overall set, leads towards a 
qualitative description of patterns of disturbance in July 1981, as fractals. 
 
A fractal is ‘rough or fragmented geometric shape that can be split into parts, each of 
which is (at least approximately) a reduced-size copy of the whole’311. The property 
of self-similarity at varying levels of scale, an important attribute of the fractal, can be 
observed in the relationship between the mini-waves of disturbance situated in cities 
and the overall wave of incidents countrywide. Each mini-wave displays features in 
its form (initiation, growth, peak and death) that mirror the overall wave albeit at a 
greater level of magnification
312
. This suggests that effect of contagion in generating 
waves of disturbances in the landscape of the city and its environs are either replicated 
in some manner at the national level or at least simulated by the superposition of the 
constituent mini-waves. These two possibilities, one pointing to city-based local 
contagion as a driver, the other to nation-wide contagion, may have been in operation 
simultaneously.   
 
                                                 
311
 B. B. Mandelbrot, The Fractal Geometry of Nature. (New York: W.H. Freeman, 1982). 
312
 Potentially a third level of fractal scale may exist between the local wave of disturbances and the 
temporal form of individual serious disturbances. Examination of Table 8, which describes the severity 
(and to a certain extent the numbers of participants) in the Toxteth disturbances of July 3
rd
 – 7th , shows 
similar growth, peak and decline characteristics as in the distribution over time of the collected 
disturbances in Merseyside given in Figure 11. 
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4.4.4 Crowd Ethnicity and Disturbance Severity 
 
As discussed in Section 4.2, Keith proposed in his analysis of the July 1981 
disturbances in London that incident severity was linked to the particular ethnicity of 
the participants. The data set for the whole of England presented in Appendix 10.4 
contained 52 daily incidents where the ethnicity of the crowd was alluded to in the 
primary sources. This was considered to be a large enough sample to allow statistical 
analysis
313
. The entries in the primary sources ranged from specific designations such 
as ‘Asian’ or ‘Afro-Caribbean’ to the vague description of ‘mainly White’ or ‘Black’. 
In the absence of clear delineation in many of the examples and for the sake of 
simplicity it was decided to break depictions of the crowd ethnicity into three groups, 
White (W), Non-White (NW) and Mixed (M)
314
. In the few cases where ‘mainly or 
mostly’ had been used as a descriptor, the crowd was designated as being of that 
group, so for example ‘mainly Black’ was taken as a ‘Non-White’ crowd.  
 
Keith’s crowd ethnicity-disturbance severity hypothesis was expanded and tested for 
the whole of England in July 1981 by linking the three crowd designations to the DSQ 
rating. The results of this filtering exercise are tabulated in Appendix 10.7. The 
arithmetic mean of the DSQ ratings for each crowd ethnicity designation (White, 
                                                 
313
 These 52 daily disturbances made up approximately 26% of the total number of recorded daily 
incidents. 
314
 The definition of ‘Mixed’ refers to a crowd where the participants of different ethnic backgrounds 
were actively collaborating at best and tacitly supporting each other at worst. The small minority of 
disturbances where significant racial violence between groups was noted in the primary sources as 
central to the incident were assumed not to constitute the situation of a ‘Mixed’ crowd and were either 
excluded from this particular study (e.g. Reading 10-07-81) or designated as ‘White’ or ‘Non-White’ 
(e.g. Southall 03-07-81) accordingly. 
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Non-White and Mixed) were calculated, as well as a further calculation combining 
Mixed and Non-White crowds, that is, crowds that contained some or all Non-White 
participants. The results of this analysis are given in Table 11 and compared to the 
mean DSQ ratings for all 52 of the incidents that constituted the crowd ethnicity 
subset as well as the overall 200 daily disturbances that comprised the overall set.  
 
Examination of Table 11 shows that, for the given sample of daily disturbances, the 
difference in incident severity between the ‘White’ crowd (2.00) and the ‘Non-White’ 
crowd (1.99) is small, with the ‘Mixed’ crowd (2.71) being significantly higher than 
either. 
 
Crowd Ethnicity 
Designation 
Frequency of 
Disturbances 
Mean of DSQ 
Ratings 
Disturbance 
Severity 
Designation 
White 12 2.00 Major Disturbance 
Non-White 13 1.99 Major Disturbance 
Mixed 27 2.71 Riot 
Non-White & Mixed 40 2.48 Riot 
Crowd Ethnicity Subset 52 2.37 Riot 
Overall Set  200 1.65 Major Disturbance 
Table 11: Summary of the analysis of the relationship between crowd ethnicity and disturbance 
severity 
 
However, when the ‘Mixed’ and ‘Non-White’ crowds are combined, to represent the 
dichotomy between the exclusively ‘White’ crowd and the participation of ‘Non-
Whites’ in disturbances, there is a marked difference in event severity. The 
involvement of Non-Whites in a ‘crowd’ appears to be linked to more serious public 
disorders. This is in keeping with Keith’s work, which although more detailed, 
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involved a smaller sample of disturbances specifically from London in July 1981
315
.  
 
A comparison of the mean DSQ ratings between the subset of disturbances with 
crowd ethnicity designations (2.37) and the overall set of events (1.65) also shows a 
significant divergence. This suggests that the incidents that had references in the 
primary sources concerning crowd ethnicity tended to fall into the more serious 
categories of ‘riot’. This is unsurprising, as these more serious events generally had 
more numerous citations in the media and thus more chance of having the ‘rioting’ 
crowds ethnically defined
316
.  
 
Another aspect of Keith’s study of the representation of the July 1981 disturbances in 
London involves a criticism of the concept of the ‘multi-racial crowd’. He argues that 
‘The notion that in 1981 Black and White regularly fought a united battle on the 
                                                 
315
 Keith carried out a regression analysis on the ethnic breakdown of arrests for a sample of 11 
locations of disturbance in London in July 1981. He investigated the relationship between the ethnic 
breakdown of overall arrest figures and riot severity as well as more specifically the distribution of 
charges concerning ‘violence against the person’ by ethnicity. Keith, Race, Riots and Policing: Lore 
and Disorder in a Multi-Racist Society, pp.109-115. 
316
 It should be noted that many newspaper articles made a point of citing the multi-racial nature of the 
rioters in the July 1981 disturbances in a transparent (and crude) attempt to scotch the idea that the 
cause of the disorder was racism and turn instead towards the mere question of criminality. Conversely, 
the rioting ‘White crowd’ is less often defined, either because it is taken as read or because without the 
existence of the ‘Black other’ in the crowd the question of ‘racial composition’ is deemed irrelevant. 
These effects may have skewed the results presented here towards a greater prevalence of ‘Mixed 
crowds’. Massive exaggerations of the presence of ‘Non-Whites’ in the populations of British cities 
and towns have also been noted in studies examining the perceptions of native residents. M. Lewis, 
Asylum: Understanding Public Attitudes. (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 2005). 
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streets…becomes virtually untenable in the light of the analysis’317.  Instead he 
suggests that the ‘multi-racial crowd’ could be crudely divided into two groups, the 
‘Black crowd’, which is generally engaged with initiating and developing violent 
confrontations with police, and the ‘White crowd’ which is more focussed on 
peripheral looting often at a later time or date (in a disturbance spread over a few 
days). Keith continues this approach by proposing that a second division in the multi-
racial crowd can be drawn between ‘locals’ (by implication members of the Black 
community in the vicinity of the disturbance) and ‘travellers’, those (by implication 
Whites) who make their way to the disturbance primarily for the potentiality of 
acquiring commodities by looting
318
.  
 
These positions can be tested to some degree by considering the change in description 
of the ethnicity of the crowd within the primary sources as a significant disturbance 
develops over a few days. Table 12 cites eleven serious disturbances over the first two 
weeks of July 1981. For an event to be included in this table there were three criteria 
required for selection: 
 
 Some evidence concerning the ethnicity of the crowd in the primary sources 
 A longevity of two or more days 
 A DSQ rating of greater than 2.0 (i.e. the event achieved the severity status of 
‘riot’ or greater) at some point in its duration.  
 
 
                                                 
317
 Keith, Race, Riots and Policing: Lore and Disorder in a Multi-Racist Society, p.116. 
318
 Ibid. p.117. 
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Disturbance Location: 
District (City) 
July 1981: Day/Date 
Fri  
3
rd
 
Sat 
4
th
 
Sun  
5
th
 
Mon  
6
th
 
Tue  
7
th
 
Wed  
8
th
 
Thu  
9
th
 
Fri  
10
th
  
Sat 
11
th
  
Sun 
12
th
  
Mon 
13
th
  
Toxteth 
(Liverpool) 
NW 
[1.8] 
M 
[4.0] 
M 
[4.3] 
W 
[2.8] 
       
Moss Side 
(Manchester) 
    
NW 
[2.3] 
M 
[4.2] 
M 
[2.0] 
    
Dalston 
(London) 
      
M 
[1.0] 
NW 
[3.0] 
   
Hyson Green 
(Nottingham) 
       
M 
[3.2] 
M 
[3.0] 
  
Brixton 
(London) 
       
M 
[3.5] 
NW 
[2.0] 
M 
[2.0] 
 
Handsworth 
(Birmingham) 
       
M 
[3.0] 
? 
[2.5] 
? 
[1.0] 
 
City Centre 
(Luton) 
       
M 
[2.7] 
M 
[2.7] 
  
Chapeltown & 
Harehills 
(Leeds) 
        
? 
[2.8] 
M 
[3.5] 
 
City Centre 
(High Wycombe) 
        
M 
[3.0] 
M 
[2.8] 
 
Highfields 
(Leicester) 
        
? 
[2.0] 
M 
[3.2] 
? 
[2.0] 
Normanton & Pear 
Tree (Derby) 
        
W 
[2.3] 
NW 
[1.5] 
? 
[3.3] 
Table 12: Relationship between changing crowd ethnicity and development of incident severity 
for eleven selected locales in July 1981
319
 
 
In two out of the 11 selected locations (Toxteth and Moss Side) a ‘Non-White’ crowd 
appears to be clearly involved in the initiation of the disturbance sequence. The crowd 
is then defined over the succeeding days as being ‘Mixed’ and in the case of Toxteth 
appears to develop into a mainly ‘White’ contingent. The only clear exceptions to this 
are the series of disturbances in the adjacent Normanton and Pear Tree districts of 
Derby where at the initiation a ‘White’ crowd is cited as being involved and on the 
                                                 
319
 Disturbance Severity Quotients for each daily disturbance are given in parentheses. A question mark 
signifies a lack of description of the crowd ethnicity in the primary sources. 
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succeeding day a ‘Non-White crowd’. 
 
Although Table 12 provides some evidence to support Keith’s proposition that the 
‘Black crowd’, with its supposed fixation with violent confrontation with the police, 
was a disturbance initiator in some instances, it is clear that at the peak of the 
disorders in all the locations (excepting Dalston) the crowd is described as ‘Mixed’. 
Keith’s argument that the crowd did not share a unified type of activity (i.e. the Black 
contingent were ‘local’ and more committed to violent confrontation with the police, 
whereas the ‘White’ groups were generally ‘travellers’ and more interested in looting) 
may still hold as the bland description of group of ‘rioters’ as ethnically ‘Mixed’ does 
not specify the content of their activity as such. However, it is clear from some of the 
more ferocious encounters (in particular in Toxteth
320) that a predominantly ‘White’ 
crowd developed over the duration of the disturbances and was involved directly in 
extremely serious violence against the police. Very few of the primary sources cite 
that there was a division between the activities of the ‘Black’ and ‘White’ contingents 
of the ‘Mixed’ crowd, which at best provides no useful evidence for Keith’s assertions 
and at worst may contradict them.  
 
For example, in some disturbances the primary sources state that there was clear 
cooperation between ethnic groups within the crowd
321
.  In addition, a detailed study 
                                                 
320
 Hernon notes that at the peak of the Toxteth riots on Sunday 5
th
 July 1981 ‘By now most of the 
rioters appeared to be white. Racial tensions within the community’s youth were forgotten. The 
police were the common enemy’ (this author’s emphasis in bold) in Hernon, Riot!: Civil Insurrection 
from Peterloo to the Present Day, p.204. 
321
 For example the High Wycombe Observer (17
th
 July 1981) notes that on the evening of Sunday 12
th
 
July 1981 a crowd of 200 ‘Skinheads, Asians and West Indians’ attacked 30 police officers in the town. 
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by Cooper of the Toxteth and wider Merseyside disturbances of July 1981 compared 
the ethnic breakdown of arrests in the disorders to the ethnic mix of the locations and 
concluded that ‘It was a Toxteth riot, and not a “Black” Toxteth one’322. Keith may 
have retorted that such an analysis is too crude to ascertain potential divisions in 
motive and action between ethnic groups, but clearly the evidence in the primary 
sources points towards some modes of collaborative behaviour (whether tacit or 
active) in the July 1981 disturbances. Assuming that there were differences in 
behaviour between the various ethnic groupings, the real difficulty still lies in judging 
the actual objectives and content of these activities within ‘rioting’ crowds using the 
limited lens of a quantitative analysis. 
 
Another possibility, which Keith appears to fail to recognise, is that the disturbance 
itself as an extraordinary event may provide the scenario for collaboration between 
ethnic groups that were hitherto divorced from common action. Although perhaps 
only fleeting, these moments of cooperation may explain why both the numbers of 
participants, their ethnic mix and the severity of an incident appear to increase after 
the initial trigger of the disturbance, which may have been originally instigated by a 
mono-ethnic ‘Non-White’ crowd as Keith suggests.  
                                                                                                                                            
The cooperative nature of this event is corroborated by the Reading Evening Post (13-07-1981). 
Similarly, in Luton on Saturday 11
th
 July 1981 the crowd was clearly designated as a collaborative 
group of ‘Blacks, Whites and Asians’ by the Luton News (16th July 1981). Finally after a disturbance in 
Rugby, on Saturday 11
th
 July 1981, ‘a delegation of Punks, Skinheads and Blacks’ visited the offices of 
the local newspaper, the Rugby Advertiser, to protest about an article (from the Rugby Advertiser 10
th
 
July 1981), which suggested that racial tension between the youth was causing the riots’ (Rugby 
Advertiser 17
th
 July 1981). 
322
 Cooper, Competing Explanations of the Merseyside Riots of 1981, p.65-66. 
 198 
 
4.5  Discussion 
 
In overview, this analysis of the July 1981 disturbances in England using hitherto 
untapped primary sources has provided a wealth of new data concerning the number, 
severity and spatial and temporal extent of these extraordinary events. Through the 
process of deconstruction of the data into discrete daily incidents, mapping, 
quantitative analysis and ethnographic study of the participating crowds, significant 
characteristics of the disturbances at various scales have been revealed. This has 
allowed some existing theories to be tested and new ideas to be proposed concerning 
the initiation, spread and decline of the July incidents.  
   
Examination of the overall daily disturbance data set for July 1981 demonstrated that 
the majority of the incidents were of minimal severity. In addition, the overall 
expansion of the ‘riot lists’ generated in the original secondary sources by this phase 
of research was, in general, limited to the addition of numerous lesser incidents. This 
was no great revelation in that the primary sources studied allowed greater local 
definition. New incidents would thus tend to be of minor severity or they would have 
been reported in greater numbers and detail in the national media and consequently 
would have more likely to feature in the secondary sources. Despite the lesser 
importance of these newly reported disturbances their very existence shows that the 
countrywide impact of the more serious incidents was significantly greater than 
previously imagined. An additional benefit provided by the comprehensive 
investigation into the primary sources was the significant enhancement of the 
historical information pertinent to the disorders that were already recorded in the 
secondary sources. 
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The cartographical and quantitative analyses revealed similarities in the character of 
disturbances at three levels of magnification, the particular, the local and the global. 
Using disturbance severity analysis, specific serious incidents demonstrated a similar 
pattern over a period of a few days. Beginning on the first day with an initial ‘trigger’ 
event, they involved relatively few participants with fairly low levels of violence and 
property damage. During the ‘growth’ phase on the second day they typically 
escalated to a major conflagration involving larger numbers of rioters, increased use 
of weapons such as the petrol bomb, greater police injuries and significant property 
damage. Finally the ‘death’ phase was reached and the disturbance generally petered 
out to a minor incident.  
 
At the local level of a city or conurbation a major disorder was often followed by a 
series of more minor and disparate disturbances over subsequent days. The form of 
these mini-waves was also characterised by initiation, growth, peak and decline 
phases. The distribution of these mini-waves in the wake of more serious singular 
disturbance series located in inner city locales provided evidence of local contagion 
and opened up the requirement for more research into the effects of regional media, 
the nature and effect of policing tactics and the actuality and mechanisms of physical 
communication between participants prior to and during the disorders
323
.  
 
From a global viewpoint, analysis of all the disturbances countrywide showed a 
similar pattern of initiation, growth, peak and decline to the local waves, though it 
                                                 
323
 These latter effects are investigated in the case studies of the ‘Bristol Riots’ of April 1980 in 
Chapters 5.0, 6.0 and 7.0. 
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was prescient to note that the city-based mini-waves in general preceded the peak of 
the overall curve. This suggested that the national distribution was initially a 
superposition of these mini-waves and later a cumulative effect of this and another 
mode of contagion linked to a national effect.  
 
A fractal analogy was drawn to describe the self-similarity of disturbances at the three 
levels of magnification, the serious particular disturbance, the resulting city based 
mini-wave of incidents and the overall national characteristic. This demonstrated that 
in order to understand phenomena such as contagion from a national perspective the 
best approach was to begin with studies of the association between particular serious 
disturbances and resulting local mini-waves of incidents. Examining this spatial 
heterogeneity offered better appreciation of the construction of the apparently 
homogenous wave of national disturbances
324
. 
 
An examination of what failed to happen in the July 1981 disorders was also 
undertaken. Regions of the country that had an absence of significant incidents were 
studied and tentative explanations based upon the need for specific conjunctions of 
structural factors to induce disorder or the restraining effects of local cultural factors 
were offered. Associated questions concerning the ethnic make-up of cities and 
districts where disturbances did occur were also considered. A broad ethnographic 
study of the participants in major disturbances was undertaken, despite the limitations 
in detail in the primary sources. This suggested that although non-White and Mixed 
crowds were in general the initiators of major incidents, significant participation by 
Whites occurred in some of the most violent clashes with the police. This provided 
                                                 
324
 These effects are studied in relation to the ‘Bristol riots’ in Chapter 7.0 Sections 7.2.3 and 7.2.4. 
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counter-evidence to claims, based on a study confined to London, that the July 1981 
disorders were characterised by ‘Black violence’ and ‘White looting’. 
 
 202 
5.0 Bristol 1980: St. Paul’s, Southmead, Knowle West 
 
I honour you with a glimpse into my life 
And betray you with the subject of my need 
 
I strip you of the disadvantages we share 
And leave clothed the appearance of your privileged past 
I listen to the constructed syllables of sound 
And hear my own inadequate reply 
I face in conflict the difference of our lives 
And in conflict recognise defeat 
 
I will in dignity defend my place 
And cast the stone that ripples, outward and not in 
325 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of the chapter as a whole is to present a solid quantitative and qualitative 
base for the subsequent micro-histories of the disturbances in Bristol in April 1980. 
This chapter is thus essentially dedicated to a distillation of statistical data and oral 
histories concerning the St. Paul’s and Southmead districts, which experienced the 
most serious disorders. Testimonies from residents of the third area under study, 
Knowle West that underwent a near ‘riot’ in April 1980, are analysed to enhance the 
studies of youth-subculture and policing. 
 
The quantitative data presented in this chapter is used to investigate the specific social 
and economic conditions within the two principal areas of study. Essentially, 
similarities and differences between these areas and the rest of the city provide 
                                                 
325
 A poem entitled ‘The Committee’ by Kathleen Horseman in Southmead Writers' Workshop, A 
Southmead Festival of Word : Writings from the 1986 Southmead Festival and the Southmead Writers' 
Workshop. (Bristol: Bristol Broadsides, 1986). 
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information concerning the propensity for these locales to experience collective 
disorder and the form and content of particular disturbances.  As was discussed in the 
previous chapter, if a series of disturbances were truly independent, unconscious and 
random events, then we might expect to see no correlation in socio-economic 
conditions between ‘riotous’ areas. However, it would be naïve to assume that a 
similarity in quantitative socio-economic data between areas directly correlates with 
‘riot’ propensity. Other more subjective evidence concerning the effect of these 
conditions on the populace is required to further substantiate this ‘propensity’. This 
additional evidence is delivered by the oral histories of ‘rioters’ which generate richer 
descriptions of life within the areas under study and expose the relationships between 
the subjects and police. 
 
However, the objective in this chapter is not merely to examine the empirical data in 
an attempt to characterise the locales. Instead, the section is prefaced with a critique 
of the available primary sources providing demographic information about the two 
areas from a post-riot perspective. An examination of the rationales of the various 
contending political factions that produced the data assists in understanding the 
context for some confusions and distortions in the evidence presented. It also provides 
some insights into the different sub-texts in the primary sources and the focus on 
particular areas of the city and the lack of attention to others.  
 
In the second part of this chapter, the relevant data for the principal subject areas is 
studied and various comparisons are made using data relating to structural aspects 
such as housing, unemployment and education. The locales are also measured against 
the background data for the whole city of Bristol and its environs. These comparisons 
 204 
whilst not providing explanations as such, do offer a degree of social mapping, that is, 
top-level views of the nature of the locales in relation to the whole city. Whilst 
similarities between the subject areas may provide grist to the mill of structural 
explanations for ‘riot’, what perhaps is of more interest are the geographic and 
demographic differences between them. 
 
The third part of this chapter is based upon the testimony of the oral history 
respondents who were interviewed by the author as part of the research activity. The 
aim of this section is to provide richer descriptions of the subject areas to enhance the 
demographic and background data provided by reports and surveys. The oral histories 
from ‘insiders’ both corroborate and challenge this information, which was on the 
whole generated by ‘outsiders’ to the communities under study. 
 
5.2 Review of the Primary Sources 
 
The majority of the information analysed here is derived from local government 
reports commissioned by either Bristol City Council or Avon County Council
326
 the 
two governing bodies operating ostensibly in tandem in the region in the 1980s. These 
reports had various raisons d’etre and consequent geographic and social foci 
determined either by the prevailing political relationship between local and central 
government or by the exigencies created after urban disorders in the city. In addition, 
in the aftermath of the St. Paul’s disturbance of 1980 a subsidiary parliamentary body 
                                                 
326
 Avon was formed from the City and County of Bristol and parts of Gloucestershire and Somerset by 
the Local Government Act 1972, and came into being on April 1, 1974. It was dissolved into four 
unitary authorities including the City and Council of Bristol as a result of the Local Government Act 
1992 and the Avon (Structural Change) Order 1995 on April 1, 1996. 
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concerned with ‘race relations and immigration’, part of the overall Home Affairs 
Sub-Committee, tasked local government in Bristol to provide data for their inquiry 
concerning that particular locale
327
. 
 
General reports covering Bristol and its environs such as ‘Social Stress in Avon 
1981’328 and ‘Poverty in Bristol’329 were commissioned from within local government 
but angled at securing central government funds for inner city areas or ‘deprived’ 
districts
330
. More specific studies aimed at particular districts of the city, such as the 
‘Southmead Report’331 were the product of local government working parties and 
were concerned with providing evidence for domestic allocation of resources. Two 
unofficial reports were also produced in the aftermath of the St. Paul’s disorder both 
sanctioned by trade unions and both as a response to the failure of central government 
to launch a full public enquiry into the incident. These were the Bristol Teachers 
                                                 
327
 Minutes of evidence taken before the Home-affairs Sub-committee on Race Relations and 
Immigration (22
nd
 May 1980). (Bristol Record Office 42974/1, 1980), Vol. 1 Part A. 
328
  Avon County Council, Social Stress in Avon, 1981: A Preliminary Analysis. 
329
  Bristol City Council. Planning Department, Poverty in Bristol: Final Report. (Bristol City Council, 
1985). 
330
 For example, the Bristol City Council report ‘Poverty in Bristol’ refers directly to the 1977 White 
Paper ‘Policy for the Inner cities’ which gave ‘preferential treatment to areas with certain ‘inner city’ 
problems’ and complains that ‘Bristol has on a number of occasions applied for designated status but 
without success’. Ibid. p.4. 
331
  Bristol City Council. Planning Department, Southmead Report: Report of the Southmead Working 
Group. (Bristol City Council, 1983). 
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Association report ‘After the Fire’332 and ‘Slumbering Volcano?’333, a document 
summarising the findings of a public enquiry facilitated by the Bristol TUC between 
November 1980 and February 1981.  
 
5.2.1 Spatial definition of the ‘St. Paul’s neighbourhood’ 
 
The April 1980 disturbance and the national publicity it generated clearly highlighted 
‘St. Paul’s’ as a location of concern for local government, the Trade Unions and the 
wider left. However, the question of what was being spatially referred to was 
problematic and affected the way statistical and cartographical data was collected and 
presented by local government. ‘St. Paul’s neighbourhood’, is locally defined as a 
relatively small cluster of streets bounded by Newfoundland Road (M32), Ashley 
Road and Stokes Croft lying within a much larger electoral ward with the same name 
prior to 1982
334
 (see Figure 16). The confusion or conflation of these two distinct 
geographic areas, the neighbourhood and the ward (sharing the same name), 
particularly after 1980 is revealing. The wider ward of St. Paul also included the 
districts of Ashley Down, Baptist Mills, Montpelier, St Andrews and St Werburghs, 
but despite its renaming to Ashley in April 1982, the whole area remained colloquially 
labelled as St. Paul’s in Bristol.  
                                                 
332
 Equal Opportunities Sub-Committee, Bristol Teachers Association (NUT) commissioned by the 
Avon Division of the NUT, After the Fire: A Report on Education in St. Paul's Bristol and Multi-
Ethnic Education in Avon. (1980). 
333
 D. Bateman and R. Press, Slumbering Volcano? - Report of an Enquiry into the Origins of the 
Eruption in St. Paul's Bristol on 2nd April 198. (Bristol T.U.C., 1980). 
334
 This ward appears in the 1971 and 1981 censuses as ‘St. Paul’ Avon County Planning Department, 
Avon 1981 Census Populations (Preliminary Counts) Including 1971 Comparison. (Bristol: Avon 
County Planning Department, 1981). 
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Reproduced by permission of Geographers' A-Z Map Co. Ltd.  ©Crown copyright and database rights 2014 Ordnance Survey 
100017302 
Figure 16: Ashley ward (originally St. Paul) showing ‘St. Paul’s neighbourhood’, extent of 
disturbance 2
nd
 April 1980 and workplace zones 
 
After 1982 this dubious conflation appears to be a conscious strategy in the local 
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government reports. ‘St. Paul’s neighbourhood’ is vastly inflated in importance in its 
representation in maps of the city in these documents. Not only is it magnified to the 
size of other much larger districts of the city such as Easton or Clifton, but it also 
claims the largest chapter in one of the dossiers on poverty
335
. The authors of this 
document erroneously stated that it included the three other districts of Montpelier, St. 
Werburgh’s and St. Agnes, thereby inflating its population several times to 10,000.  
 
Similar demographic and geographic confusions are to be found in the unofficial post-
riot reports by the National Union of Teachers (NUT) and the Bristol TUC. The 
authors of the former, whilst stating ‘it is difficult to define the area precisely’, go on 
to delineate the St. Paul’s neighbourhood claiming a similarly exaggerated 
population
336
. In contrast in the TUC report the authors recognise the potential 
confusions by stating:  
‘following the events of April 2nd 1980, the media reports and comments 
and the evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee repeatedly 
referred to the St. Paul’s area of Bristol without offering a guide to the 
area involved’.  
However, they also proceeded to delineate a much larger cartographic area including 
the St. Paul’s neighbourhood, St Werburgh’s, Montpelier, Easton and Upper Easton 
                                                 
335
 The authors clearly use the term ‘St. Paul’s area’ to expand its boundaries in Bristol City Council. 
Planning Department, Poverty in Bristol: Final Report, pp.12-13. 
336
 Equal Opportunities Sub-Committee, Bristol Teachers Association (NUT) commissioned by the 
Avon Division of the NUT, After the Fire: A Report on Education in St. Paul's Bristol and Multi-
Ethnic Education in Avon, p.6. 
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on the basis that ‘the conditions and problems of Easton are no different’337.  
 
These virtual cartographical and statistical expansions of the St. Paul’s neighbourhood 
in official and unofficial reports, particularly after the 1980 disturbance, had a 
connection with municipally derived strategies for wider resource generation and 
allocation for the city. The political actors consciously attempted to exploit the effects 
of the massive media coverage of the April 1980 disturbance and the sudden interest 
of central government in Bristol after years of indifference. Interestingly the 
concentration on and symbolic use of St. Paul’s mirrors a series of post-riot effects in 
the local and national media as well as in the popular psyche of Bristolians. St. Paul’s, 
in actuality a relatively small neighbourhood, came to occupy an expanded 
geographic and mythic space far beyond its realities in the 1980s
338
. 
 
5.2.2 Spatial definition of ‘Southmead estate’ 
 
Although it appears there was no obvious reaction in terms of information gathering 
by either central or local government in the immediate aftermath of the Southmead 
disturbances of April 1980, it was considered useful to apply the same spatial 
examination to contemporary reports covering this locale. Southmead (see Figure 17) 
features in both of the citywide and countywide local government reports on ‘poverty’ 
and ‘social stress’ in the early 1980s, as well as being the subject of a specific report 
                                                 
337
 Bateman and Press, Slumbering Volcano? - Report of an Enquiry into the Origins of the Eruption in 
St. Paul's Bristol on 2nd April 1980, p.4. 
338
 Dresser notes the dubious conflation of the ward and the neighbourhood by stating ‘for White 
residents outside the inner city, ‘St Paul’s’ was a euphemism for a supposedly ‘Black’ area of ‘vice and 
shame’. Madge Dresser and Peter Fleming, Bristol: Ethnic Minorities and the City, 1000-2001 
(Chichester: Phillimore, 2007), p.159. 
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in 1983. Southmead is cartographically defined differently in each survey , appearing 
as a single entity based on the 1981 ward boundary , subdivided into four ‘workplace 
zones’  and arbitrarily as ‘Southmead Estate’ with no clear explanation of how this 
was determined . The basis for the delineation of ‘Southmead’ as a statistical unit of 
study is important, as it lies adjacent to areas of significantly greater affluence such as 
Westbury-on-Trym and Henleaze. 
 
The merging of such areas can have a serious impact on the statistical results of any 
survey and more crucially act as a politically motivated mechanism for hiding relative 
deprivation
339
. However, with the municipal Labour Party in power in both Avon and 
Bristol Councils by 1981 and in a political climate marked by a raging battle between 
local and central government over their fiscal relationship, it suited municipal surveys 
to delineate areas of deprivation. ‘Southmead’ thus appears boldly on the ‘poverty 
map’340 of 1981 as one of the 20% of Bristol areas to ‘suffer a multiplicity of 
problems’ despite the fact that it lay outside the boundary of the politically pertinent 
‘inner city’ areas of Bristol.  
 
 
                                                 
339
 One oral history respondent made reference to this particular issue within the context of political 
‘gerrymandering’ of ward boundaries in North Bristol in the 1970s. 
340
  Bristol City Council. Planning Department, Poverty in Bristol: Final Report, Fig.5. 
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Reproduced by permission of Geographers' A-Z Map Co. Ltd.  ©Crown copyright and database rights 2014 Ordnance Survey 100017302 
Figure 17: Southmead ward showing the 'Southmead estate', extent of disturbances 3
rd
-4
th
 April 1980 and workplace zones
 
Southmead ‘estate’ 
Extent of disturbances 
3
rd
-4
th
 April 1980 
WZ 
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WZ 
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WZ 
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WZ 
25 
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5.2.3 Comparison of coverage in local government reports 
 
A more illuminating facet of the ‘Poverty in Bristol’ document is the reportage 
accorded to Southmead in comparison to St. Paul’s. Of the six areas dealt with in the 
text
341, Southmead is covered in the least detail whilst St. Paul’s comes out on top 
with more than three times as much information provided to the reader. The content is 
also revealing, with the St. Paul’s section counter posing problems of racial 
discrimination, unemployment and lack of community facilities with positive efforts 
by ‘City and County Councils, other public agencies, local community, interest 
groups and many individuals’ in trying to overcome them, all backed up with pictures 
of the diversity of housing styles in the area and ‘the Georgian elegance of Portland 
Square’342.  
 
In contrast the sparse section on Southmead employs phrases such as ‘bleak’, ‘poor 
design’, ‘a tough and unpopular image’ and ‘no strong tradition of local community 
leadership’ fronted by a bland photograph of an empty expanse of green space 
captioned with the repeated ‘bleak appearance’343. Although it is important to exercise 
caution in attempting to read sub-texts within such documents, tentative narratives can 
be drawn for each of the locales from the perspective of local government. St. Paul’s 
as a dynamic local community combining with a pro-active municipal authority in a 
united struggle against adversity; Southmead as bleak, leaderless, trapped by a history 
of unpopularity and where the City Council ‘hopes’ rather than acts. The thread of this 
                                                 
341
 The areas were, in order, St. Paul’s, Totterdown, Knowle, Southmead, Hartcliffe/Withywood and 
Easton. Ibid. pp.12-18. 
342
 Ibid. p.12. 
343
 Ibid. p.16. 
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municipal narrative is continued in the Bristol City Council ‘Southmead Report’ of 
1983 which again returns to the question of improvement of the area stating: 
‘The lack of significant local authority assistance or guidance in 
community development over the years may well have contributed to 
many of the problems now faced. Necessary improvements have not been 
done, partly because of the “it’s not worth it” argument borne of 
vandalism, but the real problem is likely to have stemmed from a lack of 
community involvement in the first instance. Over the years this attitude 
has resulted in the present situation where there is very little local 
community action or leadership’344 
This blatant attempt to abrogate municipal responsibility by blaming the Southmead 
‘community’ for its problems appears to be a recurrent theme in these reports, as is 
the reference to its ‘favourable North Bristol location, adjoining some of the most 
sought after suburban residential areas in the City’ however ‘Southmead by design 
and reputation retains an air of isolation’.  This statement explains to the residents of 
Southmead that, as they were not living in the inner city they should be content and if 
not then they have isolated themselves
345
. This strangely ahistorical position, which 
carries no reference to structural factors or class relations, effectively summarises the 
political standpoint of the document. 
 
                                                 
344
 From the ‘Foreword: A Summary Assessment’ of Bristol City Council. Planning Department, 
Southmead Report: Report of the Southmead Working Group. 
345
 The report was clearly not written for the Southmead ‘community’ but this of course begs the 
question as to any involvement they might have had in its production. 
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To what degree these two contrasting narratives were formed by responses to the 
disorders of 1980 is debatable, though it certainly appears the City Council were 
reacting quite differently to each of the areas under study in this thesis. St. Paul’s had 
clearly become politically contentious for local government in the aftermath of the 
disorder. Not only had the ‘Bristol riot’ exposed a series of issues concerning racism, 
inadequate provision of resources in housing, education and community facilities but 
the area itself had been artificially expanded in importance for various tactical and 
political reasons. This in turn affected the collection and dissemination of statistical 
and other forms of data. In contrast, the Southmead area, despite having simultaneous 
‘riots of its own’ in 1980 was at best of lower priority and at worst ignored by local 
government. When scant attention was drawn to it, the ‘community’ was blamed for 
the estate’s ‘problems’ furthering the isolation of the residents from municipal 
political processes 
 
5.3 Analysis of primary sources: reports and inquiries 
 
In the following section the available quantitative and qualitative data from the 
various reports previously reviewed will be presented and analysed for the St. Paul’s 
and Southmead areas in the early 1980s. As has already been discussed, the variable 
definition of these locales will be addressed by stating, where possible, the parameters 
of the statistical data. The sources of this data are also stated for comparative 
purposes.  In addition, where they are available, relative comparisons with the overall 
picture for the city of Bristol and the County of Avon are provided. The data is 
filtered into various groupings, derived from the categories defined in the sources.  
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5.3.1 Population 
 
Table 13 provides information on the overall population and the various spatial 
definitions of the areas under investigation. The numbers in parentheses refer the 
designations of ‘workplace zones’ employed in the report ‘Social Stress in Avon 
1981’346. The ‘workplace zone’ as a quantitative unit lies between the smaller census 
areas and the larger electoral Ward classification. This rationalisation does have an 
impact upon both the definition of areas and the resultant statistical data. 
 
Locality Pop. Definition of Area Source Date 
‘St. Paul’s’ 
~10,000 St. Paul’s Neighbourhood ‘After the Fire’ 1980 
~10,000 
St. Paul’s, Montpelier, St. Werburgh’s & St. 
Agnes 
‘Poverty in 
Bristol’ 
1981 
1,073 St. Agnes-Newfoundland Rd. (66) 
‘Social Stress 
in Avon’ 
1981 
1,008 City-Portland Sq.-Stokes Croft (65) 
4,316 Montpelier-City Rd.-St. Andrews Pk. (34) 
3,701 Mina Rd. Area (46) 
10,098 Areas (34-46-65-66) combined 
‘Southmead’ 
~11,000 Southmead Ward 
‘Poverty in 
Bristol’ 
1981 
7,755 Southmead-Wigton Cres.-Pen Park (25) 
‘Social Stress 
in Avon’ 
1981 
3,121 Southmead-Ambleside Ave-Greystoke (26) 
4,783 Southmead-Southmead Rd. Area (39) 
1,924 Southmead-Hospital Area (40) 
17,583 
Southmead Ward: Areas (25-26-39-40) 
combined 
Table 13: Population statistics for ‘St. Paul's’ and ‘Southmead’ in the 1980-81 period 
 
For example the St. Paul’s ‘neighbourhood’ defined in Figure 16 is located amongst 
three workplace zones (shaded in Table 13) comprising ‘St. Agnes-Newfoundland 
                                                 
346
 These areas were originally defined in 1971 in order to rationalise the Small Area Statistics (SAS) 
information from the census data of that year and are based upon analyses of ‘journey to work’ and 
other unidentified ‘physical and community characteristics’. These classifications were retained for the 
collation of the 1981 census information upon which this later report is based. Avon County Council, 
Social Stress in Avon, 1981: A Preliminary Analysis, Section 3 c). 
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Road’ (66), ‘City-Portland Sq.-Stokes Croft’ (65)347 and ‘Montpelier-City Road-St. 
Andrews Pk.’ (34) with a total population of 6,397. Similarly the Southmead ‘estate’ 
area shown in Figure 17 is defined by two workplace zones (shaded in Table 13) 
namely ‘Southmead-Wigton Cres.-Pen Park’ (25) and ‘Southmead-Ambleside Ave-
Greystoke’ (26) with a combined population of 10,876. The wide variation in the 
population dependent on spatial definition of the ‘neighbourhoods’ may create 
distortions in the statistical data.  
 
Cursory examination of the combined population totals in Table 13 suggests that the 
spatial and statistical expansion of the ‘St. Paul’s neighbourhood’ (noticeable in 
several of the reports) is achieved by the amalgamation of all four workplaces zones 
(34-46-65-66) into one entity. Whereas in Southmead, it appears that only two of the 
four workplace zones (25 and 26) have been combined. This spatial delineation 
conforms to the definition of ‘Southmead Estate’ in the later ‘Southmead Report’348. 
If these questionable definitions are assumed then both designated areas had similar 
populations of around 10-11,000 persons. However it is questionable that St. Paul’s 
‘neighbourhood’ could be quantitatively or qualitatively merged with the adjacent, 
though distinct districts of St. Andrew’s Park, Montpelier or St. Werburgh’s.  Thus, 
despite the politically motivated conflation of the ‘St. Paul’s neighbourhood’ with the 
wider ward and the expanded perception of the district amongst many Bristolians, it 
                                                 
347
 This area is actually combined in the report with workplace zone (64) ‘City-Old Market-Bond 
Street’. This other zone has been ignored in this analysis as it is not considered to lie in the St. Paul’s 
‘neighbourhood’ and only has a population of 183 according to the document. Ibid. Section 3 c) and 
Table 5. 
348
 See the map definition in the final section of, Bristol City Council. Planning Department, 
Southmead Report: Report of the Southmead Working Group. 
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had a considerably smaller population than the ‘Southmead estate’ area. 
5.3.2 Ethnicity 
 
Table 14 examines the percentages of the workplace zone population who were born 
in New Commonwealth countries
349
 (NC) or Pakistan (Pak.) and the fraction that 
lived in a household where the head was born in these designated countries.  
Locality 
% of Pop. 
Born in NC 
& Pak. 
% of Pop. 
NC & Pak. 
Head of 
Households 
Definition of Area Source Date 
‘St. Paul’s’ 
26.9 48.8 St. Agnes-Newfoundland Rd. (66) 
‘Social 
Stress 
in 
Avon’ 
1981 
16.1 28.7 City-Portland Sq.-Stokes Croft (65) 
19.5 34.6 
Montpelier-City Rd-St. Andrews 
Pk. (34) 
18.0 33.2 Mina Rd. Area (46) 
19.4 35.0 Areas (34-46-65-66) combined 
‘Southmead’ 
1.8 3.6 
Southmead-Wigton Cres.-Pen Park 
(25) 
1.7 2.4 
Southmead-Ambleside Ave-
Greystoke (26) 
1.0 1.7 
Southmead-Southmead Rd. Area 
(39) 
1.8 1.5 Southmead-Hospital Area (40) 
1.6 2.6 
Southmead Ward: Areas (25-26-39-
40) combined 
‘Inner City 
Bristol’ 
5.8 9.5  
‘Bristol’ 2.5 4.0  
‘County of 
Avon’ 
1.7 2.4  
Table 14: Percentage of 1981 ‘St. Paul’s’ and ‘Southmead’ population born in New 
Commonwealth countries (NC) or Pakistan (Pak.) and percentage of population where the head 
of household was born in a New Commonwealth county or Pakistan. 
 
Despite popular perceptions that ‘St. Paul’s’ was a majority ‘Black’ or ‘immigrant’ 
area, in 1981 only one fifth of the residents were actually immigrants and New 
Commonwealth or Pakistani immigrants headed about a third of households. The 
latter group would have, of course, also included mixed marriages and their offspring. 
                                                 
349
 The New Commonwealth refers to former British colonies in the West Indies, Asia and Africa and 
was central to the debates about immigration in the 1960s and 70s. Effectively it is coding for ‘Black’ 
immigrants to the UK. 
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The highest concentration of these groups lay in the St. Agnes-Newfoundland Road 
(66) workplace zone, which included the symbolic ‘front-line’ of Grosvenor Road, the 
location of the Black and White café and a complex of local authority housing. 
Popular perception of ‘St. Paul’s’ may have been mistaken with respect to the size of 
the immigrant population in the district but comparison of this data for ‘inner city 
Bristol’ suggests that these groups were concentrated in this area. In contrast, 
‘Southmead’ is clearly a majority ‘White’ area, with figures below that of ‘Bristol’ as 
a whole. The greater part of the few ‘non-White’ households in the area were located 
in the ‘Southmead estate’ locations (25-26). 
5.3.3 Socio-economic groupings 
 
Several of the reports examined provide percentage breakdowns of households 
according to the socio-economic group of the household ‘head’. The definitions of 
social class by occupation utilised in these documents are based on rationalisations of 
the ‘Socio-economic Group’ (SEG) classifications in the 1981 census350. Table 15 
displays this data for ‘St. Paul’s’ and ‘Southmead’ in 1981. 
 
Comparisons between ‘Southmead estate’ (25-26) locality and the ‘St. Paul’s 
‘neighbourhood’ (34, 65-66) show increased numbers of households headed by 
skilled workers in the former. This is probably an effect of the proximity of major 
                                                 
350
 Explanation of this rationalisation of the SEG’s is given in Bristol City Council. Planning 
Department, Poverty in Bristol: Final Report, App.4. The SEG categories were changed in the 2001 
Census to National Statistics Socio-economic Classification (NS-SEC) after a report commissioned in 
1994 by the ESRC Office For National Statistics, ‘Continuity Issues: SC, SEG and NS-SEC,’ 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/about-statistics/classifications/current/ns-sec/continuity-issues/index.html 
(accessed March, 2010). 
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aerospace industry employers, notably British Aerospace and Rolls Royce in Filton 
and the nearby chemical industries of Avonmouth. Both areas also have significantly 
higher percentages of semi and unskilled workers compared to the city of Bristol. This 
is particularly true in the St. Agnes-Newfoundland Road (66) ‘workplace zone’ in the 
‘St. Paul’s’ area where almost half the heads of household were semi or unskilled 
workers. The overall picture suggests both study areas had higher than average 
concentrations of the grouped unskilled, semi and skilled workers in comparison to 
the more ‘middle-class’ professional and managerial occupations. ‘St. Paul’s’, 
however, clearly suffered from a deficiency of recognised skilled workers. 
Locality 
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Definition of Area Source Date 
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‘St. Paul’s’ 
45.8 18.9 8.1 5.4 0.0 21.8 
St. Agnes-
Newfoundland Rd. (66) 
‘Social 
Stress 
in 
Avon’ 
1981 
22.9 18.7 6.2 12.5 2.1 37.6 
City-Portland Sq.-
Stokes Croft (65) 
32.4 19.2 4.8 19.8 4.2 19.6 
Montpelier-City Rd.-
St. Andrews Pk. (34) 
25.5 22.6 3.5 16.3 2.8 29.3 Mina Rd. Area (46) 
‘Southmead’ 
26.7 21.1 6.0 8.8 5.2 32.2 
Southmead-Wigton 
Cres.-Pen Park (25) 
20.6 30.9 1.9 14.0 0.9 31.7 
Southmead-Ambleside 
Ave.-Greystoke (26) 
16.2 18.8 5.9 25.3 4.3 29.5 
Southmead-Southmead 
Rd. Area (39) 
13.3 21.3 6.6 23.9 4.0 30.9 
Southmead-Hospital 
Area (40) 
‘Inner City 
Bristol’ 
18.0 21.3 9.1 22.0 5.4 24.2  
‘Bristol’ 18.2 25.6 9.5 18.7 4.5 23.5  
‘County of 
Avon’ 
15.4 25.3 13.4 19.1 5.6 21.2  
Table 15: Socio-economic groups based on of head of household for ‘St. Paul’s’ and ‘Southmead’ 
in 1981. 
                                                 
351
 This category applies to ‘those heads of households who have never worked, or described 
themselves as housewives or students or whose occupation was not given, or members of the armed 
forces’. Bristol City Council. Planning Department, Poverty in Bristol: Final Report, App.4.  
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5.3.4 Housing 
 
Table 16 provides information as to the status of house tenure in the two districts. The 
most explicit difference between the two areas was the high concentration of owner 
occupied and local authority housing in the ‘Southmead’ area as a whole, with a tiny 
proportion of privately rented accommodation. In the ‘Southmead estate’ area (shaded 
in Table 16) three quarters of the residences were local authority housing
352
. In 
comparison ‘St. Paul’s’ had a more even mix of owner occupied, rented and local 
authority housing more in line with the distribution for ‘Bristol’ as a whole. The 
connection between the higher levels of rented accommodation and the ethnic 
diversity of the area is an historical relationship. Prior to the first post-war arrivals of 
migrants (particularly from the Caribbean) the ‘St. Paul’s’ district was already ‘a 
reception area for Polish, Hungarian, Cypriot and Irish families’ and ‘the last great 
reservoir of rented accommodation in the city’353. 
 
In the 1950s and 60s, faced with discrimination by landlords in much of the rest of 
Bristol and the need for at least a year of residence in the city prior to be eligibility for 
the long council housing waiting lists, recently arrived ‘New Commonwealth’ 
migrants headed for the traditional ‘reception area’ of St. Paul’s. The transient nature 
of certain fractions of the population St. Paul’s was still reflected by the mix of 
housing tenures in the 1970s and 80s. This mobility kept the area culturally and 
                                                 
352
 The tenants ‘right to buy’ local authority housing was introduced by the incoming Conservative 
government of 1979. This skewed the statistics towards owner-occupiers who had recently bought their 
property. By 1983 16% of these properties had been purchased by tenants in the ‘Southmead estate’ 
zone (25-26). Bristol City Council. Planning Department, Southmead Report: Report of the Southmead 
Working Group, Section 2.1.4. 
353
  Dresser and Fleming, Bristol: Ethnic Minorities and the City, 1000-2001, p.159-60. 
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demographically ‘open’ to a significant extent confounding certain populist ideas of 
the closed environment of the supposed ‘ghetto’.  
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Definition of Area Source Date 
‘St. Paul’s’ 
43 27 13 17 
St. Paul’s, Montpelier, St. 
Werburgh’s & St. Agnes 
‘Poverty 
in 
Bristol’ 
1981 
48.8 37.7 6.7 6.2 St. Agnes-Newfoundland Rd. (66) 
‘Social 
Stress in 
Avon’ 
1981 
9.6 45.9 26.4 18.1 City-Portland Sq.-Stokes Croft (65) 
36.2 23.7 16.4 23.7 
Montpelier-City Rd.-St. Andrews Pk. 
(34) 
60.3 22.5 5.1 11.8 Mina Rd. Area (46) 
43.7 27.0 12.2 16.9 Areas (34-46-65-66) combined 
‘Southmead’ 
23 73 2 1 Southmead Ward 
‘Poverty 
in 
Bristol’ 
1981 
24.2 71.3 1.6 2.8 
Southmead-Wigton Cres.-Pen Park 
(25) 
‘Social 
Stress in 
Avon’ 
1981 
20.6 76.7 1.4 1.3 
Southmead-Ambleside Ave-
Greystoke (26) 
47.2 49.1 0.3 3.5 Southmead-Southmead Rd. Area (39) 
67.1 28.1 0.3 4.5 Southmead-Hospital Area (40) 
34.5 61.5 1.1 2.9 
Southmead Ward: Areas (25-26-39-
40) combined 
‘Inner City 
Bristol’ 
52.9 18.3 4.0 24.8  
‘Bristol’ 54.5 31.6 2.6 11.1  
‘County of 
Avon’ 
62.9 25.2 2.1 9.5  
Table 16: Details of residential property tenure for ‘St. Paul’s’ and ‘Southmead’ in 1981 
 
5.3.5 Transience 
 
Some measure of the transient nature of populations can be obtained by a study of 
those people who have changed address in the previous year. Table 17 provides this 
information derived from the 1981 Census for the two study areas. Consideration of 
the workplace zones of ‘St. Paul’s’ in comparison to ‘inner city Bristol’ and the ‘city 
of Bristol’ demonstrates that there were significant transient populations in the St. 
Agnes-Newfoundland Road (66) and Montpelier-City Rd-St. Andrews Pk. (34) 
localities. The high levels of owner-occupiers in the St. Werburgh’s district (Mina 
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Road Area (46))
354
 may have contributed to its relative stability but it is clear there 
was considerable movement in the locale as a whole. In contrast, the ‘Southmead 
Ward’ area had less than half of this fraction of its population ‘on the move’ in 1981. 
These results are revealing and support the previous proposition that the ‘St. Paul’s’ 
area, for at least some sections of the population, was undergoing a significant 
turnover of residents compared to the more spatially isolated, static population of 
‘Southmead’. 
 
Locality 
% Persons 
with changed 
address in the 
previous year 
Definition of Area Source Date 
‘St. Paul’s’ 
22.5 St. Agnes-Newfoundland Rd. (66) 
‘Social 
Stress 
in 
Avon’ 
1981 
12.7 City-Portland Sq.-Stokes Croft (65) 
20.8 Montpelier-City Rd-St. Andrews Pk. (34) 
11.3 Mina Rd. Area (46) 
16.7 Areas (34-46-65-66) combined 
‘Southmead’ 
8.9 Southmead-Wigton Cres.-Pen Park (25) 
11.9 Southmead-Ambleside Ave.-Greystoke (26) 
7.1 Southmead-Southmead Rd. Area (39) 
6.0 Southmead-Hospital Area (40) 
8.6 Southmead Ward: Areas (25-26-39-40) comb. 
‘Inner City 
Bristol’ 
14.4  
‘Bristol’ 9.7  
‘County of 
Avon’ 
9.2  
Table 17: Percentage of persons in ‘St. Paul’s’ and ‘Southmead’ who changed their address in 
the previous year 
 
5.3.6 Overcrowding 
 
Table 18 provides a measure of room occupancy with ‘overcrowding’ considered to 
be a density of greater than one person per bedroom
355
. Additionally, data on 
household size is presented as a similar marker.  The statistics show that significant 
overcrowding was prevalent in all the workplace zones of ‘St. Paul’s’ in 1981, 
                                                 
354
 See Table 16. 
355
 Bristol City Council. Planning Department, Poverty in Bristol: Final Report, App. 1. 
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particularly the St. Agnes-Newfoundland Road (66) locale. This was probably the 
residue of a historical trait of this ‘reception area’ for migrants that became 
particularly acute in the 1960s. The problem eased as a degree of spatial mobility 
became possible in the 1970s with the realisation of the 5-6 year wait for local 
authority housing or, for some, the capability to purchase property outside the 
immediate area due to the accumulation of wealth from the ‘full’ employment 
conditions of the period
356
.  
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Definition of Area Source Date 
‘St. Paul’s’ 
6.7 - 
St. Paul’s, Montpelier, St. Werburgh’s & 
St. Agnes 
‘Poverty 
in 
Bristol’ 
1981 
12.1 14.6 St. Agnes-Newfoundland Rd. (66) 
‘Social 
Stress in 
Avon’ 
1981 
5.2 11.2 City-Portland Sq.-Stokes Croft (65) 
6.1 12.8 Montpelier-City Rd.-St. Andrews Pk. (34) 
6.6 12.9 Mina Rd. Area (46) 
‘Southmead’ 
7.1 - Southmead Ward 
‘Poverty 
in 
Bristol’ 
1981 
8.1 20.4 Southmead-Wigton Cres.-Pen Park (25) 
‘Social 
Stress in 
Avon’ 
1981 
4.6 16.5 
Southmead-Ambleside Ave-Greystoke 
(26) 
2.7 10.1 Southmead-Southmead Rd. Area (39) 
0.7 5.5 Southmead-Hospital Area (40) 
‘Inner City 
Bristol’ 
2.9 7.7  
‘Bristol’ 2.8 10.1  
‘County of 
Avon’ 
2.2 10.1  
Table 18: Variables measuring overcrowding and large households in ‘St. Paul’s’ and 
‘Southmead’ in 1981 
 
Intriguingly, the overcrowding in St. Paul’s is mirrored in the ‘Southmead estate’ 
zones (25-26) despite the fact these housing projects were originally planned to 
overcome this problem. These zones of the ‘Southmead’ ward are also striking in that 
they have unusually large household sizes compared to the wider city. One important 
                                                 
356
 Dresser and Fleming, Bristol: Ethnic Minorities and the City, 1000-2001, p.161-63. 
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effect of this level of overcrowding which was relevant to both locales under study 
was appreciated by Jerry Brent a youth worker in Southmead when he stated: 
‘[The crowded home] is an important consideration in the public life of 
the area – for example, young people who do not have space at home have 
to socialise more on the streets and in [youth] clubs’ . 
Thus the ‘St. Paul’s neighbourhood’ and the ‘Southmead estate’ areas both suffered 
from significant overcrowding which would have had an impact on the prevalence for 
youths to access other external spaces for socialising. 
5.3.7 Unemployment 
 
Unemployment was a key political indicator of the early 1980s, as the economic 
slump of the period appeared to be descending into a fully-fledged depression. 
Consequently it was often cited as the main structural factor for the urban unrest of 
the time. Table 19 categorises unemployment data into three groupings, the overall 
figure, those without work for more than one year (marking long term unemployment) 
and the subset of those under the age of 25 (marking youth unemployment).  
 
The general and long-term unemployment rates in the ‘St. Paul’s neighbourhood’ area 
were approximately three times as high as those in the wider city, whereas the 
‘Southmead estate’ zones were only marginally above the average. This variation 
does suggest that ethnic minorities were suffering the combined effects of the 
recession and discrimination in employment throughout the age range. What is 
striking are the two massive rates of unemployment amongst the young in the St. 
Agnes-Newfoundland Road (66) area of the ‘St. Paul’s neighbourhood’ (89.6%) and 
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the Southmead-Ambleside Ave-Greystoke (26) zone of the ‘Southmead estate’ area 
(84.6%). These are strikingly high rates of unemployment and although potentially 
affected by statistical variations due to sample size or other effects, still reflect the 
stress that the young people of the specific locales were undergoing due to the 
prevailing economic conditions. Almost everyone in the peer groups of the under 
twenty-five’s in these specific areas in 1980-81 was without a full-time job and it 
appeared that these prospects were not going to improve for the foreseeable future. 
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Definition of Area Source Date 
‘St. Paul’s’ 
25.6 - - 
St. Paul’s, Montpelier, St. Werburgh’s & 
St. Agnes 
‘Poverty in 
Bristol’ 
1981 
32.1 13.8 89.6 St. Agnes-Newfoundland Rd. (66) 
‘Social 
Stress in 
Avon’ 
1981 
31.4 9.2 29.4 City-Portland Sq.-Stokes Croft (65) 
38.2 21.0 67.6 
Montpelier-City Rd.-St. Andrews Pk. 
(34) 
19.2 7.8 56.3 Mina Rd. Area (46) 
   Areas (34-46-65-66) combined 
‘Southmead’ 
12.4 - - Southmead Ward
357
 
‘The 
Southmead 
Report’ 
1981 
15.4 - - Southmead Ward 
‘Poverty in 
Bristol’ 
1981 
15.7 4.7 38.1 Southmead-Wigton Cres.-Pen Park (25) 
‘Social 
Stress in 
Avon’ 
1981 
15.9 2.9 84.5 
Southmead-Ambleside Ave.-Greystoke 
(26) 
9.5 4.3 27.3 Southmead-Southmead Rd. Area (39) 
9.2 2.3 23.1 Southmead-Hospital Area (40) 
   
Southmead Ward: Areas (25-26-39-40) 
combined 
‘Inner City 
Bristol’ 
15.3 4.9 31.3  
‘Bristol’ 11.2 3.2 26.6  
‘County of 
Avon’ 
8.8 2.4 23.4  
Table 19: Unemployment rates (general, long term and young persons) for ‘St. Paul’s’ and 
‘Southmead’ in 1981 
                                                 
357
 It is noted in this report that the Southmead Ward ‘includes more affluent areas outside the estate’ 
and ‘the refined figure for the estate alone will be much higher’. Bristol City Council. Planning 
Department, Southmead Report: Report of the Southmead Working Group, Section 3.4.3. 
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5.3.8 Mobility and isolation 
 
The geographic locations in relation to Bristol city centre of the ‘St. Paul’s’ and 
‘Southmead’ districts are quite different. The former is a few minutes walk from 
Broadmead, the main shopping area of the city centre in the early 1980s and the main 
bus route hub. In contrast, Southmead lies approximately six kilometres north of the 
city and off the main bus routes. The spatial isolation of the latter estate from the 
cultural and commercial core of Bristol is thus far more pronounced. Table 20 
provides data on the percentage of households that were without a car in 1981 in the 
two locales under study.  
 
Locality 
%  
Households 
without a 
car 
Definition of Area Source Date 
‘St. Paul’s’ 
62.5 
St. Paul’s, Montpelier, St. Werburgh’s & St. 
Agnes 
‘Poverty in 
Bristol’ 
1981 
64.4 St. Agnes-Newfoundland Rd. (66) 
‘Social 
Stress in 
Avon’ 
1981 
73.0 City-Portland Sq.-Stokes Croft (65) 
63.5 Montpelier-City Rd.-St. Andrews Pk. (34) 
57.1 Mina Rd. Area (46) 
‘Southmead’ 
46.5 Southmead Ward 
‘Poverty in 
Bristol’ 
1981 
46.7 Southmead-Wigton Cres.-Pen Park (25) 
‘Social 
Stress in 
Avon’ 
1981 
44.3 Southmead-Ambleside Ave-Greystoke (26) 
42.3 Southmead-Southmead Rd. Area (39) 
34.4 Southmead-Hospital Area (40) 
‘Inner City 
Bristol’ 
48.6  
‘Bristol’ 40.6  
‘County of 
Avon’ 
32.8  
Table 20: Percentage of households without a car in ‘St. Paul’s’ and ‘Southmead’ in 1981 
 
Car usage was understood in two of the surveys as being a measure of the ‘possession 
of consumer goods’ and on the assumption that ‘most people want to…drive around 
in cars’358. In this study, however, it will be taken as a measure of mobility, 
particularly in the context of outlying areas such as ‘Southmead’ where the car was 
                                                 
358
 Bristol City Council. Planning Department, Poverty in Bristol: Final Report, p.4. 
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more of a necessity due to the proximity of the area from the city centre and crucially 
the lack of an integrated transport system in Bristol
359
. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the inner city area of ‘St. Paul’s’ had lower levels of car ownership 
per household than ‘Southmead’ probably due to a combination of lack of surplus 
wealth in the populace and no inherent necessity for a vehicle because of its location. 
‘Southmead’ did however have higher than average lack of access to cars per 
household compared to the rest of the city of ‘Bristol’ despite the intrinsic necessity 
for ease of mobility considering its peripheral setting. This piece of evidence 
emphasises the relative isolation of the non-car owning populace of the locale. 
5.3.9 Education 
 
Schooling in Bristol was the responsibility of the Conservative led Avon County 
Council rather than the Labour controlled Bristol City Council in 1980. There was a 
marked difference in this provision between ‘St. Paul’s’ and ‘Southmead’. The 
‘Southmead estate’ area had four primary schools and two secondary schools (Pen 
Park Girls and Greenway Boys) all situated in the immediate environs
360
. In contrast, 
‘St. Paul’s’, despite having primary schools in the locality, had no non-selective 
secondary school. Consequently teenagers from ‘St. Paul’s’ in 1980 were ‘bussed’ to 
nine or more different schools spread amongst three of the five designated education 
                                                 
359
 Bristol was (and still is) regarded as a public transport black spot with no metro or light rail system, 
an expensive bus system and consequently a high level of car ownership. 
360
 Bristol City Council. Planning Department, Southmead Report: Report of the Southmead Working 
Group, Section 2.3.1. 
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areas of the city
361
. Restrictions on educational opportunity in the area were 
compounded by the presence of the only two selective Grammar schools in Avon in 
the Northern Central Area of the educational authority
362
.  
 
In the aftermath of the disturbances of 1980, residents of ‘St. Paul’s’ drew attention to 
what they called the ‘unofficial bussing policy’. They complained about the ‘wide 
dispersal of secondary school pupils’ both in terms of the financial costs that entailed 
for them and the ‘separation from many of the child’s friends in a school that might 
only have a few ethnic minority children’ making ‘the transition from primary to 
secondary education even more difficult than usual’363. Two of the group of schools 
chosen for ‘bussing’ the inner city youth of ‘St. Paul’s’ to, were the relatively small 
Southmead secondary schools Pen Park Girls and Greenway Boys
364
, more than four 
miles from their home neighbourhoods. This is reflected in the high percentage of so-
called ‘Commonwealth immigrant children’ (14.8%) in Pen Park Girls School in 
                                                 
361
 These were the Northern, Eastern and North Central Areas; Avon County Council, County of Avon 
Education Department. Multi-cultural Education Centre. Avon Schools at which members of Staff of 
Multi-cultural Education Centre are teaching- April 1980. (Bristol Record Office 42974/2 Vol.1 Part 
B, 1980). See also A Long Way from Home, DVD, directed by C. Thomas (Bristol: WEA Second 
Chance Group, 1981). 
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 These were Cotham and Fairfield Grammar schools. Fairfield was the closest school to the 
neighbourhood of ‘St. Paul’s’. Bateman and Press, Slumbering Volcano? - Report of an Enquiry into 
the Origins of the Eruption in St. Paul's Bristol on 2nd April 1980, p.21. 
363
  Ibid. p.21 and Thomas, A Long Way from Home. 
364
 Pen Park Girls School had a roll of 657 and Greenway Boys 536 in 1979-80 placing them in the 
smallest group of secondary schools in Avon. The majority had over 1,000 pupils. Avon County 
Council, County of Avon Education Department. Multi-cultural Education Centre. Avon Schools at 
which members of Staff of Multi-cultural Education Centre are teaching- April 1980.  
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1980, despite the fact that the local catchment area probably had less than 3% of its 
population of similar origin
365
. Greenway Boys School although having less than 5% 
of its roll from this group also exhibited the effects of the ‘bussing’ strategy.  
 
The falling school rolls of the late 1970s are a clue to the rationale behind Avon 
County Council’s questionable policy of displacing large numbers of ‘St. Paul’s’ 
youth to far away schools such as Greenway Boys in Southmead
366
. Rather than 
addressing the problem of the lack of a non-selective secondary school in the ‘St. 
Paul’s’ area, the local authority attempted to protect its budget by displacing the inner 
city youth to distant peripheral schools and particularly those with falling numbers 
that were under the threat of closure. The teenagers of ‘St. Paul’s’ were thus victims 
of a fiscally orientated and arguably discriminatory local education strategy. 
5.3.10 Social facilities 
 
It is worth turning now to compare the social facilities that were available in each area 
in 1980, particularly for the young. For the ‘St. Paul’s’ locality, the independent NUT 
report and the TUC enquiry findings both note the lack of green or open spaces and 
play areas in the immediate vicinity (there was only the ‘picturesque but small St. 
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 Table 14 and Avon County Council, County of Avon Education Department. Multi-cultural 
Education Centre. Avon Schools at which members of Staff of Multi-cultural Education Centre are 
teaching- April 1980. 
366
 According to ‘The Southmead Report’ of 1983, Greenway Boys School was marked for closure due 
to ‘the decline in school age population’ and ‘the poor reputation the school has gained’. Greenway 
Boys School was eventually closed in 1985. Bristol City Council. Planning Department, Southmead 
Report: Report of the Southmead Working Group, Section 2.3.3-4.  
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Agnes Park’)367. The existing adventure playground had been closed down and ‘only 
after significant pressure was brought to bear by playground leaders and members of 
the community was another site made available’368. No local authority funded 
community centre existed and neither was there a dedicated sports facility.  
 
Consequently the majority of the social facilities that were present were actually the 
result of the self-activity of individuals and collectives within the ‘community’. These 
included the ‘Empire Sports Club’ based in a disused church next to the M32, the 
youth programmes at the ‘Dockland Settlement’ on City Road and the film, drama 
and arts centre the ‘Inkworks’ on Hepburn Road In the light of the origin of the events 
in April 1980, it was noted that ‘there is no restaurant in the area although there are 
two cafés: the Black and White in Grosvenor Rd. and the Shady Grove in Ashley 
Rd.’369. This inventory of facilities that were open to the youth of ‘St. Paul’s’ suggests 
a long period of disinterest and lack of investment by local authorities. This 
stimulated an autonomous response from the residents of the area in utilising the 
bricolage of available buildings and self-generated collective resources for their own 
needs
370
. 
 
‘Southmead’ in contrast to the arguably self-made, inner city ‘immigrant reception 
                                                 
367
 Bateman and Press, Slumbering Volcano? - Report of an Enquiry into the Origins of the Eruption in 
St. Paul's Bristol on 2nd April 1980, p.7 and Equal Opportunities Sub-Committee, Bristol Teachers 
Association (NUT) commissioned by the Avon Division of the NUT, After the Fire: A Report on 
Education in St. Paul's Bristol and Multi-Ethnic Education in Avon, p.6-9. 
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 Ibid. p.8. 
369
 Ibid. p.6. 
370
 These included premises for semi-legal ‘blues’ clubs and parties, which were popular in the area. 
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area’ of ‘St. Paul’s’ had entirely different origins in a diluted version of the ideas of 
romantic socialists such as Ebenezer Howard and the ‘garden cities’ movement of the 
late nineteenth century
371.  Howard’s vision was of the fusion of aesthetically pleasing 
and durable homes situated in environmentally appealing surroundings with a 
multiplicity of social amenities and opportunities for nearby non-alienated work. This 
dream was spoiled by the fiscal squeeze of the pre-war depression and the urgent need 
for post-war housing provision.  
 
However, some random elements of the utopian vision were retained in the large pre 
and post-war developments in Southmead
372
, the peripheral location in relation to the 
city, the spatial separation of housing and large (but featureless) green spaces plus 
forced temperance by lack of facilities
373
. The paucity of social amenities in the post-
war environment in Southmead and other similar estates was not just limited to a 
shortage of public houses. There was a lack of shops, churches, community centres 
                                                 
371
 See Stephen E. Hunt, Yesterday's Tomorrow: Bristol's Garden Suburb. (Bristol: Bristol Radical 
History Group, 2009). 
372
 1,659 houses were built south of Greystoke Avenue before WWII (the ‘pre-war estate’) and 1,027 
immediately after (the ‘post-war estate’). Evening Post 22-07-1949. 
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 Hunt notes ‘The reluctance to provide public houses in garden suburbs was based upon links 
between alcohol and poverty in studies by reforming social thinkers such as Henry Mayhew, Charles 
Booth and Seebohm Rowntree as much as a puritanical distaste for pleasure…. regardless of objections 
to alcohol consumption, public houses were (and obviously remain!) cherished public spaces and the 
lack of them on moral grounds was a thin excuse for the failure to provide social spaces’. Ibid. pp.19-
20. There was considerable excitement in the local newspaper (and it must be suspected amongst 
residents!) when the new ‘local’, ‘The Standard of England’ was opened in Southmead in 1954, nearly 
20 years after the first phase of house construction. See Bristol Central Reference Library ‘Spotlighting 
Bristol’s New Communities’ 72.4 Evening Post 1954. 
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and sports facilities for an extended period
374
. Organised groups in the post-war 
Southmead ‘community’ applied significant pressure to the local authorities to obtain 
and speed up the process of developing this social infrastructure
375
.  
 
Despite these self-organised lobby groups, by 1980, the facilities for young people 
had only extended to a Youth Centre
376
, a run-down adventure playground and two 
Scout Huts
377
. There were no dedicated sports amenities or swimming pools nor other 
attractions such as cinemas or restaurants on the estate
378
. Furthermore only three 
public houses, often the domain and centre of informal community for young adults, 
served an immediate population of 11,000. 
5.3.11 Measures of ‘social stress’ 
 
The final set of ‘official’ statistics examined in this review contains the problematic 
measure of ‘social stress’, defined as ‘significant combinations of social, economic 
and physical conditions likely to seriously affect personal well-being’379. All of the 
                                                 
374
 The ‘Southmead estate’ was granted a Congregational church, church hall, Sunday school, buildings 
for a boys club and a ‘Community Hut’ in 1949. Evening Post 22-07-1949. Other facilities followed 
five years later in 1954. See Bristol Central Reference Library ‘Spotlighting Bristol’s New 
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377
  Bristol City Council. Planning Department, Southmead Report: Report of the Southmead Working 
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  Avon County Council, Social Stress in Avon, 1981: A Preliminary Analysis. 
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previously studied statistics can be argued to have been mere categorisations of data 
whereas the overall ‘social stress indicator’ was generated from a combination of 
‘factors’. It effectively linked various measures of unemployment, one parent 
families, social service referrals, electricity disconnections, lack of car ownership, 
overcrowding of households, statutory supervision orders and households with a new 
Commonwealth or Pakistan born head
380
.  
 
Table 21 shows the ‘Social Stress Indicator’ and ranking of each workplace zone for 
‘St. Paul’s’ and ‘Southmead’ in comparison with the other 196 zones surveyed in the 
County of Avon in 1981.  
 
Locality 
Social 
Stress 
Indicator 
Ranking out 
of 196 zones in 
Avon 
Definition of Area Source Date 
‘St. Paul’s’ 
5.155 1 St. Agnes-Newfoundland Rd. (66) 
‘Social 
Stress 
in 
Avon’ 
1981 
4.974 2 City-Portland Sq.-Stokes Croft (65) 
4.529 3 
Montpelier-City Rd-St. Andrews 
Pk. (34) 
2.437 6 Mina Rd. Area (46) 
‘Southmead’ 
1.990 8 
Southmead-Wigton Cres.-Pen Park 
(25) 
1.666 14 
Southmead-Ambleside Ave-
Greystoke (26) 
0.869 39 
Southmead-Southmead Rd. Area 
(39) 
-0.172 80 Southmead-Hospital Area (40) 
Table 21: ‘Social Stress Indicators’ and rankings for the ‘St. Paul’s’ and ‘Southmead’ workplace 
zones compared to all 196 zones in the County of Avon in 1981 
 
The results are striking in that all four of the ‘St. Paul’s’ zones lie in the top six areas 
for ‘social stress’ in the county. The ‘Southmead estate’ areas (25-26) are hardly 
better off, coming in at 8
th
 and 14
th
 in the overall rankings. Clearly from a ‘social 
                                                 
380
  The linking of various factors related to social deprivation with ethnicity may explain why the four 
workplace zones in the ‘St. Paul’s locality’ appear in the top six rankings of ‘social stress’ in the county 
of Avon. Ibid. Section 4e). 
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deprivation’ perspective the ‘St. Paul’s neighbourhood’ and the ‘Southmead estate’ 
were significantly disadvantaged locales within already under-privileged areas. 
5.3.12 Policing and police-community relations 
 
None of the local authority reports studied provide any empirical data concerning 
details of policing or crime for the areas under study. In an attempt to find information 
concerning ‘St. Paul’s’ or ‘Southmead’ the Chief Constable’s report for the Avon and 
Somerset police in 1980
381
 was reviewed. Of particular interest in this report were the 
subjective accounts of the disorders in the two locations under study and the focus of 
the Chief Constable’s opening address. Both of the disturbances in St. Paul’s and 
Southmead in April 1980 are prominent incidents in the ‘General Police Duties’ 
section of the report and are, interestingly, given equal amounts of text and narrative 
weight as being ‘serious’ disorders. However, in the foreword in the same document 
there is no mention of ‘Southmead’ whilst nearly half of Chief Constable’s 
considerable account of the ‘state of policing in Avon & Somerset’ is dedicated to the 
St. Paul’s disturbance, its causes, the resulting ‘organisational lessons’ and repeated 
references to police relations with ‘ethnic minorities’.  In a paradoxical remark he 
states: 
‘Much - probably too much – has been written about St. Pauls particularly 
as to the alleged cause(s) of this sad – and untypical – incident. My own 
view has been that the trouble arose from an unfortunate and unusual 
combination of circumstances which are unlikely to re-occur’382 
                                                 
381
  Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Annual Report of the Chief Constable. (Bristol, 1980). 
382
 Ibid. p.1. 
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The paradox of course is not only did the ‘St. Paul’s’ incident and its effects dominate 
his extensive foreword, but later in the same document, prominence is given to 
another supposedly ‘untypical’ incident (Southmead). The Chief Constable 
completely fails to acknowledge this in his opening address. This is an interesting 
marker of the relation between the police and the public domain in 1980. Clearly the 
police took both disorders seriously on an operational level but when addressing the 
‘public’ the Chief Constable focussed on the governmental and media circus 
surrounding the ‘St. Paul’s’ event. There were no obvious policy responses to the 
second of his ‘untypical incidents’ of that year in ‘Southmead’. 
 
The question of policing did feature in the Home Office Sub-Committee inquiry when 
it met in Bristol on May 22
nd
 1980 to ‘investigate’ the disturbance in ‘St. Paul’s’383. 
Although this limited inquiry had been boycotted by the formal organisation probably 
closest to the actual participants in the disturbance the ‘St. Paul’s United Defence 
Committee’384 there was still an opportunity to interview other Community ‘leaders’ 
and crucially the representatives of the Avon and Somerset Constabulary. The main 
thrust of the questioning of the police witnesses was centred on the extremely low 
representation of ‘ethnic minorities’ in the local force, their relations with the schools 
in the area and their policy in dealing with illegal drinking clubs, the smoking of 
cannabis and street prostitution. Very little questioning was angled at the issue of 
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 Home Office, Minutes of evidence taken before the Home-affairs Sub-committee on Race Relations 
and Immigration (22
nd
 May 1980). (Bristol Record Office 42974/1, 1980), Vol. 1 Part A. 
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 This organisation, set up in the immediate aftermath of the disturbance, organised a vote in a public 
meeting, which by a majority supported the boycott. St. Paul's United Defence Committee, Press 
Release 14th May 1980. (Bristol Record Office 43129, 1980), Box 105: P ST PA B1 and St. Paul's 
United Defence Committee, Resolution. (Bristol Record Office 43129, 1980), Box 105: P ST PA B1. 
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actual street relations between the police and residents in St. Paul’s (particularly 
ethnic minorities) apart from revealing testimony from a ‘beat’ police constable who 
stated: 
‘St. Paul’s itself is a very much extroverted community in so much as 
when a response call is made and an officer goes he does not find himself 
talking to the person who might be responsible or to the person who is 
making the allegation. He finds himself talking to the entire 
street…Unfortunately there is not enough time to tell the entire street 
what they are doing; so therefore, the entire street gets the idea that there 
is either harassment or Police brutality...’385 
Whether the ‘street’ was correct in its assessment of the actual situation or not, this 
testimony illuminates the reality of policing where an active ‘community’ response 
was in operation. It appears the ‘street’ in St. Paul’s was questioning police activities, 
making judgements about them and in some cases intervening. 
 
The tentative questioning of police witnesses’ in the Home Office inquiry was 
matched by the cautious responses in the ‘unofficial’ TUC report.  After significant 
analyses of structural issues such as housing, employment and education the shortest 
section of the document is concerned with ‘Community Relations’386, despite the 
authors noting: 
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 This author’s emphasis in bold. Ibid. p.33. 
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 Bateman and Press, Slumbering Volcano? - Report of an Enquiry into the Origins of the Eruption in 
St. Paul's Bristol on 2nd April 1980, Chap. 6. 
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‘It was understandable from the nature of the Enquiry that we should 
receive a considerable amount of evidence concerning relations between 
the Police and the community’.  
They went on to state: 
‘We were told of instances of harassment by the Police, that they react 
more harshly in the enquiry area than to a similar situation elsewhere, and 
more harshly to a situation involving ethnic minority persons than to a 
similar one involving whites. The complaints came not only from those 
who had sustained the alleged harassment and over-reaction, but also from 
elected representatives, community leaders and others, both black and 
white.’387  
This unofficial inquiry did not appear to have had participants in the disturbance 
giving testimony. Despite this, it appears that there were so many complaints made by 
witnesses from various ethnic groups (both ‘Black and White’) that the organisers 
stated that they ‘had neither the time nor the facilities…to investigate individual 
complaints, but the volume of these was so great and their incidence so widespread as 
to constitute a prima facie case’. 
 
In retrospect, the ‘St. Paul’s’ disturbance and the subsequent inquiry generated some, 
albeit unofficial, criticisms of policing. In contrast, ‘Southmead’ in the wake of its 
‘riot’ received no ‘official’ or ‘unofficial’ enquiry, no apparent interest from either 
local or central government and hardly any exposure in the media. Only one local 
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 This author’s emphasis in bold. Ibid. p.24. 
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authority document refers to the issue of policing in relation to the area, the 
‘Southmead Report’ of 1983 and its findings are, to say the least, controversial. In a 
section labelled ‘Police and Probation’388 the report states that ‘there seems to have 
been a general quietening down in Southmead of late’ which is perhaps a reference to 
the serious disorders of 1980 and 1981
389
. The anonymous authors of the report coldly 
state the reason for this ‘happy turn of events’ was young people’s ‘fashion for glue 
sniffing rather than vandalism’. They go on to argue ‘but this does not fully explain 
the turn about from an era when Southmead created much of its present reputation’. 
Once again the approach is noticeable, ‘Southmead’ is of its own making, the authors 
are just (uncaring) observers and the local authority takes no responsibility for the 
situation.  
 
To give some credit to the authors of the ‘Southmead Report’ for at least listening to 
some residents of the area they do add that: 
‘However, there have been complaints from young people of heavy 
handed policing at night and of actual harassment. This, it is claimed, 
stems from Southmead’s reputation – if there is a disturbance or crime in 
the wider area Southmead residents are prime suspects and groups of 
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 Serious disorders in ‘Southmead’ in 1981 are noted in the Chief Constable’s report of that year. 
Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Annual Report of the Chief Constable. (Bristol, 1981), p.36. 
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youths in particular are picked on’390 
The authors question these claims but note that ‘it does indicate an under-current of 
unrest and conflict which efforts should be made to overcome’ and suggest that an 
improvement of the ‘affluence of the estate through reduced unemployment’ is the 
solution. However, they conclude by stating that ‘the practicality of making progress 
is limited’.  ‘Southmead’ was thus an ahistorical product of itself and seemingly a lost 
cause as far as the local authorities are concerned, an apparently reoccurring theme in 
this review of post-riot ‘official sources’. 
 
5.4 Analysis of the primary sources: oral history 
 
Following this quantitative groundwork, some qualitative and more subjective detail 
will be accessed to both ‘thicken’ these somewhat one-dimensional narratives as well 
as to offer challenges or substantiations. In the following section, excerpts from oral 
history interviews with respondents who were present in the 1980s in both study areas 
will be employed to ‘flesh out’ some of the potential inferences of the earlier review. 
 
5.4.1 Ethnicity, unemployment and ‘branding’ 
 
The main demographic difference demonstrated by the reviewed and somewhat 
selective statistics of 1981 were the much larger proportion of ‘ethnic minorities’ 
resident in the ‘St. Paul’s’ area. However, both ‘St. Paul’s’ and ‘Southmead’ had 
notable similarities in social class composition by head of household occupation and 
both areas were suffering the effects of a high degree of overall unemployment 
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 Bristol City Council. Planning Department, Southmead Report: Report of the Southmead Working 
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prevalent in the British economy in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  The greatest 
jobless levels were amongst young adults and as has been observed, they were often 
concentrated in specific localities within the wards. The impact this had upon the 
aspirations of younger school-leavers are recounted by a respondent from the 
‘Southmead estate’ area: 
‘You know, if you had lived in Southmead and I told you earlier on, if you 
weren’t in sort of class, the top class, you were basically just there to 
make up the numbers and we were told that my, when I went to…erm… 
my Careers I was told how to fill in the … UB40. That was it’391 
This feeling of ‘making up the numbers’, effectively being written off by the careers 
advisor at school and discrimination in employment opportunities due to association 
with a particular locality is backed up by the respondent more forcefully later in the 
interview: 
‘You know, we were told at school that if you had a BS10 postcode, from 
Southmead you ain’t going to get an interview for a job. So what 
prospects did you have? You know, you come from Southmead and you 
were openly discriminated against’392 
The problem of association with a particular locality especially when making job 
applications was a reoccurring theme in both of the areas under study. One White 
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 A UB40 was the form you completed to obtain Unemployment Benefit. Oral History File J_12-02-
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respondent claimed he had lost jobs because he lived in ‘St. Paul’s’393 and evidence of 
similar discrimination by locality was given as testimony in the post-riot TUC 
inquiry: 
‘Discrimination can take place even before an interview on the basis of a 
name or an address. It was made clear to us, for example, that the image 
of the Enquiry area [the wider ‘St. Paul’s’ ward] itself is a disadvantage in 
job-seeking. The view was held that if certain localities appeared on job 
application from this militated against the possibility of black or white job 
applicants even getting an interview.’ 
The authors go on to quote a statement from Avon County Council’s principal careers 
advisor representing the mediators between employers and prospective job applicants: 
‘…employers still query names. When a Career’s Officer or a Careers 
assistant makes an appointment for a young person to go for an interview 
there will still be comments back from employers if the name sounds as if 
it might be West Indian or if indeed it is an applicant from St. Paul’s or St. 
Werburghs area that could indicate they might be from an ethnic minority 
group’394 
A common response of job applicants to such discrimination by locality is recounted 
by another respondent from ‘Southmead’: 
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‘If you applied to get a job, then you wouldn’t put down BS10, which was 
the Southmead postcode. You knew that it would define you as being of 
Southmead and it would go against you because we all knew that 
Southmead had a bad name…if you had to put a postal contact you would 
put WOT on it, not Southmead…just to kind of up the chances of you 
getting that job’395 
Similar strategies were applied in several other areas of Bristol where perceived (or 
actual) discrimination in applying for jobs was taking place. Approaches such as this 
became part of the ‘underground’ knowledge of the unemployed in dealing with 
problems of the reputation of their home neighbourhoods with potential employers. 
The tactic of ‘disguise’ was particularly prevalent in ‘St. Paul’s’396 and neighbouring 
areas where members of ethnic minorities often faced the double-bind of prejudice 
extended to both their location and their sometime ‘un-English’ looking names. 
 
For many respondents, feelings of being discriminated against had a deeper reality 
than just problems of employment. This was demonstrated when one respondent 
referred to how people from ‘Southmead estate’ were perceived and treated: 
‘Southmead was always a council estate and everyone was shit and you 
were gonna be treated like shit and that’s it and all about it, you had no 
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 WOT refers to the affluent nearby area of Westbury-on-Trym. Oral History File H_18-02-2010 
(0:15:24). 
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 The author himself when resident in the ‘St. Paul’s’ area in the 1980s was well aware that referring 
to this locality in making job applications was ‘suicide’. Instead he gave his resident address as being in 
the adjacent area of Montpelier. 
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prospects to go anywhere…’397 
These deep-rooted prejudices about certain localities were not just confined to 
employers and in hindsight cannot be simply put down to particular economic cycles 
or moments of negative media representation. The effects of this ‘branding’ appear to 
have stayed with the residents and their home areas for life, as was recounted by a 
respondent who lived in Southmead in the 1970 and 80s: 
‘The image of Southmead was massively bad and we all knew it and that 
continued into my adult life. In the 90s, I moved down to Easton
398…and I 
would meet people, educated people, University educated…but even these 
so-called educated middle class people…they would if the subject of 
Southmead came up to do with anything…it would be like ‘Ohhh 
Southmead’ [imitates the sound of an ape] it was like a total put down as 
if Southmead was full of Neanderthals and I would always say ‘Well I am 
of Southmead’ and that would FUCKING shut them up. So even 
these…educated people they still had this opinion of Southmead being 
kind of like full of idiots…it was just put down by people who should 
have known better. They had such a shit opinion about Southmead, which 
still continues to this day. I’m defensive of this all the time. So that whole 
image of White council estate working class people was happening as a 
child…continued into my teenage [life]…continued into my adult 
life…The language changed but the attitude of, as I said educated people, 
it stayed the same….I don’t get why they have this undeveloped attitude 
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and opinion of the people who are living out on places like Southmead. 
It’s just ignorant; they don’t know what they are talking about. I don’t 
know how it’s come about, I’m puzzled by that one…No doubt it’s fed by 
media, talk by politicians…but it’s always been the same.’399 
This incisive statement, which reveals both anger and bewilderment at being the 
victim of discrimination based upon the fusion of locality and social class, was a 
reoccurring characteristic of all the interviews undertaken with respondents from 
‘Southmead’. The feeling that ‘branding’ had significant, almost lifetime, longevity 
even when the respondent had moved away from Southmead
400
 was a source of 
significant resentment. These feelings are certainly reminiscent of the experiences of 
historical and physical entrapment by ethnicity and locale that have been recorded 
amongst the ethnic minorities of ‘St. Paul’s’401.  
5.4.2 Isolation and exclusion 
 
The experiences for many of the young people of both ‘St. Paul’s’ and ‘Southmead’ 
also differed in several ways. The spatial isolation of ‘Southmead’ and the fact that 
most of the required amenities such as the schools were within the estate compounded 
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the sense of separation from the ‘outside’. The lack of car ownership enhanced this 
effect with one respondent from Southmead remarking that: 
‘You need to understand what Southmead was….as in this estate which 
was isolated, that was a big thing. It was a Council estate of low-income 
families out on the edge of the city. Because, it was low income, people 
had vehicles but a lot of people did not have vehicles. So the only way out 
of Southmead was by bus and…buses going out of Southmead, it wasn’t 
like one each twenty minutes or anything like that. You’d be waiting ages 
on bus stops just to get in and out of Southmead. And little things like that 
have an effect….it accentuates the isolation of the place…’402 
This physical isolation was often compounded by exclusionary responses when 
Southmead residents, especially the young, attempted to socialise in areas surrounding 
their estate. According to the respondents these reactions had two forms, inter-
communal violence or expulsion, dependant on whether the area was deemed as a 
‘rival’ estate or a ‘middle-class area’ respectively. Fights in public houses between 
‘locals’ and the Southmead interlopers were fairly common in nearby districts, 
particularly Filton and Patchway. The consequent need for communal self-defence 
was part of being a ‘Meader’ as is recalled by one respondent: 
‘When you did go outside of Southmead, you stuck with fellow 
Southmead kids and you would kind of defend a fellow Southmead kid. If 
we went to a pub in Henleaze or Clifton or any place outside of 
Southmead and if any Southmead kid got into a fight in a pub in any of 
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these places, then anyone who was with him who was also out of 
Southmead would join in and fight with them. So it was a unifying thing 
just being of Southmead. Which wasn’t a bad thing because we didn’t 
have anything else.’403 
In contrast, the ‘middle-class’ area of Westbury-on-Trym presented different 
problems for the visiting ‘Meaders’ related to exclusion and the attention of the 
police: 
‘We used to go to Westbury a lot…to wind them up…cos we were from a 
council estate, they’re from a well to do area… …and we used to go to the 
Post Office tavern and they’d all be in there going ‘What, what, what, 
what, what’ [fakes a posh accent] We would always get chucked out for 
swearing. Go to the Mouse…chucked out for swearing…Foresters 
Arms… chucked out for being from Southmead. But you’d go there every 
time to wind em’ up. Because they were like just like, they hated people 
from the council estate. So you’d go there just to wind the fuckers up… 
We never got nicked actually, we never got…cos we always went before 
the old…the blue light come down the road. Cos then you left to go to 
another pub.’404 
These exclusionary responses to travellers from Southmead and their aggressive 
reactions not only cemented identities based upon home locale but also heightened the 
sense of isolation of the residents of the estate. In contrast, for many of the youth of 
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St. Paul’s there was no choice but to leave their neighbourhoods on a daily basis. 
5.4.3 Education, displacement and racism 
 
The ‘bussing’ strategy instigated (and enforced) by Avon County Council meant that 
many of the teenage youth of ‘St. Paul’s’ had to leave their surroundings and travel to 
distant places for schooling, with all the potential trauma that entailed. This created 
effectively a dual identity, living in one environment and displacement amongst other, 
sometimes, majority White ‘communities’ during term time. It appears that at the sole 
Boys secondary school in Southmead, Greenway, an influx of displaced inner city 
youth began in the 1979-80 school year. Several respondents note this change in the 
demographic of the school. One (mixed-race) respondent resident in Southmead and a 
pupil at the school in the late 1970s, recalled: 
‘At Greenway…even though it [Southmead] is a 99% White area, we had 
probably about 20% Black Africans and Asians so it was a real mix. Even 
though it was a White area Black and Asian kids were bussed in and there 
were kids from St. Paul’s and from some other areas as well there, you 
see. So it was a real hodge podge of cultures really. But where we actually 
lived in Southmead there weren’t that many Black or Asian families.’405 
A change in the ethnic make-up of the Southmead Youth Club in the late 70s and 
early 80s was also noted by several youth workers
406
, suggesting that at least some of 
the new ‘inner city’ pupils were beginning to socialise ‘after hours’ with resident 
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youth. However, for the displaced, especially those who were noticeably from ethnic 
minority backgrounds, the school year of 1979 was particularly difficult period in 
which to arrive. The same respondent recalled: 
‘It was ’76 I went to Greenway. It weren’t until 79-80 when coming back 
from the summer holidays and all of a sudden they were calling you 
‘Paki’…all that sort of stuff. To me that was the beginning of all the 
fascist stuff, the racist stuff really and you’d look down at the colour laces 
on the Doctor Martens to see whether they were British Movement, 
National Front or League of St. George. National Front sellers tried to 
sell…there was always an undercurrent of racism ‘cos you were growing 
up in a White area but it wasn’t organised [until then]…’407 
Fights in ‘Southmead’ between ‘organised racists’ and groups wholly or partly made 
up of various ethnic minority members became the norm for a period. This state of 
affairs created the necessity for ‘ganging up’ for protection which often centred on 
youth sub-cultures. 
5.4.4 Gangs and youth sub-cultures 
 
Many respondents made reference to their membership of youth sub-cultures in the 
late 70s and early 80s. These groupings were intimately related to gangs and the 
problems of racism. One respondent explained the ethnic divisions in ‘Southmead’ 
and the responses to this through the medium of the various sub-cultures and gangs: 
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‘I was a bit of rude boy, which is Ska and Ska is a fusion of music, that’s 
what we were into…In ‘Southmead’ we were always called the 
‘straights’, there was Black mates, some White mates, Asian mates and 
we were into our own sort of stuff. And then you had like your fascists 
and then you had the Black kids who wanted to stay with Black kids and 
Asian kids who wanted to stay with Asian kids and that was it. But this is 
all in a very White area. So it was kind of chaotic stuff…The last two 
years [of his schooling] it was fighting every single week. It was 
predominantly with the racists, the fascists.’408 
The effect of this violence spread to ‘Southmead Youth Centre’ where a youth worker 
with perhaps less ‘insider’ knowledge of the gang divisions and their relations to 
organised racism and fascism commented: 
‘In the early 1980s, there were a large group of black teenagers on the 
estate. The number of blacks built up and there was a racist backlash by 
the young whites. There were major fights just before the youth club 
closed for the summer in August: when it reopened in September there 
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were no black people at all’409 
 The divisions at the youth centre were eventually remedied and by 1983 the 
considerable presence of both Black and White youth spawned the influential Black 
DJ from ‘Southmead’, Krissy Kriss, who recounted his first performance: 
‘I first picked up the mic in 1983, it was because of the ‘man dem’ I used 
to step with – Wallace, Claudio and Rookie, we all had the same sort of 
flavours, it was kind of organic you know, there was no rhyme or reason 
to it and we kind of formed our own thing down at Southmead Youth 
Club; we called ourselves ‘Crazy 17’. We did our first jam at Southmead 
Youth Club, it was ‘no alcohol’ youth kind of thing. It was crazy because 
people came from all over Bristol, people who normally went to the Dug 
Out
410
 and other places came over to Southmead to party. Bristol was very 
special in this way maybe because of the size of the city; you would just 
get to know people just from seeing them at parties regularly’411. 
This testimony not only demonstrates the importance of youth sub-cultures and their 
music in generating rhizomic links between distant communities of different ethnic 
make-up but also it shows the development of these relationships in spite of the inter-
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communal violence of 1979-80. The ‘double-edged sword’ of youth sub-culture is 
exposed here, initially an expression of divisions in ‘Southmead’ but eventually in a 
later form, to some extent, breaking the relative isolation of the estate. This process 
was at least partially initiated by the, albeit traumatic, influx of youth from inner city 
areas such as ‘St. Paul’s’ into Greenway and Pen Park schools in the late 70s. 
5.4.5 Transience 
 
The relative geographic isolation and physical effort in getting in and out of 
‘Southmead’ had other effects, which were reflected in the lower levels of transience 
of the population. A respondent noted:  
‘Southmead was unto itself…its got a lot of old families…they go back a 
long time…quite big established families and a lot of the kids, a lot of the 
families would stay in Southmead. They would have families and kids 
themselves but stay in Southmead. It seemed that not many people moved 
away. They just stayed close-knit in the community’412 
In contrast, the ‘St. Paul’s’ ward despite its popular and media representation as a 
closed ‘ghetto’413 had a much more transient population, derived from its location 
near the city centre and its post-war status as an ‘immigrant reception area’. These 
historical and structural factors allied with the attractions of the diversity of culture 
drew many ‘outsiders’, as is recounted by a White respondent: 
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‘I moved to St. Pauls when I was sixteen…and that was for the 24 hours 
drinking. The very good music. The cultural identity. And the smoke... So 
that was quite…adventurous. All the family thought I was mad. But they 
thought that anyway…’414 
‘St. Paul’s’ in 1980 had established ‘immigrant’ communities including Polish and 
Irish peoples, more recent migrants such as Asian and Afro-Caribbean peoples as well 
as a dynamic population of native interlopers. This fact, reflected in the statistical 
evidence that the ‘New Commonwealth’ population was actually in the minority, 
created a far more diverse demographic than was often presented in the media of the 
1980s. Another respondent linked this diversity with the creation of space for 
culturally dissident groups: 
‘Most of the punks back then used to drink in a place called ‘The 
Crown’… But in St. Paul’s we used to drink in the Inkerman415, cos it was 
an Irish pub then. Black people went in there but it was more of an Irish 
pub cos there was still, in the late 70s and early 80s, there was a huge Irish 
contingent in St. Paul’s and…cos it was the ‘No Blacks, No Irish, No 
Dogs’. And that was the only place they could really live, I spose…that 
was sort of like a hub really’416 
                                                 
414
 Oral History File G_09-10-2009 (0:03:12). 
415
 ‘The Crown’ pub was in the St. Jude’s area across the M32 motorway from ‘St. Paul’s’. ‘The 
Inkerman’ was on the ‘frontline’ (Grosvenor Road) in the St. Paul’s neighbourhood almost directly 
opposite the ‘Black and White’ café, the flashpoint of the April 1980 disturbance. 
416
 Oral History File L_15-02-2010_Main (0:03:46). 
 253 
Other new residents in ‘St. Paul’s’ were the product of the placement teenagers from 
the Social Services ‘care’ system or from young offenders institutions. A White 
respondent recounted his experience of living in a ‘multi-racial’ hostel for young 
people in ‘St. Paul's’ in 1980: 
‘I was like in a hostel at the time. I think I was only sixteen or something. 
I didn’t have anywhere else to stay. It was called the ‘Multi-racial Youth 
Hostel’… it was young people. I don’t think anyone was over the age of 
18 or 19 in there. Black and White… It was all right living down there. I 
fell out with my parents and end up in care. I was in the care system for 
few years…It was quite a good experience really, it was right in the thick 
of [it]…it was good down there. Being a punk in St. Paul’s wasn’t a bad 
thing. There was like an affinity between Blacks and punks. They got on 
well with us and we got on well with them. The Black community down 
there like…there was never any problems with that sort of side of things. 
Went to all the Blues
417
 in St. Paul’s, ‘Ajax’, ‘Manley’s’…the ‘Dockland 
Settlement’. It was a good buzz down there in those days. A really good 
buzz. And like between Blacks and Whites there wasn’t a lot of racial 
tension. We didn’t have any trouble.’418 
A Black respondent, arrested as a juvenile in the back of a stolen car in his home town 
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of Sheffield in the late 70s, recounted his route to the ‘St. Paul’s neighbourhood’: 
‘I ended up off the street, I was supposed to be in my father’s house [in 
Sheffield], off the street into a police station, into Shirecliffe [young 
offenders institution], Court, Shirecliffe, Court, I never seen my house 
again, right. And then [moved to] Bristol. And I never saw an appropriate 
adult or anything. So that’s how I see this country, I don’t know about 
justice. I always say to myself, so where was my Dad then? I didn’t even 
see my Dad. I just went to the police cells and then to an institution, 
backwards and forwards all the time waiting for court dates and then to 
Bristol and more trouble with the police. That was my transition into adult 
[hood]…to tell the truth it is only when I look back on it I think... fucking 
hell’419 
St. Paul’s thus had a significant number of displaced teenagers both Black and White 
without direct family support having to cope with adulthood in a ‘new’ environment. 
5.4.6 Overcrowding and social space 
 
As has already been stated, in both study areas, overcrowding of households, tended 
to increase the street presence amongst the young and placed pressures on the limited 
social facilities for this age group. However, this structural consideration does not 
fully explain the ‘street culture’ of the youth of these locales in 1980. After the 
disturbances in April in Southmead a local newspaper published an article entitled 
Riot Youths ‘ignore our bid to help’ in which a Conservative Councillor who ran a 
local community centre complained that ‘there was encouragement and financial help 
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waiting for the youngsters. But bored teenagers ignored the chance to spend their time 
usefully’420.  
 
None of the respondents from Southmead who were interviewed in the research for 
this thesis were actively involved in youth clubs in the area. They gave differing 
reasons for this, ranging from the fear of violence, the need to create their own 
entertainment, to the proliferation of ‘rules’: 
‘I knew a lot of the kids going to Southmead Youth Club but I was 
somebody who would hang about the shops instead of going up to the 
Youth Club…Southmead youth club was a tough youth club, you’d get 
fighting it seemed a lot…but it was just kids basically and kids fight a lot. 
It’s not just like kind of nice and playing Ping-Pong. Kids would thieve. 
They would just be kind of acting anti-socially actually. We didn’t know 
anything else. It was just kind of like living. It was kind of being naughty 
was fun. Do you know what I mean? Cos like being of low income we 
didn’t have cash to spend on going out or anything. To spend on flagons 
of Natch. So being naughty was just kind of entertainment. Depending on 
the age, at a young age kids would do ‘knockout ginger’ and ‘hedge 
hopping’. Just kind of jumping into people’s hedges and being chased off 
by people. It was that kind of stuff as well as vandalism. Vandalism was 
obviously mindless, but I don’t think we knew anything else…it was just 
a laugh. It was just kind of entertainment to us’.421 
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Another respondent specifically referenced the youth club in relation to the build-up 
of tension in the area before the ‘riots’ of 1980: 
‘So it was all this which built up to the kind of…well what’s the fucking 
point? What’s the point? And it was just this, this, the build-up, the 
tension over the years and over the years, over the years…and you go to 
the Club and you can’t do this and you can’t do that. Rules for this, rules 
for that, can’t do that. It was just a powder keg waiting to happen for 
years’422 
Shelia Welsh carried out participant-observation with a group of teenagers in Bethnal 
Green in London’s East End and in her writing touches on some of the themes 
brought up by the respondents: 
‘From the kids’ point of view the attractions of the street are manifold and 
manifest. First and foremost the street means freedom; freedom from 
parental supervision, from the discipline of work or school and from the 
structured leisure of the youth club. The street means movement; 
movement of people, movement of traffic. It provides a familiar but ever 
changing background to “doing nothing”. It suits the milling behaviour so 
characteristic of groups of teenagers. The street provides an almost 
unlimited potential for drama - acting out your own or watching that of 
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other people’423 
The need for children and teenagers to find unmediated spaces without surveillance 
where they could ‘do what they want’ was central to the testimony of the Southmead 
respondents. Brent’s studies of Southmead in the 1990s charted a history of the 
contestation between the youth and the authorities (principally the police) over such 
spaces particularly ‘The Green’ and the nearby Badocks Wood424. A ‘girls gang’ 
wrote in the youth club magazine in 1983 about their experiences in one such space: 
‘We all went down the cornfields for something to do and the coppers 
came down and disturbed us. They would not let us just go down there. 
We all went out of the way of the houses and everything. They said we 
were disturbing all the houses but we weren’t really. We was camping 
there, we had a fire, it was alright. There was no trouble or nothing, and 
they had to come down and spoil it. They all got beat up. The car got 
smashed and everyone had to run for it, but everyone was alright 
afterwards. The coppers beat up a few boys though, pretty bad. But it was 
a bit tight seeing as we had nowhere to go. We went in the field to get out 
of everyone’s way’425 
The key point of these testimonies is that the removal of ‘private’ space at home by 
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structural overcrowding does not mean it can be successfully replaced by mediated 
and monitored spaces in youth clubs, adventure play grounds or other such amenities. 
The Conservative Councillor in Southmead who complained about the lack of usage 
of the youth centre by ‘bored teenagers’ had misunderstood the problem. The 
teenagers wanted to spend their time, in an unmediated place, doing what they 
thought was useful to them. Unfortunately, for the youth of Southmead trying to 
achieve this often involved having to literally fight the police for access to space. 
5.4.7 Encounters with the police 
 
One major similarity shared by the respondents from areas of ‘St. Paul’s’, 
‘Southmead’ and ‘Knowle West’, most of whom were teenagers in 1980, was their 
relationship with the police and their perceptions of how they were treated. In the 
following section are excerpts from different interviews where six respondents 
recount ‘face to face’ meetings on the street with the Avon and Somerset 
Constabulary in the early 1980s. Some of the excerpts are reproduced in length to 
allow some expression of the respondents’ feelings about these interactions. The 
ethnicity and age of the interviewees and the locales in which these incidents occurred 
are purposely not initially stated. 
 
Excerpt 1 
Respondent (G): ‘They were there earlier in the afternoon…provoking people…lot 
of provoking down that end…leaning out of police cars, when they were on patrol and 
that. Saying your mother’s a whore, a Black whore.’ 
Interviewer: ‘Was that normal on the streets?’ 
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Respondent (G): ‘Oh, that was normal, yeah’426  
 
Excerpt 2 
Interviewer: ‘So was it, it was sort of normal, I mean you say you didn’t get nicked 
often, but how normal was it for people to get stopped and searched?’ 
Respondent (J): ‘Oh, it was…they’re on about stop and search nowadays…fucking 
hell we got stopped and searched all the time… Honestly stop…you’re walking up the 
road, stop, search. You know, Panda cars and then they [unclear] Panda cars, stop, 
search [unclear] stop, search, stop search you know.’ 
Interviewer: ‘And what was their attitude, did they give you shit or what? 
Respondent (J): ‘Oh yeah. There, there was some of em… the older coppers right 
they were OK. They were OK. Young coppers were cunts. They really had like a 
problem with you, you know.’427 
 
Excerpt 3 
Respondent (N): ‘Cos they were heavy handed…At least now they might try and talk 
to you. Then they hurt you. They weren’t just sort of like ‘Come on mate we want a 
word with you’. They physically got into your face. Half the time we would go back 
into school afterwards and say ‘Do you know who was in it? Who was there?’ The 
coppers would be arresting somebody for some minor thing and half the time it would 
be someone who was just driving or his car…people were just pulled over for 
ridiculous things. I didn’t drive at the time, but when I did drive you were pulled over. 
This what we thought the norm was. It’s not the pulling over, it’s the way they did it. 
After I left School... ’81 I left. A mate of mine had this ‘socialist’ T shirt on and we 
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went out for few beers and I saw him the following day at work and has face was all 
scraped up and I said ‘What happened to you?’ He said left the pub, walking home, 
vanload of coppers asked where he’d been, ‘What you doing this time of 
night?’…’Pub’. They saw his [T shirt] and they started kicking his shirt up the street, 
then they sort of roughed him up and just arm round the back and used the wall as a 
grater on his face. This a little blond… he’s only about five foot four…five. Of course 
you feel angry, you feel angry at this. But they do this in a group with the vans.’ 
Interviewer: ‘If you was pulled over in a mixed group, would you get targeted more 
because you were mixed race?’ 
Respondent (N): ‘You would get the nice nasty. You get the one who’d say ‘We can 
have you for this, we can do this to you’. ‘You what’s your name’ ‘What’s that again, 
didn’t hear you’ ‘Say that again’. To wind you up, ‘cos you knew, I’m not biting, I’m 
not going to give you the enjoyment of me. ‘Cos I know it’s back of head job, back of 
the van. And that’s the way it was. They ruled the roost, they wanted to show who 
were the masters.’428 
 
Excerpt 4 
Respondent (L): ‘The police were really, really, really…really bad then. You’d be 
walking down the street and they’d just pull you over…‘What you doing, where you 
going, what you got in your pockets, what’s this’ And if you said ‘get out of it’ or 
‘piss off’ or whatever you’d get a slap and a lot of that went on. And sort of being 
crusty punks we were always getting harassed and I think that’s why we got on a lot 
with the Rastas and people like that, ‘cos we were as harassed as they were.’ 
Interviewer: ‘So was it normal practice for them to just give you shit?’ 
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Respondent (L): ‘Yeah, you just got shit all the time no matter where you go…There 
were racial tensions because a lot of Black people did get picked on by the authorities 
and they were like singled out, you know…I can remember being with the Half-
breeds
429
 and I can remember being pulled over and there’d be about three or four 
White punks and three or four Black punks and they’d always pick the Black punks. 
They would call them all sorts of names, sort of Black bastards and all of that…’430 
 
Excerpt 5 
Respondent (F): ‘There might be a bit of jeering as a cop car went by but there was 
nothing serious going on and then they [the police] just started getting really heavy, 
coming over and taking people off, taking ‘em round the back and giving them a bit 
of a slapping. And eventually getting to the point where they would take people in a 
car and drive ‘em off and dump ‘em and that happened a few times. Dump ‘em miles 
away. Dump ‘em up Dundry… A mate of mine [name deleted], he got dumped off in 
Weston-Super-Mare.
431
 He got a taxi from Weston-Super-Mare back to the police 
station and walked in and said ‘Oi mate, there’s a taxi outside for you’ and give them 
the copper’s number. The taxi-driver wanted paying and there was all kinds of 
ructions going on…They were pretty rough and the reaction would normally be that if 
you saw a police car stop you’d leg it, ‘cos you knew you were probably gonna to get 
a kicking or get taken off somewhere.’ 
Interviewer: ‘Were they searching you, would they do stop and search or not? 
Respondent (F): ‘They were searching, yeah. They’d use any excuse. The usual one 
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was ‘Oh, a granny’s just been mugged round the corner and somebody’s done it 
fitting your description’. That was usually the one.’ 
Interviewer: ‘You said you knew a few Black punks. So did you have any 
experiences where the police pulled you as a group?’ 
Respondent (F): ‘Yeah, yeah definitely. I had one experience that just stands 
out…coming out of the Dug Out. Me [the respondent: White male], [name deleted: 
White male] who was from a well-to-do middle class family and [name deleted: Black 
male] who had dreadlocks. We were all seventeen, eighteen, quite young lads and we 
got pulled up by a police van and they got all three of us. And then they separated us 
off. So they took me [White male] and [name deleted: White male] to one way and 
[name deleted: Black male] to the other. And they started searching [name deleted: 
Black male] and then… 
Interviewer: ‘They did that ‘cos he was Black?’ 
Respondent (F): ‘Cos he was Black, definitely ‘cos he was Black. Because 
afterwards they just said ‘Who’s yer nigger mate?’ to us thinking we’d be as racist as 
them. But it was outrageous. So they give him a real searching. They just asked us 
what we were doing. They searched him. So it was blatant that it was a racist thing 
going on’ 
Interviewer: ‘Did you see any other incidents like that?’ 
Respondent (F): ‘Well the other thing was, I used to hang out with [name deleted: 
Black male] quite a lot and if we were out of town or in Clifton or somewhere around 
like that we’d always get stopped and he would be the one that got searched’432 
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Excerpt 6 
Interviewer: ‘Before the ‘riot’ what was the relationship with the police then?’ 
Respondent (E): ‘It was terrible you couldn’t trust the police. As a youth personally 
at the time we didn’t realise how…you look back and you think that was like the 
‘good old days’ but there was some nasty things that went with it. As a Black man 
you knew where you stood when you talked to certain people. Police would stop you 
and call you a ‘Black bastard’ and they made you know how they felt. There was no 
hiding it, not like now where it is all subtle and every ting. And so now when I look 
back and… I didn’t realise I was going to miss those days where at least you knew 
what you was dealing with’ 
Interviewer: ‘What about ‘stop and search’ was that common?’ 
Respondent (E): ‘I was stopped by the police for ‘walking aggressively’. We got 
stopped by the police for trying to get to the cinema. Back then they treat we like crap. 
People was getting stopped like that all the time’ 
Interviewer: ‘How much did they do it in St. Paul’s, was it more dangerous outside 
of St. Paul’s?’ 
Respondent (E): ‘Back then just the journey between Easton and St. Paul’s…there 
was a good possibility that you would be stopped. Anywhere outside…most 
definitely. It was on the cards, always on the cards…they would stitch you up, they 
would put something on you quite easily, you couldn’t trust them. We weren’t the 
only people who didn’t trust the police, I don’t think anyone did’433 
 
These six recollections from the early 80s came from the oral history respondents 
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(0:26:26). 
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listed in Table 22.  
 
Excerpt Respondent 
Home locale in 
Bristol in 1980 
Youth 
Sub-culture 
Age 
April 
1980 
Ethnicity 
1 G St. Paul’s - 30s White 
2 J Southmead Ska 17 White 
3 N Southmead Ska [RudeBoy] 17 Mixed Race 
4 L St. Paul’s Punk 16 White 
5 F Knowle West Punk 15 White 
6 E St. Paul’s Rastafarian434 16 Black 
Table 22: Home locale, youth sub-culture, age and ethnicity of a sample of the oral history 
respondents quoted in excerpts concerning the relationship with the police in Bristol 1980 
 
When these respondents were interviewed and bearing in mind the effect of a lapse of 
thirty years in their memories, these particular experiences were vivid and the anger 
still visible, particularly in the younger interviewees. Some claimed that certain 
unhappy memories of their interactions with the constabulary on the street in the early 
1980s had stayed with them for the rest of their lives and had played a major role in 
forming their views of the police as adults. The overall corroboration of experiences is 
clear despite the fact that only two of the respondents knew each other and neither 
group had ever lived in the other areas under study. 
 
Several points are of particular interest in the testimonies. There was an explicit 
recognition at the time amongst the White respondents of the specific and unequal 
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 The classing of Rastafarianism as a ‘youth sub-culture’ rather than a ‘religion’ in this case is not 
intended to detract from the latter category. Instead it reflects the important influence it had upon Black 
youth in the late 1970s. Its very lack of a central orthodoxy and hierarchy was important in its adoption 
and mutation by wider sections of Black youth and in its subsequent influence on other sub-cultures 
such as Punk. See E. Cashmore, Rastaman: The Rastafarian Movement in England. (London: 
Counterpoint, 1983) and E. E. Cashmore, The Rastafarians. (London: Minority Rights Group, 1984). 
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treatment of Black youth by some police officers despite sharing similar ages, sub-
culture or home locality (excerpts 4 and 5). It also appears that in some cases racist 
abuse from the predominantly White police officers was used to denigrate both Black 
and White subjects, thereby, in the eyes of some police officers ‘relegating’ Whites 
living in areas of mixed ethnicity to the status of Blacks (excerpt 1).  
 
It is significant that all the respondents describe the behaviour of the police as being 
the ‘norm’ rather than just a single bad experience. The third respondent was 
particularly disturbed by recalling that in the 70s and 80s in Southmead he and his 
friends believed that such behaviours of the police force at the time were quite 
normal, that they were ‘routine’ and ‘what the police did’. Whilst some respondents 
were clearly aware at the time that some of these behaviours were ‘wrong’, others 
appear to have been socialised through their childhood experiences to accept them as 
the ‘norm’. The same respondent was visibly moved by recalling his need to show 
restraint in the face of (racist) abuse from police officers in order to avoid the 
inevitable consequences of detention or violence (excerpt 3). This still created an 
intense feeling of repressed anger thirty years later.  
 
The fourth respondent (and several others who are not quoted here) argued that the 
‘good’ relationship between predominantly Black (Rastafarians) and White (Punks) in 
St. Paul’s was partly derived from the similarity of their treatment on the street by the 
police. Most of the White punk respondents agreed with this analysis and interestingly 
one added that he felt safer in St. Paul’s than where he lived in Knowle West: 
‘I didn’t really get any hassle from police in St. Paul’s, it was more 
Knowle West ‘cos they knew they could get away with it whereas I think 
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it was a cultural thing, a West Indian gets arrested they tend to make more 
of a fuss whereas a British person would just say OK, alright. I knew…the 
SUS stuff was going on and a lot of [Black] people were getting stopped 
and searched for marijuana. [But in St. Paul’s] if a Black guy got held up 
by the police, then suddenly a crowd would form, whereas that wouldn’t 
really happen in Knowle, you’d be on your own. That’s why you would 
tend to leg it’435 
The relative safety provided by the contested streets of St. Paul’s was not of course 
mirrored outside of the area. Several respondents (excerpts 5 and 6) noted that being 
Black or consorting with Black punk and ‘Rasta’ friends made them a specific target 
for the police outside of St. Paul’s, particularly in the wealthier areas of the city.  
 
Despite the overall animosity to the police based on their individual or collective 
experiences the second respondent from Southmead compared the acceptable 
behaviour of the older police officers to that of the younger members of the force.  
This suggested that not all the police were behaving in the same manner and that 
some individual older officers had formed, albeit limited, relationships with the 
youths they were ‘policing’436. 
 
Finally, the accounts suggest it was not necessarily what police officers did that was 
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 This was backed up by another respondent who stated that certain individual older police officers 
who were taking the role of ‘Community Policemen’ were considered to be ‘OK’. In several of the 
interviews these officers were even praised as being ‘compassionate’. However, others complained that 
these officers were ‘nice to them’ because they were trying to get them to inform on others. 
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problematic, especially with routine policing activities; it was the way that they 
behaved in relation to the respondents that mattered most. Most of the respondents 
claimed that lying, violence, planting evidence and even kidnap were a fairly routine 
part of the policing of youths in multi-ethnic St. Paul’s and the mainly White estates 
of Southmead and Knowle West. These claims were backed up by another more 
shocking testimony from a teenage Punk who attended the main male comprehensive 
school in Knowle West: 
 
Respondent (K): ‘To give an idea what policing was like in Knowle West at the time 
[laughs] and I’m not a crim…although I’m from Knowle West I’m not particularly 
criminally inclined or anything…so I was really shocked when we had our police 
Liaison officer or whatever he was, did a big speech in front of us all. In front of the 
teachers as well…’ 
Interviewer: ‘So that was like assembly, was it?’ 
Respondent (K): ‘Yeah, in assembly. I suppose I still had doubts that you know…I 
still didn’t quite believe that all cops were assholes. Although you had to believe that 
‘cos you were a punk. I didn’t really believe that, I thought maybe he’s alright. But 
the thing that I remember is that he [the police liaison officer] said ‘It’s too much 
trouble to go through the hassle of arresting you lot [the assembled pupils]. What I’d 
do is take you down a back alley and beat the shit out of you’. And…[laughs]…even 
the teachers were shocked at it, ‘cos I think they were expecting a different kind of 
speech…[laughs]. I remember at the time thinking ‘fucking hell’, I am really glad 
we’ve moved from Knowle West to Knowle Park and I’m out of this’437 
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 Oral History File K_09-09-2010 (0:09:48). 
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The respondent added that this was one of the defining moments in his ‘politicisation’ 
as a teenager. He realised that the whole ‘community’ of pupils at Merrywood Boys 
were being treated as a criminal totality with minors and juveniles being openly 
threatened with illegal violence by a representative of the ‘state’. This incident he 
argued changed his perception of the police and their behaviour in areas like Knowle 
West, something that stayed with him for the rest of his life.  
 
5.4.8 The role of the police 
 
Having assessed actual street encounters between the respondents and the police force 
in the period under study it is worth considering the respondents’ views on how their 
neighbourhoods were policed and what role the police force were taking where they 
lived. The following passage is one respondent’s perception of the policing of 
Southmead in the early 1980s: 
 
Respondent (K): ‘There wasn’t any contact with the police. The police would just 
view us with disdain all the time’ 
Interviewer: ‘What would you say about the word ‘occupation’ or an ‘occupying 
force’ as a definition of what was going on?’ 
Respondent (K): ‘Yeah, I think the police’s job at that time was to see that we was 
behaving. To see that we was not kind of being naughty basically. All people, not just 
kids. All people. Adults as well. That they was behaving themselves. And so that was 
the job of the police. To keep an eye on us. And it’s fucking insulting isn’t it? It’s 
insulting that these people are being paid, that these people we’ve got nothing in 
common with, that have got nothing to do with Southmead. They don’t know us and 
they don’t like us, it seemed. They was coming in seeing that we was behaving. It’s a 
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bit of an insult. So ‘occupying’? Kind of, yeah. But not ‘occupying’… almost kind of 
like jailing. Do you know what I mean? Kind of warders in a jail’438 
 
This resident’s bleak picture of the policing of Southmead estate throws up several 
important observations. Rather than feeling the presence of the police as an 
‘occupation’ he instead characterises the relationship as being closer to incarceration 
with the ‘jail’ patrolled by ‘warders’ in Panda cars who no one knew and whose task 
was to watch the population as a whole, not just the ‘criminals’ or even the ‘young’.  
 
The role of the police in Southmead was questioned by several respondents who 
outlined a dichotomy between protecting the community from crime and controlling 
the whole population of the estate. For many the former role was defunct as the police 
were not part of the community and therefore were unable to successfully carry out 
this task.  One respondent recalled the building of the nearby Southmead police 
station in the late 1970s and the ‘community’s’ view on this: 
 
Respondent (N): ‘The police were the police, you didn’t expect any kind of fairness’ 
Interviewer: ‘That was a general feeling around where you lived?’ 
Respondent (N): ‘Yeah, oh yeah. I mean it really felt when they built this police 
station on Southmead Road it was to monitor the ‘Mead’ as such...They said it was to 
support the community and all that sort of stuff.’ 
Interviewer: ‘But that’s not what people felt or not what some people felt?’ 
Respondent (N): ‘The thing is if you grew up in Southmead you knew who all the 
scallys were, you knew who all the druggies were, you knew who all the thieves were, 
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you knew who the ones were who were likely to cause trouble in your neighbourhood, 
your direct neighbourhood. So like when your moped went missing you went round to 
someone’s house and said ‘give it back’. You call the police. What would happen? 
Nothing. You dealt with it yourself.’439 
 
These readings of the observation and policing of the community of Southmead as a 
totality rather than being connected to solving crimes through interactive relationships 
and selective surveillance, interestingly correlates with the changes in policing 
policies for some inner city communities with ethnic minority populations in the late 
1970s. In assessing the changes in Metropolitan police strategies in that period, one 
critic argued that: 
‘The extension of the containment policy under Sir David McNee’s 
commissionership is important not for the local conflicts which resisted it 
but for the manner in which it marked a departure from a policing strategy 
based on the need to combat particular types of crime – burglary or 
‘mugging’. Instead the direction shifted towards area-based strategies 
which assume that any inhabitant of a high-crime district could be treated 
as a criminal’440 
These significant policy changes were understood by some commentators as being the 
result of a shift from post-war consensus policing of a ‘liberal-democratic’ society 
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 McNee was the Commissioner of the Metropolitan police from 1977-82. Gilroy, There Ain't no 
Black in the Union Jack : The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation, p.98.  
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towards the more coercive strategies of an  ‘authoritarian democracy’441. This, it was 
argued, was a product of the industrial and political struggles of the 1970s, which led 
to the reorganisation, centralisation and closer working relationships of the various 
state security services, from the Constabulary to MI5. Another major influence on the 
tactics employed by the police forces was the experience of the conflict in Northern 
Ireland in that era
442
. It is interesting to note that most analyses of the move towards 
criminalizing whole communities concentrated on inner city areas of mixed ethnicity, 
which appeared to bear the brunt of the new style policing tactics in the mid to late 
1970s. However, little research or writing was addressed to investigating the effects of 
these strategies on mainly White working class communities, which were often not in 
the inner city, but in many cases, were situated in large peripheral council estates. So 
the racialisation of crime and community (and its critiques) may have inadvertently 
concealed changes in policing of some White communities in the period.  
 
To an extent, debating the degree to which more coercive and ‘area-based’ policing 
were applied to particular ‘Black’ and ‘White’ communities is missing the point. 
Instead, the fact that there was a disparity in the way some areas were policed in the 
1970s and 80s is the more salient feature to be concerned with. Little work appears to 
have been undertaken to assess if there were differences in the policing strategies and 
tactics undertaken in say White working-class and nearby middle-class areas of a city. 
Certainly, the respondents quoted had a perception based on their experiences on the 
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street and where they lived that there was a difference. Understandably, such 
disparities have the potential for breeding resentment, which has a close relationship 
to feelings of ‘branding’ by class and locality discussed previously. If there was a 
combined class and ethnicity based policing ‘apartheid’ operating in Bristol in the 
period then it clearly would have had a part to play in the disturbances that exploded 
in 1980. 
 
Another consequence of the introduction of ‘area-based’ policing strategies was the 
effect on the perception of police officers that were actually on the front line. It is 
clear that, for example, some police officers held racially prejudiced views at this time 
but what is not so obvious is the impact on them of the racialisation of criminality in 
the 1970s
443
, which occurred in most police forces dealing with major urban areas. In 
contrast to the racial prejudice of some police officers against visible or perceived 
ethnic groups, the new institutional policy of targeting ‘high-crime’ areas allowed 
whole communities to be ‘lumped together’ regardless of their actual ethnic make-up. 
This meant that an area that was explicitly categorised (or implicitly coded) by police 
policy as ‘Black’ and problematic444 in practice included everyone, whether Black, 
Asian or White. White residents of these locales were thus ‘tainted’ by the very fact 
that they lived in a designated ‘Black area’. These residents were labelled by some 
police officers, in classic racist terminology, as being ‘degenerate’ because they lived 
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in such areas and consorted with ‘Black’ people.  
 
Similar, though perhaps less explicit, behaviours could also result through the 
institutional categorisation of particular White working class areas as ‘problematic’. 
One of the oral history respondents from Southmead made it clear that he felt that the 
Constabulary showed ‘disdain’ for the ‘Meaders’ as a whole and pointed out that the 
police officers neither lived in the area nor were known to the residents. The attitudes 
of police officers to the resident population are of course vital in achieving any level 
of ‘policing by consent’ and it is arguable that the turn towards ‘area-based’ rather 
than ‘crime-based’ policing in the late 1970s actually encouraged the dissemination of 
reactionary views about particular communities that were already held by those 
officers. As was pointed out by the oral history respondents from Southmead, the 
‘branding’ of their area of Bristol, was considered by them to be a general view in 
Bristol. Police officers, who on the whole were ‘not of Southmead’, would of course 
have been subjected to these ‘outsider’ opinions. It is quite likely that ‘area-based’ 
policing strategies gave these views greater credibility and allowed them to become 
more explicit amongst police officers on the ‘front line’. 
 
Another facet of the policing of their estate that was recalled by the Southmead 
respondents was the ‘faceless’ nature of the activity in the 1970s. The move from beat 
policing on foot in the 1950s and 60s to the vehicular patrols of the 1970s clearly had 
an impact upon the potential for interaction between the police and the policed. The 
very fact of the re-emergence of ‘community policing’, arguably as a response to the 
disorders of the 1980s, provides evidence that some police forces were trying to re-
establish an interaction, which had been lost at some point in post-war history. It 
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should be noted, however, that the nostalgia for consensus policing which was 
prevalent was often based on mythologized constructions of the past. 
 
Despite the problems of establishing if things had been different in the past, what was 
explicit in the testimonies of the Southmead and Knowle West respondents was the 
physical and psychological separation between the police and the policed in 1980.  
The situation appeared to have degenerated further in St. Paul’s. Both respondents and 
police in this area were aware of a different kind of community response to ‘routine’ 
police activity, which sometimes involved collective interventions by ‘crowds’ in 
reaction to ‘Stop and Search’, arrests or raids. 
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6.0 What Happened in the ‘Bristol Riots’? 
 
‘A policeman... threatened to arrest a youth 
who replied defiantly ‘Arrest my ras!’’ 445 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The following chapter is concerned with generating comprehensive narratives of the 
disturbances in Bristol in St. Paul’s on April 2nd, Southmead on April 3rd-4th and 
Knowle West on 4
th
-5
th
 April 1980. The three episodes of disorder present 
contradictory difficulties with regard to the analysis of primary and secondary 
historical sources. The St. Paul’s disturbance became iconic in the popular memory 
for several reasons. Primarily it was perceived to be the first major outbreak of urban 
‘rioting’ on mainland Britain for a considerable period of time, which was not directly 
instigated by formal political protest
446
. Although this view is considered to be 
incorrect by many authors, in that it ignored violent disturbances centred around raids 
on clubs and cafés frequented by ethnic minorities in the 1970s
447
 as well as 
significant disorder at large public events such as the Notting Hill Carnival in 1975 
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and 1976
448
, the wider perception was that the St. Paul’s disturbance was ‘something 
new’.  
 
As a result of the intense media interest, the subsequent political debates in local and 
central government and the involvement of local and national bodies such as the 
Commission for Racial Equality, there is a considerable volume of both primary and 
secondary source material available for study. In contrast, the Southmead and Knowle 
West incidents received sparse attention in the local media, no national coverage and 
little or no interest from local government bodies. Consequently primary sources 
concerning these events are thin at best and secondary sources are virtually non-
existent. 
 
In this study of the St. Paul’s disturbance of 2nd April 1980 newly available source 
material such as oral history interviews, photographs, television footage and hitherto 
restricted police documents have been gathered to supplement the existing primary 
and secondary sources. Furthermore, it was clear from a close reading of all the 
secondary sources that certain aspects of the disturbance had been under-researched or 
ignored
449
. Of particular interest were the existing social networks from which much 
of the ‘crowd’ was composed, the phase of the disturbance after the withdrawal of the 
police, the activities of participants during this time and the involvement of non-
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residents who travelled to the area to take part in the disorder. Consequently the 
research activity in this account of the St. Paul’s disturbance of April 1980 was angled 
toward these under-researched areas and utilises a fusion of quantitative and 
qualitative analyses in an attempt to illuminate them. 
 
The Southmead and Knowle West disturbances, which followed immediately after the 
St. Paul’s incident, provided quite different difficulties with regard to research and the 
construction of a narrative. The lack of formal primary sources and the absence of any 
substantial written accounts propelled the researcher towards the construction of 
wholly new narratives for the incidents in these areas rather than the critique, 
modification and correction of existing accounts as in the case of St. Paul’s. The 
description of the incidents presented here is essentially based upon an amalgamation 
of newly recorded oral history accounts with the sparse primary sources (mostly local 
newspapers). In the absence of significant detailed data from police and other 
authorities the narrative is clearly driven by the perceptions and memories of 
participants from Southmead and Knowle West. However, this in itself provides an 
interesting and valuable approach to constructing the narratives of ‘riot’. 
 
6.2 The St. Paul’s disturbance: April 2
nd
 1980 
6.2.1 Introduction 
 
Michael Keith in his analysis of the urban disturbances in London in 1981
450
 made the 
concept of ‘symbolic locations’ central to his study. These locations, in particular the 
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so-called ‘frontlines’451 he argued were sites of confrontation of between the 
authorities and the local community, being simultaneously perceived as potential ‘no 
go’ areas by the police and as places of sanctuary by many of the local residents. 
Within ‘frontlines’ lay specific clubs, cafés and pubs452, which became symbolic in 
themselves partly through their reputation for social activities (parties, gigs or ‘hang-
outs’) as well as being locations for obtaining soft drugs, which in the early 80s were 
typically cannabis resin or marijuana. They also gained a wider fame from the regular 
raids that were carried out by the police, sometimes resisted in varying degree by the 
customers and nearby local community. 
 
In St. Paul’s the ‘frontline’ was Grosvenor Road453 (see Figure 18) running from the 
junction with the main thoroughfare, Ashley Road to Brighton Street. Within 
Grosvenor Road there were two main ‘legal’ symbolic locations, the Inkerman public 
house and on the opposite side of the road a few metres away the Black and White 
café. The latter premises had been raided several times by the Avon and Somerset 
police ‘A’ division454 and its proprietor Bertram Wilkes had lost his licence to sell 
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alcohol in 1979. A few weeks before the raid in April 1980, a similar ‘operation’ had 
been carried out on the ‘Shady Grove’ café455 (a similar contentious site) on Ashley 
Road a few hundred yards from the ‘frontline’ (see Figure 18). 
 
6.2.2 The ‘trigger’: Raid on the Black and White café: 2.40pm-
4.30pm 
 
On March 26
th 
1980 the Chief Superintendent of Avon and Somerset Constabulary 
authorised an operational order
456
 for a ‘raid’ on the Black and White café with two 
explicit aims, ‘to discover evidence of illegal sale, supply or offer to supply of 
intoxicating liquor. To seize such intoxicants and vessels containing same.’ and ‘to 
discover evidence of illegal possession or use of controlled drugs and arrest those 
persons involved’. Interestingly it was noted in the operational order that the Black 
and White café was a licensed ‘late night refreshment house’ and that ‘persons found 
on the premises NOT being in possession of intoxicants can state they are on the 
premises for a lawful purpose’, something which would seem self-evident to most 
members of the public who fraternise cafés. The symbolic nature of the Black and 
White café is the sub-text to this operational order, as it was necessary to inform the 
policemen and women who were going to carry out the raid that not everyone in the 
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café was ‘fair game’. Similarly in block capitals and underlined was the statement that 
‘BUT ONLY PERSONS FOUND IN POSSESSION OF DRINK WILL BE, (i) taken 
to a reporting officer and (ii) arrested if name and address not known or cannot be 
verified’. The weight given to these statements suggests that the Chief Superintendent 
was struggling with a problem of discipline and feared the punitive behaviour of his 
officers in dealing with a premises where according to the order ‘cannabis is openly 
smoked’ and whose supposedly numerous patrons were ‘mainly West Indian men and 
white prostitutes’. The operational order is thus contradictory in that it sets the target 
up as a ‘den of vice’ and an affront to the police (it was certainly well known by 
reputation in the Avon and Somerset Constabulary ‘A’ division) but then informs the 
participants in the ‘raid’ that they can’t arrest everybody merely because they are 
present, even if they are ‘West Indians and prostitutes’. It is certainly questionable 
that it was routine police practice (or even legally justified
457
) to arrest customers in a 
café who happened to have alcohol in their possession and refused to give their details 
after being, note, ‘taken to a reporting officer’. 
. 
                                                 
457
 Defence lawyers at the ‘riotous assembly’ trial of 1981 pointed out that ‘they (the police) had no 
legal right to document innocent people nor ask them to wait outside the café’. Joshua, Wallace and 
Booth, To Ride the Storm: The 1980 Bristol 'Riot' and the State, p.76. 
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Figure 18: St. Paul’s ‘neighbourhood’ 2nd April 1980: The ‘raid’ on the Black and White café458 
                                                 
458
 The maps underlying Figures 18-21 are derived from Ibid. Figure 2 pp.66-67. 
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The evidently serious nature of the ‘raid’ was echoed in the operational order by the 
planning regarding manpower, vehicles and logistics. In all there were eight teams of 
police officers involved each with a specific role and designated call sign. These are 
listed in Table 23 and located on Figure 18. 
 
Table 23: Roster of police teams for the Black and White café raid, St. Paul’s April 2nd 1980 
 
In all more than forty police officers were planned to be involved in the operation, 
with thirty-seven at or in the vicinity of the café itself. How many officers were 
actually involved in the raid was particularly contentious in the days after the events 
of April 2
nd
 1980.  In a press conference
459
 the morning following the ‘raid’ and the 
disturbances, the Chief Constable of the Avon and Somerset police Brian Weigh, 
made several careful statements suggesting that only twelve officers had been directly 
involved in the ‘raid’ on the Black and White café, although he admitted (an 
unnamed) number were held ‘in reserve’. The Chief Constable amended this 
statement in a report to the Secretary of State almost a month after the event stating; 
                                                 
459
 Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Press Conference Following the Disturbances in St. Paul's: New 
Bridewell: 11.00am Thursday April 3rd 1980. 
Call Sign No. Police 
Officers 
Task Location 
Zulu 1 2 Observation of café (plain clothes) Black and White café  
Zulu 2 12 Raid team Black and White café 
Zulu 3 6 Street control Grosvenor Rd. - Campbell 
St.- Denbigh St. 
Zulu 4 8 Drugs team for raid (plain clothes) Black and White café 
Zulu 5 6 Task force back-up unit Portland Square 
Zulu 6 2 Dog handlers Portland Square 
Zulu 7 Unknown C.I.D. ‘scenes of crime’ team Unknown 
Zulu 8 Unknown Prisoner reception team Trinity Rd. police station 
Zulu 99 1 Overall command Black and White café 
Total 37+   
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‘20 officers from the division covering the St. Paul’s area, including 2 of 
the local community constables, went, under the command of a 
superintendent, to the café. Of these officers, one sergeant and 6 men were 
members of the Drug Squad and, together with the officer in charge, were 
in plain clothes: the remainder were in uniform. A further 6 officers and 
an Inspector were in the road outside to control traffic and anyone who 
assembled. No difficulties were expected in the execution of the warrant, 
therefore the manpower involved was kept to a minimum so that the 
operation could be regarded as low key’460 
The number of police officers directly involved in this ‘low key’ operation had thus 
more than doubled from twelve to twenty-seven. He went on to add that: 
‘Two dog handlers, with dogs trained to search for drugs, attended the 
briefing and were then deployed in reserve in the Portland Square area 
with instructions to remain away from the scene unless otherwise directed. 
They could not be seen by people near the Black and White café…’ 
Although Weigh makes the point that the ‘dog handlers’ could not be seen from the 
café he then mentions another ‘reserve’ of six officers that are not specifically located 
in his statement. Taking all these groups into account, there are now a total of at least 
thirty-five police officers present for the ‘raid’, more than tripling his original estimate 
                                                 
460
 Secretary of State for the Home Department, Serious Disturbances in St. Paul's, Bristol on 2 April 
1980: A Memorandum Placed in the Library of the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, Following the Report made to Him by the Chief Constable of the Avon and 
Somerset Constabulary. (Bristol Record Office 43129, 1980), Box 105: P ST PA B1. 
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at the press conference and approaching the evidence provided by the operational 
order.   
 
The ‘Black and White’ was a small café, estimated to be approximately five metres 
square, the size of a front room
461
. When several
462
 drug squad officers in plain 
clothes entered the café on the afternoon of 2
nd
 April 1980 at approximately 2.40pm
463
 
to undergo their duty of ‘observation’, there were a number of customers and the 
proprietor Bertram Wilkes present. The exact figure is somewhat of a mystery, as 
again police evidence varied from twelve to thirty
464
. The most reasonable estimate 
seems to be about fifteen customers were present mostly young Black men, whom it 
was stated were peacefully ‘playing dominoes, drinking soft drinks and chatting’465. 
After the Drug Squad officers had ordered some coffees and observed the customers 
                                                 
461
  Joshua, Wallace and Booth, To Ride the Storm: The 1980 Bristol 'Riot' and the State, p.75. 
462
 The number of plain-clothes policemen who entered the ‘Black and White’ prior to the ‘raid’ proper 
varies in the accounts from being completely ignored in the Chief Constable’s statement to the 
Secretary of State for the Home Department; Secretary of State for the Home Department, Serious 
Disturbances in St. Paul's, Bristol on 2 April 1980: A Memorandum Placed in the Library of the House 
of Commons by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Following the Report made to Him by 
the Chief Constable of the Avon and Somerset Constabulary to two, Reicher, The St. Paul’s Riot: An 
Explanation of the Limits of Crowd Action in Terms of a Social Identity Model, p.190 or three, 
Stephenson, Report of Bristol Disturbances: April 2nd, 1980, p.1. 
463
 The question of exact timing is problematic as police evidence varied considerably on this point. 
However, the most accurate timing appears to be from the evidence provided by Paul Stephenson of the 
Fieldwork and Liaison Division of the Commission for Racial Equality. Ibid. p.1. 
464
 Joshua, Wallace and Booth, To Ride the Storm: The 1980 Bristol 'Riot' and the State, p.76. 
465
 The estimate of numbers comes from Stephenson. The statement of the peaceful nature of the café at 
the time of the raid comes from the evidence of a policewoman present. Ibid. p.75. 
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for a few minutes, the ‘raid’ commenced with the arrival of at least twelve other 
uniformed and plain clothes police officers from the Zulu 2 and 4 teams. Again the 
exact numbers of police officers who actually entered the café at the initiation of the 
operation are unclear varying between twelve or fourteen in the accounts
466
. 
According to the plan in the operational briefing, the potential numbers could have 
been up to twenty if the Drug squad in plain clothes (Zulu 4, numbering eight 
officers) and the uniformed police team (Zulu 2, numbering 12 officers) are 
combined
467
. In either case it appears the customers were almost outnumbered by the 
‘raiders’, with the small café filled with more than thirty customers and police officers 
in total. 
 
After declaring the nature of the raid to the owner of the café, the police immediately 
arrested one man for drinking beer and after searching the customers (who were all 
found to be ‘clean’) ordered them (some were protesting ‘at some of the remarks and 
heavy handed behaviour of the police’468) out of the premises onto the street outside. 
At this point, a few minutes after the start of the ‘raid’, Superintendent Arkell made a 
decision to call in his reserve, the ‘A’ division Task Force who it appears were not 
                                                 
466
 The sources are Reicher, The St. Paul’s Riot: An Explanation of the Limits of Crowd Action in 
Terms of a Social Identity Model, p.191, Bristol Disturbances and Stephenson, Report of Bristol 
Disturbances: April 2nd, 1980, p.1 respectively. 
467
 Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Operational Order: Black and White Cafe, 27 Grosvenor Rd., St. 
Paul's: 26th March 1980, App. A. 
468
 Stephenson, Report of Bristol Disturbances: April 2nd, 1980, p.1. Gladys Wilkes (the wife of the 
proprietor) an eyewitness to the events also stated that the police ‘started pulling them (the customers) 
about and they did not give any reason whatsoever. I think the police over-reacted.’ Bristol 
Disturbances. 
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located out of sight in Portland Square as planned in the operational briefing, but were 
actually in view of the café at the Inkerman public house less than 100 yards away 
(see Figure 18). They drove their van to the café and then proceeded to help search it 
for stolen property (without a warrant). Arkell’s reason for calling the Task Force and 
their van to the café was to remove over a hundred crates of beer that the raid team 
had discovered on the premises.  
 
Inside and directly outside the café there were now approximately thirty or more 
police officers
469
 along with a crowd of customers and onlookers. The police removed 
the crates of beer from adjoining rooms of the premises to the café, then carried them 
through the crowd gathered outside, stacking them on the pavement. The crates were 
then loaded into the awaiting Task Force ‘A’ van. As this removal operation was 
taking place, the café proprietor Bertram Wilkes was arrested
470
 for possession of 
drugs and sales of illegal alcohol and, significantly, handcuffed and held in the café. A 
second prisoner, the person who had been arrested for being in possession of alcohol, 
was held in a police vehicle outside the café for over half an hour in full view of the 
crowd, before being driven away for questioning
471
. 
 
                                                 
469
 This was corroborated by Gladys Wilkes who said that the raid involved ‘about thirty’ police 
officers. Ibid.. 
470
 Joshua and Wallace note that ‘this was quite unnecessary as he was known to the police and the 
community and there was little fear of his disappearing or using violence. He could have been 
summoned to appear at the police station rather than arrested and police awareness of this led every 
senior officer in court to deny ordering his arrest, and ordering him to be handcuffed’. Joshua, Wallace 
and Booth, To Ride the Storm: The 1980 Bristol 'Riot' and the State, pp.76-7. 
471
 Ibid. pp.76. 
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Several key drivers for the disturbance that was to follow were now in place. The 
operation to remove the large amount of ‘illegal’ alcohol from the café in full view of 
and directly through a gathering crowd took over an hour
472
 (between approximately 
3.00pm and 4.30pm) and involved a significant number of police officers including 
the ‘reserve’. During this time school children from the nearby Cabot School, who 
had just broken up for the end of the spring term, filtered directly past the scene, 
taking their exciting information into the wider community of St. Paul’s473. More and 
more passers-by (it was approaching the rush hour) stopped to watch the police 
operation, some observed the events from their flats in Burnell Drive, which 
overlooked the ‘Black and White’ and others, on nearby streets in St. Paul’s, heard of 
the events and made their way down to Grosvenor Road. 
 
It is worthwhile considering the perception of the gathering crowds on Grosvenor 
Road as they watched a large number of police officers in plain clothes or in uniform 
surrounding the Black and White café and systematically loading numerous crates of 
beer into their van. For many, the removal of Wilke’s licence to sell alcohol the 
previous year due to police objections had been a clear case of racial 
                                                 
472
 An Avon and Somerset police officer who was in the Black and White café during the raid stated 
that, in his opinion, the key error made during the operation concerned the decision to move the large 
amount of alcohol stored at the ‘Black and White’ in full view of a crowd for over an hour, rather than 
rely on photographic evidence (notes from an unrecorded interview by the author March 2010). 
473
 Reicher, The St. Paul’s Riot: An Explanation of the Limits of Crowd Action in Terms of a Social 
Identity Model, p.191. 
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discrimination
474
. This particular raid now appeared to be outright robbery, an 
organised operation to deprive the ‘community’ of their beer ‘for a party over 
Easter’475. As sections of the crowd around the café entrance became more vociferous 
in their attempts to stop the removal of the crates of beer, the decision was made to 
move the handcuffed Bertram Wilkes held inside the ‘Black and White’ to Trinity 
Road police station. Sometime between 4.00 and 4.30pm, Wilkes was escorted 
through the crowd to a police vehicle and driven away, further agitating those 
gathered on Grosvenor Road. The stage was thus set for a confrontation. 
 
6.2.3 The first phase of the disturbance: 4.30pm-5.45pm 
 
The first phase of the disturbance was characterised by a series of simultaneous bouts 
of violence against the police in the streets in the direct vicinity of the Black and 
White café. These attacks were initiated by grouplets from the crowd originally 
watching the events at the café, often in reaction to the behaviour of the police and 
were interspersed by lulls in the action.  
 
It is not explicitly clear why the vociferous crowd outside the ‘Black and White’ 
became violent
476
, but the exit from the café of four officers of the Drug Squad
477
 in 
                                                 
474
 See Bristol Evening Post 03-04-1980 and Ras Judah who recalled ‘The fact that it [the Black and 
White café] had not received a licence to sell alcohol was seen as another indication of discrimination 
towards African-Caribbean people’. Statement to Karen Garvey of the Museum of Bristol 26-02-2009. 
475
 Statement by Bertram Wilkes in Bristol Evening Post 03-04-1980. 
476
 The narrative contained in most of the secondary and some primary sources refers to the ripping of 
the trousers of a Black youth as the ‘trigger’ for violence. However, the new research evidence suggests 
that this was a convenient story for many participants and commentators to avoid any connection with 
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plain clothes sometime after the removal of Wilkes appears to be the moment where 
the event began to escalate into serious disorder. One oral history respondent who was 
in the crowd outside the café recalled the moment in detail: 
 
Respondent (E): ‘And eventually the door [of the café] opened and that must be 
when they decided they were gonna start, they’re ready now, they’d got everything 
bagged up and they gonna take it away. And they started coming out with the drinks 
or whatever, the goodies, the loot…’ 
Interviewer: ‘Cos they were lifting all the beer out they found in the back weren’t 
they…was there a van there they were loading it into?’ 
Respondent (E): ‘Yeah, they was loading, they was loading, doing the chain thing 
walking out…and that’s when how I remember it is eventually one of them came out 
and he had what would have been like a bread tray…and that had the weed man and 
everybody was just get kinda frenzied then. A frenzy when they seen the weed 
coming out, ‘cos drinks is drinks, but weed is kind of another ting. An everybody 
kinda start pushing and it got kinda like a scrum…’ 
Interviewer: ‘Yeah, and they were trying to get out of it?’ 
                                                                                                                                            
the open removal of a small amount of soft drugs by the plainclothes officers, which probably was the 
precipitator. 
477
 The Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary stated that only two drug squad officers 
left the café in his report to the Secretary of State. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Serious 
Disturbances in St. Paul's, Bristol on 2 April 1980: A Memorandum Placed in the Library of the House 
of Commons by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Following the Report made to Him by 
the Chief Constable of the Avon and Somerset Constabulary, p.2. However, this report was undermined 
by the corroborative evidence given by four drug squad officers Joshua, Wallace and Booth, To Ride 
the Storm: The 1980 Bristol 'Riot' and the State, p.79. 
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Respondent (E): ‘They were trying to get out but people now is prevented it. And at 
some point some guy walked out of there as well that someone in the crowd 
recognised as someone who had walked in there obviously in plainclothes to purchase 
weed. Just to obviously spot the ting and realised that he was a part of it and he was 
police…and they run him down man and give him some kicks man. I remember when 
he was running across the green, it was like a leopard chasing a gazelle or whatever 
and they just trip him up and give him some ras clat licks and kicks right there, know 
what I mean. That is what I recall’478 
 
The plainclothes officers were attempting to return to their vehicle, which was parked 
nearby in Ludlow Close out of sight of the Black and White café. According to their 
statements, on leaving the café they walked through a crowd of two hundred or so 
people (mostly Black males), from which a smaller group of forty to sixty youths 
suddenly detached and began to chase them
479
. Witnesses in the crowd claimed that 
the drug squad officers had ‘struck out calling the crowd “Black bastards” thus 
precipitating the ensuing chase
480
. This perhaps explains why other uniformed police 
officers in the immediate vicinity were not attacked at this time.  
 
Unable to get to Ludlow Close due to their pursuit by a section of the ‘crowd’, the 
Drug Squad officers headed for Denbigh Street where an unmarked police car (a red 
Avenger) was parked (see Figure 19). In their attempt to reach this car they claimed 
                                                 
478
 Oral History File E_09-14-2010 (0:05:40). 
479
 The numbers involved in this group according to evidence given by other police officers varied from 
12 to 40 to a ‘large crowd’. Ibid. p.79. 
480
 Reicher, The St. Paul’s Riot: An Explanation of the Limits of Crowd Action in Terms of a Social 
Identity Model, p.191. 
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they were ‘jostled, kicked, punched and subjected to verbal abuse’481. Only one of the 
four made it to the unmarked car in Denbigh Street, the others returning to the café. 
The chasing crowd began to stone the red Avenger, injuring one of the occupants (a 
woman police officer) and several other uniformed police who had arrived at the 
scene and were close to the vehicle. The drug squad officer managed to start the 
vehicle as another police vehicle at the City Road end of Denbigh Street arrived with 
its sirens wailing and lights flashing which distracted the crowd allowing them to 
escape
482
. The crowd that had attacked the unmarked police car then moved off onto 
City Road and headed for Campbell Street on the other side of the ‘Black and White’. 
Some members of this crowd, including several women, then engaged in verbal abuse 
and dispersed stone throwing with police officers and arriving police vehicles that had 
reacted to two earlier calls for assistance
483
. The violence resulted in several chases 
and arrests of ‘suspects’ by police officers, one of which led to a dog handler being 
knocked unconscious on Campbell Street at 4.47pm
484
. 
 
                                                 
481
 Joshua, Wallace and Booth, To Ride the Storm: The 1980 Bristol 'Riot' and the State, p.79. 
482
 Ibid. p.81. 
483
 In the police log of radio and telephone calls entitled ‘Riots St Paul’s Area Bristol’, the first entry 
appears at 4.31pm when ‘A’ Division Control gives out the message ‘Reference the raid black and 
white café Grosvenor Road – trouble brewing. Units despatched’. This is followed at 4.44pm by ‘10-9 
Grosvenor Road’, which translates as a ‘call for assistance’ at the café. From the timings of the calls it 
appears the trouble connected to the exit of the Drugs Squad officers from the café prompts the first 
message, the second is as a result of violence in the vicinity of the Black and White café. It is curious 
and unexplained why no messages are recorded for the duration of the raid at the Black and White café, 
which lasted from approximately 2.40pm to 4.30pm Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Log of Events: 
Riots St Pauls Area Bristol, p.1. 
484
 A request for an ambulance was made by police officers at this time. Ibid. p.1. 
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As these events were unfolding on the nearby Denbigh Street, City Road and 
Campbell Street between 4.30pm and 4.45pm, outside the café on Grosvenor Road 
the remaining section of the crowd were still present though not apparently engaged in 
any violence.  The police communications log shows that there was little serious 
activity until around 5.00pm when a police motorcyclist was knocked off his bike 
outside the café
485
. According to police witnesses inside the café, Superintendent 
Arkell had instructed them to stay on the premises with the door locked and the 
curtains closed
486
 
 
Throughout this time the police had continued to load the ‘illicit’ crates of beer into 
the police van, and at approximately 5.00pm made off with their cargo only to come 
under renewed attack by members of the watching crowd. The police van was stopped 
outside the Inkerman pub, less than 100 yards from the ‘Black and White’, overturned 
and the crowd liberated the beer
487
 (see Figure 19). Several police officers fled the 
scene; some hid in the gardens of nearby houses and others sought refuge in the café 
as they too came under attack from missiles. At 5.05pm Inspector Allen made a 999 
call using the café phone stating: ‘I’m in the Black & White café it is approaching riot 
proportions – please get all available units to attend’488.  
 
 
                                                 
485
 A 999 call was made by a resident of the Council flats opposite the café at 5.02pm stating that the 
police motorcyclist had been injured. Ibid. p.1. 
486
 Joshua, Wallace and Booth, To Ride the Storm: The 1980 Bristol 'Riot' and the State, p.82. 
487
 Reicher, The St. Paul’s Riot: An Explanation of the Limits of Crowd Action in Terms of a Social 
Identity Model, p.193 Section (c). 
488
 Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Log of Events: Riots St Pauls Area Bristol, p.1. 
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Figure 19: St. Paul’s ‘neighbourhood’ April 2nd 1980: The first phase of the disturbance: 4.30pm-5.45pm  
Location of burned-
out police car 
(5.45pm) 
Location of 
abandoned 
police van 
(5.00pm) 
Route of the 
‘rescue march’ 
(5.30pm) 
Location of 
the unmarked 
‘red avenger’ 
police car 
(4.30pm) 
 
Police 
rendezvous 
point 
(5.10pm) 
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At this point the crowd outside was alternately stoning the café and making forays to 
grab the remaining beer stacked inside. Two nearby police cars parked at the end of 
William Street were attacked by a section of the crowd and turned over. One of these 
vehicles was righted by some police officers who then used it to make their escape 
from the scene; the other was left behind and was eventually set on fire by a group of 
three or four Black and White youths
489
 (see Figure 19). 
 
By 5.10pm thirty to forty police officers had regrouped at the Inkerman public house 
and all mobile units, including a number of dog handlers, were being instructed to 
rendezvous there. At approximately 5.30pm the contingent of police officers under the 
command of a Superintendent marched five abreast in ‘military’ style down 
Grosvenor Road to ‘relieve the siege’ of the Black and White café (see Figure 19). 
According to witnesses some had truncheons drawn, others were carrying dustbin lids 
and milk crates to defend themselves from missiles and they were accompanied by at 
least eight dog handlers
490. How successful this supposed ‘rescue march’ was is 
debatable, as several police witnesses claimed that it caused the renewal of stone 
throwing by a crowd of somewhere between 200 and 600 which was now in the 
vicinity. However, the evidence suggests that this crowd local to the café was partially 
                                                 
489
 This is noted in Reicher, The St. Paul’s Riot: An Explanation of the Limits of Crowd Action in 
Terms of a Social Identity Model, p.193 and there is a call for the fire brigade to attend at 5.24pm; 
Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Log of Events: Riots St Pauls Area Bristol, p.2. 
490
 Reicher, The St. Paul’s Riot: An Explanation of the Limits of Crowd Action in Terms of a Social 
Identity Model, p.193 and Joshua, Wallace and Booth, To Ride the Storm: The 1980 Bristol 'Riot' and 
the State, p.84. 
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dispersed or at least fell back after forays led by police dogs and handlers
491
. This 
allowed the police officers to both secure the Black and White café and the burning 
vehicle at the end of William Street. By 5.45pm there was a lull in the violence, 
prompting one senior officer at the scene to prematurely state that ‘the trouble was 
over’492. Many sources note that by this stage of the disturbance the crowds of 
onlookers had grown rapidly prompting the Chief Constable, who claimed he had 
arrived on the scene at approximately 5.30pm
493
, to state: 
‘There were now large numbers of people in the St. Paul’s area. In 
addition to those who had been involved in the incidents of damage, the 
majority of residents were out of their homes watching, and there was a 
heavy volume of traffic and pedestrians making their way out of the City 
during the evening traffic peak period. Groups were forming and 
reforming at various locations in the neighbourhood, but there was no 
open violence…A large number of people of all ages were on a large 
                                                 
491
 Reicher, The St. Paul’s Riot: An Explanation of the Limits of Crowd Action in Terms of a Social 
Identity Model, p.193 Section (d) and Joshua, Wallace and Booth, To Ride the Storm: The 1980 Bristol 
'Riot' and the State, pp.84-85. 
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 Ibid. p.85. This was also noted in the Chief Constable’s report when he stated ‘The senior officers 
present were satisfied that police manpower was sufficient and that once the (burned out) vehicle was 
removed despite the tension, the situation would quickly revert to normal’. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, Serious Disturbances in St. Paul's, Bristol on 2 April 1980: A Memorandum Placed 
in the Library of the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Following 
the Report made to Him by the Chief Constable of the Avon and Somerset Constabulary, p.3. 
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 The police communications log states at 5.38pm that ‘Mr. Weigh (Chief Constable) and Mr. Smith 
(Deputy Chief Constable) are attending in the general area’. Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Log of 
Events: Riots St Pauls Area Bristol, p.2. 
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grass area adjoining Grosvenor Rd., opposite the Black and White café, 
and though there was tension there was no open hostility, missiles were 
not being thrown at that stage’494 
Despite the variation in estimates of the actual numbers of residents on the streets 
during this uneasy calm ranging from ‘large numbers’ to ‘thousands’495, the evidence 
suggests that the disturbance had attracted a large proportion of the local population as 
well as others routinely travelling through the area. By that stage the first reports of 
the disturbance were reaching the media and local reporters had either just arrived or 
were heading to the area, so little information had reached the wider populace of 
Bristol
496
. The crowd was thus in the main of St. Paul’s and to varying degree had 
seen or had had related by eye-witnesses much of the action of the previous hour. 
What was patently clear to the onlookers and was later clearly stated by the Chief 
Constable when commenting on this initial phase of the disorder was: 
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 Secretary of State for the Home Department, Serious Disturbances in St. Paul's, Bristol on 2 April 
1980: A Memorandum Placed in the Library of the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, Following the Report made to Him by the Chief Constable of the Avon and 
Somerset Constabulary, p.3. 
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 Ibid. p.3, Reicher, The St. Paul’s Riot: An Explanation of the Limits of Crowd Action in Terms of a 
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 Police officers had reported to ‘A’ Division at 5.14pm ‘For information 3 men at Ashley Rd. 
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Log of Events: Riots St Pauls Area Bristol, p.2. The disturbances in the vicinity of the Black and White 
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timing it is quite likely that they would have arrived after the first phase of the violence. The lack of 
reporters, photographers or cameramen prior to 5.30pm explains the paucity of photographic or film 
images of the first phase of the disturbance. 
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‘The Police had been the sole target of the violence. No attempt had 
been made to attack or interfere with any other people or property. The 
incidents had not extended beyond the locality of the Black and White 
café. At this stage, it seemed that the reduced Police presence had eased 
the situation. Apart from the contingent of Police near the burnt-out 
vehicle, all other officers had been withdrawn to the area near the 
Inkerman public house, where they were in a less overt position’497 
The Chief Constable’s retrospective account of the situation at this point in the 
disturbance was of course heavily influenced by the need to counter the internal and 
external criticisms he faced after the events of April 2
nd
 1980. However, he was 
clearly aware at this stage in the disturbance, that the sole targets of the crowd 
violence were police officers and their vehicles. He makes no reference to any other 
crimes committed by the crowd and he recognises that the potential ‘flashpoint’ that 
could initiate further trouble was the mere visual presence of the police in the vicinity 
of Grosvenor Road. Hence his orders to withdraw his officers to positions out of sight 
of the large crowds of onlookers. Crucially, the only large contingent of police 
officers (approximately thirty
498
) in full view of those gathered on Grosvenor Road 
were protecting the burning police car at the end of William Street. 
 
The first hour or so of dispersed attacks on police officers and vehicles had exposed 
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 Author’s emphasis in bold. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Serious Disturbances in St. 
Paul's, Bristol on 2 April 1980: A Memorandum Placed in the Library of the House of Commons by the 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, Following the Report made to Him by the Chief Constable 
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serious confusions in the command and control process of ‘A’ division of the Avon 
and Somerset Constabulary. There had been uncertainty in who was actually in charge 
of the Black and White café ‘operation’ after the initiation of violence as several 
senior officers were present
499
 but apparently out of radio communication with each 
other. This confusion in the chain of command was accentuated by the subsequent 
arrival of the heads of Avon and Somerset Constabulary, the Chief Constable and 
Deputy Chief Constable, who made their way down to St. Paul’s as the serious nature 
of the situation became apparent. There was also a significant breakdown of 
communications between the police officers at the scene and ‘A’ division control at 
the central Bridewell police station.  
 
More significantly, a study of the police communications log
500
, shows a pattern of 
                                                 
499
 Joshua and Wallace note this in summarising the testimony of several of the police officers present 
in the café, stating ‘The woman police sergeant said she was instructed by the Superintendent (Arkell) 
to stay in the café with four police officers under her command, the male Inspector (Allen) said he had 
requested to be in charge, and neither of them were apparently aware that a Chief Inspector was in 
command, standing outside the café’. Joshua, Wallace and Booth, To Ride the Storm: The 1980 Bristol 
'Riot' and the State, p.82. 
500
 Calls for mobile units to attend the Black and White café were sent at 4.31pm by ‘A’ division 
control and then backed up by several ‘calls for assistance’ by police officers in the vicinity between 
4.44pm and 4.51pm. Immediately after these at 4.56pm, an unattributed order for mobile units to 
withdraw from the area was given which in turn was followed by further calls for assistance at 5.00pm, 
a 999 call from a member of the public at 5.02pm and Inspector Allen’s desperate call from the café at 
5.05pm. The following twenty minutes is marked by a plethora of further requests for support from 
mobile units that came under attack as they entered the vicinity of Grosvenor Road and City Road 
Significantly an urgent request for ‘shields and a wireless vehicle’ is made at 5.18pm, alluding to the 
seriousness of the incident and problems with radio communications. In the midst of this chaos, at 
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contradictory orders being issued by senior officers on the ground and ‘A’ division 
control, interspersed by desperate calls for assistance as police vehicles and officers 
came under attack. The confusion for mobile units being alternately called to the 
scene, sent away and then recalled minutes later could only be imagined. In the city 
centre and particularly on the streets of St. Paul’s police vehicles raced backwards and 
forwards, sirens wailing and lights flashing, exacerbating the unfolding drama and 
certainly helping to draw onlookers into the gathering crowds. 
 
6.2.4 The second phase of the disturbance: 6.40pm-7.30pm 
 
As the Wilkes family, friends and neighbours began to clear up the debris scattered 
around the Black and White café, the large crowds of onlookers that had gathered 
continued to grow as people returned from work. Basking in the late afternoon 
sunshine, the apparent calm was laced with tension and as one witness put it ‘I didn’t 
know what was going to happen next’501. The police certainly seemed unaware that 
the disturbance was far from over. Six police officers with barking dogs patrolled the 
grass areas in front of Burnell Drive, whilst the majority had withdrawn out of sight to 
the Inkerman public house. Hundreds of local residents milled about on Grosvenor 
                                                                                                                                            
5.26pm all mobile units are then ordered to rendezvous at the Inkerman public house (in preparation for 
the ‘rescue march’). Finally, following several more confusing calls for help, at 5.40pm ‘A’ division 
control gave the ambiguous order for ‘all police units not essential please remove yourselves from area 
of riot’ to which one exasperated police officer replied ‘most personnel are out of their vehicles’. Avon 
and Somerset Constabulary, Log of Events: Riots St Pauls Area Bristol, pp.1-3. 
501
 Reicher, The St. Paul’s Riot: An Explanation of the Limits of Crowd Action in Terms of a Social 
Identity Model, p.193. 
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Road watching the scene
502. More than thirty officers that were ‘protecting’ the 
burning police vehicle at the end of William Street assisted the fire brigade in 
extinguishing the flames along with local children who helped unroll the hoses
503
.  In 
other parts of St. Paul’s police officers were deployed to ‘strategic locations’ or were 
engaged in clearing traffic on City Road. 
 
Significantly, at approximately 6.00pm, attempts were begun to ‘disperse’ the crowds 
of onlookers at various locations both on and outside of the immediate ‘frontline’ of 
Grosvenor Road. These crowds were situated in multiple locations and were of 
considerable size by this stage
504
. How successful these clearing operations were is 
unclear, but the senior officers judged that further manpower was not required and the 
situation was considered by them to have been ‘contained’505.  At 6.08pm a mobile 
unit on Grosvenor Road requested information as to the arrangements for removal of 
damaged police vehicles and was informed that a breakdown vehicle was on route to 
William Street to recover the burnt out police car.  
 
During the lull of more than an hour A division of Avon and Somerset Constabulary, 
still reeling from the earlier chaos, had regrouped and had managed to assemble 
reinforcements from seven different force areas both in the city and as far south as 
                                                 
502
 TV cameramen from the BBC and HTV were present during the second phase of the disturbance. 
Their footage is used to corroborate many of the incidents that are related in this section. BBC & HTV: 
St. Paul’s riot. Television. (Bristol: BBC News West Library, 1980). See Appendix 10.1 for full 
details. HTV (00:05:16)), (00:16:54) and (00:21:27) and Figure 10.8.2 in Appendix 10.8. 
503
  See Figure 10.8.1 in Appendix 10.8 and Ibid. p.193. 
504
 This is reflected in the TV footage BBC & HTV: St. Paul’s riot. 
505
  Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Log of Events: Riots St Pauls Area Bristol, p.3. 
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Somerset. Forty-seven of these officers had already been sent to St. Paul’s and another 
twenty-one were on standby
506
. In addition the Assistant Chief Constable had 
assumed command in ‘force control’ at the Bridewell headquarters, whilst the Chief 
Constable and his Deputy remained at the scene.  On the streets of St. Paul’s there 
was along with the disparate but large crowds (now numbering a thousand or more
507
) 
a considerable number of local journalists, photographers and television cameramen, 
who had arrived during the hour-long cessation of violence. 
 
The second ‘trigger’ event of the afternoon was marked by the entrance of the police 
recovery vehicle, which arrived at the junction of William Street and Grosvenor Road 
at 6.18pm pulling up near the burned police car and the assembled police officers. 
Three minutes after it arrived an order was given by the Assistant Chief Constable at 
‘force control’ to all mobile units stating ‘no one to approach scene unless 
                                                 
506
 The deployed officers [numbers of personnel in parentheses] were from the following divisions, 
home police stations and force areas; B [8] (Broadbury Road, South Bristol), C [8] (Southmead, North 
Bristol), D [2] (Northavon and Kingswood), E [6] (Bath and Wansdyke), J [6] (Woodspring), Van unit 
[7] and TW unit [10]. Officers from the more distant F and G divisions in East [10] and West [11] 
Somerset were held in reserve, on standby. Ibid. p.4. 
507
 Reicher estimates that 2,000 people were present Reicher, The St. Paul’s Riot: An Explanation of the 
Limits of Crowd Action in Terms of a Social Identity Model, p.194, ‘thousands’ in Stephenson, Report 
of Bristol Disturbances: April 2nd, 1980, p.2, ‘up to a thousand’ in Joshua, Wallace and Booth, To Ride 
the Storm: The 1980 Bristol 'Riot' and the State, p.88, and the Chief Constable more than one group of 
‘several hundred’, Secretary of State for the Home Department, Serious Disturbances in St. Paul's, 
Bristol on 2 April 1980: A Memorandum Placed in the Library of the House of Commons by the 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, Following the Report made to Him by the Chief Constable 
of the Avon and Somerset Constabulary, p.4. The TV footage suggests that hundreds of (if not a 
thousand) local residents were watching the events unfold. BBC & HTV: St. Paul’s riot. 
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requested’508 suggesting that the situation was tense. The police mechanic who was 
connecting the burned car to the recovery vehicle was instructed by the 
Superintendent at the scene to do the job as quickly as possible. Despite the danger of 
towing the vehicle with the steering lock engaged ‘an order came from 
elsewhere…and they were told to drive away immediately’509. The Superintendent 
ordered the large contingent of police officers, which were originally protecting the 
burned car, to form up around the recovery vehicle followed by a line of six dog 
handlers
510
. At 6.40pm the recovery vehicle, its towed cargo and the escorting officers 
moved off along Grosvenor Road and almost immediately came under attack from 
missiles thrown by ‘black and white youths’ in a nearby crowd on the green in front 
of Burnell Drive
511
. As a result the ‘towing vehicle speeded up and slewed, hitting one 
of the dog handlers and knocking him over’ before racing down Grosvenor Road and 
out of St. Paul’s with the recovered ‘car swinging all over the road’512 (see Figure 20).  
 
The injured dog handler and the rest of the escorting police officers were left facing a 
hail of missiles and retreated on foot towards the grassy area at the end of the 
                                                 
508
 Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Log of Events: Riots St Pauls Area Bristol, p.4. 
509
 Reicher, The St. Paul’s Riot: An Explanation of the Limits of Crowd Action in Terms of a Social 
Identity Model, p.86. 
510
 There were approximately 40 or so police officers clustered around the tow truck. BBC & HTV: St. 
Paul’s riot, HTV (00:05:16), (00:16:54) and (00:21:27) and Figures 10.8.3-4 in Appendix 10.8. 
511
 Stephenson, Report of Bristol Disturbances: April 2nd, 1980, p.2 and BBC & HTV: St. Paul’s riot, 
HTV (00:16:54) and (00:21:27) and Figures 10.8.5-6 in Appendix 10.8. 
512
 Joshua, Wallace and Booth, To Ride the Storm: The 1980 Bristol 'Riot' and the State, p.86. 
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‘frontline’ heading towards Ashley Road513. Almost simultaneously as violence 
erupted near William Street, the body of police officers that had been held out of sight 
near the Inkerman public house at the other end of the ‘frontline’ began to march up 
Grosvenor Road once again in ‘military’ formation. They also came under a ‘fierce 
barrage of sticks, bottles and stones’514 and were forced to retreat via the side streets 
onto City Road (see Figure 20).  In less than five minutes the ‘frontline’ had been 
effectively cleared of police officers by the stone throwing crowds. 
 
After the retreat of the majority of the police officers from Grosvenor Road, the loci 
of the disturbance now switched to the small green at the end of the ‘frontline’ and the 
nearby junction of City Road and Ashley Road (see Figure 20). This brought the 
action to the commercial centre of St. Paul’s, which was filled with onlookers. 
Reicher states: 
‘As the first group of Police reached the grass area there was a pause. 
Then an old man walked up to a parked Panda car and kicked in its lights. 
There was a loud cheer and missiles were flung at the Police, who were 
exposed on all sides and after a while were so fiercely pressed that were 
                                                 
513
 Secretary of State for the Home Department, Serious Disturbances in St. Paul's, Bristol on 2 April 
1980: A Memorandum Placed in the Library of the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, Following the Report made to Him by the Chief Constable of the Avon and 
Somerset Constabulary, p.4. 
514
 Reicher, The St. Paul’s Riot: An Explanation of the Limits of Crowd Action in Terms of a Social 
Identity Model, p.193. This event is also substantiated by a radio message at 6.40pm Avon and 
Somerset Constabulary, Log of Events: Riots St Pauls Area Bristol, p.5. 
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forced to fall back towards City Rd.’515 
The retreating police officers were chased a crowd of Black and White men and 
women of all ages
516
 who eventually gathered on the junction of City Road and 
Ashley Road.  
 
Several minutes previously, at the same junction the police officers who were already 
present plus those who had been driven out of the ‘frontline’ formed a hasty cordon 
facing another crowd of ‘two to four hundred youths’517 who proceeded to shower the 
unprotected line with missiles forcing it to disperse. Thirty riot shields were then 
issued to ‘A’ division personnel and other officers and they formed up and at 6.50pm 
began to advance down City Road under ‘bombardment from various missiles’518. 
 
Numerous calls for assistance and reinforcements had been issued on the police radio 
                                                 
515
 Reicher, The St. Paul’s Riot: An Explanation of the Limits of Crowd Action in Terms of a Social 
Identity Model, p.194 Section (g). 
516
 Many of this group used the short cut of Winkworth Place to access Ashley Road-City Road This 
event is captured in the T.V. footage. BBC & HTV: St. Paul’s riot, HTV (00:25:30) and Figure 10.8.7 
in Appendix 10.8. 
517
 Joshua, Wallace and Booth, To Ride the Storm: The 1980 Bristol 'Riot' and the State, p.86 Section 7 
and Secretary of State for the Home Department, Serious Disturbances in St. Paul's, Bristol on 2 April 
1980: A Memorandum Placed in the Library of the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, Following the Report made to Him by the Chief Constable of the Avon and 
Somerset Constabulary, p.4. 
518
 The Chief Constable also noted that missiles (bricks, slate, concrete and bottles) were being thrown 
at the flanks of the cordon from private residences and the overlooking flats. Avon and Somerset 
Constabulary, Log of Events: Riots St Pauls Area Bristol, p.5. 
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net by this stage and they attracted a number of nearby mobile units, who raced to the 
area. Three police vehicles arrived in St. Paul’s (see Figure 20) and parked outside the 
Lloyds bank. A crowd stopped the police cars from moving and ‘the occupants got 
out and fled’519. By 6.59pm all three abandoned vehicles had been stoned by the 
crowd and one turned over and set ablaze in the middle of Ashley Road
520
.  
 
Three hundred yards away on City Road, a thirty strong riot shield unit advanced 
under the command of a Superintendent, followed by another thirty or so unprotected 
officers
521
. They had orders to secure the junction of City Road and Ashley Road but 
as:  
‘the cordon reached William St…the barrage of missiles from front and 
side caused the cordon to waver and bend and being completely exposed 
to attack from William St., it was obliged to fall back’522. 
                                                 
519
 Reicher, The St. Paul’s Riot: An Explanation of the Limits of Crowd Action in Terms of a Social 
Identity Model, p.194 Section (g). 
520
 Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Log of Events: Riots St Pauls Area Bristol, p.5. 
521
 See Figures 10.8.8-11 in Appendix 10.8. 
522
 Secretary of State for the Home Department, Serious Disturbances in St. Paul's, Bristol on 2 April 
1980: A Memorandum Placed in the Library of the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, Following the Report made to Him by the Chief Constable of the Avon and 
Somerset Constabulary, p.4. 
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Figure 20: St. Paul’s ‘neighbourhood’ April 2nd 1980: The second phase of the disturbance: 6.40pm-7.30pm 
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of police unit with riot 
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Three police 
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at Lloyds bank 
(6.59pm) 
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rover and van with escorting 
officers 
(~7.00pm) 
Police units forced to 
withdraw to Brigstocke 
Rd.  
(~7.15 pm) 
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As the police shield line collapsed and retreated back up City Road to Denbigh Street 
(see Figure 20), several police officers and journalists were injured by the missiles. At 
approximately 7.00pm, the commanding officer noticed a pall of smoke rising above 
the centre of St. Paul’s and received a call that that the police cars outside Lloyds 
bank were on fire and that the bank was being broken into. Another Superintendent, 
though in plain clothes, had earlier made his way towards the Bank and noted that: 
‘this crowd was of some hundreds who were gathered in Ashley Rd. near 
its apex with Grosvenor Rd. and towards Sussex Place and quite separate 
from the crowd confronting the Police on City Road;  again in the group 
there was an estimated hard core of some 200 obvious trouble makers’523 
The Superintendent approached the crowd, remonstrated with them but was then 
physically attacked. He was protected by two ‘West Indian ladies who were known to 
him’ who pulled him back into Brooke Road from where he made his escape. 
 
According to the Chief Constable the attacks on the bank and the nearby police 
vehicles spurred the Superintendent on City Road to order another attempt to get to 
the centre of St. Paul’s. This time the advance was initiated from Ashley Road 
towards its junction with City Road (see Figure 20). Two vehicles led the charge, a 
Sherpa van filled with police officers with riot shields and a Land Rover with further 
reinforcements. Another group of police officers on foot formed up to follow the 
vehicles down Ashley Road. The two vehicles came under fierce missile attack as 
they reached the junction with City Road, both of the drivers were injured and they 
                                                 
523
 Ibid. p.4. 
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were forced to turn round and return up Ashley Road
524
. Some of the occupants got 
out with riot shields and attempted to defend the vehicles; others without protection 
ran back up Ashley Road. The group of officers on foot who were following the 
vehicles got about 50 yards towards the junction under a hail of missiles before 
having to ‘withdraw’. Those retreating up Ashley Road were ‘met by another group of 
some 100 violent youths, predominantly Black, and again subjected to extreme 
violence’525. In response the escaping police officers ran down Drummond Road and 
                                                 
524
 This incident is recorded by some of the few photographs that exist showing the ‘rioters’ actually in 
action. Shortly before being injured by a missile, Bristol Evening Post photographer Martin Chainey 
took some shots of the police Land Rover under attack by the crowd at the junction of City Road and 
Ashley Road See Bristol Evening Post 03-04-1980, p.3. These particular photographs were widely used 
in the national media (as there were so few action shots) and are interesting for several reasons. The 
original photos show a group of seven or eight Black men and women throwing missiles at the police 
Land Rover as it returns up Ashley Road watched by other onlookers from the crowd gathered at the 
junction. In the foreground a white Mini has pulled up at the junction clearly outside the line of fire of 
the stone throwers. The photos were cropped and then used by the Daily Mail and the Sun national 
newspapers (and the Bristol Evening Post though perhaps less deliberately) on their headline pages. 
The editing of the pictures was undertaken to create the impression that the group of ‘rioters’ were 
using the Mini as cover (the illogicality concerning what they were taking cover from is not of course 
explained) or to insinuate that they were attacking the civilian occupants. To cement this ‘distortion by 
association’ the photographs were respectively captioned ‘Youths take cover behind a car during the 
battle. At least six civilians were hurt’ and ‘MOB RULE…a group of youths run through the trouble-
torn streets’. Daily Mail and Sun 03-04-1980. The full version of the photo for comparative purposes is 
available in P. Hallet, 150 Years Policing of Bristol. (Bristol: Avon & Somerset Constabulary, 1986). 
and a low quality version in Figure 10.8.15 in Appendix 10.8. 
525
 Secretary of State for the Home Department, Serious Disturbances in St. Paul's, Bristol on 2 April 
1980: A Memorandum Placed in the Library of the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for the 
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Dalrymple Road to re-join the main body of their colleagues on City Road. 
 
By about 7.15pm, the vast majority of police officers were now congregated on City 
Road. They had withdrawn under attack from the ‘frontline’, had failed to reach or 
protect the bank in the centre of St. Paul’s526 and had been forced out of Ashley Road. 
After the collapse of the advance of the police with riot shields a dubious decision had 
been made to withdraw the shields from City Road altogether. Some of the 
unprotected police officers picked up dustbin lids despite being ordered earlier not to 
do this. The command structure appeared to be breaking down as different and 
contradictory orders were given by competing senior police officers. From their 
testimony many police officers ‘had little idea who was in command or what was 
happening from now on’527. As the sun set, the final act of the most serious phase of 
the violence was played out on City Road as related by Reicher:  
‘As they (the Police cordon) retreated the crowd surged forward flinging 
missiles at them. Skips along the road provided ample ammunition. As the 
Police retreated some people came out of their houses joining in the 
attack, others came from side streets to stone the Police from behind. 
Outnumbered and outflanked the Police line disintegrated and they 
                                                                                                                                            
Home Department, Following the Report made to Him by the Chief Constable of the Avon and 
Somerset Constabulary, p.5. 
526
 The police communications log records that the Fire Brigade were present at the bank at 7.01pm and 
proceeded to extinguish the police car that was on fire at approximately 7.12pm. Although they 
requested cover from police whilst putting out the fire, this appears to have been ignored. The Fire 
Brigade then left the scene sometime shortly after 7.15pm. Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Log of 
Events: Riots St Pauls Area Bristol, pp.5-6. 
527
 Joshua, Wallace and Booth, To Ride the Storm: The 1980 Bristol 'Riot' and the State, p.87. 
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retreated in disarray; some were chased up side streets’528 
The stone-throwing crowd pursued the fleeing rabble of police officers, journalists 
and TV cameramen along City Road until they reached Brigstocke Road
529
, arguably 
the symbolic boundary of the neighbourhood of St. Paul’s (see Figure 20). The 
chasing crowd seemed satisfied with this and according to Reicher ‘the crowd then 
moved apart and let the traffic back through and even helped direct it in order to ease 
congestion’530. City Road was left strewn with debris including several police 
helmets, which were piled up and set on fire by some of the participants
531
. 
 
After the humiliating retreat on City Road the Chief Constable stated that: 
‘Out of the 50-60 Police officers that had been engaged overall, 22 had 
been injured, 27 more had minor injuries, and 21 Police vehicles were 
severely damaged, of which six were burned and destroyed. 10 members 
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 Reicher, The St. Paul’s Riot: An Explanation of the Limits of Crowd Action in Terms of a Social 
Identity Model, p.194 Section (h) and Figures 10.8.12-13 in Appendix 10.8. 
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 Several police officers threw missiles at the pursuing crowd as they retreated in disarray. This final 
act of violence of this phase of the disturbance was famously captured in the T.V. footage. BBC & 
HTV: St. Paul’s riot, BBC rushes 2 (00:00:25). 
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 ‘That was after they [the police] had been chased down City Road which was quite hilarious…I was 
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lit ‘em up right in the middle of City Road’. Oral History File A_20-03-2010 (0:13:15). This fire is also 
captured on the T.V. footage; BBC & HTV: St. Paul’s riot  HTV (00:27:03). 
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of the public had also been injured’532 
Consequently at 7.18pm the Chief Constable made the controversial decision to 
withdraw all mobile police units from the area
533
. All reinforcements were directed to 
attend Trinity Road police station and an overall withdrawal of all police officers to 
‘reorganise’ was ordered at 7.26pm534. Finally at 7.36pm at general order was 
despatched on the radio net: ‘To all mobiles, under no conditions are any Police 
vehicles to go into the St. Paul’s area’535. The Chief Constable later related the 
rationale for these decisions: 
‘The officers present were clearly overwhelmed. The decision was 
therefore taken to withdraw and regroup, to gather strength and to obtain 
sufficient reinforcement to ensure a speedy return to law and order with a 
minimum of bloodshed. It seemed that no useful purpose could have been 
served by the remainder of the Police officers staying in the area; and it 
was hoped that the removal of the Police – the object of the violence – 
                                                 
532
 Secretary of State for the Home Department, Serious Disturbances in St. Paul's, Bristol on 2 April 
1980: A Memorandum Placed in the Library of the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, Following the Report made to Him by the Chief Constable of the Avon and 
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 Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Log of Events: Riots St Pauls Area Bristol, p.6. 
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would quieten the crowd and itself help the return to order’536 
The majority of police officers were back at Trinity Road or Bridewell police stations 
by 7.35pm. 
 
6.2.5 After the ‘withdrawal’ of the police: 7.30pm-12.00am 
 
The official exit of the Avon and Somerset Constabulary from the St. Paul’s area at 
7.30pm meant that, barring the radio and telephone communications log
537
, police 
sources concerned with this phase of the disorder are virtually non-existent or limited 
to post-disturbance reports. For several reasons (which are discussed in the next 
chapter), neither of the main secondary sources covers this period of the disturbance 
in any detail. Consequently, the evidential emphasis now focuses on members of the 
public who were eyewitnesses to the proceedings
538
.  
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 Secretary of State for the Home Department, Serious Disturbances in St. Paul's, Bristol on 2 April 
1980: A Memorandum Placed in the Library of the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for the 
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After the last of the police units vacated the St. Paul’s area at around 7.30pm, there 
was a cessation of the violence and the atmosphere changed as described by an 
eyewitness in the local community paper Bristol Voice: 
‘Wednesday evening developed into a kind of community carnival. City 
Rd. at sunset was quite unforgettable; the traffic had gone, two bonfires 
had been lit and seemingly hundreds of people had come out onto the 
street, to stand around talking, often to people they had never met 
before’539 
These particular events were noted by many other sources including Stephenson’s 
account, which stated: ‘Youths lit a bonfire in the middle of City Rd. and danced, to 
which could be described as a joyous rebellion’540. At 7.45pm the first of a long series 
of 999 calls to the emergency services was received and the eyewitness stated:   
‘I have just driven through City Rd. where there is a large fire in the 
middle of the road with a crowd of 200 to 300 around it. Lloyds Bank 
Ashley Road has been extensively damaged and windows broken and 
outside are three Police vehicles one burnt out and two extensively 
damaged’541 
This witness, who was not a resident of St. Paul’s, had driven apparently unimpeded 
through the ‘centre’ of the disturbance a few minutes after the police had left. Ten 
minutes after this call a police mobile unit asked for permission to close City Road 
                                                 
539
 Bristol Voice, no. 55 May (1980). 
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 Stephenson, Report of Bristol Disturbances: April 2nd, 1980, p.2. 
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 Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Log of Events: Riots St Pauls Area Bristol, p.7. 
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and other routes into St. Paul’s to all vehicular traffic on the basis that ‘all vehicles 
(civilian) using City Road are now being stoned and kicked’542. 
 
As the police attempted to cordon off the wider boundary of St. Paul’s the locus of 
crowd activity began to switch from City Road to other locations. Outside the 
Inkerman public house a group of ‘coloured youths’ set fire to the A Division Task 
Force van, which had been abandoned after originally being involved in the raid on 
the Black and White café
543
. They then proceeded to turn over another civilian van on 
Wilder Street and it too was set alight. A few minutes later, just after 8.00pm, a 
resident made a 999 call stating ‘many people breaking into a shop opposite the off 
licence in Brighton St.’544. This premises was a print shop directly opposite the 
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1980). In the aftermath of the disturbance the Chief Constable made a point of noting that five private 
vehicles had been damaged. However, this is a very low total considering the volume of missiles that 
were unleashed over the two periods of serious violence in multiple locations in St. Paul’s and it should 
be compared to the 21 police vehicles that were damaged or completely destroyed. In addition, as is 
discussed later in this chapter, some vehicular traffic was entering the immediate area of the 
disturbance throughout the period after the police had completely withdrawn from St. Paul’s. Despite 
all of these potential situations for criminal damage to vehicles, the number of ‘civilian’ cars and vans 
that required repair was negligible. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Serious Disturbances 
in St. Paul's, Bristol on 2 April 1980: A Memorandum Placed in the Library of the House of Commons 
by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Following the Report made to Him by the Chief 
Constable of the Avon and Somerset Constabulary, p.7.  
543
 This is recorded in the police communications log; Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Log of 
Events: Riots St Pauls Area Bristol, p.8 and photographs taken at the scene (Bristol Evening Post 03-
04-1980) and the following day; Penny, Presentation Slides about the St Paul's Riots 1980. 
544
 Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Log of Events: Riots St Pauls Area Bristol, p.8. 
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Inkerman pub (see Figure 21). On the opposite corner of the Brighton Street and 
Grosvenor Road junction a commercial printing supplier and small warehouse were 
subsequently broken into and set on fire by 8.18pm
545
 and an unmarked police car 
was overturned and set on fire
546
. However, far more attractive targets for looting, the 
Asian run off licence on the corner of Brighton Street and Argyle Road, and the 
newsagent and the Inkerman public house on the ‘frontline’, were left untouched. 
These events marked the beginning of a pattern of selective looting and arson that was 
to characterise this phase of the disturbance.  
 
In the commercial centre of St. Paul’s at the junction of Ashley Road, Sussex Place 
and Lower Ashley Road, the Lloyds bank had been the centre of the attention and the 
primary target of the crowd situated there.  Several oral history respondents recalled 
the frustration of those who had by now broken into the premises: 
‘They got into the bank but they couldn’t get into the money, so they just 
trashed it. I don’t actually remember the moment it happened [the burning 
of the bank] but obviously there was a frustration going on there that they 
couldn’t get into the safe’547 
                                                 
545
 Again, this is recorded in photographs by Penny, Presentation Slides about the St Paul's Riots 1980 
and the log Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Log of Events: Riots St Pauls Area Bristol, p.9.  
546
 A defendant stated in evidence in a subsequent court case that ‘as he walked away from the car he 
saw some children trying to overturn it and he had returned to help them; some young girls had then set 
fire to the car’. Joshua, Wallace and Booth, To Ride the Storm: The 1980 Bristol 'Riot' and the State, 
p.164. 
547
 Oral History File A_20-03-2010 (0:14:20). 
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By 8.26pm the bank had been set on fire
548
. Another respondent recalled the moment 
it went up in flames: 
‘The bank was quite interesting cos there was a collection, a large 
collection of people just on that end of the green in front of the bank. And 
people knew it was their own bank but they didn’t get free loans or 
nothing. And you weren’t going to rob it cos you couldn’t break in. You 
could burn it. That’s how it was done. And…a huge, huge clamour of 
goodness went up…when it went up…[laughs]’549 
Whilst some of the crowd were inside the bank other groups began to break the 
windows and loot a bookmakers, the Post Office, a clothes shop and a car dealer
550
 
(see Figure 21). These businesses were adjacent to the bank and lay either side of the 
Criterion public house, which was open but left completely unmolested. All of these 
properties except the car dealers were later set on fire. The ‘looters’ then turned their 
attention to the row of shops on the opposite side of Ashley Road. Those targeted 
included a bicycle shop, a newsagent
551
, and a general food store which lay between 
the only local chemist and the Prince of Wales public house (see Figure 21). In this 
case several sources note that both members of the crowd and onlookers mediated the 
selection of targets. An oral history respondent who took part in the looting recalled: 
                                                 
548
 Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Log of Events: Riots St Pauls Area Bristol, p.10 and Figure 
10.8.14 in Appendix 10.8. 
549
 Oral History File G_09-10-2009 (0:12:18). 
550
 These were all attacked at 8.13-14pm. Ibid. p.9. The clothes shop, ‘Trident superstore’, was in the 
converted Metropole Cinema. 
551
 This was part of the ‘Kiosks’ chain of newsagents. 
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‘Some of the older guys, probably sixty year old Black guys just standing 
in the doorways, there was a respect going on there that people didn’t do it 
[looting]. The chemist was one of them. I don’t know why, you’d of 
thought drugs and things like that would have been well lootable wouldn’t 
you?… I never forgot that, it’s quite clear in my memory that these older 
Black guys who obviously been around since probably the ‘Windrush’ 
years, standing in these doorways and nobody even tried to go past them. I 
thought that was pretty cool at the time.’552 
Neither the chemist nor the pub were touched by the looters, however, simultaneously 
another group was attacking some less fortunate targets further down Grosvenor 
Road. At 8.19pm it was reported by a resident that the windows of a motorcycle shop 
on the corner of Grosvenor Road and St. Nicholas Road were being broken (see 
Figure 21). Within a few minutes a number of motorbikes were stolen
553
, along with 
leather jackets and other goods. Between the motorbike dealer and the junction with 
Ashley Road was line of fifteen or more shops and businesses including a stationers, a 
grocer, an upholsterer and a dress fabric shop. Only one of these, the drapers, ‘was 
singled out for exclusive attack’ and the owner later stated: 
‘They picked on us because no one was living above…I kept on chasing 
                                                 
552
 Oral History File A_20-03-2010 (0:15:23). Another respondent recalled that a group of older 
Rastafarians also intervened and protected the chemist from attack from younger looters. G_09-10-
2009 (0:03:12). This was also noted by the local Anglican priest, Keith Kimber in the Bristol Evening 
Post (03-04-1980). 
553
 Famously one motorbike was driven through a plate glass window by a looter. This may be a myth, 
but it was certainly a story that was relayed widely after the event and was recalled by the oral history 
respondents. 
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them away but whenever my back was turned more youngsters would be 
in the shop. They tried to cause a fire but I put it out’554 
The owner of the adjacent premises, a general store and off licence, who is still living 
at the premises, remembered that her shop ‘didn’t even have a finger mark on the 
window’ after the ‘riot’555.  
 
Whilst groups of looters went about their selective business on Grosvenor Road the 
crowds estimated by one resident to be 500-700 strong
556
 at the junction of Sussex 
Place and Ashley Road proceeded to move down Lower Ashley Road towards the 
M32 roundabout. Again there were several different businesses located on this 
thoroughfare including a TV servicing shop, a builder’s merchant, a dry cleaners, an 
electrical goods retailer and hardware shop (see Figure 21). Between 8.35pm and 
8.47pm looters targeted the premises containing electrical goods and the hardware 
shop before rounding off their attacks at a record shop on Sussex Place, which they 
attempted to set on fire at 8.58pm
557
 (see Figure 21). The other premises were left 
untouched. By 9.00pm most of the window smashing had ceased. The systematic 
destruction of particular shop frontages had lasted an hour and had been carried out by 
multiple groups of looters, in parallel, in three distinct locations in the 
neighbourhood
558
. The looting did not come to an end at this point however, but 
                                                 
554
 Bristol Evening Post (03-04-1980). 
555
 Unrecorded interview with a shopkeeper (I). 
556
 This estimate was from a 999 call received at 8.31pm. Ibid. p.11. 
557
  Ibid. p.11-12. 
558
 This assertion is backed by the various simultaneous 999 calls from the three different locations in 
the police communications log as well as the oral testimony of several looters who were disappointed 
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began to involve a wider section of the community and continued in a far more bizarre 
manner. 
 
The surreal feeling at the lack of a police response to the initial explosion of looting 
and arson was compounded as older men and women ventured on to the streets and 
began to wander into the damaged shops to collect the goods that had been ignored by 
the younger looters.  Several eyewitnesses and oral history respondents endorsed this 
particular period of the disturbance with an air of wonder: 
‘There was women in there, in one of the supermarkets they were 
grabbing everything, babies milk and anything they could get their hands 
on, whatever you could carry’559 
Another respondent recalled: 
‘The looting, which is quite a good one to endorse I think. Yesterday we 
were paying for this. Big African ladies carrying bags of rice. That was 
very uplifting. There wasn’t too much booze being nicked. A little bit but 
that got stashed’560 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
that they had not been at the right place at the right time to get some of the high value goods (such as 
the motorbikes for example). 
559
 Oral History File A_20-03-2010 (0:16:25). 
560
 Oral History File G_09-10-2009 (0:05:30). 
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Figure 21: St. Paul’s ‘neighbourhood’ April 2nd 1980: After the withdrawal’ of the police: Targets for looting and arson 
Bank [L & A] (7.45pm & 8.26pm) 
Post Office [L & A] (8.14pm) 
Bookmakers [L & A] (8.13pm & 10.45pm) 
Clothes shop [L] (unknown) 
Furniture store [L] (unknown) 
Drapers [L] (unknown) 
 
Key 
[D] = Damaged 
[L] = Looting 
[A] = Arson 
(x.xxpm) = Time of event 
Dress fabric shop [L] 
(unknown) 
Car dealer [D] (unknown) 
Record shop [L] (8.58pm) 
TV repair shop 
 [L] (unknown) 
Hardware shop 
[L] (8.19pm) 
Print shop [L] (8.09pm) 
Commercial printing supplier [L & A] (unknown) 
Print warehouse [A] (8.18pm) 
Labour Exchange [D] (unknown) 
Bicycle shop [L] (8.19pm) 
Newsagent [L] (8.14pm) 
General store [L] (unknown) 
 
Motorbike dealer [L] 
(8.19pm) 
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This was corroborated by another testimony: 
‘And the good thing I will always remember was it wasn’t just young 
people there were older people out there as well…This was on the night 
time when there was a lot of the looting going on…they went into a shop 
and they was pinching booze…and they looked round and there was a lot 
of older women in there filling up baskets of food and they were sort of 
like just helping themselves. And I just thought brilliant, absolutely 
brilliant’561 
Even the local newspapers picked up on this odd aspect of the disturbance though 
with the need to racialise the activity: 
‘Among the looters were elderly Black women who snatched linen from 
shops and told men what to take’562 
Another respondent who ventured out in the evening to go shopping for his two 
children’s breakfast challenges the impression of ‘snatching and grabbing’ as 
necessarily associated with ‘looting’: 
‘I went up to the shops, there had been looting…being up with lots of 
other people around, the normal customers of the shop…to some extent 
the initial looting or taking had happened, the shop had been broken into. 
That was our little local supermarket… I remember going in there and the 
owners weren’t there. People were just walking in and out. The windows 
                                                 
561
 Oral History File L_15-02-2010 (0:11:15). 
562
 Western Daily Press 03-04-1980. 
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were smashed and I got a packet of Sugar Puffs…Old ladies and my 
neighbours, the normal customers were in the shop…The booze and the 
fags had gone and what was left was the rest of the shop. People were in 
there just looking around, picking things up…some things that they 
needed because that was the local shop, but there was no one there to take 
the money… It was a nice community feel’563 
The ‘surreal normality’ of shopping without money was closely linked by the oral 
history respondents to a deepened sense of ‘community’, as wary residents began to 
venture onto the streets to mingle with the crowds: 
‘Everyone was out chatting…it was like, you never had so many people 
chatting out on the street…what we were seeing on the media wasn’t our 
experience of it…we were seeing it [on TV] and it was from the outside 
and it was all ‘terribly dangerous and stuff’. We were to some extent 
getting on with our lives. Everyone was on their doorsteps…and the 
atmosphere was kind of like ‘God this is exciting’ and it didn’t feel 
dangerous’564 
The strange feel to the evening was enhanced by the apparent inability of the police to 
enforce the traffic cordon that some mobile units had earlier requested. A 999 caller 
had complained at 9.01pm ‘with regards to road diversion signs at Cheltenham Rd. 
with Ashley Rd., the signs are inadequate and traffic is still going into Ashley Rd.’565. 
                                                 
563
 Oral History File D_01-07-2010_Part I (0:11:20) and (0:33:30). 
564
 Oral History File D_01-07-2010_Part I (0:15:45). 
565
 Ibid. p.12. 
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This statement suggests that the ‘cordon’ was actually unmanned, allowing many 
civilian vehicles to enter the area and literally drive through the ‘riot’566. One oral 
history respondent remembered: 
 
Respondent (C): ‘We drove down Ashley Road while the ‘riot’ was on, there was a 
police car on fire…we drove past Lloyds bank and no body turned a hair, there was no 
sense of it being kind of [racial] …it was an anti-police riot. The idea that we could 
drive down…I didn’t feel alarmed or anything. We drove through the middle of it’ 
Interviewer: ‘Can you remember seeing a police cordon or anything like that?’ 
Respondent (C): ‘Oh no, they’d gone by then’ 
Interviewer: ‘Can you remember crowds at all?’ 
Respondent (C): ‘There were sort of people milling about and we were quite struck 
by Black and White, it wasn’t only White... It was such an astonishing sight’567 
 
The failure of the police to stop traffic entering the area was noted at the time by 
participants in the disturbance and as a result some of them took matters into their 
own hands as was stated by one source: 
‘Gangs of youths formed human barriers across main roads in the area 
                                                 
566
 The Chief Constable subsequently claimed that ‘Seven mobile units, each with one Sergeant and 
three Constables, were deployed to form an outer ring around the area of violence to report movement 
and to act in the event of isolated incidents in the area’. However it is unclear when this deployment 
was carried out and whether it was also aimed at controlling traffic entering the area. Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, Serious Disturbances in St. Paul's, Bristol on 2 April 1980: A Memorandum 
Placed in the Library of the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
Following the Report made to Him by the Chief Constable of the Avon and Somerset Constabulary, p.6. 
567
 Oral History File C_24_09_2010 (00:21:54). 
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stopping people driving into St. Paul’s’568 
Reicher drew reference to the limiting behaviours of the crowds when one of his oral 
history respondents recalled: 
‘Cars coming down City Rd., they were getting stuck because people were 
blocking the road. People just moved apart and people stood there 
directing the cars through. It seemed really strange, like you’d taken 
control of the streets’569 
In addition to these attempts to control traffic, other participants, local to the area, 
were conscious of the potential danger of interlopers and opportunists from ‘outside’ 
entering the neighbourhood and decided to act: 
 
Respondent (G): ‘But we also stopped people coming in from outside…who we 
knew weren’t from the area.’  
Interviewer: ‘What time was that then that you started to notice people? Did you 
notice people arriving from other places?’ 
Respondent (G): ‘Yeah, it was on the news, the wireless and TV, and you started 
seeing people coming in, which wasn’t unusual because it’s quite an active little 
social place. But more so and we had to ask certain people why they were there. 
Which we did. And the ones we didn’t agree with we fucked ‘em off. Cos it was ours 
[laughs] and it was a good mixture of Blacks and [Whites] you know…’ 570  
                                                 
568
 Daily Telegraph 03-04-1980. 
569
 Reicher, The St. Paul’s Riot: An Explanation of the Limits of Crowd Action in Terms of a Social 
Identity Model, p.197. 
570
 Oral History File G_09-10-2009 (0:05:30). 
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As the crowds on the streets of St. Paul’s became aware that the police had been 
absent for more than an hour and the threat of their imminent arrival lessened, the 
looting became less frantic, better organised and more of a collective activity. One 
local newspaper commented that ‘Looters had formed human chains to grab 
televisions, cycles and clothing from shattered shops’571 and a local resident recalled 
the looting of the bicycle shop: 
‘Cars were pulling up in Badminton Road… and it was like a chain taking 
bikes out of Overburys [the bicycle shop] into vans…[the shop owners] 
weren’t on site, they don’t live there or anything…bikes were going out 
the windows. That was older people, that was families…they got a van 
and they had brought it along specifically. That was local families 
thinking ‘right here is an opportunity’…’572 
The crowds were in effective control of the streets of the St. Paul’s neighbourhood for 
several hours after the withdrawal of the police at 7.30pm. During this period Avon 
and Somerset Constabulary had been busy preparing to retake the area.  
 
The priority was the organisation of reinforcements, which were obtained by 
redeploying divisional assets local to Avon and Somerset, calling in night duty 
personnel early, recalling others who had finished their shifts and filling the non-
essential patrol and station duties with the Special Constabulary. In addition, the 
neighbouring forces of Devon and Cornwall, Gloucestershire and Wiltshire were 
                                                 
571
 Bristol Evening Post 03-04-1980. 
572
 Oral History File D_01-07-2010_Part I (0:13:00) and (0:32:10). 
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contacted in order to secure further reinforcements
573
. The Chief Constable later 
admitted that ‘this build up of the necessary manpower was bound to take time 
although, both to the Police and to the public, it seemed agonisingly slow’574. The 
need for intelligence (other than the numerous 999 calls) on the situation in St. Paul’s 
was vital to the operation and consequently plainclothes officers were sent into the 
area to obtain information
575
. 
 
Having gained the required intelligence the Chief Constable decided ‘that the situation 
would be brought under control by forming Police cordons at various points, and then 
moving forward into the area under coordinated command’576. The officers in charge 
of the cordons were briefed at 9.30pm, whilst the gathering of the reinforcements and 
‘riot’ control equipment were still underway. The operation to retake the St. Paul’s 
area was launched sometime after 10.30pm and by 11.15pm the cordons of police 
with riot shields were formed up, the largest of which were on Sussex Place at the 
junction with Ashley Hill and on Lower Ashley Road near the M32 roundabout. As 
the second larger unit moved up Lower Ashley Road they ‘found a large number of 
                                                 
573
 Personnel from these force areas were enroute by 10.30-11.00pm. Avon and Somerset Constabulary, 
Log of Events: Riots St Pauls Area Bristol, p.15. 
574
 Secretary of State for the Home Department, Serious Disturbances in St. Paul's, Bristol on 2 April 
1980: A Memorandum Placed in the Library of the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, Following the Report made to Him by the Chief Constable of the Avon and 
Somerset Constabulary, p.6. 
575
 This also included the Chief Constable and a Chief Superintendent who ‘returned to the St. Paul’s 
area to assess, from a plain vehicle and in plain clothes, the requirements for manpower and the 
strategy to be followed’. Ibid. p.6. 
576
 Ibid. p.6. 
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people milling about who were shouting and jeering at the officers’ which they appear 
to have ignored. 
 
As the first cordon reached the junction of Ashley Road and Grosvenor Road: 
‘the officer in charge found his manpower insufficient to move forward. 
Some of the crowd moved behind the cordon through side streets. A 
reserve consisting of one Inspector, one Sergeant and 10 Constables then 
arrived and the crowd quickly dispersed’577 
With the arrival of the cordon moving up Sussex Place and other units the majority of 
the mass of people left the scene and ‘the remaining violent elements in the crowd 
dispersed of their own accord’578. By midnight, the police force had apparently 
regained control of the area. In all more than six hundred police officers had been 
deployed to Avon and Somerset ‘A’ division in order to carry out the operation to 
pacify the St. Paul’s neighbourhood579. 
 
Whilst all these plans were being put into operation, the Chief Constable made several 
other decisions that were not made public at the time or in his subsequent reports. 
Between 11.30pm and midnight, as the police cordons were finally securing the area, 
the police received several intelligence reports concerning ‘armed’ reinforcements 
being sent from other cities to aid the people of St. Paul’s. The first arrived via a 999 
call at 11.33pm and stated: 
                                                 
577
 Ibid. p.6 and Figure 10.8.16 in Appendix 10.8. 
578
 Ibid. p.7. 
579
 Ibid. p.7. 
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‘Asking advice about what to do, stated that the coloured people are 
saying they are going to get guns from Birmingham, Coventry and 
London and they will be here by 3am this morning’ 
An informant known only as the ‘RASTA’ contacted Trinity Road via a private line 
and at 11.46pm a Chief Inspector stated: 
‘We have received information…to say that there are coach loads of 
coloureds coming from Birmingham ARMED to kill policemen. Request 
motorways to be informed to stop and search coaches heading to Bristol 
M5’ 
This was backed up about ten minutes later by a call from the local newspaper the 
Western Daily Press who repeated this claim
580
. Although, perhaps laughable in 
retrospect, these reports were taken very seriously at the time. The neighbouring 
police forces of Gloucestershire and West Mercia were informed to intercept suspect 
vehicles coming from the West Midlands down the M5 motorway. Also an order was 
given at 12.22am for a firearms unit consisting of fifteen officers and a coordinator to 
be assembled at Bridewell police station
581
. It is unclear in the sources if any vehicles 
were successfully intercepted on the motorways or if the firearms unit was deployed 
                                                 
580
 Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Log of Events: Riots St Pauls Area Bristol, p.16. Another report 
(p.19) was received at 03.38am in the Trinity police station Incident Room that stated ‘Information has 
been received from…Wolverhampton that 25 plus taxis/vehicles have been commandeered by 100 plus 
coloureds and that are believed to be heading for Bristol. Please reinstate motorway stop checks’ 
581
 Ibid. p.16. The ‘arming of officers’ was denied by the Chief Constable in a press conference the day 
after the disturbance. Ibid. p.13. 
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in St. Paul’s582. However the gravity of the events of 2nd April 1980 for Avon and 
Somerset Constabulary was certainly demonstrated by these particular responses. 
 
The collective violence that was unleashed in St. Paul’s was confined to April 2nd, 
failing to re-ignite over the subsequent days. This was probably a consequence of the 
intensive (and controversial) operations that Avon and Somerset Constabulary 
launched to both police the area
583
 and to apprehend suspects
584
. However despite the 
apparent cessation of violence in St. Paul’s, over the succeeding days new outbreaks 
of unrest appeared in two other areas of Bristol. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
582
 One source quoted a Black and White skinhead gang from St. Paul’s as stating ‘We heard other kids 
were coming to help us from Birmingham and London. But the police turned them back on the 
motorway’. Socialist Worker 12-04-1980 p.5. 
583
 This involved approximately ‘80 police officers on patrol in St. Paul’s with several hundred more 
ready to be called in at short notice’. Bristol Disturbances. The operation was planned to last from 4th - 
9
th
 April 1980 Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Policing the St. Paul's Area, Bristol, 4th-9th April 
198.  (Bristol Record Office POL/IO/7/8, 1980). 
584
 The ‘ten days of terror’ (as one activist depicted the police activities in the aftermath of the ‘riot’) 
included house-to-house searches, dawn raids and detaining suspects from the street. Bristol 
Disturbances and Joshua, Wallace and Booth, To Ride the Storm: The 1980 Bristol 'Riot' and the State, 
pp.130, 148-9. Two sources claimed police had interviewed up to 1,500 people in the aftermath of the 
St. Paul’s ‘riot’; The Guardian 12-04-1980 and Socialist Worker 19-04-1980 p.4. The Chief 
Constable’s Report for 1980 stated that of these 132 people had been arrested with 91 proceeded 
against. Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Annual Report of the Chief Constable. (Bristol: 1980), p.40.  
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6.3 The Southmead disturbances April 3
rd
-4
th
 1980 
6.3.1 Southmead: Thursday 3rd April 1980 
 
Thursday April 3
rd
 1980, the day after the ‘Bristol Riot’ in St. Paul’s was, to the 
casual observer, a normal day for the residents of the Southmead in North Bristol. 
During the afternoon, police officers from the North Bristol ‘C’ division carried out 
their daily routine of Panda car patrols in and around the estate. However the apparent 
calm belied the fact that via the numerous media reports, the majority of the adult 
residents were fully aware of the previous day’s events in St. Paul’s. Other groups, 
especially some younger people, had received or were receiving first-hand accounts of 
the ‘Bristol Riot’ via their peers, friends or acquaintances from St. Paul’s585.  
 
Similarly the impact of the previous night’s violence and logistical chaos had both 
emotive and practical significance for the ‘C’ Division personnel. A number of police 
officers from the North Bristol division had been deployed to St. Paul’s during the 
early evening violence
586
, others had been brought in as reinforcements during the 
operation to ‘retake’ the area later that night and many had been recalled to the 
depleted Southmead police station to create a ‘skeleton’ crew in order to keep it 
                                                 
585
 The actuality of this and the links between St. Paul’s and Southmead are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 7.0 Section 7.2.3. 
586
 Some had simply driven into the violence after the numerous 10-9 ‘calls for assistance’ during the 
afternoon and many others had been requested as reinforcements (see Section 6.2.4 note 506 and 6.2.5) 
including firearms officers. Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Log of Events: Riots St Pauls Area 
Bristol, p.16. It is unclear from the sources, though likely, that at least some of the 49 police officers 
that were injured were from ‘C’ Division. In addition others would have deployed to St. Paul’s over the 
following days in the major policing operation that followed the disturbance. Avon and Somerset 
Constabulary, Policing the St. Paul's Area, Bristol, 4th-9th April 1980. 
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functioning
587
. Eyewitness accounts of the violence of the previous day were almost 
certainly circulating amongst ‘C’ division personnel as they carried out their routine 
tasks in the midst of the logistical shockwaves that were running through the force. 
Thus both the police and the policed were simultaneously alive to the extraordinary 
events that had occurred a few miles away in the centre of Bristol. 
 
The apparent normality in the Southmead estate, with its dual undercurrents of rumour and 
rumour and high emotion, was punctured in the evening when small dispersed groups of youths 
of youths began to stone passing police vehicles as they drove along Greystoke Avenue adjacent 
Avenue adjacent to the symbolic gathering point for youth known locally as the ‘Green’588 (see 
‘Green’588 (see Reproduced by permission of Geographers' A-Z Map Co. Ltd.  ©Crown copyright and database rights 2014 
Ordnance Survey 100017302 
Figure 22). This relatively minor incident led to the call for back up police units, 
which entered the estate and congregated at the nearby Arneside shops close to 
Southmead Youth Centre. 
 
An oral history respondent remembered: 
‘Police back up came in but the kids who had chucked the stones didn’t 
fall away. They stayed to face out, to face this backup of police. I think 
                                                 
587
 Southmead police station was not a minor outpost but in fact the headquarters of ‘C’ division of the 
Avon and Somerset Constabulary covering North Bristol, from the Severn Estuary to the inner city. 
588
 In 1980 this particular area was at the junction with Arneside Road in front of the Southmead Youth 
Centre, part of the long flat expanse of green space that lies between the parallel Greystoke Avenues 
running through the centre of the Southmead estate. It was eventually developed into a car park for a 
supermarket as noted by Brent ‘One area, ‘the green’ was used so often as a gathering place and centre 
of joy-riding and battles with the police, that in 1996 it was built on’. Brent, Searching for Community : 
Representation, Power and Action on an Urban Estate, p.2, 136. 
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the police were hesitant in kind of coming in. They came in but they 
didn’t know what to do. They knew they had been attacked but they didn’t 
know how to handle it…They came onto the estate in a load of vehicles, 
not getting out of the vehicles, well they’d get out but just stood outside 
next to these vehicles. They didn’t go out to kind of face these kids or 
anything. They just met up in a bunch’589 
The arrival of the police reinforcements attracted more youths creating a small crowd 
from which several began to stone the collected police and their vehicles. In response 
to the attacks the police officers called further reinforcements in vans. These units 
helped formed a ‘wall’ of vehicles in front of the shops at the junction of Arneside 
Road. The respondent continued: 
‘They kind of pitched up by these shops waiting to be stoned. They were 
just inviting it. Stones were getting chucked at them and the police 
weren’t doing anything about it. They weren’t attacking back, they were 
kind of just taking it’ 
The crowd was estimated by residents to be a hundred strong, mainly composed of 
youths and reportedly ‘including skinheads and punk rockers’590. As the barrage of 
missiles continued several shop windows were broken, including a butcher and 
hairdressers but there were no attempts to loot any premises. At approximately 
10.00pm the senior police officer made the decision that enough manpower had been 
assembled for them to take more aggressive action. 
                                                 
589
 Oral History File H_18-02-2010 (0:40:57). 
590
 Western Daily Press 05-04-1980. 
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Figure 22: The centre of Southmead ‘estate’ 
 
The ‘Green’ 
The ‘Standard of England’ public house 
The ‘Pegasus’ public house 
Southmead Youth Centre 
Arneside Shops 
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The police officers formed a line and along with police dogs began to advance across 
the ‘Green’ towards the crowd, who began to disperse across the estate. As the youths 
scattered, the police fanned out in groups in an attempt to make arrests, the majority 
of which were made outside the Standard of England public house opposite the 
‘Green’. In all twelve arrests were made, of which three were juveniles.  Six of the 
adults were aged between 17 and 19 and lived in adjacent streets in the pre-war part of 
the Southmead estate south of Greystoke Avenue
591
.  The remaining two adults who 
were detained were older (23 and 28 years) hailing from nearby Westbury-on-Trym 
and Southmead respectively. The arresting police officer a dog handler described the 
situation at the time of their arrest outside the public house: 
‘[the police officer] said he tried to split the crowd into smaller, more 
manageable groups, but one group refused to move. It was a very volatile 
situation. The whole area was filled with people acting in a disorderly 
manner’592 
The two older men were later cleared of using threatening words and behaviour and 
the latter was defended in court by a police officer who claimed ‘that in the past…[the 
defendant] had on several occasions helped Police disperse groups of youths in the 
area who had become too boisterous’593. 
 
                                                 
591
 The seventh young adult (20) was a brother of one of those arrested. He was not detained at the 
scene but later at Southmead police station whilst making enquiries about his sibling. Western Daily 
Press 07-04-1980 and Bristol Evening Post 22-05-1980. 
592
 Bristol Evening Post 22-05-1980. 
593
 Bristol Evening Post 22-05-1980. 
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Some of the arrested youths and adults, none of whom were charged with assaulting 
police officers, complained bitterly that they had been harassed earlier in the evening 
and had been beaten by the police when they were detained
594
. A reporter working for 
a community paper who spoke to youths in Southmead over the succeeding days 
provided an explanation of why the disturbance on the 3
rd
 of April had begun: 
‘The youth of Southmead generally agree that on Thursday night the 
Police appeared on the scene and over-reacted to them sitting on the 
Green (which is a place where they always meet). The kids responded by 
banding together and fighting back. Police were drafted in from all over 
Redland and Filton. The riot vans and the heavies
595
 appeared and the 
violence escalated. They are also saying they will get together with the 
kids from St Pauls’596 
By about 10.30pm and crucially before the local pubs had closed, the police had 
driven off the crowd of youths and had restored their control over the ‘Green’. Despite 
the incidents outside the Standard of England public house they had managed to 
achieve this without having to negatively engage with a wider section of the 
community. To all intents and purposes the incident was over. However, Friday 4
th
 
April was to see a significant escalation of the violence. 
 
                                                 
594
 This article was reproduced in the May issue of Bristol Voice from the original published in 
Socialist Worker (19-04-1980), p.4. 
595
 This is probably a reference to ‘C’ division ‘task force’ units in vans. These units were modelled on 
the Special Patrol Groups (SPG) operating in Metropolitan police areas. 
596
 Bristol Voice. no. 55, May (1980). 
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6.3.2 Southmead: Friday 4th April 1980 
 
For the senior police officers of ‘C’ Division the heightened atmosphere after the 
nationally perceived ‘defeat’ of the police in St. Paul’s and the subsequent disturbance 
in their own ‘manor’ on the Thursday night in Southmead put them under some 
pressure to react. It is unclear whether the orders for the policing of the Southmead 
estate on the day following the disorder on the ‘Green’ came from above or were 
derived locally. Either way, their normal policy of non-interactive vehicular patrols 
was altered on the afternoon and evening of the Friday and was more in line with the 
tactics of the ‘post-riot’ policing operation that was launched between 4th and 9th April 
in St. Paul’s597.  One oral history respondent out on the estate, recalled: 
‘The following day and the following evening it was noticeable that vans 
of police was just tucked away, dotted about Southmead…. up the little 
quiet bits of Southmead… sat in vans…hidden away in the shadows just 
waiting, on watch almost. Again it’s like, you know, fuck ‘em… ‘cos they 
had no connection with Southmead. They was not of Southmead. They 
had obviously come in, were they expecting [trouble]?... Were they 
attempting to keep the peace by being hidden away in vans? They wasn’t 
out walking about, they were still cut-off, they had no connection with us. 
Still that explicit division between local people and the police.’598 
The change in policing routine on the Friday afternoon was immediately noticed by 
many of Southmead’s residents, especially younger people who were traversing the 
                                                 
597
 St. Paul’s had been swamped with police officers over the days following the ‘riot’. Avon and 
Somerset Constabulary, Policing the St. Paul's Area, Bristol, 4th-9th April 1980. 
598
 Oral History File H_18-02-2010 (0:44:50). 
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estate. The feeling that the neighbourhood had been secretly ‘occupied’ and that they 
were under surveillance from the estranged police force heightened the tension. This 
was exacerbated by the apparent decision by the police force to carry out the 
operation without positive engagement with the community. There are no sources that 
suggest that there was consultation with ‘community leaders’ before or during the 
operation. In addition, it appears that the police may have closed the Southmead 
Youth Centre on the Thursday night, possibly as a result of the unrest. The Centre 
remained closed until at least the following week
599
. 
 
Two other important factors also influenced the events that were to follow that 
evening. These were the perceptions, particularly amongst the youth, of what had 
happened the previous night on the estate and what had happened in St. Paul’s a 
couple of days earlier. The respondent referring to the events of the Thursday night 
stated: 
 
Respondent (H): ‘We had seen that we had attacked the police and it was a 
laugh…and it was seen as well that the police didn’t actually do that much…There 
hadn’t been any mass nicking. We had kind of got away with it. The following night it 
was like, OK we’ve done it once, the police was on the estate and we could do it 
again. And that [feeling] was quite wide, ‘cos by then on that the second night, it was 
totally in the news about St. Paul’s, absolutely in the news, big headlines in the 
Evening Post and so on… We knew what had gone on in St. Paul’s, we knew the 
damage that had been caused, we knew the police had been beaten and backed out of 
                                                 
599
 The Bristol City Councillor for Southmead stated that ‘He would meet police as soon as possible 
and investigate the availability of the youth club, which has been closed since Thursday’. Western 
Daily Press 07-04-1980, p.2. 
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St. Paul’s and we saw this as…well my lot of my age, which would have been 14 or 
15…we’d saw that that was quite good. Do you know what I mean? It was quite…it 
was like fuck…making national headlines as well. We hadn’t seen anything like that. 
It was totally new to us cos we were so young. The fact of seeing something so local, 
going up like that and a bank going up in flames, seeing all that kind of close by in 
town was quite amazing actually…’ 
Interviewer: ‘Would you use the word ‘inspirational’?’ 
Respondent (H): ‘Absolutely, yeah, absolutely. It said something. It gave out a 
message. It wasn’t a defined message, it was a vague message being sent out, it was 
kind of a ‘beacon’ lit up. It gave out this message of ‘fighting back’. That the police 
can be beaten. That you can actually fight against the police and you can kick the 
police out. You can ‘take the police’ basically…it gave out a kind of message of hope 
actually, it gave a message of ‘life’ of positive ‘life’…that if St. Paul’s had something 
in common with Southmead and we knew it had, cos we had seen that these kids were 
exactly the same as us. We had this in common.’600 
 
The confidence provided by their experience of the previous night’s attack on the 
police and the perceived ineffectual response, combined with the news of the 
‘successful uprising’ in St. Paul’s that had both travelled by word of mouth and via 
the mass media
601
 was a potent brew. Consequently larger numbers of youths
602
 were 
                                                 
600
 Oral History File H_18-02-2010 (0:46:25). 
601
 This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.0 Section 7.2.3. 
602
 Various estimates of the numbers of youths involved in at least the initial phases of the disturbances 
on Friday night are given in the sources. One oral history respondent recalled ‘On the second night 
twice as many people and especially kids was up to it’, Oral History File H_18-02-2010 (0:53:05) and 
newspapers reported that ‘more than 200 youths’ were involved, Western Daily Press (05-04-1980), 
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engaged in the disturbance on the Friday night and after nightfall they began to act. 
 
The disturbance commenced at around 9.00pm with youths breaking the windows of 
some of the shops close to the Southmead Youth Centre. According to one account 
this was a tactic to draw the police units who were dispersed around the estate into a 
confrontation: 
‘As it was the police who were the targets, they first needed to be lured 
from out of the back streets and in to the open, so shop windows on 
Greystoke Avenue were duly smashed, causing the desired effect’603 
For others in the crowd of youths merely smashing the windows and preparing for the 
inevitable confrontation with the police was seen as somewhat short-sighted. As far as 
they were concerned it was also an opportunity for looting as was recounted by an 
oral history respondent who was in the crowd: 
‘this mob come round…smashing the windows and kicking the windows 
in and that and this of course was like we’ll have a little bit of this 
ourselves… this is like, this is an opportunity… oh what can I have out of 
the window. Cos, some of em right, they kicked the windows in and fuck 
off. Wrrrrong. It’s like you kick the window in, the window falls in…look 
                                                                                                                                            
‘80 to 120 youths’, Bristol Evening Post (27-04-1980) and ‘150 youths’, The Times (11-04-1980). The 
annual report of the Avon and Somerset Constabulary stated ‘gangs of youths numbering some two 
hundred’ were engaged in the violence. Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Annual Report of the Chief 
Constable. (Bristol: 1980), p.40.  
603
 J. Serpico, ‘The Southmead Riots,’ Bristol Radical History Group (Bristol, 2006) 
http://www.brh.org.uk/articles/southmead.html. 
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at this! Ahh, me mum’s Christmas present! [laughs] You get all kinds of 
shit. Me mum’s going so why have I got two left shoes?’604 
Whether tactical or opportunist the smashing of the shop windows had the effect of 
luring the police units to the centre of the estate, the site of the previous night’s 
confrontation. Vanloads of police left their ‘hiding places’ and sped to the scene. 
Once again the police and their vehicles gathered as a big group close to the shops. 
‘Load of kids…hundreds of them it seemed, it was a lot of kids out on that 
night. The police got into one big bunch and they was basically a sitting 
duck. It was like a Cowboy film, with the wagons in one spot and all the 
Indians all about them on the outside. So then any kid could just pick up a 
stone and just lob it at some distance, you didn’t have to go in close to the 
police…you could just lob a stone and the police would just duck and just 
get out of the way being hit…Hails of stones were being chucked at them. 
All kinds of kids of all ages was just lobbing stuff at the police and the 
police were just taking it’605 
For the next hour or so the situation descended into a standoff with the police 
seemingly corralled and the crowds of youths facing them across the ‘Green’ 
intermittently stoning them. Between 10.00pm to 10.30pm people began to arrive 
from nearby houses and the two nearby pubs ‘The Pegasus’ and ‘The Standard of 
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 Oral History File J_12-02-2010 (0:04:19). 
605
 Oral History File H_18-02-2010 (0:56:33). 
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England’ which stood on opposite sides of Greystoke Avenue606. The gradual 
appearance of the wider community is remembered by one oral history respondent: 
‘All the people began coming out of the pubs and this was like blokes, 
older blokes. People was like coming up out of the estate, coming out of 
houses…to see what was going on, to watch this battle going on. Whole 
families, of all ages, old ladies, old men. It was like a kind of spectacle to 
watch. Nobody, oddly, was kind of going ‘shocking’. No one was 
condemning the kids, there wasn’t any of that. Nobody was saying ‘you 
bloody get home’ or stuff like that’607 
At this stage of the evening some of the new arrivals to the disturbance began to take 
an active rather than a tacit role: 
‘It was at that point that a lot of these blokes [from the pubs] began 
advising the kids about what to do. Like to move about and to come in at 
one angle and lob stones at them [the police]…[whilst] a second bunch of 
kids get them on the opposite side and lob stones. So some of these blokes 
were kind of guiding and giving advice. They had a lot of suss 
actually…they could kind of plan it. They could tell these kids what to do, 
how to go about it. I took that in actually, ‘cos I thought at the time, fuck, 
this wasn’t just wild and mindless, it was kind of planning going into it’ 
As the attacks on the police intensified, one particular moment, which was 
                                                 
606
 These public houses had rival clienteles, some of whom had a reputation for fighting each other on 
the ‘Green’. It appears these divisions were overcome during the ‘riots’. 
607
 Oral History File H_18-02-2010 (0:54:40). 
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remembered vividly by the respondent, exposed the relationship between the 
apparently tacit crowds of observers and the police: 
‘Somebody chucked a block…it went high up into the sky and landed full 
onto the window of a police van…It just smashed it and that was quite a 
sight. All these people, all about just roared. A massive cheer went up. All 
the people who was watching. All the kids who were chucking stones they 
saw this and they thought ‘yeah, fucking bullseye’… It must have shaken 
the police as well, it must have shaken them up. But that was quite 
illuminating to me because it kind of showed all of these local Southmead 
people, of all ages, not condemning this and actually thinking and saying 
out load ‘yeah, that was a good one’. That was an amazing moment to see 
this kind of unified applause. It showed again this kind of unity and it 
showed we’ve actually got a lot in common all of us lot. It showed that 
none of us were supporting the police, of all ages. That nobody was 
disgusted by this. They was applauding it. It defined the position of the 
police to us as a community. It showed explicitly that the police was not 
of the community…that there was a division between us and that nobody 
gave much backing to the police’608 
For more than an hour the police apparently failed to respond to the attacks being 
made on them. It is unclear whether this was due to operational policy or a lack of 
orders. As far as one respondent was concerned the inaction of the police was in fact a 
psychological consequence of the situation: 
                                                 
608
 Oral History File H_18-02-2010 (0:59:28). This event is partly corroborated by a report of the 
breaking of a police van window during the disturbances in the Bristol Evening Post (21-05-1980). 
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‘It showed as well that the police was a bit frightened. You could tell that. 
They wasn’t up for having a go back at these kids. They were intimidated 
by the scale, by the amount of kids they were up against. The scale of the 
people all about watching. The police would have seen that they was 
isolated…they were the alien element in that community’609 
According to police sources nineteen arrests were made on the Friday
610
, though it 
appears the majority were made towards the end of the disturbance that night. 
According to a participant these were mainly peripheral to the main crowds as groups 
began to drift away from the scene: 
‘There was a line of coppers who were on the outskirts without getting too 
involved. I think what they done is contained it and I’ll tell you what if 
you moved out of the section and if you were out in the streets, three or 
four of you…that’s when they were gonna get you…pick you off…they 
were never going to go into the main [crowds] were they? They’re going 
to pick people on the edges. They come in they take out people on the 
edges, you know’611 
This testimony supports the view that the police were either unwilling or unable to 
make mass arrests amongst the hundreds of participants in the disturbance of Friday 
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 Oral History File H_18-02-2010 (1:10:49). 
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 This figure is derived from the thirty-one arrests that the police stated were made over the two days 
of the disorders. Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Annual Report of the Chief Constable. (Bristol: 
1980), p.40. 
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4
th
 April. 
 
There was minimal coverage in the local press of the more serious events of the 
Friday night in Southmead. However during the clear up operation on the Saturday 
morning a resident discovered a crate containing seven Molotov cocktail firebombs 
hidden under a hedge in Ashburton Road, a few hundred yards from the scene of the 
violence. She alerted the police who mounted a surveillance operation on the location 
and eventually arrested five youths between the ages of 13 and 19. This particular 
story made the local and national press
612
 and through its ‘shock’ value, dominated 
the few reports about the Friday disturbance. In so doing it effectively functioned as a 
mask, disguising the lack of detailed accounts of the actual nature of the disorder in 
the media
613
. 
6.4 Epilogue: Knowle West, the ‘riot’ that never was… 
6.4.1 Introduction 
 
Following the disturbances over the start of the Easter weekend in Southmead the 
Monday edition of the Western Daily Press carried an editorial entitled ‘Lessons for 
the young’ which stated that ‘HOOLIGANISM in Southmead and Knowle West 
                                                 
612
 Western Daily Press (12-04-1980), Bristol Evening Post (27-04-1981) and The Times (11-04-1980).  
613
 A similar emphasis was made of this relatively minor incident in the Chief Constable’s Annual 
Report for 1980. Ibid. p.40. The response in Southmead was more humorous as one oral history 
respondent recalled ‘I knew one of the kids who was arrested [name deleted]. He was quite 
embarrassed about it, by the fact that he was caught, I mean. He wasn't at all ashamed of his 
involvement as I remember him sporting a t-shirt the following week that had emblazoned upon it 
'Southmead Urban Guerrilla'. In hindsight, I suspect that he was too young at the time to have gone out 
and got it printed himself and he must have had help from his parents. Which suggests that they weren't 
ashamed either...’ Unpublished e-mail to the author 10-01-2011. 
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follows the riots in Bristol’s St. Pauls’614. The only reference made in the rest of that 
edition of the newspaper as to what had actually occurred in Knowle West was a short 
article referring to some slogans daubed on three shops in the area
615
. However, 
clearly ‘something had happened’ over the weekend of 4th-6th April to spur the 
comment in the editorial. Further research in the local media, available police reports 
and similar primary sources failed to locate any reference to the mysterious event in 
the South Bristol neighbourhood. It is unclear whether this was a result of suppression 
of information by the Avon and Somerset Constabulary due to the fear of the 
contagion potentially sparking further disturbances in the wake of the St. Paul’s 
disorder or merely that the ‘hooliganism’ was considered to be of minor importance. 
Either way the Knowle West ‘incident’ vanished into a deeper obscurity than even the 
underreported Southmead disturbances of April 1980. 
 
Knowle West is a mainly White working class district approximately three kilometres 
south of the city centre. It had a high concentration of local authority housing in 1980 
and was referenced in both of the major local government reports into ‘poverty’ in the 
early 1980s as being an area of significant deprivation
616
. The area certainly had a 
reputation of being ‘tough’ amongst most Bristolians and in some ways played the 
same demonised role in south Bristol as Southmead did in the north of the city. The 
vast majority of teenagers attended one of the two schools in the area Merrywood 
                                                 
614
 Western Daily Press (07-04-1980). The reference to the plural ‘riots’ in St. Paul’s is left 
unexplained, probably as a result of the editor’s enthusiasm rather than a basis in fact. 
615
 The slogans were painted on the shops in the early hours of Sunday April 6
th
 and included ‘Kill the 
Bill’, ‘Kill All Police’ and ‘Mental Mob’, Western Daily Press (07-04-1980) p.2. 
616
 Avon County Council, Social Stress in Avon, 1981: A Preliminary Analysis and Bristol City 
Council. Planning Department, Poverty in Bristol: Final Report. 
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boys and Merrywood girls
617
. This concentration of local pupils for schooling and the 
small numbers of ‘New Commonwealth’618 pupils mirrored to a certain extent the 
isolation of Southmead, though the area was both closer to the city-centre and more 
accessible than the latter district. 
 
6.4.2 Knowle West: April 4th-5th 1980 
 
In order to discover what ‘happened’ in Knowle West in the wake of the St. Paul’s 
disturbance of April 1980 we must turn to oral histories from the participants. One 
particular respondent, a White teenage punk from Knowle West who had both links to 
St. Paul’s and had travelled with his friends to the disturbance619 on the Wednesday 
(2
nd
 April) remembered the beginning of the Easter weekend (4
th
-5
th
 April) in Knowle 
West: 
‘The word went round Knowle that we were all going to meet up and have 
a ‘riot’…there must have been three hundred people, three hundred youths 
in Filwood Broadway, just hanging around, all tooled up, bottles, ready to 
go. And then when we arrived we think that somebody had got the word 
out to the Old Bill because there were just Old Bill everywhere. Like there 
                                                 
617
 Both of these comprehensive schools had more than a thousand pupils in 1980. According to oral 
history respondents the only other option for schooling was ‘if you were a Catholic’ in which case you 
would attend the smaller St. Bernadette School three kilometres southeast of the centre of the Knowle 
West estate. 
618
 Merrywood boys and girls schools had 5% or less pupils of ‘New Commonwealth’ origin. Avon 
County Council, County of Avon Education Department. Multi-cultural Education Centre. Avon 
Schools at which members of Staff of Multi-cultural Education Centre are teaching- April 1980.  
619
 See Chapter 7.0 Section 7.2.5. 
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was probably, it seemed like there was two Old Bill to every one person 
and it just got quelled. A few bottles got thrown and they just marched on 
us and we all sort of dispersed, basically’620 
The chosen meeting point for the ‘riot’ was again a symbolic location, ‘The Green’ at 
the top of Filwood Broadway, the main shopping street in the local area and close to 
the centre of the Knowle West estate, Melvin Square as shown in Figure 23. The 
respondent recalled the effect that the St. Paul’s ‘riot’ had on the youth in the area: 
‘Everybody was like gee’d up about St. Paul’s and the feeling was that the 
whole of Britain was gonna go…it was a few days after the St. Paul’s riots 
‘cos that sort of, you know inspired a lot of people’621 
He also provides an interesting insight into the organisational forms and mechanisms 
for the transfer of information between the youth of Knowle West prior to the 
incident: 
 
Interviewer: ‘How did you know about that then, how did you find out about what 
was going to happen then?’ 
Respondent (F): ‘It was just word of mouth round the streets. Kiddies would just 
come around on their bikes. ‘Cos we used to…when we were in Knowle West there 
used to be gangs of kids. ‘Cos there was no youth club or nothing like that, well there 
was a youth club but it finished at nine o’clock or something. So what you used to do 
                                                 
620
 The ‘Old Bill’ is a colloquial expression for the police. Oral History File F_27-08-2010_Part_2 
(00:00:05). 
621
 Oral History File F_27-08-2010_Part_2 (00:00:40). 
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was to hang out then and go and hang around by the chip shop. So there used to be a 
gang at Jarman’s, a gang at Novers Park, there used to be a gang down by the Inn’s 
Court pub. We all knew each other and we were all mates, it weren’t gangs that 
was…you know…but where different people used to hang out…’ 
Interviewer: ‘You knew each other from school?’ 
Respondent (F): ‘We knew each other from school and just from the community 
basically, yeah. People would go round on bikes saying ‘We’re meeting at the thing, 
we’re meeting at the thing’. It all went round and everybody sort of met there. It was a 
word of mouth thing really’ 
Interviewer: ‘So they decided to meet in…’ 
Respondent (F): ‘In Filwood Broadway at the top on the ‘Green’’622 
 
It is interesting to note that the respondent explains that the gangs should not be 
understood as warring factions, but instead that ‘We all knew each other and we were 
all mates’. The gangs were not defined by specific sub-cultural or similar allegiances 
but merely spatially located according to where young people lived and had attended 
junior school in the area
623
. The four youth gangs named by the respondent who 
participated in the disturbance, the ‘Cosso Crew’ (Cossington Road), the ‘Jarman’s 
Crew’ (Jarman’s off licence), the ‘Inns of Court Crew’ (Inns of Court public house) 
and the ‘Novers Hill Crew’ (Novers Park Drive) have their ‘hangouts’ marked by blue 
circles in Figure 23. 
                                                 
622
 Oral History File F_27-08-2010_Part_2 (00:00:57). 
623
 There were several junior schools in the area. The respondent added that those who had attended the 
single Catholic school had experienced more contact with other areas as it had a wider catchment area 
(including Hartcliffe, Knowle and Hengrove). 
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Reproduced by permission of Geographers' A-Z Map Co. Ltd.  ©Crown copyright and database rights 2014 Ordnance Survey 
100017302 
Figure 23: The centre of the Knowle West ‘estate’ and Filwood Broadway 
 
Organisational forms above the local gang level had been part of the history of 
Knowle West youth in their inter-estate ‘wars’ with nearby rivals from Hartcliffe624. 
The respondent went on to explain: 
‘If there was trouble with Hartcliffe, we used to try and get a crew 
together and that what was going round. So people used to go around 
‘Right there’s trouble, they’re coming’…we’d try and get a crew together 
                                                 
624
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and go down and see what was going on. And obviously the more you get 
together the more intimidating you are…’625 
The same method for spreading news and gathering the youth gangs together was 
used to organise the ‘riot’ in Filwood Broadway, this time however rather than their 
nearby rivals, it was the police that were the target.  The particular organisational 
form employed by the youth of Knowle West can be understood in the same manner 
as the ‘firm’ in inter-fan football violence. That is, an organised collective made up of 
smaller gangs (or ‘crews’) with their own personal loyalties but sharing an overall 
allegiance, in this case to Knowle West (rather than a football club).  This is clear 
when the respondent describes the composition of the crowd that arrived at the 
‘Green’.  
 
Interviewer: ‘What sort of ages were they?’ 
Respondent (F): ‘Thirteen, fourteen, up to twenty, I guess, twenty, twenty-one.’ 
Interviewer: ‘And the vast majority would have been White people then?’ 
Respondent (F): ‘Yeah, ninety-five per cent ‘cos of where it was…’ 
Interviewer: ‘Was it kiddies just from Knowle West?’ 
Respondent (F): ‘Yeah, just kiddies from Knowle West’ 
Interviewer: ‘So the [names deleted from Hartcliffe] weren’t there?’ [laughs] 
Respondent (F): ‘No, no, no they were in Hartcliffe’ 
Interviewer: ‘So they wouldn’t have come over then?’ 
Respondent (F): ‘…if they had of come and it was against the Old Bill then probably 
they’d’ve been welcome. They probably would’ve been welcome…people used to 
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 Oral History File F_27-08-2010_Part_2 (00:04:55). 
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keep to themselves basically. People used to stay in their own areas. There was more 
tension between Knowle West and Hartcliffe than there was between Knowle West 
and St. Paul’s’626 
 
Interestingly the respondent later added that one of the leaders of his gang (the 
‘Jarman’s Crew’) who was colloquially known as ‘The General’ had attempted to 
contact rival gangs in nearby Hartcliffe prior to the planned ‘riot’ in order to solicit 
their support, but with little success. He speculates in his testimony that if their arch 
rivals from Hartcliffe had turned up to the planned ‘riot’ against the police then they 
would have been accepted for pragmatic reasons and the understanding that they were 
up against ‘bigger’ enemy shared by both groups of youths.  
 
The hundreds of youths that did gather on the ‘Green’ were, according to the 
respondent, the biggest ‘crew’ he had ever seen and it brought out older residents in 
the neighbourhood: 
 
Respondent (F): ‘We all went up there [to Filwood Broadway], there were loads of 
people out as well, load of the locals were out on the street, and you know, some for, 
some against…’ 
Interviewer: ‘So it got round the older people as well?’ 
Respondent (F): ‘It got round the older people as well, what was gonna go on…’627 
 
The youths were met by a massive pro-active police response, which in itself is a 
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 Oral History File F_27-08-2010_Part_2 (00:02:42). 
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 Oral History File F_27-08-2010_Part_2 (00:01:52). 
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testament to the importance the Avon and Somerset Constabulary gave the potential 
of such incidents in the wake of the disturbances they had recently experienced. 
According to the respondent he had never seen so many police in Knowle West: 
Interviewer: ‘They [the police] were already there then?’ 
Respondent (F): ‘They were already there. We arrived and they were in vans and 
then they got out...there must have been about twenty vans lined up. And each van 
was packed. So they knew what was going on and they were prepared’628 
 
The Knowle West ‘riot’ was effectively ‘snuffed out’ before it could begin, as a result 
of advance intelligence and on the day by weight of police numbers.  The event 
effectively remained unreported in the local media and obscured as ‘hooliganism’ or 
‘vandalism’ where it was alluded to. The similarity to the form and content of the 
Southmead disturbances is, however, striking. 
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7.0 The ‘Bristol Riots’: An Analysis 
 
‘Four Police constables were injured in a midnight battle with a crowd of 150 
skinheads on Birmingham’s Castle Vale estate on Friday. Chanting “Bristol, Bristol” 
the skinheads attacked the Police as they tried to arrest a youth’629 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The following chapter is devoted to a detailed analysis of selected aspects of the April 
1980 ‘Bristol riots’. The chapter commences with a comparative examination of the 
three case studies, which considers the temporal and spatial nature of the disorders as 
well as the apparent motives of the participants during the events. This is followed by 
‘thick’ descriptions of some aspects of the disorders, which were ignored by the 
secondary sources. In particular these focus on relations of force, negotiation and the 
desires of some of the participants, the sub-cultural links and social networks that 
helped create the crowds and the mechanisms for the transmission of information 
which facilitated the ‘riot’ contagion. Various concepts associated with ‘riot’ are also 
examined in relation to the events, specifically those concerned with under-researched 
categories of ‘looters’, ‘agitators’ and ‘travellers’. 
 
The quantitative data presented in the following chapter is used to substantiate various 
facets of the disturbances in Bristol in April 1980. Data on the characteristics (age, 
gender, subculture and ethnicity) of the oral history respondents is employed to 
demonstrate both their diversity and connectivity. Social network analysis is used to 
expose connections between ethnic groups and sub-cultures in St. Paul’s in order to 
help explain the composition of the ‘rioting’ crowd(s). Samples of offenders in the 
disorders are utilised to show differences in the propensity of participants to travel to 
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rioting locales. Finally, a detailed analysis of properties targeted by ‘rioters’ in St. 
Paul’s and a study of the age and gender of a sample of ‘looters’ are undertaken to 
investigate the composition and agency of the crowds during the disorder. 
 
7.2 The anatomy of the ‘Bristol Riots’ 
 
7.2.1 Comparisons 
 
It is pertinent to begin with the differences between the disturbances in Bristol in 
April 1980 associated with the initiation, temporal pattern and longevity of the events. 
Although the specific ‘flashpoint’ of the St. Paul’s disorder at the Black and White 
café is debatable it is clear that the raid initiated by ‘A’ division of the Avon and 
Somerset Constabulary had a key role in gathering the crowds of onlookers to the 
location and set the scene for the drama that was to follow. Despite the retrospective 
assertions by the Chief Constable that the raid was ‘routine’, a ‘low key’ operation 
and that the numbers of police officers involved was ‘normal’630 there is a serious 
contradiction implicit in these comments.  
 
If the raid was a routine affair, then certain premises in St. Paul’s would have been 
targeted a number of times previously for similar types of police operation
631
. This 
would suggest that launching surprise raids using large numbers of police officers was 
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 Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Press Conference Following the Disturbances in St. Paul's: New 
Bridewell: 11.00am Thursday April 3rd 1980, p.1 and Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
Serious Disturbances in St. Paul's, Bristol on 2 April 1980: A Memorandum Placed in the Library of 
the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Following the Report made 
to Him by the Chief Constable of the Avon and Somerset Constabulary, p.1. 
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actually part of day-to-day policing in St. Paul’s, which was patently not the case in 
other parts of Bristol.  The Chief Constable appears to have assumed that the residents 
should be happy with having their neighbourhood policed differently to other areas of 
the city. It also presupposes that they should get used to the normality of raids rather 
than become increasingly angered by them. Conversely, if the raid was not routine 
then the possibility of an unforeseen reaction was greater. In either case, it is clear that 
the possibility for reaction was present whether due to the expected or the unexpected. 
The evidence discussed in Chapter 6.0 Section 6.2.1 suggests that the former was the 
case and consequently the police did anticipate some form of reaction. This explains 
the deployment of significant numbers of personnel to the operation. What they 
clearly did not foresee was the magnitude and ferocity of that response. 
 
The St. Paul’s event can thus be characterised as a defensive reaction by a section of 
the community, ‘triggered’ by an infrequent incident (the ‘raid’) but nonetheless 
historically recognised police action. In contrast the Southmead and to some extent 
the Knowle West incidents were quite different in that the initial protagonists from 
these communities chose locations in which to launch offensive actions against the 
Constabulary. Although arguably, the locations of all three points of initiation were 
symbolic to both sides (the ‘frontline’ and the two ‘Greens’ respectively) the second 
two events were ‘triggered’ by some residents of the neighbourhoods rather than 
being due to specific police actions. 
 
The St. Paul’s ‘riot’, although of considerably greater magnitude and intensity than 
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the disorders in Southmead and Knowle West
632
, was confined to the afternoon and 
evening of 2
nd
 April 1980. The Southmead disturbances lasted at least two nights and 
increased in intensity before decaying to minor incidents
633
. Thus they exhibit the 
classical pattern of growth, peak and decline, which is analysed in greater detail as 
part of the analysis of the wave of July 1981 riots in Chapter 4.0 Section 4.4.2. The 
tentative nature of police tactics on the first night of the Southmead disturbances was 
cited by one oral history respondent as the reason why the confidence of the ‘rioters’ 
grew
634
 and may explain the longevity of this particular series of disturbances. In 
contrast, the Knowle West incident was apparently ‘nipped in the bud’ by police 
action and lasted less than an hour. Arguably, the longevity of the St. Paul’s 
disturbance was also impeded by the major policing operation that was launched in 
the area over the succeeding five days
635
.  
 
Having discussed some of the evident situational and temporal dissimilarities between 
the disturbances, it is worth considering the characteristics they shared. It is 
immediately apparent that in the case of all three incidents that physical violence to 
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 Using the measure of riot intensity developed in Section 4.3.3 of Chapter 4.0 to categorise the three 
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April 3
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 See Chapter 6.0 Section 6.3.1 and 6.3.2. 
635
 Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Policing the St. Paul's Area, Bristol, 4th-9th April 1980. 
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the person was almost entirely focussed on the police officers that were present. The 
only real exceptions to this were some reports of fire engines being stoned as they 
attempted to extinguish blazes in St. Paul’s636. There were no corroborated reports of 
intra-crowd violence in any of the disorders and only isolated accounts of the crowds 
intentionally attacking firemen
637
. Of the ten civilians who were injured in the St. 
Paul’s disturbance, Reicher stated: 
‘Apart from the Police who, without exception seem to have been targets 
of attack, the only victims of intentional violence were T.V. and other 
camera operators and photographers. This seems to have been simply a 
function of the fact that people in the crowd were afraid of the film being 
                                                 
636
 According to the Bristol Evening Post (03-04-1980) three firemen sustained minor injuries, though 
the Daily Mail (03-4-1980) stated ‘it was not clear whether they were hit by the missiles or hurt fire-
fighting’. The Sun (03-04-1980) claimed firemen had been ‘punched, kicked and stoned as they tackled 
the blazes’, though this was not a verifiable quote or substantiated by any other sources. The police 
communications log has many messages relayed from Avon Fire Brigade, but none refer to any attacks 
directed at them. The Chief Constable in his comprehensive assessment of the injuries in his report to 
the Secretary of State for the Home Department makes no mention of any injuries to firemen, only 
minor damage to their vehicles; Secretary of State for the Home Department, Serious Disturbances in 
St. Paul's, Bristol on 2 April 1980: A Memorandum Placed in the Library of the House of Commons by 
the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Following the Report made to Him by the Chief 
Constable of the Avon and Somerset Constabulary, p.7. One oral history respondent stated ‘There was 
quite a large crowd of people on the Green by now and it had quite a carnival atmosphere! The fire 
engines tried to get in to extinguish the by now, several burning cars and bank building, but were 
chased off.... the bank was a small single storey building and posed no danger to other buildings. I'm 
pretty sure the engines were stoned, so they left’ Unpublished e-mail to author 17-10-2010. 
637
 The only reported incidents occurred in the St. Paul’s disturbance where one or two civilian vehicles 
driving through the area were stoned. See Chapter 6.0 Section 6.2.5 note 542. 
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used by the Police…Apart from the photographers, all the civilians seem 
to have been hurt either by the Police or in the cross fire of stones between 
the Police and the crowd’638 
In St. Paul’s the intense violence that was unleashed during the latter stages of the 
second phase of the disturbance ceased the moment that the police withdrew from the 
perceived boundaries of the area. After this point there were no reports of violence 
against the person, only against property. In the Southmead and Knowle West 
incidents there were no reported civilian injures.  
 
Another shared characteristic in all three case studies concerns the perception of a 
collective identity within the crowds who drove out or attacked the police. Reicher 
provides ample oral history evidence for this phenomenon in the case of the first 
example, which he defines to be ‘a St. Paul’s community member’639. In the case of 
Southmead the oral history respondents repeatedly stated that the police were not ‘of 
the community’ or not ‘of Southmead’640. Certainly the apparent aim of the stone 
throwers and the crowds of onlookers who cheered them on during the Friday night 
disturbance was to eject the alien police presence from their community. 
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 Reicher, The St. Paul’s Riot: An Explanation of the Limits of Crowd Action in Terms of a Social 
Identity Model, p.195. The seizing and destruction of cameras from people taking photographs of the 
disturbance within the crowds was also recalled by on oral history respondent who stated ‘Oh and there 
was a young kiddie that some of us knew who brought his brand new fucking couple o’ hundred pound 
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out of his hand and danced on’. Oral History File G_09-10-2009 (0:12:18). 
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 Ibid. p.204. 
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 See particularly the comments by the oral history respondent (H) in Section 6.3.2. 
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7.2.2 Relations of force and negotiation: reality and desire 
 
None of the secondary sources that examined the St. Paul’s disturbance investigated 
whether formal or informal negotiations took place between the ‘rioting’ community 
and the Avon and Somerset Constabulary and if they did what the form and content of 
these ‘meetings’ was. This remains a particularly contentious subject in the history of 
urban disturbances in the 1980s
641
. It appears that there were two moments where 
individual senior police officers at the scene made attempts to intervene or parley 
within the crowds that were present. Some national and local newspapers ran stories, 
which attempted to demonstrate the futility of such actions, insinuating that the 
crowds were pathologically or irrationally violent. One example stated: 
‘One tall policeman in a white shirt with short sleeves walked through this 
crowd, telling everyone to move along, but then he got stones thrown at 
him. The rest of the Police formed up ranks to get him out’642 
The Chief Constable also recounted in his report to the Government that a 
Superintendent in plain clothes had attempted to address a crowd in the area 
controlled by the ‘rioters’ and had been subsequently attacked643. The inclusion of 
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 For example John Clare was the BBC’s community affairs correspondent and was present in the 
Brixton ‘riots’ of April 1981. Clare mediated a negotiation between the two sides during the riot, which 
included facilitating an interview with the media and a parley with a masked representative of the 
‘rioters’ during which their demands were articulated. Information about this incident was not made 
public at the time though it did feature in the later Scarman Report. Clare, Eyewitness in Brixton, p.51 
and Scarman, The Scarman Report, p.58. 
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643
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these two instances in the media and state narratives is interesting as the function they 
appear to serve is to highlight the bravery of the police officers but more crucially to 
emphasise the futility of face to face negotiation.  
 
After the Avon and Somerset Constabulary had withdrawn from the immediate area 
of St. Paul’s at 7.30pm senior officers did begin to consult with some people whom 
they regarded as ‘community leaders’. Around 8.30pm at Trinity Road police station 
contacts were sought by a Chief Inspector acting as community liaison officer with 
connections to the Bristol Commission for Racial Equality (BCRE). Three members 
of the executive council of the BCRE and two magistrates responded
644
. There is 
some evidence that these exchanges were not intended merely for negotiation but 
tactically in order to gain intelligence on the situation, as at this point in the 
disturbance the police were effectively ‘blind’ to what was happening in the area645. It 
is unclear what the content and outcome of these contacts was although the Chief 
Constable stated in the press conference on the following morning: 
‘I also ought to say that we did have the services of members of the local 
Community Relations Council, and leaders of the ethnic minorities to try 
and cool the thing down and damp it down. Unfortunately they didn’t 
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 Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Avon and Somerset Constabulary Support Services Division 
Report (C.I. Lane) ‘Community Relations’. (Bristol Record Office POL/LG/1/9, 1980). 
645
 This is supported by the Chief Constable’s statements about the intelligence gathering operation he 
launched in St. Paul’s during this time period. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.0 Section 
6.2.5. 
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succeed’646 
The most salient fact is that these contacts were made after the police had been driven 
out of the area rather than prior to the raid on the Black and White café or during the 
three or so hours of intermittent violence which preceded their humiliating 
withdrawal. 
 
At this stage of the disturbance, the relations of force between the state and the 
revolting sections of the ‘community’ of St. Paul’s were exposed to both sides. 
Certainly some of the ‘rioters’, who were effectively in control of the area, were 
aware of the potentialities of the situation, in particular the possible responses of the 
police on their inevitable return. One oral history respondent recalled: 
‘Yeah, now that was quite frightening. Cos you really did think they [the 
police] were gonna come in heavy and armed because…the area down 
there, only about half a square mile was involved as such…and cos [we’d] 
seen what they’d done in Ireland and other places of, shall we say, civil 
unrest.’647 
Several respondents recounted a plan that was hatched by the ‘rioters’ after the police 
had withdrawn to spread the attacks on property to nearby major commercial centres: 
‘They planned to move later into the city centre to promote the cause 
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 Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Press Conference Following the Disturbances in St. Paul's: New 
Bridewell: 11.00am Thursday April 3rd 1980, p.11. 
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 Oral History File G_09-10-2009 (0:16:14). 
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wider by attacking large corporations such as Debenhams and Lewis’s’648 
According to one respondent the threat of further destruction of property was used as 
a bargaining counter in some ‘negotiations’ that were initiated by the rioters with the 
police force via anonymous phone calls: 
 
Respondent (G): ‘There was a few meetings going on from concerned individuals, 
shall we say, and it was suggested that if they [the police] come in again heavy, then 
the whole of Broadmead would go up. I think that come from politicised Blacks, who 
were down there’ 
Interviewer: And how did they communicate that to the authorities? 
Respondent (G): On the day, went through them. A few people went and talked. 
Which has got to be done, you know. Got to put yourself out a little bit. I think some 
people were phoning. But that was brilliant, absolutely brilliant, cos people were 
scared’649 
 
Only one media source makes reference to these anonymous phone calls to the police 
in quoting a local resident (and reader of Socialist Worker): 
‘The whole thing [the ‘riot’] would have spread. The only way it stopped 
was when the punks phoned Trinity Rd. Police Station and said: ‘Unless 
you release Bertram [Wilkes] we’ll spread the riot to the main 
                                                 
648
 Statement by Ras Judah to Karen Garvey of the Museum of Bristol 26-02-2009. 
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 Oral History File G_09-10-2009 (0:16:14). Broadmead was the main shopping area in central 
Bristol, less than half a mile from St. Paul’s. 
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shopping centre’. Within minutes he was released’650 
The proprietor of the Black and White café, Bertram Wilkes, who had been arrested 
during the police raid earlier in the afternoon, was released without charge (but on 
police bail) at 9.00pm, approximately an hour and a half after the withdrawal of the 
police from St. Paul’s651. The Chief Inspector who was acting as community liaison 
officer made the following statement in his notes: 
‘At approximately 22.15 I went to the ‘new garage’ Lower Ashley Road 
to R.V. [rendezvous] with WILKES – owner of Black and White who had 
phoned offering to address crowd with a loud hailer. In spite of assistance 
of Rev. Keith Kimber, and waiting for nearly one hour I was unable to 
locate him’652 
It is interesting that a senior police officer was willing to enter a ‘riot’ zone to consort 
with a suspect whose arrest earlier in the afternoon on a drugs charge arguably helped 
precipitate the disorder. Clearly, the police were desperate to find anyone in the 
community (despite their criminal and possibly iconic status in the disturbance) who 
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 This author’s emphasis in bold. Socialist Worker 12-04-1980 p.5. 
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 The time of his release is stated by one source: Bristol Disturbances. The Chief Constable stated in a 
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 The ‘new garage’ was situated half way along Lower Ashley Road close to the M32 roundabout. 
This was effectively within the area affected by the ‘rioting’ and looting. Avon and Somerset 
Constabulary, Avon and Somerset Constabulary Support Services Division Report (C.I. Lane) 
‘Community Relations’. 
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could defuse the violent situation after ineffectual results with members of the 
Community Relations Council. It is unclear if the ‘early’ release of Wilkes was down 
to threatening phone calls from anonymous ‘rioters’ or whether his subsequent role as 
a ‘peacemaker’ was part of that arrangement, but this evidence does point towards 
attempts by the police to negotiate with the ‘crowds’ that were in control of the streets 
in St. Paul’s. 
 
These passages are illuminating in that there is realisation amongst some of the St. 
Paul’s ‘rioters’ of the precarious situation of ‘dual power’ for the community. There 
was also recognition that negotiation was necessary but that it had to be done from a 
position of strength, hence the threat of more widespread destruction. The very fact 
that these fairly sophisticated responses were developed amongst at least some of the 
‘rioters’ points to a hidden history of spontaneous organisational forms in the 
disturbance. Some impromptu meetings were clearly taking place on the street and 
responses were being articulated and communicated to the local state in order to 
protect ‘the community’ from a perceived potential backlash.  
 
It is, of course, possible that these memories derived from the oral history respondents 
and other sources merely reflected their desires at the time of the disturbance (or even 
afterwards)
653
. It is also unclear from any official sources whether these informal 
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 In her analysis of oral testimony Passerini stated ‘the raw material of oral history consists not just in 
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negotiations actually took place or that the authorities acceded to the threats. Similarly 
the multiple intelligence reports received by the Avon and Somerset Constabulary 
(some of which were from ‘reliable’ sources in St. Paul’s) concerning the intervention 
of large numbers of armed outsiders travelling from Birmingham, Coventry and 
London
654
 may have played a similar role to the threats of the ‘rioters’. That is they 
confronted the police commanders in Bristol with the peril of a violent countrywide 
reaction if they unleashed severe repression during their operation to ‘retake’ St. 
Paul’s. For reasons already discussed, it is extremely unlikely that senior police 
officers would have made information about these threats and potential negotiations 
public. Instead it had to appear (at least) as if their ignominious withdrawal and 
subsequent responses to the disturbance were on their own terms rather than being 
influenced by organised ‘rioters’ amongst the St. Paul’s community. 
 
7.2.3 ‘Copycat’ and ‘Contagion’ 
 
Several historical questions are thrown up by the near simultaneous disturbances of 
St. Paul’s (2nd April), Southmead (3rd-4th April) and Knowle West (4th-5th April) in 
Bristol in 1980. These relate to whether the initial incident in St. Paul’s influenced or 
even caused the latter episodes and if so, how did this occur? Certainly the temporal 
proximity of the series of these ‘riots’ begs the former question and in turn leads to 
the latter. However, considering the incidents from a spatial perspective appears to 
confound this link. The three areas in question are clearly not adjacent to each other or 
                                                                                                                                            
communist militants in Italy. A. Portelli, ‘Uchronic Dreams: Working-Class Memory and Possible 
Worlds,’ in The Myths we Live by, eds. R. Samuel and P. Thompson, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 
1990), pp.143-60. 
654
 See Chapter 6.0 Section 6.2.5. 
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even located in the same districts of Bristol. Southmead lies six kilometres north of 
the city centre, Knowle West more than three kilometres south and St. Paul’s is the 
only area actually located in the ‘inner city’ approximately one kilometre to the 
northeast (see Figure 24). So in spatial terms the three neighbourhoods were very far 
apart.  
 
Figure 24: Location within the City of Bristol of the Southmead, Ashley (St. Paul's) and Filwood 
(Knowle West) electoral wards (Bristol City Council 2003) 
 
The considerable geographic separation of the three disturbances in Bristol lends itself 
 
Southmead Ward 
Ashley Ward 
Filwood Ward 
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towards a somewhat superficial understanding of the diffusion of disorders as being 
purely based upon the transmission of information through the mass media, 
specifically the television. In order to test this theory, all of the oral history 
respondents were asked how they first received information about the St. Paul’s 
disturbance on April 2
nd
 1980. Table 24 gives the results of the survey: 
 
Respondent Home locale 
Means of 
transmission 
of 
information 
Participant in 
April 2
nd
 1980 
St. Paul’s 
disturbance? 
Participant in 
a subsequent 
disturbance in 
April 1980? 
A St. Paul’s Eyewitness Yes No 
G St. Paul’s Eyewitness Yes No 
D St. Paul’s Eyewitness Yes No 
L St. Paul’s Eyewitness Yes No 
E St. Paul’s Eyewitness Yes No 
C St. Paul’s Eyewitness No No 
I St. Paul’s Eyewitness No No 
B St. Paul’s Eyewitness No No 
H Southmead Word of mouth No Yes 
J Southmead Word of mouth No Yes 
N Southmead Television No No 
F Knowle West Television Yes Yes 
K Knowle West Word of mouth No No 
M Hartcliffe Word of mouth No No 
Table 24: Survey of oral history respondents with reference to initial source of information about 
the St. Paul’s disturbance of April 2nd 1980  
 
The survey is somewhat inconclusive in that information about the St. Paul’s riot was 
derived from a mixture of situations, word of mouth and television news reports and 
did not bear a direct relation to participation in that or subsequent disturbances. It is 
clear a more detailed account of the particular circumstances in which the information 
was received and how this information affected the participants in areas outside of St. 
Paul’s is required. The following excerpts are from three respondents from 
Southmead and a fourth from Knowle West who were asked about where and how 
they first received information about the St. Paul’s ‘riot’: 
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Excerpt 1 (Southmead) 
Respondent (J): Most…like me when I was young I didn’t watch the news. The last 
thing I ever wanted to do was watch the news…all my news was [from] my mates at 
school…They used to ship a lot of pupils up from St. Paul’s. So there was a lot of 
Afro-Caribbean’s, a lot of Asian guys…That was happening just before the riots, 
because they were all involved in the riots in St. Paul’s… 
Interviewer: Was anybody bragging about being in St. Paul’s? 
Respondent (J): Yeah, course there was. Yeah, there was a guy…a big Black 
guy…he was there [in St. Paul’s]…he was in my class. He come in [one] day strutting 
and telling us, what he was doing. He was telling us you know, he’d done this to the 
copper’s car and he’d put this through this and he hit…hit a copper with this and 
that’655 
 
Excerpt 2 (Southmead) 
Respondent (N): I remember watching it on television, more than anything really 
with the St. Paul’s riots…I remember thinking…there’s a couple of guys…there was 
a guy called [name deleted] and I thought well he goes to our school. I think he was 
one of the ones…I thought there was a famous shot of him holding a paving slab over 
a coppers head and its just sort of stands out as a memory. I thought we know him and 
in school we were taking about it afterwards…he was a big Afro-Caribbean guy… 
Interviewer: So you said that you had heard about the ‘St. Paul’s’ riot from seeing 
someone on television. Was that right? 
Respondent (N): He wasn’t in school, the guy we saw on telly, he weren’t in school. 
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We wondered what happened to him. The thing is he was on telly. Me and me brother 
were going look at so and so…. He was year younger than us and he was a big 
bloke…he was a big lad, he was a tough boy…He would have handled himself…We 
didn’t see him in school again. 
Interviewer: Were there other kiddies who you can remember talking about it [the St. 
Paul’s riot]? 
Respondent (N): We talked, there was another lad we kind of recognised [on TV] 
and he said he was kind of down there. We heard he might have gone down for it…656 
 
Excerpt 3 (Southmead) 
‘Now obviously via the Evening Post because I kept the cuttings of it, but I would not 
have been watching the television news…but it makes sense that in 1980 possibly, 
Black kids who lived in St. Paul’s began going to school in Southmead and it was that 
connection. So the kids in St. Paul’s would have witnessed St. Paul’s kicking off and 
they would’ve went to school in Southmead and they would have gone to the youth 
club and obviously [there] was Black families in Southmead and they would’ve all 
been mixing with those same kids in St. Paul’s and it would’ve been that 
connection’657 
 
Excerpt 4 (Knowle West) 
Interviewer: ‘How did you first find out about the St. Paul’s riot?’ 
Respondent (K): ‘I was round my mate’s house and his sister told us about it. She 
used to go down the ‘Dug Out’ and a mate of hers [name deleted: Black Male] told 
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 Oral History File N_05-03-2010 (0:01:15). 
657
 Oral History File H_18-02-2010 (0:00:00). 
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her about it and said ‘get down there’... It was the start of the Easter holiday. It was a 
really really big deal [laughs]…You kind of felt…you’d gone from thinking we were 
the hardest area in Bristol and they’d kind of jumped ahead of us, which was a bit of a 
gutter ‘cos we’d spent years fighting with Hartcliffe. It more or less like while our 
backs was turned someone else had jumped in front’ 
Interviewer: ‘So it was bit of like fucking what’s all that about?’ 
Respondent (K): ‘Yeah, yeah…it was kind of a respect thing I suppose ‘cos they’d 
had a pop at the cops…’ 
Interviewer: ‘And also a bit of jealousy?’ 
Respondent (K): ‘And also jealousy ‘cos there we were being pushed around by the 
cops all night and they’d gone on and done it. A bit of a gutter really but a kind of 
respect for them in a way’ 
 
These four excerpts are interesting in that they expose a deeper context for the 
reception of information about the St. Paul’s riot. The experiences of the first two 
respondents were far more intense than just hearing about the disturbance by ‘word of 
mouth’ or seeing it ‘on television’ as is blandly stated in Table 24. The first was 
confronted at school
658
 (along with many other of his classmates) with an eyewitness 
account by an active participant
659
. The second saw several pupils from his school on 
television participating in the ‘rioting’ in St. Paul’s. The impact of these experiences 
on the respondents should not be underestimated. The resulting transfer of 
                                                 
658
 It is probable that this account of hearing the information in school happened a week or so after the 
St. Paul’s ‘riot’ on Wednesday 2nd April.  This was the last day of the spring term in 1980 and so the 
school would have reopened after the Easter holiday. 
659
 The names of the participants have been withheld but the individuals concerned been verified by 
research to have been directly involved in the violence in St. Paul’s. 
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information through the youth grapevines in the Southmead estate would have been 
more urgent, authentic and crucially had a greater shock value than merely impersonal 
news of a ‘riot’ in a distant (though infamous) area.  
 
The third respondent, though not confronted in the same manner by direct oral or 
visual information, was fully aware of the connections between the two areas that 
were to a certain extent the product of local government policy. Avon County 
Council’s controversial educational ‘bussing strategy’ that was discussed in Chapter 
5.0 was mentioned by all three respondents as being central to forming social links 
between youths resident in St. Paul’s and Southmead660. The fourth respondent from 
Knowle West heard about the event through his friends’ connections with St. Paul’s 
derived through the ‘Dug Out’ club. The respondent emphasises the impact of the 
events, the (grudging) respect for the ‘rioters’ of St. Paul’s in their attack on the police 
and feelings of jealousy that his area was being left behind or its reputation undone by 
their actions. Within his testimony is the feeling that battles with the rival estate of 
Hartcliffe were now passé in the new environment created by the St. Paul’s ‘riot’ 
which demonstrated the police could be ‘dealt with’, something they had failed to do 
in Knowle West. 
 
One of the key points to consider here is that although the mechanisms for 
transmission of information about disturbances are important in understanding 
‘contagious’ effects, the context is doubly so. In 1981 a debate raged around whether 
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 The dual social environments of young people, living in St. Paul’s and going to school in 
Southmead as a result of the Avon County Council ‘bussing’ strategy is discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 5.0 Section 5.3.9. 
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the national TV networks were responsible for spreading or even causing the ‘riots’ of 
that summer
661
. As a result some researchers demonstrated that most young people 
did not watch the television news
662
, a proposition that has been partially 
substantiated by the analysis here. They also provided evidence that the ‘the 
classroom, the street and the pub’ were where detailed information about a 
forthcoming disturbance could be garnered. However what was not considered was 
that the reception of such information in the context of direct (or even indirect) social 
linkages magnifies its impact and urgency as appears to have done so in the case of 
Southmead. Also, as was noted by the final respondent from Knowle West, youth that 
were dealing with perceived or actual police harassment were inspired (and in some 
cases jealous) in their reactions to receiving the information. It effectively altered the 
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 The debate was actually initiated at two important and highly publicised junctures. As the 1981 
disturbances were peaking on 11
th
 July, the media campaigner Mary Whitehouse sent telegrams to the 
BBC and ITN broadcasting organisations suggesting that they were responsible for the spread of the 
‘riots’ (Daily Mail 14-07-81). In November 1981 the Scarman report was published and this made 
reference to the ‘copycat’ effect, causing the debate to be re-energised. The influence of the resulting 
discussions in the media led to the publication of several quasi-academic sources supporting the 
‘copycat’ thesis, for example, Moonman, Copy-Cat Hooligans and Clutterbuck, Terrorism and Urban 
Violence. Neither of these efforts provided much empirical evidence for their suppositions and they 
relied heavily on perceived similarities between the English disturbances and those in Northern Ireland 
in 1981 as a result of the deaths of Republican hunger strikers. These sources suffered from a 
fundamental problem in confusing causality with correlation in their use of observations of ‘riot’ 
practice to support their case for the ‘copycat effect’. It was quite possible that ‘rioters’ may have 
observed tactics and practices on television (and even employed them) but this did not explain why they 
were rioting. 
662
 See the research in Tumber, Television and the Riots: A Report for the Broadcasting Research Unit 
of the British Film Institute. 
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‘terrain’ of what was possible, with inter-estate rivalry apparently being denigrated in 
the process. 
 
Examination of these transfer mechanisms demonstrate that although the diffusion of 
information in the mass media (radio, television) is spatially and temporally 
homogeneous (i.e. the same information is received widely and almost 
instantaneously), this does not necessarily create homogenous responses. Once the 
information is available (by whatever means) it passes into heterogeneous social 
networks where the particular contexts are crucial and differing responses are 
formulated as a result. 
 
7.2.4 Sub-cultural and familial youth networks and the composition 
of the ‘crowd’ in the April 1980 St. Paul’s disturbance 
 
It is useful to consider another set of social linkages between the study areas that both 
facilitated the dissemination of news of the ‘riot’ amongst participants, created the 
conditions for active participation in the St. Paul’s rioting crowds and encouraged 
working class youth to ‘travel’ sometimes considerable distances to take part. These 
social connections between some of the St. Paul’s youth and those of the distant 
Southmead and Knowle West areas were derived via youth sub-cultures. Of particular 
relevance are the Skinhead, Punk, Rastafarian and Ska (rude boy) sub-cultures, which 
were prevalent in the late 1970s and early 1980s in some or all of these areas.  
 
Much has been written about the origins of and links between these cultural 
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movements
663
, in particular the effect of Caribbean music forms on the early skinhead 
movement in the UK, the linkages between punk and reggae in the late 1970s and the 
fusion of styles and ethnicities in the Ska movement originating in the West Midlands 
in 1979. Their importance in this specific analysis is the part they played in bonding 
youth of different locales and ethnicities, both socially and ideologically, in and 
around the urban disturbances in Bristol in 1980.  
 
Table 25 gives details of the home locale, youth sub-culture, ethnicity and 
participation of some of the oral history respondents in the ‘Bristol riots’ of April 
1980. It is clear that the majority of the younger respondents were active in some of 
these youth subcultures and they feature prominently in many of their testimonies. 
 
Essentially the social connections fostered by these sub-cultures in Bristol came in 
two distinct forms, spatial and intra-subculture. The first category relates to the ability 
of youth sub-cultures to overcome spatial divisions between areas and more crucially 
those relating to historic ‘gang’ rivalries between adjacent districts. Several 
respondents from Southmead and Knowle West drew attention to the, sometimes 
violent interactions between youth from their respective areas and neighbouring 
districts. Young people from Southmead were in some danger if they travelled to the 
nearby areas of Filton and Patchway
664
. Similarly youth from Knowle West were in 
permanent ‘warfare’ with the adjoining South Bristol areas of Hartcliffe and 
Withywood. 
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 See for example Cashmore, No Future: Youth and Society, Hebdige, Subculture: The Meaning of 
Style and Jones, Black Culture, White Youth: The Reggae Tradition from JA to UK. 
664
 This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.0 Section 5.4.2. 
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Respondent Home locale 
Youth  
Sub-culture 
Age 
April 
1980 
Ethnicity 
Active Riot 
Participant?
665
 
A St. Paul’s Punk 16 White Yes 
G St. Paul’s - 30s White Yes 
D St. Paul’s - 27 White No 
L St. Paul’s Punk 16 White Yes 
E St. Paul’s Rastafarian666 16 Black Yes 
H Southmead Punk 15 White No 
J Southmead Ska 17 White Yes 
N Southmead Ska 
[Rude Boy] 
17 Mixed 
Race 
No 
F Knowle West Punk 15 White Yes 
K Knowle West Punk 15 White No 
M Hartcliffe Punk 15 Mixed 
Race 
No 
Table 25: Home locale, youth sub-culture, age, ethnicity and riot participation of oral history 
respondents in Bristol in 1980 
 
In contrast to this inter-neighbourhood warfare, youth sub-cultures allowed avenues of 
‘escape’ into wider Bristol as well as offering new social environments to explore. 
Knowle West for example, had an historic connection with skinhead culture and it 
was these older ‘original’ skins that opened up new avenues both culturally and 
spatially for one respondent: 
‘By that time I was hanging around with a load of older blokes, who were 
                                                 
665
 In this case the status of ‘active riot participant’ is defined by actively assisting and/or taking part in 
attacks upon the police and/or property rather than merely being an eye-witness or taking part in 
passive looting. 
666
 The classing of Rastafarianism as a ‘youth sub-culture’ rather than a ‘religion’ in this case is not 
intended to detract from the latter category. Instead it reflects the important influence it had upon Black 
youth in the late 1970s. Its very lack of a central orthodoxy and hierarchy was important in its adoption 
and mutation by wider sections of Black youth and in its subsequent influence on other sub-cultures 
such as Punk. See Cashmore, Rastaman: The Rastafarian Movement in England and Cashmore, The 
Rastafarians. 
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like ex-skinheads, not fascist skinheads but like ‘Black music White 
skinheads’. They were all from Knowle West…they were original 
skinheads, very anti-racist, they couldn’t believe what the young 
skinheads were into. They were constantly going into town and almost 
getting into scraps with skinheads because they’d say ‘well you’re not 
fucking skinheads, skinheads is about Black music’ and stuff like 
that…They were all very open-minded and not racist at all’667 
Through his connections to this peer group of ‘original skins’ the respondent (a punk) 
and his friends from Knowle West were introduced to one of the most important 
meeting points for Black and White Bristolians in the early 1980s: 
‘[name deleted] knew a lot of Black kids in St. Paul’s…and it was because 
of him and [name deleted] that we started going to the ‘Dug Out’. Then I 
started to see some of the kiddies, a couple of Black kids from school, 
Black punks. And it was at that time when…from the London scene 
where it was a Punky-Rastafarian cross over and it was OK to be in each 
other’s company. In London there was the Roxy scene where there was no 
punk music so everyone used to get into Black music. Before it became all 
middle-class and trendy, it was a proletarian thing to be into Black music, 
‘cos of the post-skinhead early punk kind of thing. So the ‘Dug Out’ was 
our ideal place. It was our equivalent.’668 
The ‘Dug Out’ club close to the city-centre became a popular haunt of those who 
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 Oral History File K_09-09-2010 (00:02:22). 
668
 Oral History File K_09-09-2010 (00:03:56). 
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couldn’t get into ‘straight’ clubs because of racism, sub-cultural fashions (Punk, 
Skinhead, Ska, Rastafarian) or because they wanted a place where they could listen to 
‘their’ music. The club acted as a hub for these sub-cultures allowing new 
relationships to be formed between youth of different ethnicities and locales. It also 
had a major part to play in the fusing of different musical influences into new styles, 
which formed a vibrant multi-ethnic ‘underground’ scene in the mid-eighties669. 
 
Meetings in the neutral space of the ‘Dug Out’ not only connected youth from 
outlying working class estates with inner city St. Paul’s but also allowed new contacts 
to be made with ‘sussed’ youths from nearby ‘rival’ areas.  
‘When you were like eleven or twelve in Knowle West the only political 
group, this shows how bad the Left were, was the NF [National Front], 
and you kind of thought ‘they’re quite cool like’. When I changed, which 
was when I was about thirteen, I went to this demo outside Knowle 
School when the NF were having a meeting there. And suddenly you saw 
all these cool kids from Hartcliffe and different areas. They were all there 
protesting. It was the height of the Anti-Nazi League and stuff. I didn’t 
really see them again for ages…and then you saw all those sort of 
characters reappear at the ‘Dug Out’. It had been very rare to mix with 
                                                 
669
 This led to the ‘Bristol sound’ and its progenies ‘Massive Attack’, ‘Tricky’ and ‘Reprazent’ who 
became world famous in the 1990s. Members of ‘Massive Attack’ developed out of the ‘Wild Bunch’ 
who were regular DJ’s at the ‘Dug Out’ club in the early 80s. ‘Tricky’ was well known to oral history 
respondents from Knowle West his home area. The origins and history of the 1980s Bristol music 
scene are sketched via the oral histories of the musicians, DJ’s and graffiti artists of the period in 
Burton and Thompson, Art & Sound of the Bristol Underground. 
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that lot. There was group called the ‘Red Mafia’, they became later called 
the ‘Hartcliffe Mafia’. It seems hard to believe now but at that time there 
were a few working class kids who were involved in sort of left wing 
things…You’d bump into all those sorts of people in the ‘Dug Out’.670 
The transient nature of St. Paul’s population, particularly in terms of the large amount 
of rented accommodation, allied with its historic squatting scene dating back to the 
early seventies, allowed relatively easy movement from outlying estates to the inner 
city for unemployed or low-income youth. The main impediment to this movement, 
which had to be overcome by the mainly White ‘outsiders’, was the mythical status 
the neighbourhood had amongst many White Bristolians. One respondent from 
Knowle West recalled: 
 
Respondent (K): ‘St. Paul’s was kind of like mythical. There was a lot of White 
racism. The classic line was ‘It used to be a really nice area ‘til they turned up’. So I 
never went down there then.’ 
Interviewer:  ‘So it was a bit scary as well then?’ 
Respondent (K): ‘Yeah, yeah, it was prostitutes and it was like a world you just 
didn’t…. Bristol’s like a load of villages. If you were from Knowle West then you 
stayed in Knowle West.’ 
Interviewer: ‘Did people tell stories…were women slagged off?’ 
Respondent (K): ‘Yeah if you had a woman teacher you’d say she was from ‘City 
Road’ [St. Paul’s], which basically meant she was a prostitute’ 
Interviewer:  ‘Did you know of any women who’d gone down there?’ 
                                                 
670
 Oral History File K_09-09-2010 (00:05:55). 
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Respondent (K): ‘I remember when I first started chatting to my mate [name deleted] 
about it, he said his sister used to hang round there. I said ‘that’s really odd, isn’t that 
dangerous for a White woman to go down there?’. But that sort of feeling didn’t last 
very long as soon as I started going down the ‘Dug Out’, you suddenly realised it’s 
not that bad’.671 
 
By 1980 there was a significant punk scene resident in the area, comprising ‘natives’ 
and more recent ‘interlopers’. This in turn brought more young visitors to the ‘neutral 
zone’ of St. Paul’s, escaping from the area-based rivalries in the outlying estates and 
entering a friendlier sub-cultural milieu and (ironically) the safer streets of that 
neighbourhood. For many the initial contacts in St. Paul’s were made in the ‘Dug Out’ 
club. The same respondent recalled: 
‘The classic situation would be that you’d go up the ‘Dug Out’ get off 
with a girl and she’d be living in St. Paul’s or on the periphery of St. 
Paul’s. Then you’d go through it [St. Paul’s] and you know you felt OK 
about it. It was an OK area and you’d suddenly realise all the bullshit was 
in the papers about ‘No White people can go down there’. It was all a load 
of bullshit. I never had any trouble at all. Nothing at all really. At that time 
there was a definite kind of respect. It was OK to walk through and you’d 
see loads of other punk kids, all different sorts of people. I always found it 
a safe area really.’672 
Another important reason to make contacts in St. Paul’s, which was linked to these 
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 Oral History File K_09-09-2010 (00:23:45). 
672
 Oral History File K_09-09-2010 (00:28:20). 
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sub-cultural movements, was the need to purchase soft drugs particularly cannabis 
and marijuana. This drug scene, which was intimately connected to Grosvenor Road, 
the ‘frontline’, generated many visitors from outlying mainly White estates. For some 
the initial sub-cultural contacts led to them ‘hanging out’ in St. Paul’s to buy drugs, 
thereby meeting local youth who had been influenced by Rastafarian ideas and 
making new friends. This was recounted by one White punk respondent from Knowle 
West: 
 
Interviewer: ‘How did you get your connections [in St. Paul’s] with buying drugs?’ 
Respondent (F): ‘Just through the punk scene really and just knowing where dealers 
lived because…there was a lot of punks living in St. Paul’s because the housing was 
really cheap…I was still living at home with my parents at the time. They [the punks] 
all knew the guys there and they were all hanging out together…there was a little 
economy going on...’ 
Interviewer: ‘This was like White punks living in St. Paul’s?’ 
Respondent (F): ‘Yeah like White punks living in St. Paul’s knowing the Black guys 
and it was all quite relaxed and mellow really…between the guys on the street. It was 
the Old Bill that used to cause the problems, not just in St. Paul’s but in Knowle West 
as well.’ 
Interviewer: ‘So the connections come through the punk scene, people hanging out 
in town, getting to know people and then White punks who were living in St. 
Paul’s…’ 
Respondent (F): ‘Yeah and also a bit later then getting into sort of Reggae music as 
well ‘cos you was hanging out with them guys and going to dances…there was 
Reggae, always a Blues going on’ 
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Interviewer: ‘Did you go to Blues then?’ 
Respondent (F): ‘I went to a few Blues, yeah, Shady Grove and one in Mary 
Carpenter Place, Ajax …’ 
Interviewer: ‘So it was sort of normal…it must have been fucking unusual, wasn’t 
it…it must have been a bit weird?’ 
Respondent (F): ‘Nah, the punks were kind of accepted because they lived in the 
area…it was kind of cool, obviously you used to get trouble sometimes from young 
kids but most of the older people… it was kind of cool at the Blues, they knew you, 
they let you in. Most of the punks were just going there for a late drink, so it was just 
like normal. You could have a smoke and it was relaxed and they played reggae 
music’673 
 
St. Paul’s was thus ‘discovered’ by many ‘outsiders’ through sub-cultural contacts 
and became an attractive place to hang out, as it provided safe spaces to party, drink 
after-hours and consume soft drugs. These initial fraternisations through buying drugs 
and absorbing the different culture also encouraged many to move to the area from the 
outskirts of the city. 
 
The Bristol punk scene’s symbolic daytime gathering point was outside the Virgin 
record shop in the Broadmead shopping centre
674
, where contingents from many 
working class areas congregated in 1970-80. This new environment brought together 
not only supposed ‘enemies’ from rival areas of Bristol but also in the mix were 
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 Oral History File F_27-08-2010_Part_1 (00:06:19). 
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 Evidence of the meeting points of the Bristol punk scene was supplied by respondents and is 
captured in images on the Bristol Archive Records website. 
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Black, Mixed Race and White punks from St. Paul’s. One contingent remembered by 
many respondents was the self-named ‘Half-breeds’, a group of mixed-race punks 
who traversed the ethnic and fashion boundaries of several youth sub-cultures. Their 
social and spatial make-up was unusual and directly related to the experience of first 
generation immigrants to Bristol from the Caribbean in the 1950s and 60s.  
 
As has been discussed previously St. Paul’s was the initial arrival point for many of 
these immigrants and became an established community. Through the 1960s however, 
many Afro-Caribbean residents of the area had relationships with White Bristolians 
who they met through work or leisure. Often this entailed leaving St. Paul’s to live in 
outlying mainly White working class estates where their mixed-race children were 
brought up. These relationships effectively created a mixed-race teenage diaspora in 
the late 1970s and though dispersed across the city these young people retained 
familial links to the ‘original’ Black community in St. Paul’s.  
 
The experience of being Black in the outlying estates with the prevalent racial 
prejudice of the 1970s allied with the feeling of being both ‘different’ and somewhat 
isolated, generated some interesting responses amongst these teenagers. 
Confrontations between rival groups from mainly White working class estates were 
often turned into points of fraternisation by Black youth, as was recounted by one 
mixed-race female respondent from Hartcliffe: 
 
Respondent (M): ‘If you were a girl there used to be ‘girl’s’ fights. And the girls you 
could go down to Bedminster to have a fight and it happened when there would be a 
Fair…and you would go there to have a fight with all the girls from Knowle West. So 
the boys’ fights would happen regularly of a weekend but the girls fights would be…’ 
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Interviewer: ‘Ritualised?’ 
Respondent (M): ‘Yeah and you’d go to the fair to have the fight [laughs] And what 
would happen when you’d go to those fights was if you were Black or mixed-race 
you’d meet lots of other mixed-race people from those areas like Knowle West and 
Withywood that you wouldn’t ever see before. So you never generally ended up 
having a fight. You ended up having a chat [both laugh] about who you knew, who 
you were related to…’ 
Interviewer: ‘It was almost like a level of solidarity, ‘cos it was unusual’ 
Respondent (M): ‘Yeah, ‘cos it was unusual to meet Black or mixed-race people 
from out on the out-skirts’675 
 
The shared feelings and solidarity expressed between Black and mixed-race teenagers 
from different, often rival estates allowed groupings such as the ‘Half-breeds’ to 
organically form in the late 1970s. The linkages between members of this particular 
group were a both a development and mirror of the movements that their parental 
generation had made in the 1960s. The resulting ethno-geographic map of Bristol 
from the perspective of a female mixed-race teenager in the late 1970s is recounted in 
detail by the same respondent: 
 
Respondent (M): ‘Everybody was into punk rock…and a lot of the people a little bit 
older than me were really really into that and there was a massive scene and the 
person that I remember the most was this bloke called [Black male: name deleted] and 
[Black male: name deleted] and they were really interesting ‘cos although they were 
sort of from Hartcliffe and they drank at the Hartcliffe Inn they had a bit of a… pan 
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South Bristol presence in that they knew people in Knowle, they knew people in 
Hartcliffe and they knew people in Withywood. If you knew people in all those 
places, then you would be more likely to know people in the next ‘hamlet’, if you 
like, Bedminster…’ 
Interviewer: ‘The next village’ 
Respondent (M): ‘Yeah, but from Bedminster it would always go over to 
Southmead’ 
Interviewer: ‘Is that right?’ 
Respondent (M): ‘Yeah, it was really strange. It was sort of Hartcliffe, Withywood, 
Southmead…It was clearly estates around the centre. So people on the outskirts. 
Those older boys would know people, the ‘big’ people from Southmead, Withywood 
and all the rest of it. They would know them. And they wouldn’t really go into town 
as much, though some people would go into Broadmead on a Saturday afternoon and 
hang around outside Virgin but there was definitely that older crowd and they were all 
sort of linked around Withywood, Hartcliffe, Knowle, Knowle West. There were a 
core of people in Knowle West. Knowle West was always a bit more cosmopolitan 
than...’ 
Interviewer: ‘Why was that then?’ 
Respondent (M): ‘Because the people that were in Knowle West were connected to 
people that were more central and what I imagine is that there were…people from 
these estates Southmead, Hartcliffe, Withywood that were mixed race that were 
connected through that mixture. So you would know Black people because the 
connection would be that would be a Black fathers from St. Paul’s or from the centre 
of town that would know White women in those satellite estates. And that’s how the 
connection would be made….for me ‘cos I’m mixed race obviously it would be made 
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through people who were mixed race and that’s where the sort of ‘Half-breed’ thing 
comes in, because they would be ‘Half-breed’ people who collectively would have the 
sort of shared experience of having Black parents from the inner city [St. Paul’s] but 
who had White parents from the out-skirts. So that’s why those connections were 
round the outside…those connections and those mixed-race children are evidence of 
those connections between St. Paul’s and those peripheral estates, aren’t they? When 
you would meet other mixed-race people then you would be interested in 
them…Whatever was happening in St. Paul’s would radiate via those relationships’ 
Interviewer: ‘So it was more a network than most kids would have?’ 
Respondent (M): ‘Yes, and jail also ‘cos you would be in borstals and jails with 
other mixed race kids…whose mothers might live in satellite estates but those 
mothers might not know each other but the connection would be that the fathers 
would be sort of central.’  
Interviewer: ‘So it was kind of like St. Paul’s radiating out into other areas and then 
the second generation people start to meet’ 
Respondent (M): ‘Yeah, and you’d get an affiliation as well because you’d know 
other mixed race…for girls, I talked about the fact that you’d meet mixed-race girls 
when you’d go out fighting and you’d see other mixed-race people and you’d be like 
‘Oh, that’s interesting, she’s kind of mixed race’ and she wouldn’t want to have a 
fight with me because obviously we ain’t gonna have a fight ‘cos we’d know what it’s 
like to be the only Black person around. So you are not gonna have a fight with each 
other. But I should imagine that for the boys it was the same sort of thing, you 
wouldn’t necessarily want to go and have a fight. And there was a lot of fighting… 
through hooligans and going and fighting at the City ground and that’s another way of 
knowing people from different estates and that kind of shared culture radiating 
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through conflict and at this time it would be football violence…I think that possibly a 
lot of the information about what was going on in St. Paul’s radiated through those 
families and through jails and through that kind of thing really…’676 
 
The respondent’s analysis presents a rich description of the networks that were in play 
in connecting both mixed-race Afro-Caribbean youth in outlying estates, with each 
other as well as with the ‘mother’ district of inner city St. Paul’s. Figure 25 gives a 
schematic representation of this ethnographic map based on the respondent’s 
testimony. This map effectively outlines the historical conditions for the creation of 
second-generation groupings such as the ‘Half-breeds’ and explains their ‘pan-
Bristol’ nature. It is interesting to note in the respondent’s account the meshing of the 
crucial ethnic/familial connections in the context of a youth sub-culture, in this case 
the Bristol Punk scene. The ‘Half-breeds’ although connected by the deeper 
relationships of shared family ties and dual ethnic origin were also functioning in the 
wider youth sub-culture, which connected them with both White and Black youth. 
Their ‘pan-Bristol’ network often allowed them to overcome violent inter-area 
rivalries and importantly opened up opportunities for other members of their shared 
Punk sub-culture to meet and eventually move into St. Paul’s. 
                                                 
676
 Oral History File M_05-11-2010_Part_2 (00:00:38). 
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Figure 25: Schematic of ethno-geographic connections for first and second generation Afro-
Caribbeans in Bristol 
 
One White punk respondent remembered his personal connections to the ‘Half-
breeds’:  
 
Respondent (L): ‘There was a huge contingent of punks down there [in St. Paul’s]. 
There were always punks. We used to hang round in town outside Virgins, outside 
Paradise Garage and places like that and then we’d mosey up to St. Paul’s because 
friends of ours lived there…’ 
Interviewer: ‘So the Half-breeds…when I was in the punk scene it was quite unusual 
to see Mixed-race or Black kids being punks’ 
Respondent (L): ‘There was a lot of Black kiddies who were punks…there was the 
White punks as well who lived nearby’ 
Interviewer: ‘That’s interesting, so there was proper crossover. Did people know 
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each other because of school or did they know each other just ‘cos of being punks?’ 
Respondent (L): ‘Both really, because all the people that lived in St. Paul’s all went 
to school together and then people used to come in. I first met that lot [the Half-
breeds] in early to mid ’77…’677 
  
The ‘Half-breeds’ acted as one of the conduits between the city centre punk scene 
with its constituents from many different areas of the city and St. Paul’s. These Black 
‘punks’ also connected ‘outsiders’ with other cultural groupings in St. Paul’s: 
‘We knew quite a lot of the Rastas, ‘cos Punks and Rastas used to always 
know each other. We use to buy our blow [cannabis] off them. But also 
‘cos we used to know all the mixed-race punks, they grew up there so they 
were all old friends, they went to school, they knew each other, we liked 
the same music, we went to the same places…’678 
Groupings such as the ‘Half-breeds’ not only created bonds between the Black youth 
of St. Paul’s and the city-wide Punk sub-culture prior to the 1980 disturbance but also 
were connected to symbolic locations such as the Black and White café on the 
‘frontline’ which were central to that disorder. In order to substantiate these linkages 
an analysis of some of the participants in the ‘rioting’ crowds in St. Paul’s was 
undertaken using a ‘social networking’ model.  This network is displayed in Figure 
26. 
 
 
                                                 
677
 Oral History File L_15-02-2010 (00:05:40). 
678
 Oral History File L_15-02-2010 (00:14:19). 
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Figure 26: Social network derived from a sample of participants in the St. Paul’s 2nd April 1980 disturbance 
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Figure 26 displays a social network analysis of a sample of eighteen persons involved 
in the disturbance of 2
nd
 April 1980
679
.  In the diagram, each vertex (circle) represents 
a ‘riot’ participant, indicated by a reference number (for reasons of anonymity). 
Essentially three types of connections between actors are shown. Familial ties are 
denoted by the value 1, sub-culturally derived acquaintances by 2 and a 3 marks 
spatial ties within the disturbance
680
. Members or affiliates of the ‘Half-breeds’ 
grouping are designated by red circles, the proprietors of the Black and White café by 
yellow and those associated with ‘Punk’ youth sub-culture by blue. Green vertices 
represent non-designated actors. 
 
Although a limited model, Figure 26 displays the complexity of the social networks 
amongst the crowds of ‘rioters’ but also crucially shows the importance of 
‘networking’ groups such as the ‘Half-breeds’ in traversing ethnic divisions through 
sub-cultural linkages. Four specific groupings can be isolated in this network that are 
differentiated by ethnicity, age and membership of sub-cultural or ethnically derived 
network. The first group is the family members of the Black and White café 
                                                 
679
 The data for this sample was obtained from secondary sources, transcripts from court cases; Bristol 
Commission for Racial Equality, Bristol Crown Courts Monday 26-1-81 to Friday 30-1-81. (Bristol 
Record Office 43129, 1981) P ST. PA B1, newspaper reports Bristol Reference Library, Bristol Riots: 
April 1980. (Bristol: Bristol Reference Library, 1980), Vol. 3, and oral histories. The public domain 
social network analysis software PAJEK (v.1.01) was used to model and analyse the data. See V. 
Batagelj, W. de Nooy and A. Mrvar, Exploratory Social Network Analysis with Pajek. 
680
 The three linkages familial (kinship relations), sub-cultural actors (members of the ‘punk’ youth 
subculture) and spatial (participants acting together in the disturbance) are defined in more detail in 
Section 3.3.4. The values 4 and 5 represent multiple links, spatial and sub-cultural (4) and familial, 
spatial and sub-cultural (5). 
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proprietors (yellow) who are connected to a second group of Black subjects who are 
in their 20s and 30s (green). This latter cluster of subjects operated together in the 
disturbance along with members of the ‘Half-breeds’ (red) a pan-Bristol grouping of 
teenage second-generation mixed-race youth most of who were born or lived outside 
of St. Paul’s. The ‘Half-breeds’ were in turn closely linked to the Bristol Punk youth 
subculture of similar ages, some of whose members make up the fourth grouping in 
the model (blue). Quantitative analysis of the network demonstrated that certain actors 
played significant roles in acting as brokers in and between the various social 
groupings. The liaison role, that is ‘a person who mediates between members of 
different groups but who does not belong to these groups’681 was dominated by the 
subject 80/34. This person a member of the ‘Half-breeds’ effectively connected the 
older non-designated Black subjects with members of the ‘punk’ sub-culture.  Figure 
26 thus demonstrates the social basis for the mixed ethnicity of sections of the 
‘crowds’ who fought the police in St. Paul’s. 
 
7.2.5 ‘Travellers’ and ‘Outside Agitators’ 
 
 One particular group of ‘riot’ participants that often generates derision both from the 
media, authorities and interestingly within communities where a disturbance has taken 
place are the ‘travellers’. These are non-residents of the subject area who have 
travelled some distance to take part in the action. Typically they are characterised as 
having no interest in the political or social relations that have generated the 
disturbance, act as opportunists by taking advantage of a situation of ‘lawlessness’ to 
profit from looting and are assumed to have no connections with the communities 
they are ‘exploiting’.  ‘Post-riot’ statements by members of communities affected by 
                                                 
681
 V. Batagelj, W. de Nooy and A. Mrvar, Exploratory Social Network Analysis with Pajek, p.151.  
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‘riot’ often corroborate this view by blaming ‘outsiders’ for looting and arson682. Such 
assessments of ‘travellers’ act as useful distractions from the disturbing fact that the 
majority of the violence and destruction has often been carried out from within the 
community. This relationship has a close connection to the concept of the ‘outside 
agitator’, which is discussed in more detail later in this section. 
 
So were there ‘travellers’ to the St. Paul’s and Southmead disturbances in April 1980 
and if so who were they and what was their rationale for taking part in the disorder? 
The first of these questions can be judged by an analysis of a sample of those arrested 
and charged during or immediately after the disturbance.  
Figure 27 shows ‘home locale’ and ‘nature of crime committed’ for a sample of 
thirty-nine offenders (twenty-eight from the St. Paul’s disturbance and eleven from 
the Southmead incident). 
 
It is clear that about 30% of the St. Paul’s sample lived more than a mile from the 
area, suggesting that there was a significant contingent of ‘travellers’ to the 
disturbance. Of these ‘travellers’ a higher proportion appear to have been involved in 
                                                 
682
 See for example the comments of a local trader ‘Half the damage done here was done by outsiders 
who jumped on the bandwagon after the riot started’ Western Daily Press 05-04-1980 and ‘The 
burning was instigated not by outsiders, as commonly believed (i.e. African-Caribbean people from 
London, Birmingham etc. or White people from other parts of the city), but by local Black rioters 
wishing to draw attention to their grievances’ [this author’s emphasis in bold] from a statement by Ras 
Judah to Karen Garvey of the Museum of Bristol 26-02-2009. 
 393 
‘looting’ rather than attacks on the police683. However this does not preclude the fact 
that either group may have been involved in both activities signifying the limitation of 
the somewhat artificial division between ‘looters’ and ‘rioters’. In contrast the sample 
of offenders from the Southmead disorders shows that the majority were from the 
‘estate’ and there were no interlopers living more than a mile from the area. 
 
Figure 27: Residence of a sample of offenders from the St. Paul’s and Southmead disturbances in 
Bristol in April 1980 
 
The first impression is thus some support for the idea of ‘opportunism’ in the St. 
Paul’s event and a characterisation of Southmead participants as being mainly local 
                                                 
683
 This may be the result of the time it took for ‘travellers’ to hear about the St. Paul’s ‘riot’ and get to 
the area. Many would have arrived after 7.30pm when the primary activity was ‘looting’ rather than 
‘rioting’. 
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residents. There is one significant drawback for this portrayal of the St. Paul’s 
disorder. This concerns the ‘mythical’ status of this district as a ‘No Go’ area for 
Whites. The stereotyping of the area by the local media allied with ‘fear of the other’ 
referred to by many non-resident Bristolians was of major significance in the late 
1970s. These fears were of course predicated by the assumption of everyday activity 
rather than the conditions of ‘lawlessness’ during a major civil disorder. Under such 
extraordinary circumstances it is hard to believe that many Bristolians would have 
made a journey across the city to enter a ‘riot’ torn area, which already had such a 
fearsome reputation. A richer description is thus required to gain a better 
understanding of the motivation of these ‘travellers’. 
 
A clue to at least some of these motivations lies with the oral history respondents who 
weren’t resident in St. Paul’s but attempted to get to the ‘riot’. One such respondent a 
resident of Knowle West, some four kilometres from the area, outlined his and his 
friends’ reaction to news of the St. Paul’s ‘riot’ on the night of April 2nd 1980: 
 
Respondent (F): ‘I remember the night of the St. Paul’s riot because I was in Broad 
Plain Youth Club in Knowle West and it come on the Nine O’clock News…so we 
seen it on the news…we thought fucking hell that’s a bit weird, oh right great. So we 
all piled outside and got on the number ten bus and tried to get down to St. Paul’s. But 
by the time we got there it was all cordoned off, so we ended up on Stokes Croft and 
there was like Old Bill everywhere. We hung around for a couple of hours…We 
couldn’t get in or anywhere near it.’ 
Interviewer: ‘Out of the people who were at Broad Plain who was it who went 
down?’ 
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Respondent (F): ‘It was a gang of us who were in the Club that night’ 
Interviewer: ‘Had the people who went with you, had they been to St. Paul’s 
before?’ 
Respondent (F): ‘Yeah, quite a few of them, but a few of them hadn’t as well, you 
know. But there was that thing I touched on before, everyone was into the Specials 
and Madness and there was this whole Two-Tone thing going on. So, you know, the 
sort of feeling in the Club as we were watching the news was like ‘fair play’ ‘cos we 
wished we could get it together to do that to the cops who were fucking us over. So 
the idea was that we felt a kind of sympathy for the guys that were rioting. We wanted 
to get down there and help them out basically’ 
Interviewer: ‘Did you hear about other people trying to go there or was that just a 
story that went round?’ 
Respondent (F): ‘No, no, no, there was definitely other people who were trying to 
get there and there was a lot in the press I think a day or two after about basically 
blaming it on outsiders who had arrived from all over Bristol to get involved’684 
 
The respondent had been a visitor to St. Paul’s previous to this incident as a result of 
his connections with the Punk scene and he had made several acquaintances there. For 
him and some of his enlightened companions the fearful status of the area had been 
exploded by their recent sub-culturally derived experiences and friendships. 
According to the respondent, for the uninitiated Knowle West youth in the Club that 
night, peer group pressure plus the multi-racial nature and politics of the Ska 
movement and a need to get revenge on the police overcame any remaining fears they 
might have had. This provides a quite different understanding of the ‘traveller’ than 
                                                 
684
 Oral History File F_15-02-2010 (00:17:56) 
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the shallow ‘rioting for fun and profit’ explanations provided by some analyses685. 
Instead, feelings of respect, sympathy and solidarity with the ‘rioters’ come through 
this testimony and were the driving force for the respondent’s attempted intervention. 
 
The so-called ‘outside agitator’ became an important feature of media and 
governmental propaganda during the explosion of disturbances in July 1981. The 
characterisation of sinister figures and organisations with subversive agendas entering 
communities to ‘stir up trouble’ provided convenient explanations for both the 
initiation and spread of disorder. The function of these phantom ‘folk devils’ was (and 
remains) to distract attention away from the precipitating actions of the authorities
686
 
and to remove agency from ‘rioting’ communities, instead portraying participants as 
easily led and in some cases as naïve ‘innocents’. 
 
The day after the disturbances of April 1980 in St. Paul’s the Chief Constable of Avon 
and Somerset Constabulary was asked several times in a press conference if there had 
been political interventions by left-wing activists prior to or during the disorder
687
. In 
each case he stated there was no evidence for this, which to a certain extent warded 
off media explanations based upon the concept of the ‘outside agitator’. However, 
when left-wing activists openly arrived in St. Paul’s, some days after the event and 
                                                 
685
 The seminal source for the ‘rioting for fun and profit’ theory is Banﬁeld, The Unheavenly City. 
686
 For example according to Reicher one local councillor in Bristol claimed in an interview 
immediately after the St. Paul’s ‘riot’ that ‘people were phoning each other up before the trouble 
started and busloads came down from Coventry and Birmingham with guns’ Reicher, The St. Paul’s 
Riot: An Explanation of the Limits of Crowd Action in Terms of a Social Identity Model p.197. 
687
 Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Press Conference Following the Disturbances in St. Paul's: New 
Bridewell: 11.00am Thursday April 3rd 1980. 
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certainly ‘tail ending’ the disturbance, some sections of the national press saw an 
opportunity to re-launch the story
688
. A couple of weeks after the disturbance Tariq 
Ali was invited to speak at public meeting of the Campaign Against Racist Laws in 
central Bristol
689
, not far from St. Paul’s. Two days before the meeting the Daily Mail 
ran a feature entitled ‘Agitators in Bristol’690, which made great play of the influx of 
‘hard left outside agitators’ but calmed the public by portraying the ‘Rastafarians’ of 
St. Paul’s as simply disinterested or merely bemused by the attention being given to 
them.  
 
In actual fact St. Paul’s did not require these ‘outside’ influences: it had amongst its 
residents a significant number of left-wing activists who were themselves surprised by 
the spontaneous ‘uprising’ of April 2nd 1980. They did however react retrospectively 
to the disturbances. One member of the Socialist Workers Party from St. Paul’s 
recalled being asked to get ‘involved’ amongst the local Rastafarians by his local 
branch: 
 
                                                 
688
 Reicher stated that ‘a rumour was circulating in police ranks that Tariq Ali had been present on the 
day of the riots - in fact Tariq Ali had been there but arrived on the afternoon of the 3 April in order to 
report for the left-wing paper Socialist Challenge’. Reicher, The St. Paul’s Riot: An Explanation of the 
Limits of Crowd Action in Terms of a Social Identity Model, p.197. Ali, a ‘60s revolutionary’ and 
Trotskyite ‘folk devil’ was demonised by much of the British media and certainly served the function 
of being an ‘outside agitator’. The ‘intellectual leader’ of the Socialist Workers Party, Tony Cliff also 
visited the city for a public meeting on 22
nd
 April 1980 (Socialist Worker 19-04-1980, p.4). 
689
 The meeting was held at Central Hall, Old Market Street. Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Poster: 
Campaign Against Racist Laws Public Meeting (Friday 18
th
 April 1980). (Bristol Record Office 
POL/LG/1/9, 1980). 
690
 Daily Mail 16-04-1980. 
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Respondent (G): ‘Well when I was in the SWP I got seconded with the Rastafarians. 
Fucking lovely, just got stoned. Terribly stoned, had to get carried home, but they 
were well read and they had gone through the whole gamut of stuff…Garvey and 
everything. Knocked the spots off most of our comrades…quite easily…yeah’ 
Interviewer: ‘So they knew their history then?’ 
Respondent (G): ‘Oh shit did they, inside out bloke, it was embarrassing. Absolutely 
embarrassing. Yeah, I could keep up on the Irish history but they could do their Black 
history. Like fucking solid and thought out. [We] argued…lost…come out 
again…another look at that…yeah excellent. Really I was impressed by it…well 
[laughs] impressed by the smoke as well mind. It’s a pity that happened but we had 
some fucking great times ‘cos they got to know us…’691 
 
The actual experience of the left-wing activists being engaged and out-argued by the 
‘subject’ does not sit well with the media inspired model of the agitator ‘folk-devil’ 
and it was to be a year later before the concept re-emerged in the media with much 
greater intensity during the disorders of the spring and summer of 1981.  
 
7.2.6 Looting, arson and the ‘looters’ 
 
The looting and arson which was evident after the withdrawal of the police from St. 
Paul’s on April 2nd was problematic for those commentators who wanted to 
characterise the Bristol disorders as ‘uprisings’ with formal political agendas or were 
proposing arguments for a static ‘community identity’ within the crowds692.  The very 
                                                 
691
 Oral History File G_09-10-2009 (00:32:31). 
692
 For several reasons, none of the secondary sources cover this period of the disturbance in any detail. 
Joshua and Wallace base most of their analysis on police evidence, which was lacking in the latter 
episodes of the disturbance. In any case, these authors were presenting the St. Paul’s disturbance in a 
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nature of such activities highlights divisions within the supposed and popular concept 
of a homogenous ‘community’. It is certainly simplistic to characterise members of a 
spatially defined ‘community’ as having unified economic or social interests. Brent in 
his study of Southmead in the 1990s
693
 makes a significant critique of idealised 
concepts of ‘community’ that emphasise unity and stasis. Instead he recognises that 
divisions do exist, that these are dynamic relations and can be potentially exacerbated 
or overcome in extraordinary moments of ‘assertion’. Brent stated: 
‘the first moments of community action are about assertion, not 
communication, a stage in establishing a position of power from which 
communication on a more equal footing is possible, challenging the power 
of authority while asserting their own authority to speak’ 
                                                                                                                                            
historical context of Black political struggles in Britain, so the apparent contradictions of this phase of 
the disorder were problematic and were probably ignored as a result; Joshua, Wallace and Booth, To 
Ride the Storm : The 1980 Bristol 'Riot' and the State. Reicher’s study of crowd behaviour in the St. 
Paul’s disturbance was centred on the collective identity of the crowd (as members of the ‘St. Paul’s 
community’) and he had some significant eye-witness accounts of the latter period but stated: ‘Given 
limitations of space, only a part of the data will be used. In particular, only the period before the police 
withdrew will be considered. For this reason the looting and arson attacks on various buildings will not 
be dealt with, since these occurred only after the police had left the area. This omission is not because 
the themes to be elaborated below do not apply, although there are differences between the two periods, 
but rather, due to the fact that the data is lengthy and detailed and adds little to the basic arguments’; 
Reicher, The St. Paul’s Riot: An Explanation of the Limits of Crowd Action in Terms of a Social 
Identity Model, p.189. Despite these assertions, the more controversial aspects of the crowd behaviour 
in this period may have been problematic for Reicher’s analysis.  
693
 See especially Chapter 8 in Brent, Searching for Community : Representation, Power and Action on 
an Urban Estate. 
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In examining the looting and arson in St. Paul’s it is important to recognise that 
although the violent ejection of the police can be characterised as an exclusionary and 
perhaps unified ‘community’ response, the latter stages of the disturbance were 
somewhat different. This phase instead reveals a moment of internal struggle within 
the ‘community’, exposing existing divisions and requiring negotiation and self-
limiting behaviours concerning the use of force. 
 
Examining ‘riot’ from the perspective of crowd composition, behaviour and motive is 
a difficult task for historians as the sources of evidence are usually lacking and has 
been discussed previously, many researchers are left with the sometimes dubious 
pickings from court records. However one obvious (though often ignored) source of 
information is the physical evidence left behind in the aftermath of destructive 
activities by the ‘crowd’694. These ‘primary’ sources, typically damaged or destroyed 
buildings and property can provide a useful understanding of the actions and agenda 
of the ‘rioters’. In addition, a post-structural emphasis on ‘silences and omissions’ 
leads us towards analysing which properties were not attacked or looted. Comparing 
these two types of physical evidence offers a potential path towards understanding the 
interactions between the participants and proprietors, conflicts within the crowd and 
finally the choices that were made by both ‘sides’695. 
                                                 
694
 Reddy stated in his study of one hundred years of disorders in Rouen: ‘the targets of these crowds 
thus glitter in the eye of history as signs of the labourer’s conception of the nature of society’. Quoted 
from Reicher, The St. Paul’s Riot: An Explanation of the Limits of Crowd Action in Terms of a Social 
Identity Model, p.203. 
695
 There are a few examples of using quantitative analyses of damage to properties in ‘riots’ in order to 
gauge the motives of ‘crowds’. These include R. A. Berk and H. E. Aldrich, ‘Patterns of Vandalism 
during Civil Disorders as an Indicator of Selection of Targets,’ American Sociological Review 37, no. 5 
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The first striking piece of evidence in examining the destruction of property on the 
night of April 2
nd
 1980 in St. Paul’s was the fact that no private houses were the 
intentional targets of the ‘rioters’. As was noted by Reicher696, damage to property 
was almost exclusively aimed at the police, commercial or state buildings. This 
suggests that if intra-community conflict existed it was limited to these types of 
targets and was not concerned with the private ‘home’ as such. This first clue to the 
agenda of the crowd suggests that in the state of supposed ‘lawlessness’ created by the 
withdrawal of the Constabulary the destruction that was unleashed was not directed 
by disputes between members of the community on the basis of familial, criminal or 
sub-cultural relationships. On this basis the following analysis is limited to 
considering damage to commercial and state properties.  
 
Table 26 shows the commercial and state properties within the immediate area of 
action by the crowds, grouped according to their location on the listed 
thoroughfares
697
. Properties that were damaged by looting and/or arson are marked by 
red fill. The final column, ‘Order’ ranks the damaged properties according to the time 
                                                                                                                                            
(1972) and M. J. Rosenfeld, ‘Celebration, Politics, Selective Looting and Riots: A Micro Level Study 
of the Bulls Riot of 1992 in Chicago,’ Social Problems, 44 no. 4 (1997). 
696
 Reicher, The St. Paul’s Riot: An Explanation of the Limits of Crowd Action in Terms of a Social 
Identity Model, p.195. 
697
 The table was constructed from a variety of sources including cross-referencing Kelly’s Bristol 
Directory. (Kingston upon Thames: Kelly’s Directories, 1973) and the Yellow Pages: Bristol. (Post 
Office Yellow Pages, 1980), television footage BBC & HTV: St. Paul’s riot., post-riot photographs, 
Penny, Presentation Slides about the St Paul's Riots 1980 and Leggett, as well as ‘local knowledge’ 
(including recorded and unrecorded interviews with local shopkeepers). 
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at which they were attacked.  
 
Type of Property Location Damaged Looted 
Arson
698
 
Order 
Electrical Equipment  Lower Ashley Rd.     
Mini Market Lower Ashley Rd.     
Transport Office Lower Ashley Rd.     
Hardware Shop Lower Ashley Rd.    7 
Builders Merchants Lower Ashley Rd.     
Dry Cleaners Lower Ashley Rd.     
Public House Lower Ashley Rd.     
Record Shop Sussex Place    10 
Public House Sussex Place     
Car Repair Shop Ashley Rd.     
TV Repair Shop Ashley Rd.    ? 
Butcher Ashley Rd.     
Grocer/Bakers Ashley Rd.     
Chemist Ashley Rd.     
Bicycle Shop Ashley Rd.    7 
Newsagent Ashley Rd.    4 
Men’s Clothes Shop Ashley Rd.     
General Food Store Ashley Rd.    ? 
Public House Ashley Rd.     
Car Dealer Ashley Rd.    ? 
Bookmaker Ashley Rd.    3 
Post Office Ashley Rd.    4 
Public House Ashley Rd.     
Furnishing Store Ashley Rd.   * ? 
Drapers Ashley Rd.   * ? 
Clothes Shop Ashley Rd.   * ? 
Bank Ashley Rd.    1 
Florist Grosvenor Rd.     
Upholsterer Grosvenor Rd.     
Grocers & Off Licence Grosvenor Rd.     
Dress Fabric Shop Grosvenor Rd.   * ? 
Stationers Grosvenor Rd.     
Clothes Shop Grosvenor Rd.     
Removals Grosvenor Rd.     
Launderette Grosvenor Rd.     
Hardware Shop Grosvenor Rd.     
Motor Bike Shop Grosvenor Rd.    7 
Café  Grosvenor Rd.     
Public House Grosvenor Rd.     
Newsagent Grosvenor Rd.     
Printing Shop Grosvenor Rd.    2 
Commercial Stationers Wilder St.    ? 
Warehouse Brighton St.    6 
Store & Off Licence Brighton St.     
Labour Exchange Little Bishop St.    ? 
Table 26: Damage to commercial and state properties during the disturbance in St. Paul’s on the 
evening of April 2
nd
 1980 
                                                 
698
 Properties marked with an asterisk denote attempted arson or accidental damage by fire. 
 403 
 
It is immediately clear that some level of target selection was underway during the 
looting phase, as although nineteen properties were attacked, twenty-six were not. Of 
the attacked properties, the majority (fourteen) were looted. The looted premises can 
be categorised as being likely to have cash (bank, bookmaker, post office), purveyors 
of high value consumer durables (tools, electrical goods, motorbikes, bicycles) or easy 
to carry taxed goods (alcohol, tobacco). The only exceptions to this were clothes and 
fabric shops. In Table 26 all the properties that are retrospectively considered to fall 
into these high-value categories are shown shaded in grey. 
 
Of the properties that were not looted or damaged, thirteen fell into the high value 
categories including three pubs (cash), four general stores or newsagents (alcohol, 
tobacco), several other hardware shops (tools) and a chemist (drugs). Therefore more 
than half of the twenty-four high-value properties were left untouched despite the fact 
that the participants had four hours to loot at will. 
 
The five properties intentionally damaged by fire (in order of being burned) were a 
bank, bookmaker, post office, printing warehouse and commercial stationers. 
Attempted arson was carried out against several other premises (marked with asterisks 
in Table 26). Certain targets clearly had a symbolic value for the ‘rioters’ particularly 
the bank, which was surrounded by crowds both during the initial phases of the 
violence directed against the police and later on when they had withdrawn. Several 
respondents drew attention to the collective audible ‘joy’ when it was set on fire699. In 
another interview an eyewitness added a political emphasis to the attack on this target: 
                                                 
699
 See the comments by the eyewitness in Section 6.2.5 of Chapter 6.0. 
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‘Similarly the burning of Lloyds Bank by the rioters was not an attack on 
the bank per se but an attack on a visible representation of an unfair 
system’700 
Another such building ripe for arson was the multi-storey Labour Exchange on Little 
Bishop Street close to the ‘frontline’, which was attacked and damaged by missiles 
but according to one secondary source: 
‘They were held back by a Black ex-civil servant who had recently been 
employed at the local St Paul's Labour Exchange. He warned insurgents - 
within seconds of torching the building - that if they did so they only 
stood to lose their weekly giro.’701 
Outside of these high profile, popular targets the remaining destruction was more 
problematic, in that it excited debate, involved limiting behaviours and negotiation. 
 
This quantitative analysis demonstrates that selection of targets was underway within 
the ‘looting’ crowds702. Although clearly the decisions about which premises to rob 
were driven towards the high-value options, other processes were also in play that 
limited the extent of the looting in this property category. This limiting behaviour was 
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both derived from within the crowd and as a result of interactions with residents and 
shop owners (examples of which are given in Chapter 6.0 Section 6.2.5). Self-limiting 
behaviour included awareness amongst sections of the crowd that some high-value 
targets should not be looted, as they were considered to be part of the neighbourhood 
or of use to the community. Typically this involved shop-owners that were resident in 
the area for a considerable period of time and crucially were on good terms with the 
local population both Black and White. Local ‘rioters’ were also aware that certain 
commercial properties had people living above them, which had particular relevance 
for arson. Interactive limiting behaviours typically involved the looters being 
confronted by shop-owners who directed them away from their premises or where 
sections of the crowd intervened to prevent attacks being undertaken against particular 
properties that were considered important for the community
703
. One very revealing 
testimony relating many of these interactions was given by a female proprietor of an 
off-licence (in 1980) and who has lived in St. Paul’s for more than 40 years: 
 
Respondent (I): ‘They didn’t touch here and they didn’t touch the chemist’ 
Interviewer: ‘So why do you think that was then?’ 
Respondent (I): ‘Well, I mean I was standing outside anyway and some of my 
husband’s friends and that.  And [local] people were saying ‘Don’t worry we’ll look 
after your shop you know’. Outside people might try to you know break in and that. 
The local people protected it. It was very frightening because the police withdrew 
from the area. And the local people said ‘You are alright you know’’ 
Interviewer: ‘You were kind of in the middle of it. How frightened did you feel?’ 
Respondent (I): ‘I felt very frightened, very frightened…and next door the material 
                                                 
703
 Examples of these limiting behaviours are given in the oral histories in Section 6.2.5 Chapter 6.0. 
 406 
shop, you couldn’t phone the police, you couldn’t get through to them. And there 
were people taking bales of material from next door. It was very frightening…I think 
the chemist was fine because [name deleted] who owned the chemist…he was stood 
outside his shop and of course people, the medicine you know, there was the only one 
chemist in the area, so you know, so ‘he said please don’t touch my shop’ and they 
didn’t…I think it was where people weren’t in the property. I never heard of anybody, 
shopkeepers or anything getting injured. I think it was where the shops were empty.’ 
Interviewer: ‘In amongst these looters, apart from the outsiders, the people who were 
local who were something to do with it, would they have had that kind of knowledge? 
Would they have known for example whether people were living there or whether the 
owners were living there?’ 
Respondent (I): ‘Yeah, there probably was. I mean if someone put a brick through 
the window and no lights come on, you would presume there was nobody there. I 
think that is what it was…’ 
Interviewer: ‘I think [name deleted] shop down on Brighton Street wasn’t touched 
either. I don’t know whether you can remember?’ 
Respondent (I): ‘Well they never touched his shop, because he was probably there 
and he’s sort of the local shop, isn’t he. He’d been around for years as well. They 
knew him from when he was on Grosvenor Road. He used to have a shop of 
Grosvenor Road. So he’s been there from the year dot’ 
Interviewer: ‘Whereas Fowlers [the motorcycle dealer] gets…’ 
Respondent (I): ‘Well, Fowlers [laughs] Fowlers there was probably no one there 
and it was a bigger concern and there was no one there to stop them…’ 
Interviewer: ‘It must have been quite frightening at the start but what is interesting is 
that a lot of people say well they were sort of scared to begin with but once they came 
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out on the streets they didn’t feel particularly threatened themselves, this was people 
who live round here’ 
Respondent (I): ‘Yeah, well I mean felt frightened because I had probably a lot more 
to lose you know. If you’d just come out of your house, there was you know, nobody 
was going to hurt you personally’ 
Interviewer: ‘That’s how people felt was it?’ 
Respondent (I): ‘Yeah, yeah, I think it was more against the police and then of 
course it got out of hand and then people made it into a little profitable event didn’t 
they?’ [laughs]… 
Interviewer: ‘So apart from like the fact that somebody might have put a brick 
through the window…’ 
Respondent (I): ‘Yeah, I personally didn’t feel threatened. No.’ 
Interviewer: ‘Would you say that’s how most people felt?’ 
Respondent (I): ‘Yeah, I think that’s how most people felt’704 
 
This account reveals many of the limiting behaviours of the ‘looters’. Of particular 
interest is the implicit recognition that being of the area was important in protecting a 
small business. The owners were known by many of the crowd (which contained 
many of their customers and friends) and also they were usually living above these 
shops or were close by, so were present during the early evening looting phase 
However, larger concerns such as newsagents or motor-bike shops that were part of 
wider chains of stores did not lie in this category. They were considered ‘fair game’ 
by the looters, assuming that the shops were unoccupied and that no one lived above, 
which was often the case for such premises. The shop-owner respondent also explains 
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that her fears were not for her person but her commercial property and consequently 
that she ‘had more to lose’ than a normal resident. It appears the ‘looters’ approached 
this economic division in the community on the whole by ‘face to face’ negotiation 
rather than by force. 
 
It is worth turning towards an analysis of who the ‘looters’ actually were. A sample of 
fifteen people arrested during or after the St. Paul’s disturbance for offences including 
looting, theft and receiving stolen goods are analysed in Figure 28
705
.  
 
 
Figure 28: Histogram showing age range and gender of a sample of ‘looters’ in the St. Paul’s 
disturbance 
 
Although this is a relatively small sample it demonstrates that the ‘looters’ were far 
from being young and male. Instead there was participation across a considerable age 
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range and a third of the participants were women. Several eyewitnesses (including the 
following account) who observed the looting crowds corroborated these gender and 
age distributions: 
 
Interviewer: ‘If you were going to characterise the people who were doing the 
looting…were they young people or was it a mixture or was it people you 
recognised?’ 
Respondent (I): ‘It was a mixture, it was a mixture, young people, young women, 
young men, women in their thirties and there was a lot of people from outside that I’d 
never seen before. So it was, yeah, it was a mixture’706 
 
The analysis of the residence of offenders previously carried out in Section 7.2.5 ( 
Figure 27) demonstrated that more than three-quarters of the sample of ‘looters’ lived 
within one mile of St. Paul’s. So although there is certainly some evidence of 
‘outsider’ intervention in this phase of the disturbance, it is important to recognise the 
function of a ‘travelling looter’ as an ‘other’ in deflecting attention from the more 
problematic ‘looters’ within the community. 
 
7.2.7 ‘Joy’, ‘Liberty’ and taboo 
 
A couple of days after the serious disturbances in Handsworth, Birmingham in 
September 1985 a major national newspaper printed the following story under the 
headline ‘SONG OF JOY BY RIOTERS’: 
‘Whooping West Indians sang ‘Oh, What A Beautiful Morning’ as they 
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surveyed the riot wreckage yesterday. They laughed and drank while one 
section of the community mourned the victims of the violence. And they 
jeered and booed Police and firemen dealing with the burnt out cars 
littering a stretch of road nick-named Mayhem Mile’707 
This excerpt exposes one of the major taboo subjects both in the media and in many 
analyses of urban disturbances by commentators and academics. The feelings of ‘joy’ 
and ‘euphoria’, which litter the accounts of the participants in such incidents, are 
rarely discussed and usually completely overlooked. When the media does make 
reference to such feelings and resultant behaviours the accounts serve only one 
function, that of creating horror amongst their readers and branding the protagonists 
behaviour as evil or even subhuman. In the 1980s this media branding was closely 
linked to racialising the disorders
708
 often through clumsy codifications such as that 
demonstrated in the above excerpt. 
 
In terms of overlooking this aspect of ‘revolts’ the ‘Bristol Riots’ of April 1980 are no 
exception to this. Although one academic paper and a report drew attention to these 
facets of crowd behaviour
709
, the local and national media ignored the subject 
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altogether. However the testimonies of participants confirmed that the experiences of 
joy and euphoria were central to their memories of the events. The following is a 
selection of the accounts from various sources: 
 
St. Paul’s April 2nd 1980 
 ‘It was good, very good – everyone felt great’  
 ‘It was like a carnival out there – everyone was having a great time’ 
 ‘It was lovely, I felt free’ 
 ‘Everyone was walking around, just nodding at each other and smiling – it was 
really great’ 
 ‘People were so warm: they said ‘glad to be with you brother’ and put their 
arms round you’  
 ‘It wasn’t like what the papers say. This absolute mad mob. Everyone was 
together. They were looking at each other the whole time. It was Black and 
White and all ages and that was fantastic’ 
 ‘It was really joyful, that’s what they [the media] all leave out, the ‘joy’’  
 ‘You were just grinning at everyone because everyone was from St. Paul’s and 
you knew half the faces anyway. You saw your mates there, you know’ 710 
 
Interviewer: ‘So what was the feeling like? Were people chatting to each other?’ 
Respondent (A): ‘It was sort of like a party atmosphere. Especially after the police 
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had gone. It was like a proper party atmosphere. Burning [police] helmets in the 
middle of the street. Everybody was like ‘Yeahhhhhh, we beat them’. There was 
definitely a euphoria going on there. Definitely. Everybody was talking to each 
other…there was police cars going upside down and people running over with lit 
papers to blow them up. It was very different. I’d never experienced anything quite 
like that before…It definitely was a different night’711 
 
Southmead April 4
th
 1980 
‘It’s just fucking…it’s just that sort of…all of a sudden you’ve had no power all your 
life and you’ve got some power haven’t you, you know and you go shopping for 
nothing…It’s like…if I had…if in them days they had a shopping trolley I’d have 
gone round on…yeah, I’ll have some of that [laughs]…but the thing is, what it done 
was it empowered us…’712 
 
‘As a group of officers hid behind one of their vans for safety, a large brick arched 
through the air and landed full square on the windscreen window, shattering it with a 
loud crash. A roar went up from the crowd. Young and old, men and women. All 
applauding the damage caused. If the police were meant to be serving and protecting 
the community but that community was rejecting them, what then was their role? 
What were they really protecting? Who were they really serving? It was a brilliant 
moment. Revelatory. It was also at that very same moment that I realised and 
understood the power of riot. Riot as a weapon that we held and which the police were 
afraid of. Riot as a tool at our disposal. Riot as a fine expression of inarticulate rage. 
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Riot for the hell of it and riot as a means to an end’713 
 
These passages express a series of feelings and desires in the extraordinary experience 
of ‘riot’. The intense feelings of joy were not merely immediate reactions after the 
disorders but were exhibited by oral history respondents more than thirty years after 
the events. None of these later respondents showed remorse or guilt for these feelings 
with the benefit of hindsight but instead spoke fondly of their memories of these 
moments. Another aspect that comes through the accounts is both the desire and 
realisation of togetherness, especially in relation to ethnicity in St. Paul’s. Two 
respondents, one from St. Paul’s and the other from Southmead, also emphasise the 
different ages and gender of the participants in the context of this ‘togetherness’. This 
evidence points towards a desire to overcome these various divisions amongst many 
of the participants. These extraordinary incidents of collective ‘revolt’ appear to have 
realised these urges to some extent and it is no surprise that they are fondly 
remembered. Distinct parallels can be drawn here with the acceptable face of 
extraordinary collective behaviour that supposedly transcended barriers of class, age 
and gender; the ‘Blitz Spirit’, which marked a generation and was so championed by 
the British media. It is ironic that the ‘war stories’ told by some Black and White 
urban youth of the 1980s generation are more likely to be of the ‘taboo’ variety714. 
 
The last passage of the set is of particular interest as it leads us towards more 
profound articulations of these desires and experiences particularly with respect to the 
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ideas of ‘freedom’ and ‘empowerment’ mentioned in many of the testimonies. In a 
more revealing manner the same respondent attempted to convey his feelings about 
the epiphany he underwent during the Southmead ‘riots’: 
 
Interviewer: ‘Would you say it felt almost surreal?’ 
Respondent (H): ‘No, no…no I wouldn’t say that no…it was too vivid to have any 
kind of sense of that, it was too in the face, it was in the moment. Do you know what I 
mean? It was kind of life affirming actually. It was this stepping into something which 
none of us has touched upon in the past. This kind of like dimension almost of …a 
kind of liberty, of a kind of sense of liberation…of being able to step outside of and 
beyond what we’d got, do you know what I mean? Which was nothing, poverty… just 
to step beyond that and to touch upon something else, to touch upon something which 
was unspoken, that was kind of difficult to…almost impossible to define as in kind of 
to explain, but something almost kind of philosophical, that people would kind of talk 
about as to do with living and liberty and just escaping out of the life that you’ve got, 
that you’ve been handed and that you’re stuck in…and seeing a way out of this…just 
glimpsing this sense of being able to do something else, a capability of attaining 
something…yeah, of touching liberty, basically freedom..’715 
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8.0 Conclusions 
 
8.1  Introduction 
 
In this concluding chapter the aim is to review and assess the findings of the research 
in relation to the relevant existing theory and secondary sources, to draw some 
conclusions and to propose further research activities. The chapter is divided into four 
sections. The first and second are respectively concerned with the results of the 
analysis of the macro (Chapter 4: England July 1981) and micro (Chapters 5-7: 
Bristol April 1980) histories of urban disturbances in England 1980-81. In the third 
section, ‘Bridging the macro and the micro’, selected aspects of the analysis of the 
micro-history are utilised to explain some of the characteristics of the macro study. 
The final section is devoted to considering the implications of these conclusions in 
determining paths for future research. 
 
8.2  England: July 1981 
 
8.2.1  Overall characteristics  
 
The systematic and comprehensive collection of information from the primary sources 
concerning the urban disturbances in England in July 1981 significantly expanded the 
number of known locations of incidents in the period. The original list of ‘riots’ that 
was derived from combining data from thirteen secondary sources delineated eighty-
nine different locations experiencing disorder in July 1981. The results of the research 
exposed a further thirty-nine locations that were previously unrecorded, expanding the 
original list by over forty per cent.  Although the majority of these new locations 
underwent only relatively minor incidents, the overall list of daily disturbances was 
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expanded to two hundred events in one hundred and twenty eight different locales. As 
far as the author is aware, the dataset presented in Appendix 10.4 is the most complete 
listing of urban disorders in England in July 1981 currently in existence. 
 
In addition to this, information concerning the temporal nature and measures of 
disturbance severity in the dataset also significantly extended the detail for each daily 
incident far beyond what had been originally available. The fact that the original roll 
call of ‘riots’ could be so significantly expanded in both senses demonstrated both the 
lack of comprehensive research in the past and the importance of the July wave as a 
whole. With the exception of significant events such as the ‘Swing Riots’ of 1830-
31
716
, this research has established that the unrest in July 1981 represents one of the 
most intense and widespread periods of disorder in modern British history. 
 
Analysis of the overall disturbance dataset showed that the majority of incidents were 
spread over the week of 6
th
-13
th
 July although some areas (such as Toxteth in 
Liverpool) had significant reoccurrences of unrest throughout the month. The bulk of 
disorders in the period were of minor or major disturbance level with only 18% falling 
into the higher severity levels of ‘riot’. The majority of these serious events were 
experienced in inner city areas of major conurbations though serious disturbances 
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were also experienced in towns such as Chester, Luton, High Wycombe and Keswick. 
Cartographical analysis of the national picture established that the majority of serious 
events occurred in cities lying on or either side of a line running from London to 
Liverpool with Wales, Scotland, the far south-west, north-east and East Anglian areas 
of England being largely unaffected.  
 
8.2.2  Temporal and spatial patterns 
 
The temporal and spatial analysis of the dataset demonstrated a fractal-like pattern at 
three levels of magnification; the particular (severity of individual disorders spread 
over a few days), the local (clusters of disturbances within the boundaries of a city or 
conurbation) and the global (the overall wave at a national level). The pattern was 
represented by the following phases, a precipitating event (the ‘trigger’) followed by 
growth, peak, decline and ‘death’, which were repeated at all three levels of 
magnification. The decline of these various waves was probably due to a combination 
of exhaustion effects and police repression within individual locations that 
experienced disorder. These local declines, united with the depletion of virgin 
locations for likely outbreaks of disturbance (as proposed in the classical diffusion 
model), explained the overall decay in the numbers of further disorders. 
 
Deconstruction of the overall wave, demonstrated that significant mini-waves of 
disorders occurred in the following cites and conurbations (in chronological order); 
Merseyside, Manchester, London, and the West Midlands with other cites such as 
Nottingham experiencing similar though more minor patterns. It was noted that these 
city-level mini-waves shared temporal and spatial characteristics. Typically a major 
disorder in a multi-ethnic inner city area (Toxteth-Liverpool, Moss Side-Manchester, 
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Southall and Wood Green-London, Handsworth-West Midlands) acted as a 
precipitating incident and led to a cluster of more minor disturbances in other 
disparate districts of that city. Examination of the peaks of these mini-waves 
demonstrated that they generally lagged a day or so behind the zenith of the overall 
wave (Saturday 11
th
 July 1981). Superposition of these city-based mini-waves 
successfully generated the characteristic shape of the overall distribution of 
disturbances but did not fully account for the quantity of events or their peak on the 
11
th
 July. Consequently, a more sophisticated quantitative analysis was required to 
examine this feature. The overall wave of disturbances was compared to the classical 
model of diffusion (the logistic function)
717
. This demonstrated that contagious 
processes were underway that undermined the assumptions of independence between 
events in the classical model and were particularly prevalent over the weekend of 
10
th
-11
th
 July.   
 
Combining the various characteristics of the distributions of disorders at the 
particular, local and global together generated a more nuanced temporal and spatial 
narrative for the July events than had previously been established. The outbreak of 
serious disorders in multi-ethnic inner city areas acted as precipitating events for local 
contagious mini-waves of lesser disturbances within each conurbation. These city-
based mini-waves followed their own heterogeneous temporal and spatial paths over 
the succeeding days. The superposition of these events generated the characteristics of 
the overall wave prior to the weekend of 10
th
-11
th
 July.  Over that weekend, a more 
homogenous national contagious effect occurred which broadened the number and 
locations of disturbances to disparate towns outside of the major cities that were 
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undergoing disorder.  
 
However, it appears that cities that had an absence of initiating incidents of serious 
disorders in multi-ethnic inner city locales also failed to develop mini-waves of 
disorder. This may help explain why large regions of the country did not experience 
significant unrest. The major cities in these regions simply did not have large multi-
ethnic inner city areas primed for ‘riot’ and consequently, although other more 
disparate areas within those cities may have been ripe for disorder, the crucial 
precipitating incidents never transpired. However, some of these areas were briefly 
influenced by the national contagion hence the minor incidents in cities such as 
Newcastle, Sunderland, Hull and Southampton. 
 
8.2.3  Ethnicity of ‘crowds’ 
 
It is important to point out that the reference to multi-ethnic inner city areas does not 
necessarily imply that precipitating disorders in these locales were solely the province 
of ‘Black crowds’.  The analysis of the ethnic composition of ‘crowds’ in a sample of 
fifty-two daily disturbances in July showed that mixed ethnicity crowds made up 
more than half of these events. Also, these particular events were significantly more 
severe than the daily disorders involving either solely ‘Black’ or ‘White’ crowds718. 
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This did not exclude the possibility that the actions of mono-ethnic crowds were 
initiators of unrest. However, a temporal study of eleven serious disorders 
demonstrated that in only two locations (Toxteth, Liverpool and Moss Side, 
Manchester) were the initiating crowds ‘Black’ and in both of these areas the 
disorders rapidly developed into multi-ethnic affairs.  
 
This evidence essentially refutes the idea that the July disorders were solely ‘Black 
riots’ or more superficially ‘race riots’ with connotations of intra-ethnic violence. 
However, this does not imply that racism was not an important factor in the initiation 
of incidents. Participating groups in disorders can have different motives and the 
quantitative study of the July ‘wave’ did not provide enough specific evidence to 
assess this aspect of the unrest in detail. It should also be pointed out that anger about 
institutional and societal racism is not solely the province of the directly oppressed 
subject as is assumed in many studies. Mixed ethnicity crowds may have been 
‘rioting’ together for this very reason. 
 
8.3  The ‘Bristol Riots’: April 1980 
 
The disturbances in Bristol in April 1980 were treated as separate case studies in order 
to facilitate structural, contextual and situational comparisons. The aim of the analysis 
of the case study areas and the disorders they experienced was to try to understand the 
process for the spread of the disturbances, why they occurred in the areas they did and 
to assess various under-researched aspects of the incidents. 
 
8.3.1   Demography 
 
The detailed analysis of demography of the areas experiencing the principal disorders 
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(St. Paul’s and Southmead) highlighted significant similarities and differences 
between the locales, which helped explain the form and content of the disorders. In 
summary, both areas were of similar sized populations, principally composed of lower 
working class socio-economic groupings, were experiencing very high levels of youth 
unemployment and household overcrowding, lacked social facilities and scored highly 
on the ‘social stress’ scale. However, the St. Paul’s ‘neighbourhood’ had a large 
population of ethnic minorities compared to the Southmead ‘estate’, mixed forms of 
housing tenure and a considerably transient population. In contrast, the Southmead 
‘estate’ was principally composed of local authority housing with a more static 
population. Whilst St. Paul’s was in the inner city close to the heart of Bristol, 
Southmead was geographically isolated on the outskirts. 
 
The analysis of oral history testimony from respondents from all three areas and other 
primary sources confirmed the perceived negative branding of each area by social 
class (all three) and ethnicity (St. Paul’s). However, whereas St. Paul’s was 
commonly racialised as a ‘closed Black inner city ghetto’, the actual experience of 
respondents was quite different. In fact it was one of the more cosmopolitan areas of 
Bristol, with a long history of being a reception area for immigrants (Irish, Polish, 
Afro-Caribbean, Asian), those in the ‘care’ and probation systems and others in search 
of cheap rented housing or squatting. A lively cultural scene attracted a transient 
population of young people in the 1970s connected to various (youth) sub-cultures 
such as Punk and Rastafarianism.  
 
In contrast, Southmead and Knowle West were actually far more ‘closed’ districts by 
geography, ethnicity and reputation. Both areas were a distance from the city centre, 
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were constructed as self-contained estates and experienced relatively static mainly 
‘White’ resident populations.  Respondents from both areas highlighted violent inter-
estate rivalries with neighbouring districts, which inhibited mobility and 
fraternisation. The negative ‘branding’ accorded to their neighbourhoods, which 
inhibited socialising in wealthier nearby areas, compounded these exclusionary 
aspects of their lives. Within their estates, struggles for control over social space 
between local youth and the authorities were common and brought them into contact 
with the police on a fairly regular basis. 
 
8.3.2  Policing 
 
The most striking similarities in the testimony of the oral history respondents from the 
three areas concerned their experience of encounters with the police in the late 70s 
and early 80s.  In fact it was possible to interchange these accounts by location, with 
one exception, that of ethnicity. Almost all the White respondents experienced 
situations where ‘Black’ friends and acquaintances had been treated worse than they 
had in particular situations and crucially they were fully aware of this fact.  In some 
cases the respondents cited the generalised maltreatment as a basis for solidarity 
between sub-cultures and ethnic groups.  Neither were these isolated incidents. 
Several respondents realised in retrospect that, at the time, they had accepted police 
maltreatment as the norm and had not known anything different. This pointed to a 
history of policing practice that appeared to be area based and in many cases racist 
and derogatory to certain youth sub-cultures.  
 
When confronted with the question as to the role of the police in their home areas, the 
respondents emphasised the fact that their whole community was policed as a totality, 
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with little apparent differentiation between the known ‘criminal’ element and the rest 
of the residents. Police officers were variously seen as ‘faceless outsiders’, an alien 
presence, an occupying force or more significantly as ‘warders in a jail’. They were 
certainly not consulted by much of the community when crimes were committed; 
instead methods of self-policing were commonplace.  For some respondents this 
begged the question as to what use the police actually were for the community and 
several viewed them as merely ‘agents of control’ rather than ‘public servants’.  
However, this was not understood as a general problem for all Bristolians, but was 
related to the specific areas in which they were resident. Awareness and resentment of 
the disparities in the policing of different neighbourhoods of the city was prevalent in 
the accounts. 
 
Ironically, despite the negative myths about St. Paul’s, several White respondents 
from Knowle West and Southmead regarded the inner city multi-ethnic area as a 
‘safer’ area for youth than their own neighbourhoods. This inference was based upon 
on the propensity of ‘Black’ residents to collectively intervene in police activities on 
the street, something the Constabulary were fully aware of. The experiences of 
respondents point towards the model of the breakdown of consensus policing in the 
late 1970s and early 80s proposed by Lea and Young
719
.  Comparisons of this model 
                                                 
719
 Studies of breakdowns in police-community relations suggest that if a significant division arises 
between the two sides then the result is a loss of trust that can initiate a cycle of response and counter-
response. Loss in trust leads to a reduction in the amount of intelligence information received by the 
police force from the community. This is in turn can result in a change in policy by the Constabulary 
towards more ‘military-style’ or operationally driven mass policing activity which can exacerbate the 
divide further and can create physical resistance by the community on the street as well as potentially 
‘no-go areas’. J. Lea and J. Young, ‘The Riots in Britain in 1981: Urban Violence and Political 
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with the areas under study suggested that Southmead and Knowle West were at an 
earlier stage of the process, where although consensus had broken down, residents had 
not translated this into regular interventions in street policing activities.  In contrast, in 
St. Paul’s such confrontations were more commonplace and appeared to have 
moderated at least some of the routine activities of the constabulary on a day-to-day 
level. However, these relations of force may have led to over-policing of specific 
operations such as raids and other such irregular actions. 
 
8.3.3  The April 1980 disorders 
 
The temporal and spatial pattern of the disturbances in Bristol in the first week of 
April 1980 demonstrated a similarity with the characteristics of the city-level mini-
waves of disturbances highlighted in the analysis of the July 1981. Essentially a 
serious disturbance in an inner city area of mixed ethnicity (St. Paul’s) led to a 
number of less severe disorders in mainly ‘White’ outlying areas of the city. 
(Southmead, Knowle West). 
 
The historical narratives of the St. Paul’s, Southmead and Knowle West disorders of 
the first week of April 1980 presented in Chapter 6.0 represent the most 
comprehensive accounts available. They were reproduced in detail to both add to the 
historical record and to inform the subsequent analysis of the events in Chapter 7.0. 
                                                                                                                                            
Marginalisation',’ in Policing the Riots, eds. D. Cowell, T. Jones and J. Young (London: Junction 
Books, 1982), pp.10-13. This positive feedback loop was certainly in operation in some areas of mixed-
ethnicity in the inner cities of major conurbations in the 1980s. However, it is unclear whether such a 
process was underway in some of the peripheral mainly White working class estates in Bristol. It 
appears from the evidence that the first phase of this cycle was in place in 1980 but the latter phases 
only partially developed some years after. 
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Comparing the three events demonstrated that there were significant difference in the 
scale, longevity, severity and the precipitating events that led to the incidents.  
 
The St. Paul’s ‘riot’ was essentially a one-day event involving a defensive reaction to 
an over-policed raid on a symbolic location. The violence sporadically escalated until 
large multi-ethnic crowds drove the police from the area. Following this, serious 
damage was inflicted by fire on several buildings and a number of properties were 
looted.  In contrast, the Southmead and Knowle West incidents were initiated by the 
offensive actions of mainly White youths centred on symbolic locations of their 
choosing (the two ‘Greens’). Whereas there was significant pre-planning involved in 
the Knowle West event, in the Southmead incidents this may have only been the case 
prior to the second night of ‘rioting’720, though older members of the community were 
clearly providing tactical direction for the younger ‘rioters’ on that occasion.  Whilst 
the Knowle West disturbance was effectively suppressed before it could begin, in 
Southmead the disorder escalated into at least two nights of violence.  
 
The similarities between the events in all three areas are manifold. In each location, 
the police were the principal target of the collective violence
721
. Damage to property 
was limited to police vehicles and commercial and state premises. There were no 
                                                 
720
 Evidence of pre-planning before the second night of ‘rioting’ in Southmead refers to the cache of 
petrol bombs that was found after the incident and to the tactic of breaking windows to lure the police 
from their hiding places around the estate. See Chapter 6.0 Section 6.3.2. 
721
 The only exceptions to this were the incidents involving the alleged stoning of a few private vehicles 
and firemen in the St. Paul’s riot. See Chapter 7.0 Section 7.2.1. 
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attacks on resident’s homes, hardly any recorded incidents of intra-crowd fighting722 
and no major incidents of violence against the person even when the police had 
withdrawn from St. Paul’s. These limiting behaviours demonstrate that the initial 
agenda of the crowd in each incident was to attack the police and/or drive them out of 
an area. This may have been on the basis of fulfilling subsequent actions such as the 
freedom to loot (perhaps in Knowle West) but there is little evidence for this in the 
sources for the three incidents. The only apparent change in the agenda of the crowds 
happened in St. Paul’s once the police had left and this entailed a bout of selective 
looting and street partying. 
 
From the perspective of emerging collective identities within the ‘crowds’, the 
evidence suggests that in each area the participants defined themselves as being 
representative of their home district in some manner; whether as a ‘firm’ of youth 
‘crews’ from Knowle West, the ‘rioters’ almost wholly derived from Southmead or 
the large multi-racial crowds in St. Paul’s who, Reicher claimed, shared the identity of 
the ‘St. Paul’s community member’723. Although within the large crowds that were 
present at each event the actual number of participants who were actually attacking 
the police was limited to several hundred at most, crucially there was evidence in each 
                                                 
722
 There was only one account of intra-crowd incidents during the Southmead unrest, this was a 
newspaper report (Western Daily Press 05-04-1980) that stated ‘Last night police broke up fighting 
between more than 200 youths who clashed in Arneside Road. There were six arrests’. This appears to 
refer to the serious disturbance on the night of Friday 4
th 
April, which went underreported compared to 
the events of Thursday 3
rd
 April. There are no other corroborating sources for this unsubstantiated 
account of intra-crowd violence. 
723
 Reicher, The St. Paul’s Riot: An Explanation of the Limits of Crowd Action in Terms of a Social 
Identity Model, pp.202-5. 
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case that there was tacit and sometimes vocal support from large numbers of residents 
who watched the events unfold.  In each case the disorderly crowds regarded the 
police as outsiders whose activities during the disorders exacerbated this division.  
 
Many respondents questioned whom the police were actually protecting in the unrest, 
as it appeared their only task was to protect commercial properties. In any case, the 
evidence suggests that ‘civilians’ were not the targets of the ‘rioters’ and crucially this 
was clear to the majority of non-participants. Certainly these observations support the 
heavily criticised decision of the Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary 
to withdraw from St. Paul’s on the evening of April 2nd 1980. It appears that it was 
recognised by the Chief Constable that the ‘breach of the peace’ that was occurring in 
St. Paul’s was the direct result of their presence in the area. 
 
Assessments of under-researched aspects of the St. Paul’s disturbance focussed on the 
latter phase of the event after the police had withdrawn from the neighbourhood. 
Unsuccessful attempts by senior police officers to negotiate with the ‘crowds’ were 
initiated at several points during the disturbances and more significantly with 
community representatives after they had withdrawn. However, certain ‘rioters’ may 
have undertaken more successful negotiations. There are several sources of evidence 
that suggest that the fear of police actions in retaking control of the area may have 
spurred some groups to relay messages to the police authorities. These contained 
threats to extend the targeted destruction outside of St. Paul’s in order to deter violent 
police responses on their inevitable return or to obtain the release of certain high-
profile prisoners. The veracity and outcome of these claims is unclear but they 
certainly represented the desires of some ‘rioters’. 
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The detailed analysis of the targets of looting and arson in St. Paul’s represents the 
first comprehensive study of this portion of the disturbance. The evidence 
demonstrated that there were three chronological phases to this activity; initial 
window smashing and arson of selected symbolic targets and commercial properties 
with the acquisition of easy to carry high-value goods, a period where crowds 
organised together using vehicles to move larger high-value items and a latter phase 
where older residents calmly and openly ‘shopped without money’ for lower value 
‘essentials’. Analysis of the damaged buildings and the oral history, demonstrated that 
symbolic targets clearly included the Bank and the Labour Exchange and possibly the 
Print warehouse, Post Office and the Bookmakers
724
.  The commercial properties that 
were selected for looting were typified as being chain franchises with little connection 
to the area, containing high value goods, with no residents living above the premises 
and crucially no proprietors present to protect the property or negotiate with the 
looters. A sample of looters from the prosopograhical dataset and oral history 
testimony confirmed that this section of the crowds was of a wide age range and 
involved men and women who were mostly residents in or within one mile of St. 
Paul’s. Despite the claims of some that the looters came from ‘outside’ the area, the 
evidence suggests that they were actually a fairly representative sample of the 
residents of St. Paul’s and its environs. 
 
Government and media inspired ‘folk devils’ such as ‘travellers’ and ‘outside 
agitators’ were also critically assessed in relation to the St. Paul’s disturbance. The 
                                                 
724
 However, it was unclear from the evidence precisely why these latter targets were selected for arson 
so early in the looting phase. 
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depiction of the ‘traveller’ as the selfish (and lonely) ‘homo-economicus’ of neo-
liberal theory was counter-posed by the cosmopolitan, connected youths who travelled 
out of a sense of solidarity with their sub-culturally derived friends and acquaintances 
in St. Paul’s. Similarly the early (and limited in 1980) media obsession with the 
‘outside agitator’ was thoroughly debunked. 
 
8.3.4  Communication and contagion 
 
A key part of the analysis of the micro-histories of the ‘Bristol Riots’ concerned the 
mechanisms for transfer of information about the St. Paul’s ‘riot’ to the distant and 
disparate areas of Southmead in the north of the city and Knowle West in the south. 
Essentially the research questions revolved around why areas such as these, with 
differing histories and demographics to St. Paul’s, reacted to the precipitating 
disturbance, whilst others failed to do so. The evidence pointed towards several 
mechanisms for the transfer of information between widely separated locales both 
prior, during and after the precipitating disorder. These included peer-to-peer 
relationships through schools, sub-cultural and familial connections as well as the 
mass media. It was noted that the contagious effect of the information was dependent 
upon the context in which it was delivered as much as the content.  
 
The evidence also indicated two phases of information consumption and exchange. 
The first, a one-way process via the mass electronic media was temporally and 
spatially homogenous within the bounds of Bristol. The second related to the 
assessment, transfer and exchange of this information through various informal social 
networks. The latter group generated differing responses based upon situational and 
contextual factors and thus generated heterogeneous outcomes that affected the 
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likelihood of outbreaks of further disorder. Simply stated, although most Bristolians 
knew about the St. Paul’s ‘riot’ within a few hours of the outbreak of hostilities due to 
television and radio reports, this information then passed into specific pan-Bristol 
social networks that linked the subject areas as well as local networks in those 
neighbourhoods. These particular social networks were energised by news of the 
‘riot’, encouraged travelling to St. Paul’s to take part in the action and were also ripe 
for initiating a local response. Once this information had passed into belligerent local 
networks amongst youths in Southmead and Knowle West they resorted to their 
existing organisational forms to plan and launch collective violence against a shared 
enemy in their home neighbourhoods. 
 
However, the dissemination of information between areas was not on an equal basis, 
there was a hierarchy of information flow in operation principally due to the location 
and demographics of the communities involved. Commonly held racist mythologies 
of St. Paul’s as a ‘closed and ghettoised’ community in the 1980s were inverted by 
research from historical, structural and social perspectives. Instead the area sat at the 
centre of a web of radial and rhizomic social networks spreading across the city. 
These networks were generated between specific outlying working class estates and 
St. Paul’s through the fusion of the relationships between second generation ‘mixed 
race’ teenagers and youth sub-cultures. These diffuse ethnic and sub-cultural networks 
spanning the city overcame the spatial separations between areas, rose above inter-
estate rivalries and usurped the mythical status of St. Paul’s as a ‘no go’ area for 
Whites. Symbolic locations such as clubs like the ‘Dug Out’, the various ‘Blues’ 
drinking-dens in St. Paul’s and other sub-cultural gathering points acted as important 
nodes in this social web. The large multi-racial crowds in St. Paul’s that defeated the 
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police were shown to not merely be due to the cosmopolitan nature of the area, but 
also to be derived from these sub-culturally and ethnically derived social networks.  
 
During and after the St. Paul’s ‘riot’ information radiated out through this web to 
outlying areas that were ‘ripe for riot’. In 1980 this was principally a one-way flow of 
information, which precipitated disturbances in some of these neighbourhoods. 
However, the more ‘closed’, mainly White working class estates that ‘rose’, generally 
did so alone, attracted fewer ‘travellers’ and were apparently hamstrung by inter-
estate rivalries. This may also provide a clue to why areas of similar demographics 
failed to ‘rise’ in the aftermath of the St. Paul’s event.  
 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of these micro-histories of urban disorder 
concerns the respondents’ memories of receiving information about the precipitating 
disturbance in St. Paul’s and their attitudes as participants in the disorders.  Several 
respondents recalled their inspirational feelings on hearing of the St. Paul’s event and 
attempted to travel to the neighbourhood. Others felt jealousy that their home areas 
had failed to ‘rise’ (so far), showed grudging respect for the ‘insurgents’ in St. Paul’s 
and recognised it as a ‘game changing’ moment that took priority over inter-estate 
rivalries. Either way, the potential for successful collective action against the common 
enemy, the police, was now firmly on the agenda.  
 
During the disturbances themselves, respondents repeatedly stressed the feelings of 
togetherness, joy, freedom and ‘community’ and in the case of St. Paul’s celebrated 
this with a bonfire party after they had driven the police out of the area. The taboo 
feelings in those extraordinary moments should not be underestimated. They 
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remained vivid in the minds of oral history respondents after more than thirty years 
demonstrating that the tumultuous April of 1980 in Bristol was both part of their 
‘halcyon days’ and a significant marker in their own ‘histories’. 
 
8.4  Bridging the ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ 
 
The micro-histories of the ‘Bristol Riots’ of April 1980 highlight several features that 
inform the findings of the ‘macro’ analysis of the wave of disturbances in July 1981. 
These lie at the level of individual incidents as well as across a city and concern the 
precipitation, characteristics and spread of disorders. 
 
8.4.1  Crime and policing 
 
Inner city areas (such as St. Paul’s) had experienced a long-term decline in 
employment opportunities though the 1970s, which allied with racial discrimination 
in schooling and by employers
725
, generated a young, mainly Black, proletarian sub-
stratum that rejected low-paid unskilled jobs in the formal economy. Instead, the 
repertoire of survival strategies included working in the informal ‘community’ 
economy whilst illegally claiming welfare payments as well as dealing soft drugs and 
other forms of petty and street crime.  
 
The structural economic crisis of the late 70s that was enhanced by Conservative 
Party policy in 1979-81, led to significant rises in youth unemployment, particularly 
in the inner cities
726
. This particularly affected Black and White school leavers in 
                                                 
725
 Dresser and Fleming, Bristol: Ethnic Minorities and the City, 1000-2001, pp.170-171 
726
 J. Hicks and G. Allen, A Century of Change: Trends in UK Statistics since 1900. (London: House of 
Commons Library, 1999) Research Paper 99/111, p.24. 
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1979-81. One respondent in Birmingham stated: 
‘Because of the dole, right, you’ve got a lot of Black and White youth 
going round together that would have probably, after school, split apart 
more easily and gone their separate ways…and the Whites would have 
gone up the ladders. But that’s not happening now…as the number of 
unemployed increases, that question comes up less and less’727 
This state of affairs effectively forced increasing numbers of youth to adopt the 
survival strategies of the sub-stratum
728
, which inevitably brought many of them into 
contact with the police.  As a result of the crisis-ridden period of the 1970s, the police 
authorities were moving away from consensus policing strategies towards more 
aggressive operational and area-based solutions to a perceived rising crime rate. The 
dialectical (and symbiotic) relationship between these two opposing forces 
deteriorated through the 70s with cultural attitudes hardening on both sides. As inner 
city multi-ethnic communities began to close off their day-to-day relationships with 
the police, the police in turn began to explicitly view whole neighbourhoods though 
the lenses of ‘race’ and social ‘class’.   
 
These changes in the approach and strategy of policing were not however purely 
limited to multi-ethnic inner city areas, they had been developing though the 70s and 
were also applied to outlying working class ‘council’ estates that were considered by 
the authorities to be historically problematic (such as Knowle West and Southmead in 
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 Jones, Black Culture, White Youth: The Reggae Tradition from JA to UK, pp.208-9. 
728
 Jones outlines some of the more constructive inner city survival strategies in Ibid. p.212. 
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Bristol
729). In these ‘estates’ branded by reputation, criminals and the criminalized 
were intentionally (and sometimes unintentionally) aggregated into the resident 
population as a problematic whole, in a similar manner to the inner city areas, though 
without the emphasis on ethnicity.  This approach combined with the move towards 
‘faceless’ policing by vehicular patrol exacerbated the division between the police and 
the community
730
. The result was little cooperation between the residents and the 
constabulary, (ironically) less reporting of crimes
731
 and less intelligence information 
for following up those that were. As remembered by the oral history respondents of 
Southmead and Knowle West, the police appeared to be fairly irrelevant in solving 
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 It is no surprise that the two of the three main police stations that acted as headquarters for the 
policing of Bristol in the early 1980s (outside of the inner city) were built in Southmead (‘C’ Division 
HQ) and Knowle West (‘B’ Division HQ) in the 1970s; Avon and Somerset Constabulary, The Police: 
A Brief History (Bristol: Avon and Somerset Constabulary, 1980s), pp.20-21. After the St. Paul’s ‘riot’ 
of 1980, the recently built Trinity Road police station (1979) tripled its personnel and effectively 
became a headquarters adjacent to the ‘problem area’ (unrecorded interview by the author with a police 
officer; 26
th
 March 2010). This was confirmed by the Chief Constable who stated ‘Police strength for 
the Trinity Road subdivision has rapidly been increased to the figure I had planned for four years time. 
The problem of policing a multi-racial community requires understanding coupled with reasonable 
firmness’ Bristol Evening Post 23-05-1980. Some six months after the ‘riot’, the police authority also 
threatened to ‘establish cop shops in St. Paul’s’ without consultation with the community; Joshua, 
Wallace and Booth, To Ride the Storm: The 1980 Bristol 'Riot' and the State, p.131. 
730
 The physical separation of the constabulary from the neighbourhoods they police is traced back to 
the 1930s in J. R. Lambert and R. F. Jenkinson, Crime, Police, and Race Relations: A Study in 
Birmingham. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), Chapter 6 and noted in B. Jackson, Working 
Class Community. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972), p.124. 
731
 It could also mean a reduction in the number of complaints against the police as significant sections 
of the community dispensed with this tactic which rarely achieved significant results. Policing Against 
Black People. (London: Institute of Race Relations, 1987). 
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crimes, instead they seemed to be merely trying to oversee or control neighbourhoods. 
The resulting stalemate may have presented an appearance of calm (recalled by the 
one respondent as the police behaving like ‘warders in a jail’), but as in a real prison, 
a state of tranquillity does not represent an accurate picture of the real relations of 
force. The hidden breakdown in police-community relations in the outlying estates of 
Bristol and the apparent ‘normality’ of questionable street policing behaviours that the 
respondents remembered was not a stable or durable situation. 
 
As far as the police forces were concerned, the barrier of distrust and silence that 
separated the police and community in many districts and which inhibited ‘solving 
crimes’, required new short-term solutions, particularly in inner city neighbourhoods 
that had been targeted (and racialised
732) as ‘high-crime areas’. These ‘solutions’ 
included the use of specialised units such as ‘Task Forces’733, raids and ‘Swamp’ 
operations
734, aggressive street policing tactics such as ‘stop and search’ and the use 
                                                 
732
 The explicit use of racialised crime figures in London in 1976 marked the formal introduction of 
such area-ethnic based policing strategies; Hall and others, Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and 
Law and Order, pp.334-338 and Gilroy, There Ain't no Black in the Union Jack: The Cultural Politics 
of Race and Nation, pp.94-95. 
733
 The ‘heavies’ as the youth of Southmead named them (see Chapter 6.0 Section 6.3.1), were a Bristol 
based derivative of the Special Patrol Group (SPG) formed by the Metropolitan police in the 1960s. 
Hall and others, Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order, pp.46-48. 
734
 These were mass street-policing operations, pioneered in the mid-1970s and ostensibly aimed at 
stamping out street crime in targeted districts of inner cities. See B. Roberts, ‘The Debate on 'Sus',’ in 
Black Youth in Crisis, eds. E. Cashmore and B. Troyna (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982), pp.114-125 
and Policing Against Black People. One such operation was a significant precipitator of the Brixton 
disorders of April 1981 and which Scarman called a ‘serious mistake’; Scarman, The Scarman Report, 
p.110. 
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of the antiquated SUS law
735
. As the research demonstrated, these tactics particularly 
impacted on the young, whether innocent or guilty, and carried a racialised edge, 
which White youth became aware of from their encounters with the police in mixed 
ethnicity groups. 
 
By 1980, in particular multi-ethnic inner city areas such as St. Paul’s, the police-
community relationship had deteriorated to the point where there was effectively a 
state of ‘slow-riot’ in operation, as residents regularly intervened in routine street 
policing, sometimes violently
736
. Although, these behaviours were initially attributed 
to a ‘criminal’ proletarian sub-stratum, it became clear that wider sections of these 
inner city communities were being drawn into these confrontations. This change in 
the relationship with the police, marked a historic move from the verbal ‘demands for 
rights’ attributed to first generation African-Caribbean immigrants when dealing with 
the police in the 1950s-60s
737
, to second-generation youth physically demanding them 
in the early 1980s. 
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 The targeting of multi-ethnic inner city areas with the SUS law derived from the 1824 Vagrancy Act 
is discussed in C. Demuth, 'Sus', a Report on the Vagrancy Act 1824. (London: Runnymede Trust, 
1978), pp.36-37. 
736
 These behaviours were first officially noted by the Metropolitan police in 1976; Gilroy, There Ain't 
no Black in the Union Jack : The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation, pp.93-94. 
737
 A senior police officer in Bristol in the 1960s complained that ‘West Indians’ in Bristol were 
‘gregarious by nature and prone to a very strong insistence for the smallest right to which they think 
they are entitled…many of them, who are obdurate and unintelligent, press their demands to the utmost 
limits’; Dresser and Fleming, Bristol: Ethnic Minorities and the City, 1000-2001, p.143. See also 
Lambert’s study of crime and policing in Birmingham in the 1960s in Lambert and Jenkinson, Crime, 
Police, and Race Relations: A Study in Birmingham, Section 6. 
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By 1980 the conditions were thus in place for generalised violent confrontations 
between residents and police in certain mixed ethnicity inner city areas. These were as 
likely to arise as the result of fairly routine contestations of street policing as the more 
contentious mass policing measures such as ‘Swamp’-type operations or raids focused 
on symbolic locations. The lack of situational focus on ‘criminals’ engendered by the 
latter activities
738
 and failures to effectively consult with ‘community leaders’ who in 
some cases were withdrawing from such liaisons
739
, exacerbated the potential for 
mass disorders.  
 
The concentration on policing in this section is a direct result of the emphasis given to 
it in the testimonies of ‘rioters’ as a historical precipitator for disorder in 1980-81. 
Although, there may have been various other subsidiary causes for the unrest, the 
police exercised the legitimate use of force by the state on a day-to-day level and thus 
for many came to represent the ‘state’. As Sivanandan pointed out: 
‘The Police are…a threat, a foreign force, an army of occupation – the 
thick end of the authoritarian wedge, and in themselves so authoritarian as 
to make no difference between wedge and state’740 
It was unclear in many of the disturbances whether the police were targeted purely 
                                                 
738
 The large number of people stopped and searched during police ‘Swamp’ type operations in targeted 
areas, compared to the extremely low arrest rates are discussed in Roberts, The Debate on 'Sus', 
pp.117-8. 
739
 For example, the collapse in formal police-community liaison in Brixton in 1979 is recounted in 
Scarman, The Scarman Report, pp.87-96. 
740
 A. Sivanandan, A Different Hunger: Writings on Black Resistance. (London: Pluto Press, 1982), 
p.49. 
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because of an unhappy history surrounding policing issues or because they were 
(unfortunate) representatives of the wider ‘state’ or ‘system’. For either reason (or 
both) they were the principal targets of the collective violence that was unleashed. 
 
8.4.2  ‘Copycat’ and ‘Contagion’ 
 
St. Paul’s, in this comparison, effectively represents the multi-ethnic, cosmopolitan 
and deprived inner city areas that were the first to ‘riot’ in their respective cities in 
July 1981 (Southall and Wood Green [London], Toxteth [Liverpool], Moss Side 
[Manchester], Handsworth [Birmingham], Highfields [Leicester], Hyson Green 
[Nottingham]). The research demonstrated that St. Paul’s was far from being a closed 
‘Black ghetto’ (by demography and culture) and in fact had significant links to other 
mainly White working-class estates, sometimes on the outskirts of the city. These 
links were a by-product of education and the fusion of ethnic and sub-cultural social 
networks that had been energised during the 1970s as the offspring of first generation 
immigrants came of age. This ethnographic observation would also have been 
representative of many major cities in England in the period that received a significant 
number of migrants from the ‘New Commonwealth’ in the 1950s and 60s. If similar 
ethnic and sub-cultural social networks existed in other major cities of the period
741
, 
which is highly likely, then it may help explain which outlying, mainly White areas, 
responded to the serious precipitating disorders in the multi-ethnic inner cities. 
 
Once serious disorders had broken out in multi-ethnic inner city areas in July 1981 the 
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 Evidence of similar networks in Birmingham is supplied by Jones, Black Culture, White Youth: The 
Reggae Tradition from JA to UK and Cashmore, No Future: Youth and Society and discussed in 
Chapter 2.0 Section 2.2.7. 
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research showed that they generated clusters of disorders local to each city or 
conurbation. The case studies of the ‘Bristol Riots’ demonstrated that although the 
mass media carried the news of the St. Paul’s disturbance into most homes in the city 
within a few hours, many of the subsequent participants in disorder that were 
interviewed either heard about it through social networks or knew some of the people 
who had actually taken part. Thus to a certain extent the context in which the 
information was received was as important as its actual content. Similarly, those who 
had direct connections to St. Paul’s or who had actually travelled to the ‘riot’ were 
important conveyors of information to outlying estates. Once social networks on those 
estates that were primed for disorder received the information, it was transmitted by 
word of mouth leading to discussion and in one case (Knowle West) planning for a 
‘riot’. 
 
In July 1981, the lead-time for a subsequent disturbance to occur within the bounds of 
a city after the initiation of violence in an inner city multi-ethnic area was rarely less 
than a day and sometimes several days but certainly no more than this. This delay, 
which was replicated in Southmead (one day) and Knowle West (two-three days) in 
Bristol in 1980, represented the time for information concerning the St. Paul’s 
disturbance to reach and travel through social networks, be evaluated, discussed and 
acted upon. Essentially these phases correspond to the dissemination and ‘planning, 
organising and targeting’742 period prior to the outbreak of a disturbance in a spatially 
                                                 
742
 Myers demonstrated that the time for news of a disturbance to travel and pass through these 
assessment and mobilisation phases was at the very most a week during the disorders of the 1960s in 
the U.S. Myers, Collective Violence and Heterogeneous Diffusion Processes: U.S. Racial Rioting from 
1964-1971, p.9 note 3, and at least a week during the ‘Swing Riots’ of 1830-31, Myers and Przybysz, 
The Diffusion of Contentious Gatherings in the Captain Swing Uprising, p.80. The differences were of 
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distant area. The small cluster of disturbances in outlying areas of Bristol following 
the St. Paul’s event was thus spatially and temporally similar to the mini-waves that 
appeared in Merseyside, Manchester, London and the West Midlands in the first week 
of July 1981. These heterogeneous patterns of disturbances in each city shared the 
hierarchical contagion of the Bristol events in 1980. The more serious precipitating 
incident in the inner city generated further disparate and less severe disturbances 
throughout the city. However, this was generally a one-way process, with the latter 
smaller though more numerous events failing to initiate major disturbances upstream 
of the information flow. 
 
These observations lead to the conclusion that the heterogeneous diffusion of 
information through social networks that connected the inner city to outlying estates 
in Bristol was also in operation in the mini-waves of disturbances in some cities in 
July 1981. The form of the social networks that were operating in the cities in July 
1981 and facilitated these disturbance patterns was beyond the research capability in 
this thesis. However, it would be surprising if they did not show some correspondence 
to the educational, familial, ethnic and sub-culturally derived networks revealed by 
the research into the ‘Bristol riots’ of April 1980.  
 
These conclusions significantly challenge the social-psychological concept of the 
‘copycat riot’ as an event intimately connected to collections of individuals receiving 
information about a prior disturbance through mass electronic media and then acting. 
If this was so, homogenous diffusion effects would be expected, as susceptible and 
                                                                                                                                            
course related to the prevalence of electronic mass media, improved transportation and personal 
communications such as the telephone in the later period. 
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primed neighbourhoods (potential adopters), dispersed across the country reacted to 
news of major precipitating ‘riots’ in the mass media743. A faster reaction time to the 
information would be also be likely, as individuals required only an interaction with 
electronic media to begin the mobilisation phase. These spatial and temporal 
characteristics were clearly not experienced in most of the major cities that 
experienced clusters of disorders in the first week of July 1981 in England.  
 
The ‘copycat’ phenomenon emphasises the inability of individual or collective 
receivers of information about a disturbance to analyse, critique and make conscious 
objective decisions about its content. Instead the recipients are seen as passive 
consumers of the information where their unconscious desires are the driver for their 
subsequent actions
744. In contrast, the concept of ‘contagion’ understood here is 
defined by conscious, rational and evaluative decision-making based upon the real 
experiences and actual social relations within social networks that are giving and 
receiving the information
745
. The process that was in operation in Bristol in April 
1980, which it has been demonstrated shows distinct similarities to the mini-waves 
that appeared in a number of cities in July 1981, clearly falls within the latter 
definition. 
 
This observation leads to a question as to why the city-based contagious mini-waves 
                                                 
743
 This may of course be an explanation for the national contagion that was isolated as a feature of the 
overall wave of disturbances in July 1981. This effect provided an explanation for a number of 
disparate towns that experienced unrest over the weekend of 10
th
-11
th
 July and is discussed in Chapter 
4.0 Section 4.4.3.2. 
744
 See Moonman, Copy-Cat Hooligans and Clutterbuck, Terrorism and Urban Violence. 
745
 See the definition for ‘contagion’ given by Myers in Chapter 2.0 Section 2.3.5 note 141. 
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occurred at all in April 1980 and July 1981. As the research into the Bristol events 
demonstrated, there were significant differences in ethnic composition, location and 
histories between the areas that acted as precipitators and those that reacted. On 
reflection and considering the obvious divisions generated by societal racism in this 
period, it seems extraordinary that mainly White outlying estates trapped as they were 
by intense inter-estate rivalries, would rise in response to news of ‘riots’ in negatively 
mythologized multi-ethnic inner city ‘ghettos’. However, as the micro-histories have 
demonstrated, a web of primarily working class youth linked by a fusion of ethnic and 
sub-cultural social networks was in existence in 1980 (and 1981). Members of these 
youth networks shared a history of sub-ordinate class status, branding, ‘social 
deprivation’ and crucially police harassment. Amongst White members of these 
networks there was an awareness of the concrete reality of racism, through their 
experiences of the unequal treatment of Afro-Caribbean youth who they were 
acquainted with and the prevalence of racist views in their home neighbourhoods
746
. 
Racist myths concerning inner city ‘Black ghettos’ and ‘no go’ areas had been 
discredited by friendships with Black youth from these neighbourhoods. The 
respondents from outlying estates also came to regard these inner city areas as 
relatively ‘safe’ and as good places in which to socialise or even live.  
 
When news travelled through these networks that these neighbourhoods had not only 
                                                 
746
 In a section entitled ‘Race traitors’ Jones pointed out in his ethnographic study in Birmingham in 
the period that many White youth (particularly women) from outlying mainly White estates 
experienced significant disapproval and harassment from their family and peers concerning their 
relationships with Black youth from the inner city areas. Jones stated ‘The reactions of other whites to 
the respondents’ cross-racial affiliations played a crucial role in shaping their development and 
outcome’.  Jones, Black Culture, White Youth: The Reggae Tradition from JA to UK, pp.196-202. 
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‘risen up’ but also had soundly defeated the common enemy, the police, the effect was 
‘inspirational’. White youth wanted to participate, to experience the feelings that were 
related to them by their peers who were lucky enough to say ‘I was there’. Acting as 
conduits to others in their home areas that were less well connected, they spread the 
excitement, explored the potentialities for combat, and in some cases, collectively 
acted. 
 
8.4.3  Ethnicity and Class 
 
E.P. Thompson stated, in his introduction to ‘The Making of the English Working 
Class’, that: 
‘class happens when some men, as a result of common experiences 
(inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests 
between themselves, and as against other men whose interests are 
different from (and usually opposed to) theirs’747 
This definition of ‘class’ as a social relation, which rejected competing concepts of 
‘class’ as a structure or category, appears particularly apt for describing the unrest of 
1980-81 in England. If societal and institutional racism in the 1950s and 60s were 
principal inhibitors for the integration of first generation immigrants to the U.K. into 
economic and political structures, then these factors also inhibited the re-composition 
of sections of the working class through shared action. For their second generation 
offspring the situation was somewhat different, though nonetheless difficult.  
 
                                                 
747
 Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, pp.8-9. 
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Significant cultural and social integration did occur between some Black and White 
youth in the 1970s through the experience of shared schooling, locale and sub-culture. 
Despite the inequalities engendered by racism, sections of youth in particular locales 
were overcoming the explicit divisions that lay between them, despite their inability 
affect the causes and long-term outcomes of these rifts. This activity was essentially 
unnoticed or couched in the terms of ‘successful integration’ in the 1970s. During the 
events of 1980-81 the nature of this ‘integration’ became explicit at least for a 
historical moment, as both Black and White youth fought the police in the inner cities 
and White youth responded in the deprived outlying Keynesian estates.  
 
This was not perhaps the ‘assimilation’ that was intended by social planners, but in 
fact it actually represented the real dialectic of integration, as essentially a two-way 
process between people. The ‘shared experiences’ and ‘identity of interests’ that 
Thompson spoke of were drivers for the creation of the sub-culturally and ethnically 
derived social networks that were important in spreading the contagion of ‘riot’ in 
1980-81. This is not to propose that ethnicity was being subsumed into a master 
category of ‘class’ in the period. Ethnicity was always explicit748 and racism ever 
present, however, rebellious sections of youth worked through these differences and 
divisions and ended up somewhere new. As Thompson noted ‘Consciousness of class 
arises in the same way in different times and places, but never in just the same 
way’749. This was certainly true of the late 1970s and early 80s in England, where the 
                                                 
748
 Tumber noted in his interviews with Black participants in the 1981 ‘riots’ from London, Liverpool 
and Manchester that ‘there was considerable anger at continually being labelled as ‘immigrant’ or 
‘ethnic minorities’’. Tumber, Television and the Riots: A Report for the Broadcasting Research Unit of 
the British Film Institute, p.45. 
749
 Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, p.9. 
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actual overcoming of explicit ethnically derived divisions produced new experiences 
and outcomes for both Black and White alike.  
 
When the ‘riots’ finally arrived in the 1980s, as several commentators had predicted 
after studying the ‘racial’ unrest in the U.S. in the 1960s750, the surprise was the 
massive involvement of White youth, which was quite unlike the U.S. experience. 
This confounded both the racists and the ‘race relations’ specialists alike and has been 
either ignored, talked away or crudely enclosed by classical Marxist theory ever since. 
The fact that multi-ethnic inner city areas were the loci for precipitating ‘riots’ in 
1980-81 was used to mask the generalised unrest that occurred in many mainly White 
areas. Effectively the ‘riots’ were racialised by sections of the right and academia for 
their own political ends. It is no surprise that the some of the most oppressed (Black) 
sections of the working-class located in the inner cities were the first to explode onto 
the stage of history in 1980-81. What was unique was the large number of White 
youth that joined them. Together, by design or chance, they acted as a vanguard for 
numerous further disorders in mainly White areas. But this should not be a surprise, as 
Thompson theorised:  
‘Making…is…an active process, which owes as much to agency as to 
conditioning. The working class did not arise like the sun at an appointed 
time. It was present at its own making’751 
One ‘rioter’ from 1981 put it even more trenchantly: 
                                                 
750
 See for example the article in The Times from 1967 quoted in Solomos, Black Youth, Racism and 
the State: The Politics of Ideology and Policy, p.175. 
751
 Thompson’s original emphasis in bold. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, p.8. 
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‘It might have looked like we were in it for a laugh, but there was this 
incredible feeling. We weren’t fighting each other; like we weren’t 
fighting the pakis or the blackies, ‘cause they were with us doing the 
rioting. We were all fighting something else’752 
The explicit (though perhaps momentary) sectoral class recomposition that occurred 
amongst some youth in 1980-81 was the product of an active process underway in the 
1970s. Its violent outcome was an historic phenomenon, which startled the police and 
shook the Tory Government
753
. 
 
8.5 Summary 
 
This thesis has aimed to counter ideologically-driven and under-researched 
interpretations in many contemporary accounts of violent urban disturbance in the 
period. Rather than beginning with an ideological assumption and seeking evidence to 
support this position, the approach in this work follows a more scientific and 
systematic methodology. The research questions, framed by contradictions in the 
secondary sources, determined the scope and content of the data that was gathered. A 
critical study of existing analytical methods and the introduction of relevant new 
methodology allowed this data to be successfully evaluated.  Conclusions about the 
form and content of the disturbances were drawn and this enabled ideological 
                                                 
752
 Cashmore, No Future: Youth and Society, p.84. 
753
 Prime Minister Thatcher stated (without qualification) that early July had been ‘her ten most 
worrying days’; Farrar, 'Riot and revolution: The politics of an inner city' and one of her advisers 
Patrick Cosgrove recalled: ‘I remember her at the time, again and again, repeating, almost like a mantra 
‘Churchill in 1940, Churchill in 1940, Churchill in 1940’’; A. Curtis, The Living Dead Part 03: The 
Attic. Television BBC (1995). 
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concepts to be exposed to empirical scrutiny. This approach aimed to steer a ‘middle 
course’ between uncritical empiricism and ideologically driven explanations which 
effectively put the ‘cart before the horse’. 
 
As a result of this work, it is now possible to outline the process of the urban 
disturbances in England in 1980-81. The effects of long-term industrial decline, mass-
unemployment and institutional racism at all levels of society in the U.K. combined 
with the social, political and workplace struggles of the 1970s generated responses 
from both the state and sections of the working class. The former moved away from 
consensus policing strategies towards more militarised, repressive and crucially area-
based policing strategies which became more explicitly linked to social class and 
ethnicity. The latter, particularly urban unemployed working class youth linked by 
locale and sub-culture, responded with a repertoire of legal and illegal, cultural and 
economic, survival strategies which inevitably brought them into conflict with the 
police.  
 
For second generation Black youth in particular, these conflicts were exacerbated by 
societal and institutional racism which generated potential flashpoints in a number of 
multi-ethnic inner-city areas in England. When these serious outbreaks of disorder 
occurred they precipitated a series of smaller but more numerous eruptions in outlying 
mono-ethnic (White) working class estates local to that city. However, as was 
demonstrated by the quantitative and qualitative evidence in this thesis, these 
supposed independent and random ‘copycat riots’ ostensibly driven by the news 
media, were far from this. Instead, the fusing of inner-city and out-lying estate youth 
through ethnic, familial, subcultural and other linkages such as schooling generated a 
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variety of social-networks providing both context for the assessment of information 
about ‘riots’ and organisational forms for action. Consequently the picture that 
emerges is somewhat different to the pre-1960s ‘race riot’ where existing divisions 
within sectors of the working class were intensified. Instead, a recomposition of 
fractions of working class youth across ethnic and spatial divides before and explicitly 
during the disturbances redirected potentially internecine violence towards the state 
and specifically its representatives on the street, the police. E.P.Thompson’s dynamic 
and relational understanding of class struggle appears to provide the best theoretical 
model for characterising the form and content of the ‘riots’ of 1980-81 in England. 
 
8.6  Future Research and Analysis 
 
In this concluding section potential avenues for further research and analysis are 
briefly reviewed. These relate to both micro histories and the analysis of the July 1981 
disorders. 
8.6.1  Event History Analysis 
 
The statistical modelling techniques employed in Chapter 4 to analyse the database of 
disorders for July 1981 in England are relatively elementary. Although it was possible 
to demonstrate that various modes of contagion were in operation in the spread of 
disturbances, the techniques were not of sufficient sophistication to be able to 
determine a clear separation between them or to test their characteristics. More 
sophisticated statistical analysis is thus required in order to isolate the importance of 
spatial, temporal and other factors (such as the media) in the diffusion of disturbance 
locally and nationally. This could be achieved by using mathematical techniques such 
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as the event-history models described in Chapter 2.0 Section 2.3.5
754
. In addition, the 
acquisition and study of detailed, local statistical information dealing with arrests 
during the disorders will enhance both the quantitative and ethnographic analyses. 
 
8.6.2  Micro-histories 
 
In a review of the ground-breaking study of the English rural risings of 1830-31 
‘Captain Swing’, Richard Cobb made the famous remark ‘And now to the study of 
Lower Hardres’, which was reputedly the village where the disturbances originated755.  
Cobb was arguing that although Hobsbawm and Rudé provided a comprehensive 
overview (a macro study) of the wave of rural unrest, it was now the task of other 
researchers to generate micro-histories of localised mini-waves of disorders.  
 
Essentially the same call is being made here. A more informed study of the wave of 
unrest in July 1981 requires a series of micro-histories at the level of detail accorded 
to the study of the ‘Bristol Riots’ presented in this thesis. Specifically, the city-based 
mini-waves of disorder that appeared in Liverpool, Manchester, London and the West 
Midlands necessitate investigation. Demographic research into the areas experiencing 
significant disturbances in 1980-81 is certainly possible. However, as the discovery of 
the hitherto hidden disturbances of Southmead and Knowle West in Bristol has 
demonstrated, oral history testimony from participants may prove vital to uncover the 
                                                 
754
 For example the methods applied in Myers, The Diffusion of Collective Violence: Infectiousness, 
Susceptibility, and Mass Media Networks,  J. Przybysz and D. Myers, The Diffusion of Contentious 
Gatherings in the Captain Swing Uprising, Myers, Collective Violence and Heterogeneous Diffusion 
Processes: U.S. Racial Rioting from 1964-1971 and Myers, Racial Rioting in the 1960S: An Event 
History Analysis of Local Conditions. 
755
 Times Literary Supplement 11-09-1969 and Hobsbawm and Rudé, Captain Swing. 
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more obscure locations of disorder and to analyse more fully the anatomy of the 
unrest. 
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9.0 Glossary, Sources and Bibliography 
9.1 Glossary 
 
Table 27 lists the acronyms used in this text. 
 
Acronym Description 
A Arson 
ANL Anti-Nazi League 
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation 
BCRE Bristol Commission for Racial Equality 
BREC Bristol Race Equality Council 
BRO Bristol Record Office 
CRE Commission for Racial Equality 
DSQ Disturbance Severity Quotient 
DSS Disturbance Severity Score 
DUR Duration 
EHRC Equality and Human Rights Commission 
ESRC Economic and Social Research Council 
FACHRS Family and Community Historical Research Society 
HTV Harlech Television (serving Wales and the West of England) 
L Looting 
M ‘Mixed’ crowd 
NC New Commonwealth 
NF National Front 
NS-SEC National Statistics – Socio-economic Classification 
NUT National Union of Teachers 
NW ‘Non-White’ crowd 
PB Petrol Bombs Used 
PC Police Commitment 
PD Properties Damaged 
PS Police Station Attacked 
PV Police Vehicles Damaged 
REC Race Equality Council 
SAS Small Area Statistics 
SEG Socio-economic Group 
SPG Special Patrol Group 
SUS Suspected Person (under 1824 Vagrancy Act) 
SWP Socialist Workers Party 
TUC Trades Union Congress 
UB40 Unemployment Benefit form 40 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
UWE University of West of England 
W ‘White’ crowd 
 
Table 27: Acronyms and explanations 
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9.2.4 Audio Sources 
9.2.4.1 Oral history files 
 
Respondent    Date    File                    Duration 
 
A             20
th
 Mar. 2010    A_20-03-2010.WMA                00:40:30 
 
B             26
th
 Feb. 2011     B_26-02-2011.WMA                01:47:13 
 
C             24
th
 Sep. 2010     C_24-09-2010.WMA                 00:32:30 
 
D                1
st
 Jul. 2010     D_01-07-2010_Part_1.WMA    01:01:03 
 
               D_01-07-2010_Part_2.WMA    00:13:04 
  
E             14
th
 Oct. 2010     E_14-10-2010.WMA                 01:49:03 
 
F            27
th
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               F_27_08_2010_Part_2.WMA   00:06:27 
 
G             9
th
 Oct. 2009    G_09-10-2009.WMA                00:35:15 
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th
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I           20
th
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J           12
th
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               J_12-02-2010_Part.WMA         00:00:36 
 
K            9
th
 Sep. 2010      K_09_09_2010.WMA               00:37:17 
 
L          15
th
 Feb. 2010     L_15-02-2010_Main.WMA      00:35:12 
 
M           5
th
 Nov. 2010     M_05_11_2010_Part_1.WMA   00:09:54 
 
              M_05_11_2010_Part_2.WMA   00:30:29 
 
N          5
th
 Mar. 2010    N_05-03-2010_edit.WMA         00:34:21 
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10.0 Appendices 
 
10.1 Listing of BBC and HTV television footage of the St. 
Paul’s disturbance of April 2
nd
 1980 
 
TV Archive Material 
 
Listing of film sequences: St. Paul’s Riot (2nd-3rd April 1980) 
 
Explanation of phases 
 
Each excerpt of film is broken down into sequences, which are loosely linked to 
the phases of the St. Paul’s disturbance. These phases, approximate timings and 
descriptions are as follows: 
 
Wednesday April 2
nd
 1980 
 
Phase 1:  4.30pm-5.45pm Initiation of violence at the Black and 
White café on Grosvenor Road No TV 
crews present. 
 
Interregnum:  5.45pm-6.40pm Lull in the violence, TV crews arrive. 
 
Phase 2:  6.40pm-7.30pm Initiation of violence on Grosvenor Road 
as police vehicle is towed away. Violence 
spreads to Ashley Road and City Road 
Police ‘withdraw’. 
 
Phase 3:  7.30pm-11.30pm Looting and arson, TV crews mostly 
absent from area. 
 
Phase 4:  11.30pm Police operation to retake the area 
commences. 
 
Thursday April 3
rd
 1980 
 
Next Day     Aftermath of the ‘riot’ 
 
 
TV Footage 
 
Each excerpt is given a time according to the DVD counter and the sequences 
described. Interviewees are designated in parentheses (#). Section 3 has some 
extra footage from Operation Delivery (1986). 
 
1. BBC National 
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00:00:00  BBC news report (interview with Geoffrey Fowkes, interview 
with crowd) 
00:02:33  BBC Feature three weeks after the ‘riot’ (various interviews, 
residents, blues, police interview, Black and White café and 
raid, interview Wilkes (?), interview Bunny Merrit (?), 
employment, dance company, interview Monique Courtier, 
interview Peter Courtier (?), political factions in St. Paul’s 
(ANL), interview police, interview Bunny Merrit) 
00:14:35 Ends 
 
 
2. St. Paul’s Riots HTV 
 
00:00:00  Phase 2: City Road/Ashley Road Junction (Landrover), injured 
police, policeman throwing rocks at crowd, injured cameraman 
00:02:06  Interview with crowd about raid (4) 
00:02:44 Interview with female resident (1) 
00:02:58 Phase 2: City Road/Ashley Road Junction 
00:03:09 Burned police cars on Grosvenor Road 
00:03:23 Phase 1: Police with dogs clearing crowd from Grosvenor Road 
00:03:30 Police car on fire? 
00:03:46 Warehouse on fire and van turned over on Wilder 
Street/Brighton Street 
00:04:08 Lloyds bank and police cars on fire, Ashley Road 
00:04:53 Interregnum: Police with dogs on Grosvenor Road 
00:05:16 Interregnum: Crowds on Grosvenor Road, burned police car at 
end William Street, punks in crowd, police advance with dogs. 
00:07:16 Interregnum: Police with milk crates on Grosvenor Road, plain 
clothes police with dogs, crowds on Grosvenor Road/Bevin 
Court,  
00:08:51 Interregnum: Interview with female resident (2) 
00:09:16 Interregnum: Interview with youth (3) 
00:09:46 Photographer and damaged van 
00:10:01  Interview with crowd about raid (5) 
00:11:27 Shots of Black and White café, interview with crowd about raid 
(4) 
00:12:39 Interview with female resident (1) 
00:13:10  Shots of Black and White café, news report at scene 
00:13:38 Phase 2: City Road, police advance without shields, Martin 
Chainey injured by missile, shield line under attack, blue 
Sherpa van on City Road, injured policemen 
00:15:28 Damaged police vehicles on Wilder Street?, wrecked police 
vehicles leaving the scene 
00:16:07 Interregnum: News report at the Black and White café 
(interrupted by youths)  
00:16:39  Interregnum: Black and White café and youths 
00:16:54 Interregnum: Tow truck at end of William Street, crowds on 
Grosvenor Road, kids with black power salutes, lines of police 
 479 
dogs, removal of police car, beginning of phase 2, police chased 
up Grosvenor Road  
00:19:53 Interregnum: Interview with male on Grosvenor Road (6), 
police harassment, ‘numberless’ rioters, police violence, not 
over yet. 
00:21:00  Police chased onto Ashley Road/City Road Junction up 
William Street 
00:21:06  News report rushes on Grosvenor Road 
00:21:27 Interregnum: Shots of police gathered at the Inkerman pub and 
crowds on Grosvenor Road, also Willam Street, tow truck, 
police dogs advance, removal of police car, Phase 2 begins, 
mixed gender crowd charges up William Street to get onto 
Ashley Road (no audio). 
00:25:50 Phase 2: Police deploy riot shields from Blue Sherpa van on 
City Road, cameraman injured   
00:26:22  Phase 2: Grosvenor Road, pall of smoke from bank area 
00:26:34 Phase 2: City Road, police advance, massed crowds having 
pushed the police back. 
00:27:03 Phase 3: Firemen extinguish blaze at the end of Brighton 
Street/Wilder Street, Lloyds bank and police cars burning on 
Ashley Road 
00:28:13 Next day shots of Ashley Road post office, kiosks, news report 
on looting an arson, interview with resident about raid (7) and 
looting, interview with resident arrested by police (8), shots of 
food store, interview with resident about looting and violence 
(9), interview with residents (10), interview with shop owner 
(kiosks), post office, interview with resident (11), interview 
with resident about looting and tension with police (12), 
interview shop owner (13), Fowlers, interview with Fowlers 
owner about looting, news report, clear up (Nylons), Criterion, 
Bookmakers, Lloyds bank, Trident. 
00:40:09 Ends 
 
 
3. BBC rushes 1 
 
00:00:00 Phase 4: Police riot shield units deployed from coaches (M32?) 
from Weymouth, marching riot shield units (no audio) 
00:01:59 Phase 4: Inkerman, riot shield units, burned out police cars, 
shots of burned post office on Ashley Road 
00:03:03 Phase 4: Police with riot shields, police car upside down, 
burned and looted shops with firemen, Lloyds bank, bakers. 
00:05:47 Phase 4: Fire engines on St. Paul’s roundabout, police with riot 
shields, looted shops, police vehicles being removed, Chief 
police officers, clear up (no audio) 
00:08:01 Next day: looted shops, collection of burned out police vehicles 
(6), Ashley Road, groups of residents and police, post office, 
kiosks boarded up. Grosvenor Road, wrecked warehouse 
(Wilder Street?), (no audio) 
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00:10:05 Interregnum (?): Police outside Black and White café, police 
cars on Grosvenor Road, damaged police vehicles, police at the 
Inkerman, residents on Grosvenor Road 
00:10:48 Next day: Police outside boarded up Lloyds bank, residents and 
police on Grosvenor Road, clearing up on Wilder Street, police 
on Ashley Road, looted shops 
00:11:38 Phase 4: Police entering and leaving Bridewell to launch 
operation, numerous police vehicles organising to leave police 
station. 
00:14:04 Phase 4: Looted utensils shop, electrical goods shop, 
Overbury’s bike shop 
00:14:45 Phase 4: Firemen extinguish blaze and burning vehicle. 
00:14:50 Phase 4: Police with riot shields marching on Ashley Road 
00:14:52 Phase 4: Police vehicles preparing for the operation. 
00:15:09 Phase 4: Police with burned out police car on Ashley Road, 
looted electrical goods shop 
00:15:27 Phase 2: Police on Grosvenor Road, police forming up on City 
Road 
00:15:57 Next day: Police outside Lloyds Bank 
00:16:26 Operation Delivery 1986 
00:17:03 Operation Delivery 1986: Crowds and police line on Grosvenor 
Road, fighting on Grosvenor Road, riot police units on 
Grosvenor Road, police vans attacked on Grosvenor Road, 
rioting on Grosvenor Road, riot police on City Road under 
attack from missiles, crowd taunting riot police on City Road, 
police vans on City Road, riot police beating shields and 
advancing then charging, riot police running on Ashley Road, 
riot police on Stokes Croft 
00:23:23 Ends 
 
4. BBC rushes 2 
 
00:00:00 Interregnum: Police on Grosvenor Road, clearing up outside 
the Black and White café, police car towed away. 
00:00:25 Phase 2: Mass crowd charge on City Road, police, journalists 
etc. running away. 
00:00:39 Ends 
 
5. BBC rushes 3 
 
00:00:00 Phase 2: Mass crowd charge on City Road, police, journalists 
etc. running away. 
00:00:12 Ends 
 
(R. Ball UWE 13-01-2011) 
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10.2  Oral History: Respondent Information 
 
 
Information for Interviewees (January - May 2010) 
 
Project: Violent Urban Disturbance in England 1980-81 
 
Researcher: Roger Ball (PhD Post-Graduate Student) 
 
Teaching Institution: History Dept., HLSS, University of West of England (UWE), 
Bristol. 
 
Contact details:  E-mail: roger2.ball@uwe.ac.uk Phone: 07895052268 
 
Dear Interviewee, 
  
You have been asked to provide an interview as part of the research for the above 
named project (a more detailed description of which is provided on the next page). 
You have been approached due to your direct involvement with a particular urban 
disturbance of the 1980-81 period. The primary aim of this research is to gather 
eyewitness accounts of the events and other information, which will allow an 
historical analysis of the disturbances.  
 
The following points are important: 
 
Anonymity 
 
You will not be asked to give your name or personal details, which may compromise 
your identity. If you do decide to provide a name then that will be securely held by the 
researcher and him alone. It will not be not be published or passed onto to any other 
persons (including the University of West of England) without your consent. If your 
testimony is to be published then your identity (and that of others) will be protected by 
assigning agreed aliases. 
 
The Interview 
 
The interview will be conducted solely by the researcher, no other parties will be 
present (unless you request them). With your agreement, the interview may be 
recorded electronically. You are free to withdraw from the interview at any time and 
have your testimony destroyed.  
 
After the Interview 
 
If the interview is recorded, an electronic version of your testimony will be available 
to you upon request. All interview recordings and notes will be anonymously and 
securely stored by the University of West of England. With your consent the testimony 
you provide may be subsequently written up as part of a PhD thesis and may be used 
for academic articles and conference papers in the future. You will be able to 
independently access these materials upon publication. 
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Finally, as part of the ethical requirements of the University of West of England, the 
researcher is required to ask you to sign a consent form indicating your agreement to 
take part in this study as described here. You may sign this with the agreed alias. 
 
Your participation in this project is greatly appreciated.  
 
Thanks for your time and interest, 
 
Roger Ball  
 
Project Description 
 
Violent Urban Disturbance in England 1980-81 
 
 
The period 1980-81 was marked by some of the most serious and widespread urban 
rioting in England in the twentieth century. The riot in the St. Paul’s district of Bristol 
in April 1980 is commonly recognised as being the start of the wave of unrest, which 
peaked in July 1981 when violent disturbances occurred in more than 85 cities and 
towns in England. The pattern of violent urban disturbance continued throughout the 
1980’s and became associated with the period. 
 
Much of the previous academic research has been based upon secondary sources 
(newspapers, books etc.) and has failed to gather the first-hand experiences of the 
participants themselves. Consequently, histories of the disturbances have been written 
from the ‘outside’ and significant incidents seem to have been completely overlooked 
thus strengthening received explanations of the events.  
 
One of the aims of this project is to gather first hand accounts of the disturbances 
from the participants themselves and to use this information to develop a more 
informed historical analysis of the events. 
 
Of particular interest to this project are the following: 
 
 The understanding of the events from the perspective of the participants. 
 The simultaneous nature of the uprisings in different districts of cities and 
regions with apparently different ethnic compositions, histories and 
demographics. 
 The speed at which events unfolded and replicated themselves. 
 The organisational forms and social networks of the participants. 
 
For case-study research of particular urban disturbances I have chosen the city of 
Bristol as being representative of the period. 
 
As a vital part of the project will be concerned with collecting oral testimony of both 
witnesses and participants, I believe a sufficient period of time has passed to allay 
fears of prosecution. However, since it is more than 25 years ago, there is a pressing 
need to undertake this research whilst respondents are still available to provide first 
hand accounts of these events. 
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Hopefully, the results of the research will not only provide a useful history of the 
events, but also provide some explanations of the more complex aspects associated 
with the waves of urban disturbances.  In the process I hope to make a significant 
contribution to the understanding of the causes and mechanisms of the urban rioting 
in the UK in the late twentieth century. 
 
 
Consent form for Interviewees 
 
 
Project: Violent Urban Disturbance in England 1980-81 
 
Researcher: Roger Ball (Post-graduate), History Dept., HLSS, University of West of 
England (UWE), Bristol. 
 
“I have read the separate information sheet provided by the researcher and agree to be 
interviewed for the project as outlined in that document. I give permission that my 
testimony be cited anonymously, according to the terms stated in the information 
sheet” 
 
 
Interviewee: (print and sign name with date) 
 
 
 
Researcher: (print and sign name with date) 
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10.3  Index of primary sources: July 1981 
 
Newspaper Siglum 
 
July 1981 Date Referenced 
 
Notes
757
 
Accrington Observer AO            no reports 
Bedford Record BR 14
th
  21
st
            
Berrow's Worcester Journal BWJ            no reports 
Birkenhead News BN 15
th
             
Birmingham Evening Mail BEM 11
th
             
Birmingham Post BP 13
th
             
Blackpool Herald BH            no reports 
Bolton Evening News  BEN 11
th
  13
th
            
Bradford Telegraph and Argus BTA 13
th
             
Brighton Evening Argus BEA 11
th
  15
th
            
Bristol Evening Post BEP 13
th
             
Bucks Examiner BE 17
th
             
Bucks Herald BH            no reports 
Chatham Standard CS            no reports 
Chelmsford Weekly News CWN            no reports 
Cheshire Observer CO 17
th
             
Cirencester Advertiser CA            no reports 
Coventry Evening Telegraph CET 13
th
             
Croydon District News CDN            no reports 
Croydon Midweek Post CMP            no reports 
Daily Record DR 13
th
  14
th
            
Darwen Advertiser DA 15
th
             
Derby Evening Telegraph DET 11
th
  13
th
  14
th
           
Dundee Evening Telegraph DUET 13
th
             
Dunstable Evening Post DEP 13
th
             
Dunstable Gazette DG 16
th
             
Edinburgh Evening News EEE            gen. reports 
Evening Courier (Halifax) HEC 9
th
  10
th
  13
th
  14
th
          
Evening Post (Reading) REP 11
th
  13
th
            
Express & Star (Wolverhampton) ESW 11
th
  13
th
            
Fleet News FN 17
th
             
Gloucester Journal GJ            no reports 
Harlow Gazette HG 17
th
             
Harlow Observer HO            no reports 
Harlow Star HS            no reports 
Hereford Evening News HEN            gen. reports 
Herts. Advertiser HA            no reports 
High Wycombe Observer HWO 17
th
             
Hoylake and West Kirby News HWKN 17
th
             
Huddersfield Daily Examiner HDE 13
th
             
Hull Daily Mail HDM 11
th
  13
th
            
Kent & Sussex Courier KSC            no reports 
Kent Messenger KM            no reports 
Keswick Reminder KR 31
st
             
Knaresborough Post KP 17
th
             
Lancashire Evening News LEN 11
th
  13
th
            
                                                 
757
 Instances where the primary source yielded no data or only general reports are highlighted in grey. 
 485 
Newspaper Siglum 
 
July 1981 Date Referenced 
 
Notes
757
 
Lancashire Evening Post LEP 6
th
             
Lancashire Evening Telegraph LET 4
th
  7
th
  8
th
  9
th
  11
th
         
Leamington Spa Courier LSC 17
th
             
Leicester Mercury LM 6
th
  8
th
  9
th
  10
th
  11
th
  13
th
  14
th
       
Liverpool Echo LE 6
th
  7
th
  8
th
  9
th
  11
th
         
Luton News LN 16
th
  23
rd
            
Maidstone Messenger MM 17
th
             
Maidstone Times MT            no reports 
Manchester Evening News MEN 6
th
  8
th
  9
th
           
Market Harborough Mail MHM            no reports 
Medway Times MDT            no reports 
Newcastle Evening Chronicle NEC 6
th
  11
th
  13
th
  14
th
          
Nottingham Evening Post NEP 11
th
  13
th
  14
th
           
Reading Chronicle RC 17
th
             
Rochdale Observer RO 15
th
             
Romford Recorder RR 17
th
             
Rugby Advertiser RA 17
th
             
Sheffield Chronicle SC 17
th
             
Sheffield Morning Telegraph SMT 11
th
  13
th
            
Shrewsbury Chronicle SHC            no reports 
Southern Evening Echo SEE 13
th
             
Southport Visitor SV            gen. reports 
St. Helens Reporter SHR 17
th
             
Staffordshire Weekly Sentinel SWS            no reports 
Stevenage Express StE 15
th
             
Stockport Advertiser SA 16
th
             
Stockport Express SE 16
th
             
Sunderland Echo SUE 11
th
  13
th
            
Sutton Coldfield News SCN            no reports 
Swindon Express and Echo SWEE 17
th
              
The News (Portsmouth) TNP 13
th
             
The Scotsman TS            gen. reports 
The Times T 6
th
  7
th
  8
th
  9
th
  10
th
  11
th
  13
th
  14
th
  27
th
  29
th
  30
th
   
Walsall Observer WO 17
th
             
Warrington Guardian WG            gen. reports 
West Lancashire Eve Gazette WLEG 13
th
             
West Sussex Gazette WSG            no reports 
Western Daily Press WDP 13
th
  14
th
  20
th
           
Widnes Weekly News WWN            gen. reports 
Wilts & Gloucester Standard WGS 17
th
             
Windsor, Slough & Eton Express WSEE 17
th
             
Wolverhampton Chronicle WC            no reports 
Worcester Evening News WEN 13
th
             
Yorkshire Post YP 6
th
  10
th
  11
th
  13
th
  14
th
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10.4  Daily disturbance data set: July 1981 
 
District/Town City/Town 
July 
1981 
Date 
Disturbance Severity 
Score
758
 DSQ
759
 
Disturbance 
Description
760
 DUR NR PI PD AP PB 
Toxteth Liverpool 3 3 1 2  1  1.8 major 
Southall London 3 3 4 5 4 3 4 3.8 major riot 
           
Toxteth Liverpool 4 5 3 5  3 4 4.0 major riot 
           
Toxteth Liverpool 5 5 4 5 5 3 4 4.3 excep. riot 
           
Toxteth Liverpool 6 2 3  4 2 3 2.8 riot 
           
Kirkby Liverpool 7       1 minor 
Toxteth Liverpool 7  3     2 major 
Wood Green London 7  4 2 3   3 riot 
Moss Side Manchester 7 3 3 1 4 1 2 2.3 riot 
           
City Centre Liverpool 8       1 minor 
Kirkby Liverpool 8  3 2    2 major 
Netherly Liverpool 8       2 major 
Wood Green London 8       1 minor 
Clayton Manchester 8       1 minor 
Gorton Manchester 8      3 2 major 
Moss Side Manchester 8 4 5 3 4 5 4 4.2 excep. riot 
Rusholme Manchester 8       1 minor 
Salford Manchester 8  3   3 3 3 riot 
           
Blacon Chester 9  2  4  2 2.7 riot 
Hull Hull 9       1 minor 
Bootle Liverpool 9       1 minor 
City Centre Liverpool 9       1 minor 
Halewood Liverpool 9       1 minor 
Kirkby Liverpool 9       1 minor 
Leasowe Liverpool 9       1 minor 
Speke Liverpool 9       1 minor 
Thornton Liverpool 9       1 minor 
Tuebrook Liverpool 9       1 minor 
Wallasey Liverpool 9       1 minor 
Balham London 9       1 minor 
Battersea London 9      3 2 major 
Dalston London 9  3     1 minor 
Deptford London 9  3     2 major 
Fulham London 9       2 major 
Lewisham London 9       1 minor 
Notting Hill London 9       1 minor 
Stoke Newington London 9       1 minor 
                                                 
758
 Acronyms represent Disturbance Severity Scores (DSS) for the following categories DUR = 
disturbance duration, NR = number of ‘rioters’, PI = police injuries, PD = property damage, AP = 
attacks on police vehicles and property, PB = usage of petrol bombs. Full details of the DSS ratings are 
given in Table 5. 
759
 Disturbance Severity Quotient (DSQ), an overall rating for incident severity based upon the DSS. 
The process is explained in Chapter 4.0 Section 4.3.3. 
760
 The disturbance description based on the DSQ and explained in Table 6. 
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District/Town City/Town 
July 
1981 
Date 
Disturbance Severity 
Score
758
 DSQ
759
 
Disturbance 
Description
760
 DUR NR PI PD AP PB 
Tooting London 9       2 major 
Woolwich London 9  3 1 2   2 major 
Moss Side Manchester 9   2 2 2  2 major 
           
Bedford Bedford 10       1 minor 
Chelmsley Wood Birmingham 10       1 minor 
Handsworth Birmingham 10 5 4 1 3 2 3 3.0 riot 
Smethwick Birmingham 10   1 2   1 minor 
Ramsbottom Bolton 10  2     1 minor 
Chester Chester 10      1 1 minor 
Darwen East Lancashire 10   1 2   1.5 major 
Hull Hull 10  4 2    2 major 
Cantrill farm Liverpool 10  3     2 major 
Ellesmere Port Liverpool 10  3  1   2 major 
Garston Liverpool 10       1 minor 
Halewood Liverpool 10       1 minor 
Huyton Liverpool 10       1 minor 
Kirkby Liverpool 10       1 minor 
Lewington Liverpool 10       1 minor 
Netherly Liverpool 10       1 minor 
Prescot Liverpool 10       1 minor 
Wallasey Liverpool 10       1 minor 
Acton London 10 1   2   1 minor 
Battersea London 10  3  2  2 2.3 riot 
Brixton London 10 4 4 1 4 4 4 3.5 major riot 
Chingford London 10    1  1 2 major 
Chiswick London 10       1 minor 
Clapham London 10       2 major 
Croydon London 10       1 minor 
Dalston London 10 4 2 3   3 3.0 riot 
Fulham London 10      2 2 major 
Hackney London 10    3   2 major 
Harlesden London 10       1 minor 
Hounslow London 10    3   2 major 
Lewisham London 10       1 minor 
Notting Hill London 10       2 major 
Southall London 10 3   2   2 major 
Southwark 
(Peckham) 
London 10      1 1 minor 
Stoke Newington London 10     5  2 major 
Streatham London 10       1 minor 
Walthamstow London 10  4  1   2 major 
West Ham London 10 3 2  2 1 3 2.2 riot 
City Centre Luton 10  2 2 4   2.7 riot 
Newcastle Newcastle 10    2   2 major 
Hyson Green Nottingham 10 4 3 2 4  3 3.2 major riot 
Preston Preston 10  4 1    2 major 
Town Centre Reading 10  2  1   1.5 major 
Town Centre Rochdale 10  3     1 minor 
Dixon Lane Sheffield 10   1    1 minor 
Chalvey Slough 10 1 2 2 1  3 1.8 major 
Town Centre St. Helens 10  3 1 1   1.7 major 
Stevenage Stevenage 10 1 1     1 minor 
Dunstall Wolverhampton 10    2   2 major 
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District/Town City/Town 
July 
1981 
Date 
Disturbance Severity 
Score
758
 DSQ
759
 
Disturbance 
Description
760
 DUR NR PI PD AP PB 
City Centre Wolverhampton 10    2   2 major 
           
Bedford Bedford 11 3 3  2   2 major 
Balsall Heath Birmingham 11     1  1 minor 
Chelmsley Wood Birmingham 11       1 minor 
City Centre Birmingham 11 3 4  2   3 riot 
Dudley Birmingham 11    1   1 minor 
Handsworth Birmingham 11 5 2  2  1 2.5 riot 
Northfield Birmingham 11  1  2   1 minor 
Sandwell Birmingham 11       1 minor 
Smethwick Birmingham 11    1   1 minor 
Solihull Birmingham 11       1 minor 
Blackburn Blackburn 11  4  3   2 major 
Blackpool Blackpool 11 4  1    2 major 
Bradford Bradford 11 3 1  3   2.3 riot 
Bridgnorth Bridgnorth 11       1 minor 
Bedminster Bristol 11  1  1   1 minor 
Southmead, 
Lawrence Weston 
Bristol 11       1 minor 
Cirencester Cirencester 11      3 1 minor 
Coventry Coventry 11    2   1 minor 
Crewe Crewe 11   1    1 minor 
Derby Derby 11  3 1 3   2.3 riot 
Dundee Dundee 11  2     1 minor 
Dunstable Dunstable 11 3      1 minor 
Fleetwood Fleetwood 11   1    1.5 major 
City Centre Gloucester 11  3  1   1.5 major 
City Centre Halifax 11 2 4 1 2   2.3 riot 
High Wycombe High Wycombe 11 3 2 2 3 5  3.0 riot 
Huddersfield Huddersfield 11  1 1 1   1.0 minor 
Hull Hull 11    1   1.5 major 
Knaresborough Knaresborough 11  2     1 minor 
Leamington Leamington 11  3 1 2   2.0 major 
Chapletown & 
Harehills 
Leeds 11  2 2 4  3 2.8 riot 
Highfields Leicester 11   2 3   2 major 
Town Centre 
Leighton 
Buzzard 
11    1   1 minor 
Town Centre Leominster 11  1     1 minor 
Birkenhead Liverpool 11 4 2 1 1  4 2.4 riot 
Kirkby Liverpool 11    1   1 minor 
Wallasey Liverpool 11       1 minor 
Battersea London 11    1  3 2 major 
Brixton London 11       2 major 
Croydon London 11      1 1 minor 
Forest Gate London 11       1 minor 
Golders Green London 11       1 minor 
Harlesden London 11       1 minor 
Notting Hill London 11       2 major 
Penge London 11    4  2 1 minor 
Sutton London 11       1 minor 
Walthamstow London 11  4  1  1 2.0 major 
West Ham London 11       1 minor 
Luton Luton 11   2 3  3 2.7 riot 
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District/Town City/Town 
July 
1981 
Date 
Disturbance Severity 
Score
758
 DSQ
759
 
Disturbance 
Description
760
 DUR NR PI PD AP PB 
City Centre Maidstone 11  3     1.5 major 
Denton Park Newcastle 11       1 minor 
Beeston Nottingham 11  1  1   1 minor 
Bulwell Nottingham 11     5  1.5 major 
City Centre & 
Hyson Green 
Nottingham 11 3 3  3   3.0 riot 
Portsmouth Portsmouth 11  4 2    2.5 riot 
Town Centre Rochdale 11  3  2   2 major 
Cranham Romford 11  1    2 1 minor 
Rugby Rugby 11 3   1 1  1.7 major 
Shrewsbury Shrewsbury 11    2   1 minor 
City Centre Southampton 11  2 1 2   1.7 major 
Town Centre St. Helens 11  1     1 minor 
Stevenage Stevenage 11 1 2     1 minor 
Bramhall Park Stockport 11  2 2    1.5 major 
Stoke Stoke 11       1.5 major 
Seaham Sunderland 11  3 1    1.5 major 
Tunbridge Wells Tunbridge Wells 11       1 minor 
Town Centre Walsall 11  2     1 minor 
Wantage Wantage 11 1 1  1   1 minor 
Warrington Warrington 11       1 minor 
City Centre Wolverhampton 11     5  2 major 
Dunstall Wolverhampton 11  3   5  2 major 
Farndale Wolverhampton 11       1 minor 
Heathtown Wolverhampton 11       1 minor 
           
Handsworth Birmingham 12       1 minor 
Daubhill Bolton 12  3    1 1.5 major 
Avonmouth Bristol 12  1  1 2  1.3 major 
Normanton & Pear 
Tree 
Derby 12  3     1.5 major 
Dundee Dundee 12  2   1 2 1.7 major 
High Wycombe High Wycombe 12 3 3 3 2  3 2.8 riot 
Huddersfield Huddersfield 12 4 3     2 major 
Chapletown & 
Harehills 
Leeds 12  4 3  3 4 3.5 major riot 
Highfields Leicester 12 3 4 2 3  4 3.2 major riot 
Birkenhead Liverpool 12       1 minor 
Crosby Liverpool 12       1 minor 
Battersea London 12   1    1.5 major 
Brixton London 12       2 major 
Notting Hill London 12 2  1   3 2.0 major 
Clifton Estate Nottingham 12       1 minor 
Swindon Swindon 12 1     1 1 minor 
           
Aldershot Aldershot 13  3  1   1 minor 
Knowle West Bristol 13  2     1 minor 
Redfield Bristol 13  1   1  1 minor 
Normanton & Pear 
Tree 
Derby 13  4 1  5 3 3.3 major riot 
Huddersfield Huddersfield 13   1    1 minor 
Highfields Leicester 13  3  1   2 major 
Birkenhead Liverpool 13       1 minor 
Garston Liverpool 13       1 minor 
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District/Town City/Town 
July 
1981 
Date 
Disturbance Severity 
Score
758
 DSQ
759
 
Disturbance 
Description
760
 DUR NR PI PD AP PB 
Norris Green Liverpool 13  2  2   1.5 major 
Battersea London 13       2 major 
Nottingham Nottingham 13       1 minor 
Offerton Stockport 13    1  2 1.5 major 
           
Brixton London 15  3 2   4 3.0 riot 
Southall London 15       2 major 
           
Southall London 16       2 major 
           
Bedminster, 
Knowle etc. 
Bristol 17    1   1 minor 
           
Swindon Swindon 18  3     1.5 major 
           
Keswick Keswick 25  3 1 2  3 2.3 riot 
           
Toxteth Liverpool 26  2   3  3 riot 
           
Toxteth Liverpool 27   4  4 4 4.0 major riot 
           
Toxteth Liverpool 28  3 4  4 5 4.0 major riot 
 
 
10.5 Incidents recorded without primary source evidence: 
July 1981 
 
District/Town City/Town Reference 
Edinburgh Edinburgh 761 
Chatham London 
762
 
Harlow Harlow 
Market Harborough Market Harborough 
Medway towns London 
Southport Southport 
Welsh mining valleys N/A 
St. Albans St. Albans 763 
Worcester Worcester Birmingham Post (13-Jul-81) 
Hitchin Hitchin Dunstable Evening Post (13-Jul-81) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
761
 Referenced in Fryer, Staying Power: The History of Black People in Britain, p.399 and 
www.channel4.com/history/U/untold/programs/riot/timeline. 
762
 Referenced in Smith and others, Like a Summer with a Thousand Julys…and Other Seasons.., pp.3, 
43, 46 and 59. 
763
 Referenced in Rowe, The Racialisation of Disorder in Twentieth Century Britain, p.3. 
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10.6  Mapping of the July 1981 disturbances in England 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 1: Disturbances in England on Friday July 3
rd
 1981 
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Map 2: Disturbances in England on Saturday July 4
th
 1981 
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Map 3: Disturbances in England on Sunday July 5
th
 1981 
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Map 4: Disturbances in England on Monday July 6
th
 1981 
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Map 5: Disturbances in England on Tuesday July 7
th
 1981 
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Map 6: Disturbances in England on Wednesday July 8
th
 1981 
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Map 7: Disturbances in England on Thursday July 9
th
 1981 
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Map 8: Disturbances in England on Friday July 10
th
 1981 
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Map 9: Disturbances in England on Saturday July 11
th
 1981 
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Map 10: Disturbances in England on Sunday July 12
th
 1981 
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Map 11: Disturbances in England on Monday July 13
th
 1981 
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Map 12: Disturbances in England on Wednesday July 15
th
 1981 
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Map 13: Disturbances in England on Thursday July 16
th
 1981 
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Map 14: Disturbances in England on Friday July 17
th
 1981 
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Map 15: Disturbances in England on Saturday July 18
th
 1981 
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Map 16: Disturbances in England on Saturday July 25
th
 1981 
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Map 17: Disturbances in England on Sunday July 26
th
 1981 
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Map 18: Disturbances in England on Monday July 27
th
 1981 
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Map 19: Disturbances in England on Tuesday July 28
th
 1981 
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10.7 Sub-set of daily disturbance data: Crowd ethnicity: 
July 1981 
 
District/Town City/Town 
July 1981 
Date 
Crowd 
Ethnicity 
DSQ Riot Severity 
Toxteth Liverpool 3 NW 1.8 major disturbance 
Southall London 3 NW 3.8 major riot 
Toxteth Liverpool 4 M 4.0 major riot 
Toxteth Liverpool 5 M 4.3 exceptional riot 
Toxteth Liverpool 6 W 2.8 riot 
Wood Green London 7 M 3.0 riot 
Moss Side  Manchester 7 NW 2.3 riot 
Moss Side  Manchester 8 M 4.2 exceptional riot 
Dalston London 9 M 1.0 minor disturbance 
Deptford London 9 NW 2.0 major disturbance 
Woolwich London 9 NW 2.0 major disturbance 
Moss Side  Manchester 9 M 2.0 major disturbance 
Handsworth  Birmingham 10 M 3.0 riot 
Cantrill farm Liverpool 10 W 2.0 major disturbance 
Ellesmere Port Liverpool 10 W 2.0 major disturbance 
Brixton London 10 M 3.5 major riot 
Dalston London 10 NW 3.0 riot 
Hackney London 10 M 2.0 major disturbance 
Hounslow London 10 W 2.0 major disturbance 
Lewisham London 10 NW 1.0 minor disturbance 
Southall London 10 M 2.0 major disturbance 
Walthamstow London 10 NW 2.0 major disturbance 
West Ham London 10 M 2.2 riot 
City Centre Luton 10 M 2.7 riot 
Hyson Green Nottingham 10 M 3.2 major riot 
Preston Preston 10 W 2.0 major disturbance 
Chalvey Slough 10 M 1.8 major disturbance 
City Centre Birmingham 11 M 3.0 riot 
Blackpool Blackpool 11 W 2.0 major disturbance 
Derby Derby 11 W 2.3 riot 
City Centre Gloucester 11 W 1.5 major disturbance 
City Centre Halifax 11 W 2.3 riot 
City Centre High Wycombe 11 M 3.0 riot 
Brixton London 11 NW 2.0 major disturbance 
Forest Gate London 11 W 1.0 minor disturbance 
Penge London 11 NW 1.0 minor disturbance 
Walthamstow London 11 NW 2.0 major disturbance 
Luton Luton 11 M 2.7 riot 
City Centre/Hyson Green Nottingham 11 M 3.0 riot 
Portsmouth Portsmouth 11 W 2.5 riot 
Town Centre Rochdale 11 M 2.0 major disturbance 
Rugby Rugby 11 M 1.7 major disturbance 
City Centre Southampton 11 W 1.7 major disturbance 
Stoke Stoke 11 M 1.5 major disturbance 
Daubhill Bolton 12 NW 1.5 major disturbance 
Normanton/Pear Tree Derby 12 NW 1.5 major disturbance 
City Centre High Wycombe 12 M 2.8 riot 
Huddersfield Huddersfield 12 M 2.0 major disturbance 
Chapletown/Harehills Leeds 12 M 3.5 major riot 
Highfields Leicester 12 M 3.2 major riot 
Brixton London 12 M 2.0 major disturbance 
Toxteth Liverpool 27 M 4.0 major riot 
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10.8 TV stills and photographs: St. Paul’s 2
nd
 April 1980 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed for reasons of copyright. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.8.1: Burned out police vehicle on Grosvenor Road-William Street (~6.00pm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed for reasons of copyright. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.8.2: Youth gives ‘Black Power’ salute on Grosvenor Road (~6.30pm) 
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This image has been removed for reasons of copyright. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.8.3: Police officers with dogs prepare to escort the tow truck Grosvenor Road (6.40pm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed for reasons of copyright. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.8.4: Police officers and dogs escorting the tow-truck on Grosvenor Road as a crowd 
looks on (6.40pm) 
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This image has been removed for reasons of copyright. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.8.5: Police tow truck leaves Grosvenor Road with escorting police officers (6.40pm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed for reasons of copyright. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.8.6: The second phase of violence begins on Grosvenor Road as police officers come 
under attack (6.40pm) 
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This image has been removed for reasons of copyright. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.8.7: Groups of men and women chase police officers onto Ashley Road (6.40pm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed for reasons of copyright. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.8.8: Senior police officers lead an advance down City Road (~6.45pm) 
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This image has been removed for reasons of copyright. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.8.9: Crowds occupying the City Road– Ashley Road junction (~6.50pm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed for reasons of copyright. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.8.10: Police with riot shields attempting to retake junction of City Road-Ashley Road 
(~6.50pm) 
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This image has been removed for reasons of copyright. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.8.11: Police riot shield unit under attack by crowd on City Road (6.50pm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed for reasons of copyright. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.8.12: Crowds chase the police out of St. Paul’s along City Road (~7.15pm) 
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This image has been removed for reasons of copyright. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.8.13: Large crowd on City Road having chased the police back to Brigstock Road 
(~7.15pm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed for reasons of copyright. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.8.14: Lloyds Bank and police vehicles on fire on Ashley Road (>8.30pm) 
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This image has been removed for reasons of copyright. It can be viewed on-line at: 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/20654194@N07/2049070461 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.8.15: Attack on police Land-rover on Ashley Road-City Road junction. The Mini is 
fore-grounded in the photograph. (7.00 pm) 
 
 
Figure 10.8.16: Police units with riot shields retake the junction of Ashley Road, Lower Ashley 
Road and Sussex Place after the looting phase (~12.00 pm) [Photo: Mike Leggett] 
